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ABSTRACT
Research on the political economy of African states has often focused on explaining the roots of
socio-political disfunction or has been pre-occupied with successful cases like Botswana, whose
demography and social structures differ markedly from other states on the continent. This
dissertation takes a different approach; it seeks to understand the developmental dynamics of
successful African states whose peoples and societies largely reflect the majority of states on the
continent south of the Sahara. The research question first asks why Ghana and Kenya succeeded
in creating growth-enhancing economic institutions. Next it examines why, in the post-Cold War
era, Ghanaian economic institutions linked to the external economy perform better than Kenyan
institutions, while Kenyan institutions linked to the domestic and regional economy outperform
those of Ghana.
In order to answer the research question, I employ within case configurational analysis as
well as structured focused comparison across cases. To avoid selection biases, I undertake case
studies on two additional states, Tanzania and Cote d’Ivoire. I also employ a quantitative
analysis using OLS regression to verify the impact of the two main independent variables, the
presence of “core group” containing 50% or more of the population or that is 20% larger than the
next largest group, as well as past experience with forms of African socialism. In each case,
durable society rooted pacts ensure the creation of growth enhancing institutions in some sectors
of the economy. The presence of a core group in Ghana, however, creates a set of “core related”
factors leading to its uneven, externally focused development. Finally, the dissertation points to
the idea the experience with a form of African socialism may in some cases, create durable
patterns of economic institution making contributing to the autonomy of the state but also
contributing to uneven, externally oriented forms of development.
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Chapter 1: The Empirical Puzzle
In this project, I study the developmental trajectories of successful states that share many
of the same attributes as most African countries, such as a colonial history that disrupted political
borders and created relatively heterogeneous societies. In order to begin building generalizable
theory, I first compare processes of state formation and economic development in two cases, in
order to identify trends and variables that will be of use in broader theorization.
The majority of the project explores dissimilar growth trajectories in two successful
African states, Ghana and Kenya. These states resemble many other countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. Their borders were shaped more by the European scramble for African territories than by
the precolonial histories of each region. Each boasts high degrees and ethnic heterogeneity, and
neither faced ongoing existential security threats. Nevertheless, these two states host some of the
continent’s most effective institutions, and some of the best performing economies. While these
states are joined by a small set of countries such as Uganda or Senegal, whose historical
experiences will also be discussed, focusing analytical attention on the very different trajectories
of growth will provide clues as to what aspects and legacies of past development are pertinent
today.
The dissertation is motivated by a sincere motivation to both celebrate and to build
generalizable theory surrounding successful cases of African development. In the process,
however, it was necessary to interrogate the very concept of economic success, and to
problematize forms of accumulation that fail create durable linkages with other segments of the
domestic economy. This need to problematize and interrogate the shape and form of economic
development is born of a recognition, shared by world systems and dependency theorists, that the
1

economies of countries in the developing world are frequently shaped not by the needs and
priorities of the state and its people, but by the accumulative exigencies of the most powerful
states in the international system. This dissertation thus revisits the question of how economic
development actually occurs, and the attendant consequences of various patterns of development.
The goal is to help shape and formulate nuanced, theoretically driven insights into the dominant
forms and modes of African development today.
The dissertation presents a reframing of questions of development, in order to understand
more fully the contributions of successful states whose demography resembles most states on the
continent. Given the emphasis on successful cases, the term modernizing takes on a significant
theoretical dimension. It assumes first and foremost, that states are making genuine attempts to
improve their economic performance, though this performance is constrained in part by durable
forms of society rooted politics. Far too often contemporary accounts of African political
economy assume a type of criminal kleptocracy permeates the state and its interaction with
society. Yet, while state society relations may very well drift into the realm of prebendalism,
such a state of affairs rarely represents a durable social formation, especially in states that have
enjoyed a degree of economic success. For example, While well-known works such The
Criminalization of the African State by Bayartd et. al may contain accurate insights into the
crises at the heart of the Kenyan state, it tends to minimize longstanding patterns of rule and state
society-relations in its exploration of the immediate causes of regime survival strategies and their
impact upon the institutions of the state. This dissertation’s approach to theory building,
therefore, looks at patterns of state society relations, and the transformation of institutions in
ways that are not always linear but which may reflect a broader modernizing trajectory.
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The attempt to reframe questions of development by utilizing a modernizing framework
is in some ways an attempt to shift the focal point of discussion away the breakdown of African
institutions to understanding how the process of institutional creation and destruction may be
part of durable cyclical patterns of state society relations. I focus not only on patterns of
economic development but on the interrelationship between these developmental decisions, the
patterns of society rooted politics that they engender, and their subsequent impact upon
institutions and the economic interactions enacted though these institutions. This approach
differs from the many thoughtful and well-researched studies of individual cases in its
consideration of the comparative consequences of developmental successes. Thus, while a
number of works explore the Rawlings regime’s successful navigation of IMF conditionality
while still maintaining profitability in the cocoa sector, and while other works consider the
consequences of this policy approach on outcomes like poverty alleviation or the lack thereof,
the scope of analysis of these works falls short of considering policy as part of a logical and
durable pattern of engagement that may or may not resemble the developmental patterns or
trajectories of other states.
The main contribution of this project lies in its exploration of the co-constitutive
relationship between patterns of economic growth, modes of socio-political competition, and
economic institutions. In this manner, the dissertation revisits the concept of modernization, at
least to the extent that the type and manner of political engagement is both determined by and
helps to determine patterns of economic growth.
This complex cyclical patter of modernizations stands in somewhat lonely company
beside works that either assume that economic development leads to political decay rather than
evolving forms of engagement with the state and economy or works that abandon any
3

exploration of the body politic and the economy by assuming a rigid unchanging relationship
between the two. The former approach is that taken and popularized by Samul Huntington’s
Political Order in Changing Societies while the latter features prominently in a wide range of
works on the continent, one of the most well-known being Bayart’s The Politics of the Belly.
The dissertation pays special attention to demographic characteristics, political
institutions and forms of service provision used by politicians. The relationship between these
factors, while durable, is also subject to change. New forms of engagement and struggle can
broaden the manner in which goods, services and values are allocated throughout the population.
Riots, protests and other aspects of contentious politics in Kenya in recent years have no doubt
illustrated with shocking clarity the degree to which control over the apparatus of the state itself
has become over politicized. Yet, in this case, the overpoliticization of the Kenyan state led not
to a coup or the further weakening of Kenyan institutions but instead has transformed the shape
of institutions to become more inclusive and equitable resulting in such changes as the fiscal
decentralization of important projects to elected bodies at the state level. On the other hand, for
regimes whose institutions promote broad and inefficient provision of goods, services and
values, transformation is often a top down affair. In these cases, a political regime may leverage
temporary autonomy from social forces in a strategic manner, to reorient the functioning of key
institutions, ultimately producing new more efficient patterns of development, at least in some
sectors of the economy. Such an approach has been taken by states like Ghana in the 1980s and
Rwanda during the early 2000s. My dissertation explores the impact of demographic
characteristics surrounding relative group size in determining patterns of institution making.
However, though I argue that demography may indeed exert a powerful influence on the shape of
economic development and politics, it is by no means determinative.
4

The institutional profile of the state in both Ghana and Kenya was shaped by differing
patterns of consensus. In Ghana, the pathway to effective institution making led through a
socialist inspired revolution. In Kenya, it was the reassertion of a traditional Kikuyu dominated
elite. Both states produce strong economic institutions, yet the pattern in which growth
producing institution making takes shape was quite different. While Ghana produces its strongest
institutions in collaboration with the international economy, while Kenyan dynamism
economically, is found mostly in the segments of its economy geared toward internal
consumption and regional exports. These institutional profiles are unique, but contain an
overreaching similarity of social consensus surrounding the most effective areas of economic
production.
Ghana is not a “developmental state” in the manner of Japan or South Korea but starting
in the early 1980s the regime was able to drastically change its economic fortunes for the better.
For much of its post-independence history, Ghana’s tragic history of underdevelopment matched
that of many other African states. Extensive state spending failed to produce economic growth
while political infighting led to an all-too-familiar combination of instability and economic
decay. The central institutions of the Ghanaian state in particular were severely affected,
becoming fiscally constrained and debile.
A socialist inspired revolution in the early 1980s undertaken by then Flight Lieutenant
Jerry Rawlings, ironically, ushered in a newly revitalized form of market capitalism and with it, a
large degree of political stability. The size of the bureaucracy, which historically was quite large,
was cut while public spending was kept within manageable levels. Perpetually unstable, the state
succeeded in fostering enviable rates of economic growth while avoiding the tumultuous politics
of its past, which included frequent military coups.
5

The early years of the Rawlings regime were at best, inauspicious. Riding the wave of a
new popular revolution the regime embarked on what can only be described as a whirlwind of
mass mobilization that sought to overturn the balance of power in favor of the subaltern classes
(Babatope, 2000). Newly formed workers groups and volunteer councils for the “defense of the
revolution” sprang up in parallel to the established organs of government. Workers’ wages
increased and unions sprang up in even the most resolute strongholds to organized labor. Yet
despite what at first appeared to be a massive expansion of group specific spending, the
Rawlings regime would prove to be a textbook case of a regime remaking and reinvigorating its
institutions, at least those pertaining to the major export sectors of the economy. The regime
would ultimately cut wasteful spending to key constituencies while still maintaining popular
support.
The success of the Rawlings regime in turning around Ghana's lackluster economic
performance owes as much to the timing of the coup that placed flight Lieut. Rawlings in power,
as it does to the political acumen of the regime. In late 1981 in Ghana, the state was seen as the
problem and not necessarily as the solution to the maladies affecting the country. According to
Nugent (1995):
The Rawlings regime made a bold departure by diagnosing the state as an integral component of the crisis
rather than a self-evident solution to it. It identified two failings in particular. The first was that state
institutions were suffocated by a bureaucratic culture which served the interests of officialdom, while
contributing little to administrative efficiency…. [Secondly] the state (or rather its masters) was blamed for
leaving strategic sectors of the economy, notably the mining industry, in the avaricious grip of foreign capital
(p.51).

According to the narrative put forth by the regime, the inefficiency and corruption at the heart of
state disempowered the people of Ghana, and contributed to economic underdevelopment. The
Rawlings regime did not have to press hard to make their case; political upheaval combined with
a steady degradation of state services led to high degrees of distrust in government and a general
6

skepticism of governmental officials. While the ideological inclinations of Rawlings’ Provisional
National Defense Council (PNDC) tended toward African socialism or Marxism-Leninism, one
of the ironies of the "revolution" was that it was as much against the state as it was for creating a
new type of state form. Thus, instead of a massive expansion of the state apparatus what instead
took place was a profusion of workers committees, civil defense committees and etc. designed to
act as a check against both enemies of the revolution and the institutions of the state itself. And
given the general atmosphere against statism, the regime refrained from nationalizing industry
while plans for new more efficient parastatal corporations were quietly shelved. The reformatory
zeal of the Rawlings Revolution quickly moved from expanding the state to making the state
more efficient in order to safeguard the people. Thus it was with popular blessing that the regime
froze wages in the civil service and laid off tens of thousands of governmental workers (Nugent,
1995, p.133).
It was in the midst of these events, with an emphasis on efficiency, that economic
technocrats within the regime gained prominence. There ascent, however, was not without
controversy and even danger. Implementing portions of IMF conditionality was a turning point;
while Rawlings would argue that the country had no other choice, aspects of conditionality
aligned closely with the recommendation of the regime's hitherto on influential economists. After
a series of failed coup attempts, a purge of the most radical elements of the PNDC took place in
1983 and 1984. From this point on, economic technocrats within the regime took center stage in
policymaking. Under the banner of revolution, the regime started to cut back on its hitherto
generous benefits to workers. Strikes were suppressed and measures were taken to keep worker
compensation down to levels that would allow for industry to be competitive (Nugent, 1995,
p.141). In doing so, the regime was quick to remind urbanites that the most truly repressed
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elements of society remained the peasantry. Thus, cutting benefits to workers occurred soon after
their mobilization and concurrent with a political mobilization of the peasantry. But while some
essential state services were expanded in rural areas no efforts were made to provide generous
widespread side payments. For the modest cost of much-needed rural investment, much of which
was paid for by external donors, the regime managed to cut costly benefits to the core
constituencies while still maintaining sufficient political support both within the cities and in the
countryside.
The policy change in Ghana set an enduring legacy of institution making that would
become the new Ghanaian state, built on the efficiencies of the cash crop exporting sectors of the
economy. For, while the basic pattern of institution making came about during a period of
authoritarian governance, it represented a deep social consensus that would ultimately be held in
place by both internal and external actors. Thus, the basic shape and form of the Ghanaian
economy has not underwent significant change despite the fact that democratically elected
governments come and go. The underlying shape of Ghanaian institutions has remained
relatively constant, yet it is a fundamentally different pattern of institution making and economic
activity than that which exists in Kenya.
The political and economic trajectory of the Kenyan state, on the other hand, follows a
much different course than Ghana, more closely resembling those of the more traditionally
effective African states such as Senegal, or Cote D’Ivoire before the death of Houpohët-Boigny.
For most of its post-independence history, economic growth in Kenya has been well above
African averages, while Kenya has escaped bouts of political instability and civil war that have
plagued many of its contemporaries. While the state has experiences low grade conflict over land
and economic resources, in Kenya such disputes have not derailed key economic institutions.
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The Kenyan state since independence has managed to maintain more or less healthy economic
institutions and unusually amongst African states, they have managed to do so while maintaining
a long term commitment to a capitalist path to development, albeit a in a highly statist form.
Nevertheless, Kenyan institutions have continually found themselves at the heart of
political struggle and as a result have at various times have either been patronage producing but
somewhat effective, or efficient and growth producing. Yet, on the whole, in comparison to
Ghana, Kenya is host to a more variegated institutional framework. Ironically, though Ghana
underwent a quasi-socialist revolution under Rawlings, it is Kenyan institutions that tend to more
deeply penetrate society, not only to promote growth but also to mediate economic losses as
well. Thus, in the institutional model of the state tends to toward the managerial, where growth is
promoted while losses are also mediated through state power. Control over the state apparatus, as
in many states in the developing world is about patronage and economic opportunities, but more
importantly in Kenya it is also about exerting control of the impact of the market. Thus, in
Kenya, economic institution making is a more contentious process, even if there also exists
consensus at the elite level over the larger questions of the economy and the distribution of the
social product.
The first Kenyatta regime shaped an enduring strategy of using institutions both to
distribute patronage and to stimulate economic growth. And while the Kenyatta regime may have
been able to maintain a balanced approach in this regard, the later years of the Moi regime saw
the pendulum swing towards growth disrupting policies as it attempted to cling to power. It was
during this time that a massive scandal to counterfeit currency that involved President Moi
himself was uncovered, amidst other damaging revelations (Bayart, Hibou, Ellis, 1999). Yet,
even then, there were limits to the degree to which the institutions of the state would inhibit
9

growth. Strong pushback came from the national bourgeoisie and during this time there appeared
to be a sort of emerging consensus among elites against both economically harmful behaviors
and massive patronage systems. Leys (1998) describes this process amongst the national
bourgeoisie in the following manner:
There was also evidence of growing social integration among members of this class, and there were signs of
the emergence of their class interests – the beginnings of an awareness of the requirements (legal,
international, etc.) for the consolidation and defense of these interests – including an emerging critique of the
arbitrary and rapacious behavior that had been indulged in by leading members of the Kenyatta regime
(p.221).

Leys goes on to narrate the building opposition in the 1970s and 1980s amongst elites
(economic and otherwise) to using the state apparatus to retain power in ways that hurt the
interests of business and agriculture. While it is unclear what role technocrats within the regime
play in this informal compromise, elites in government and the private sector appear to be keenly
aware that that use of the formal state apparatus to distribute patronage may very well cost the
regime investment and access to foreign exchange (Branch, 2011). Thus, elite consensus appears
to hover around more efficient institutions, not necessarily as a good in and of itself, but both to
protect vital economic interests and to prevent losses from donors that may prove harmful. Yet,
the result has been a Kenyan state that on the whole, facilitates economic growth. The
bureaucracy and civil service are competent and relatively efficient, and economic policies are
stable, predictable, and healthy.
The process of creating a more efficient state form in Kenya, however, was protracted
and is still ongoing. As occurred in Ghana, an agreement with the IMF requiring structural
adjustment touched off efforts to rein in group specific spending. One of the primary reforms
demanded by the bank was to dramatically cut the size of the bureaucracy and the civil service.
Political regimes in Kenya, however, had long used the organs of the state to maintain an
10

ethnically based ruling coalition. Elites used access to state jobs in the bureaucracy and civil
service as well as parastatal corporations to build a social and political following within their
respective communities (Branch, 2011). Well-paying jobs thus became highly contested form of
inefficient spending as they allowed political regimes to build multiethnic alliances capable of
maintaining a regime in power. Decreasing the size of the bureaucracy and privatizing parastatal
corporations was thus embarked upon with great caution, and a large degree of consternation.
While the Rawlings regime forced massive layoffs upon the Ghanaian civil service and
bureaucracy in a short amount of time, the Moi, Kimbaki and second Kenyatta regimes have all
preferred to offer optional retirement packages and other means of easing redundant workers
from their positions. And even while the bureaucracy shrinks, there continues to be ongoing and
mounting pressure to increase wages and benefits (Thakar, 2014).
While elite consensus surrounding ideology and programmatic considerations may exist
in Kenya, it is also important to note that elite groups are riven by the same sectarian interests as
society at large. The entrepreneurial class in Kenyan tends to be dominated by Kenyans of Asian
descent (Leys, 1998). However, a significant amount of manufacturing sector is still owned by
the state through parastatal corporations; the same goes for export agriculture (Thakar, 2014). As
these industries slowly become privatized they provide yet another avenue for competition
between ethnic elites. Business elites tend to be concerned that the shrinking size of the state
would put their group at a competitive disadvantage in relation to others. Thus, while many elites
support a growth enhancing approach to the public sector, at the same time they tend to fear that
such an approach may put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other ethnic groups
(Leys, 1998, p.237). Yet, it must also be pointed out that the well-established nature of the
capitalist class and Kenya serves as a break on the impulse to expand the state as a patronage
11

generating machine. Consensus appears to hover uneasily over policies that keep down wages,
thus making businesses more competitive, so long as such a strategy does not favor any one
community over the others in a constant jostle for position.
These two states present a puzzle whose answer that may be helpful building useful theory
about the role of post-independence state and nation building to contemporary African development.
Ghana and Kenya produce economic institutions whose effectiveness in promoting healthy and deep
linkages in their economy and material benefits to their people are readily apparent. Yet, key
differences between the two states abound. Ghana’s economy tends to produce its most effective
institutions in important export sectors, the primary one being cocoa. However, it has trouble
producing growth enhancing institutions in parts of the economy that service its internal and regional
needs. Kenya, on the other hand, produces institutions that are more clearly focused on internal and
regional demands. However, it tends to produce pockets of functional institutions rather than a
broader array of them. Thus, my research question can be summarized in the following manner:

Why have Ghana and Kenya succeeded in creating growth-enhancing institutions? And why,
in the post-Cold War era, do Ghanaian economic institutions linked to the external economy
perform better than Kenyan institutions, while Kenyan institutions linked to the domestic and
regional economy outperform those of Ghana?
These patterns of development have social and economic significance. States that
produce for domestic and regional priorities often develop important economic sectors that might
not be demanded by powerful countries at the core of an international system but which
nevertheless, produce value at home. It is for this reasons that scholars such as Walter Rodney
have linked Africa’s entrance into an international system dominated by European superiority in
long distance maritime transport as the beginning of a longer historical epoch of
underdevelopment. While the state in what is now Nigeria struggled to create value through
12

industries such as bronze casting, the inequalities of a new world system instead forced the
region to export not bronze but slaves, thus eroding the social and economic foundations of these
states. The question of which goods are produced, for which markets, and how much value is
added in these productive processes are critical as we envision an era in which African states
move beyond simply reacting to the exigencies and priorities of the contemporary core states of
the capitalist word economy.
The question also takes into account that the challenges of regime survival and the
constraints of the international system are real, durable and not simply imagined. Nor are they
black and white questions of development. Ghana’s approach to institution making, which
encompasses not only a strong export sector but close ties to international donors, no doubt
carries with it a cost. I argue that its approach to development strongly disincentivizes the
creation of growth producing institutions in other parts of the Ghanaian economy that potentially
could produce more value for the state and its people. Yet, the approach has also brought to
Ghana much needed service provision, it has alleviated poverty, and it has produced a level of
political stability seldom seen on the continent. Thus, like many trends in contemporary
globalization, the result is seldom black and white. Yet, it does present a troubling picture of how
the hegemony of the core is perpetuated through durable institutional structures and political
practices.
The study is also aimed at thinking about understanding and proactively addressing
concerns about greater economic integration on the continent. Pan-African scholars, as well as
proponents of the continents various regional bodies such as the African Union, East African
Community, the Economic Community of West African States and others have long sought to
orient production away from the influence of core states of the international system because it
13

would force African states to produce not only consumer goods but also highly technical value
added technologies. Indeed, in situations where these goods were critically needed but
unavailable, African expertise was brought to bear to produce solutions such as during the
Biafran war, where rebels cut off from outside supplied designed and manufactured their own
sophisticated weapons system in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to break a blockade by the
central government of Nigeria. While the Biafran war may be an extreme example, the ingenuity
of African technical expertise can be seen today in systems such as the Mpesa payment system in
Kenya, one of the few in the world to work through a major telecom company, earning levels of
inclusion in the formal financial system greater than that of the United States. Thus, the benefits
of a greater integration of the economies of the region may very produce much needed positive
externalities for the people of the continent.
Nevertheless, producing for a domestic market in a competitive manner presents a set of
challenges that require growth enhancing institutional solutions. The challenges of creating
successful economic sectors, and the necessary backward and forward linkages in an ideal
environment are significant. However, when combined with an array of external pressures and
the exigencies of political survival that such a larger integrative project on the continent would
entail than understanding how these factors come together to produce growth producing
institutions is of critical importance. Thus, this study seeks to provide insight on larger structural
processes, whose solutions are not always obvious and or apparent.
Lastly, the research question deliberately avoids the language of the dependent
development, not out of any conceptual hesitation to use the term, but out of an effort to narrow
the scope and focus the inquiry. Ghana and Kenya, like most all other countries in the global
south, interact with an array of powerful international pressures and structures that place them in
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a peripheral position in the global economy. Movement away from the global periphery, in some
important respects, is geographically contingent as it requires access to large quasi-domestic
markets. It is for this region that advocates of pan-African solutions to development have
continually focused upon the establishment of one unified market in the continent. Given the
central importance of regional economic currents, it would be conceptually sloppy, at minimum,
to offer an analysis dealing with different “degrees” of dependency between these two states.
Instead, my analysis investigates a trend, the construction of growth enhancing institutions that
are focused internally and regionally, and a contrasting pattern, the construction of externally
oriented institutional forms. While each set of institutions is indeed part of a different state form,
understanding these trends within the larger context of dependent development in Africa is a
more conceptually useful exercise than attempting to argue that one state or another is more or
less “dependent” in its developmental form. Furthermore, while “dependency” carries with it
empirical data on fundamental measurable economic change, the project deals not so much with
economic trends alone so much as it examines institution building as a means of understanding
how patterns of economic change might take place. The orientation of institutions may be a
particularly important concept in thinking about the roots of dependency, but it does not
encompass the much larger international architecture of institutions that maintain and perpetuate
dependency.

Empirical Findings
The study finds strong evidence that the absence or presence of a core group, which this
work defines as a social group containing the majority of the population or that is at least 20%
larger than the next largest group, plays a definitive role in shaping patterns of development. In
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the Ghanaian case, the presence of a core ethnic group in at least two critical junctures has
generated growth inhibiting institution making that has a direct bearing on the domestic
economy. In the Kenyan case, we see clear industry level preferences that are tied specifically to
directing benefits toward specific ethnic communities. Often, as is often the case in
developmental politics, preferential policies for one industry may come at the expense of
another. Yet, nevertheless, the study finds indirect evidence of a coordination of preferences
across ethnic groups has succeeded in generating a whole host of institutionalized coordination
mechanisms between state and society which simply do not exist within the Ghanaian case.
The study finds less support for the impact of developmental legacies, mainly because of
the large similarities between African states struggling within the periphery of the global
economy. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis in chapter 7 clearly points to idea that states that
have undergone some sort of socialist inspired period of development enjoy higher levels of state
autonomy, and thus generally have better regarded judicial systems and other key institutions.
Qualitative evidence, however, points to the key importance that the use of ideology at critical
junctures has upon generating much needed autonomy for a key shift in policy making. While
this state autonomy was critical in shaping the state form of countries like Ghana, in Tanzania its
impact appears to be less definitive, as the same lack of state society connections appear to take
place in countries that have undergone various forms of authoritarian governance, as was the
case in Cote D’Ivoire.
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Theoretical Framework
Contemporary research on development has been dominated by accounts focusing on the state as
an autonomous actor. Economic and political outcomes are explained as the end product of
rationale choices of individuals controlling state power. But while such an approach has
produced valuable research it often overstates the importance of the state and minimizes the role
of society. As a result, state centric accounts often fail to generate observations about the sources
of state autonomy and their structural limitations.
I argue that neo-Marxist theories of the state conceptualize state-society relations in a
manner that is more useful for creating generalizable theory about Africa. The strength of these
accounts lies in their ability to formulate theory about the permissive conditions for institutional
change. State centric accounts of development certainly discuss state autonomy, but their
explanations are often case specific, and contingent. Neo-Marxist theories and other society
centric approaches provide more expansive explanations of institutional formation by analyzing
changing configurations of power in society and their impact upon patterns of state society
interaction. These theoretical insights pair very well with a resurgence of studies that look upon
the dynamics of socially based coalitions to explain economic outcomes. I will therefore
combine coalition based approaches with a neo-Marxist conception of state society relations to
provide a framework for this inquiry.
State centric research on Africa draws heavily upon pluralist state theory, particularly the
works of Max Weber. Scholars hailing from the Weberian tradition place analytical focus on the
procedural elements of rule-based governance. Just as Weber (2004) envisioned the modern state
as a rational bureaucratic entity, whose conduct is governed by rules, these scholars correctly
theorize that a failure of the organizational elements of the state to both follow and enforce rules
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is in large part responsible for economic and political failures (Huntington, 1968; Jackson 1987;
Reno, 2000). However, these scholars often overemphasize the historical roots of bureaucratic
governance, creating somewhat deterministic theory in the process. Kholi (2004), for example,
writes that in comparison to South Korea, the bureaucracy in Nigeria was ill served by British
colonialism, which failed to adequately train civil servants. While the state in South Korea
developed into a rule bound organization under Japanese tutelage, in Nigeria Britain expended
neither the time nor effort to do the same. Thus, variation in institutions is rooted in the ability of
the state as an organization to develop modes of behavior guided by rules at specific critical
junctures. Crawford Young (1994) argues much the same in The African Colonial State in
Comparative Perspective, explaining economic outcomes in Africa as a result of unique features
of colonialism on the continent. These arguments can indeed explain some of the variation in
bureaucratic capacity and economic outcomes in African countries. A robust, indigenous
bureaucracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, was near nonexistent after
Belgium’s departure, contributing to political disorder. Ghana, on the other hand, had a welltrained bureaucracy and experienced strong leadership in the same period. But while these
theories can explain some outcomes, they are not well equipped to explain why a country like
Kenya whose experience with colonialism mirrors other African countries has been are able to
create and maintain relatively efficient and effective bureaucracy while its contemporaries
struggle to do the same.
A second branch of research moves away from a Weberian conceptions of the state.
These scholars place emphasis on state society relations. In doing so, they acknowledged the
embeddedness of the state as an organization within society (Migdal, 1988), even as they locate
the causes of economic misfortune in this unique state form. Thus, Reno (2000) uses the term
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"shadow state" in describing the interconnectedness of formal state institutions, as well as groups
and networks within society. Bayart (2006) discusses the "rhizome state" in which formal
institutions appear on the surface but are anchored by a deep root system of networks that can
include government elites, important figures in industry and agriculture, traditional authorities,
even important players in illicit industries as well as their various clienteles.
Running through most of these accounts is an acknowledgment of the state as being riven
by the same fractures that exist throughout society. Thus, a logic of creating and maintaining a
winning coalition, or a policy coalition, pervades political regimes although it may result in
economic policies that slow growth (Gros, 1996; Clapham, 1996). For example, Boone (2003)
explains the reluctance of Senegalese politicians to invest in the Casmance region, a fertile
agricultural area, by highlighting the region's egalitarian style of governance which does not
contribute to the building of nationally important clienteles. Instead, real investment is targeted
at the Wolof groundnut basin, a region whose elites can be counted on deliver support for a given
regime or party (Boone, 2003, p.138). Thus, the state and its economic policies are embedded
within regional and national informal networks.
Research on the intertwined nature of state and society provides valuable insights into the
root causes of economic outcomes but it under theorizes the reasons for variations between states
in Africa. For example, while the IMF, World Bank, and donor organizations locate the causes of
failures of structural adjustment in Africa in a lack of accountability within institutions, Bayart,
Ellis, and Hibou (1999) provide a more compelling explanation focused on manner in which
civil society in Africa proved to be both amenable to and indeed adept at circumventing of
structural reform (pp. 69-113). These accounts of state society relations in Africa do an excellent
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job of describing the failure of state institutions. However, they often lack the conceptual tools to
describe how and why or how more effective institutions come about as a result of state actions.
Research that links the maintenance of formal and informal ruling coalitions to economic
outcomes addresses some of these weaknesses. These works often provide clear and logical
causal variables to describe variation in economic outcomes and are thus well placed to provide
explanations for why institution building and economic outcomes among African countries may
differ. They also provide useful conceptual terms such as “winning coalition” or “policy
coalition” that aid empirical analysis. The weakness of this branch of research lies in its overly
sparse descriptions of causal mechanisms, which are often the product of rational choice
theorizing. Thus, while the theories are often elegant in their simplicity, they sometimes lack the
necessary complexity to describe real world events.
Two works, in particular, are important to discuss for they come to two very different
conclusions about the nature of ruling coalitions. Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siversen and
Morrow’s (2003) The Logic of Political Survival focuses attention on the role of institutionally
determined coalitions in economic development. For the authors, the size of the “winning
coalition” or the minimum number of supporters needed for a regime to stay in power is of
critical importance. In order to remain in power the regime must provide benefits to their
supporters. In democracies, therefore, large winning coalitions mean that regimes must provide
public goods – there is no other way to reach so many people. The institutions of the state
become geared towards service provision, and operate in an efficient, growth producing manner.
Authoritarian states have smaller winning coalitions. Therefore, leaders provide private goods to
a smaller number of supporters. The institutions of the state therefore become predatory, and
hinder economic growth to serve the needs of a few.
20

Waldner (1999) comes to somewhat different results in his study of coalitions and
economic growth in Syria, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwain. Waldner highlights the
relationship between a large public sector, and the relative inability of regimes produce economic
growth. For Waldner, elite conflict leads to populist economic policies, as elites try to cultivate a
following by providing access to state resources through jobs and other side payments. In the
process, these policies succeed in creating an overly large public sector, driving up wages, and
creating a comparative disadvantage for enterprise. These distortions in the labor market weaken
the bargaining power of the regime in relation to agriculture and industry, who demand tariff
protection because of these high labor costs. The state, therefore, has few tools to force industry
and agriculture to become more competitive, and the economy stagnates. Thus for Waldner,
large coalitions are inherently inefficient.
Disagreement about the effect of coalition size upon economic outcomes, however, hints
at the possibility that size alone may not account for all types of variation. In order to gain
analytical leverage, both Waldner (1999) and Buno de Mesquita et. al. (2003) create highly
abstract and simplified causal mechanisms, focusing on coalition size. Yet, in the real world,
causal mechanisms are seldom simple, and often involve complex interactions. Thus, when
comparing the arguments of the authors, we see that both Waldner and Bueno de Mesquita et. al.
make empirically valid points. Small winning coalitions, in places such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo have indeed resulted in economic decay. Yet, in other cases, such as
Botswana or South Korea Waldner’s observation that fiscally conservative states containing a
small policy coalition spur economic growth is equally valid. Therefore, I argue that both authors
are potentially disregarding important characteristics of socially based coalitions that may have
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an impact upon economic growth and institution building. Before discussing these variables,
however, it is first necessary to define the term policy coalition as I will use it in this analysis.
To stay in power, a regime needs a sufficient number of supporters. These supporters are
found in society and they are arranged in various social groups, the most dominant type in most
African societies revolves around ethnic identity. Some members of certain social groups,
generally elites, have access to officials in the government. More importantly, some of these
individuals can have an impact upon policy. These individuals are thus members of the policy
coalition. They can act on behalf of their social group or they can be individuals with economic
and/or symbolic power who can exercise social control. Whoever these individuals may be,
membership within the social coalition implies that they have at least some degree of influence
over policy.
Policy coalitions are created through coordinating institutions, and as such represent a
commitment on the part of the regime. A coordinating institution is a means of regularized
communication with the policy coalition, often in the form of a new bureaucracy or simply a
regularized set of meetings. In some states, organizations like a chamber of commerce can serve
as a coordinating institution, though such an occurrence is somewhat rare. Regularized meetings
with a policy coalition represent a close tying together of state and society; they also represent a
loss of complete control over policy. While the regime may gain invaluable knowledge, there is
the expectation that they put this knowledge to use.
A political regime thus has a choice in determining the best means of securing the
support of a social coalition of sufficient size to stay in power. Creating coordinating institutions
to expand the policy coalition is a highly effective means of gaining support and goodwill. Yet,
this course of action also represents a loss of control over policy and indeed spending. A far less
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risky proposition is simply to attempt to win over members of a social coalition, often through
social programming and service delivery. This approach, though frequently expensive, allows the
regime to stay more firmly in control of developmental programming. It also provides the regime
with greater autonomy vis a vis the communities it is attempting to win over. Failing to construct
coordinating institutions in these cases can often serve as a means of undermining elites, a
potentially important strategy for a regime seeking support in regions traditionally dominated by
the opposition.
Taking the composition of policy coalitions into account creates additional explanatory
variables often neglected by rational choice accounts of coalitions. This manner of envisioning
coalitions is present in many classic Marxist works such as Barrington Moore’s (1968) Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy and Perry Anderson’s (1974) Lineages of the Absolutist
State as well as some of the writings of Karl Marx (1978). This branch of research places an
emphasis on the composition of the ascendant groups within society, and how these groups shape
both policy and the institutions of the state. Marx’s (1978) famous assertion that “the executive
of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole
bourgeoisie” reflects state power is held by a group whose preferences are determined by their
class and by relations of production (p.475). Coalitional research in the tradition of Marxist
scholars, as opposed to rational choice theorists, places an emphasis on society as opposed to
simple institutions. Thus, in The State in Capitalist Society Miliband (1969) could claim “a
theory of the state is also a theory of society and of the distribution of power in that society”
(p.2). Thus, the types of groups that are composed in the policy coalition may very well tell us
much about economic outcomes and the types of institutions produced by the state.

23

While traditional Marxist approaches may draw much needed attention to the
composition of policy coalitions as explanatory variables, they suffer from an overly black and
white characterization of state society relations. Even a preliminary comparison of politics in
Ghana and Kenya strongly suggest that the classical Marxist approach is far too blunt of an
instrument to explain the intricacies of these cases. Both countries, for example, were home to a
strong indigenous bourgeoisie. While this indigenous capitalist class may play a role in the two
countries contemporary economic success, this variable cannot explain why Ghana’s
performance before the mid-1980s was so dismal. Furthermore, the Nkrumah and Rawlings
regimes drew their support from very similar social groups; i.e. they had similar policy
coalitions. Yet, both the choice of institutions as well as their ultimate effectiveness varied
dramatically. While traditional Marxist theories would predict that the same socially based
coalition would produce similar policies, in Ghana this simply did not happen.
The nondeterministic nature of institution building in Ghana speaks to the relative
autonomy of the state, an attribute highlighted by neo-Marxist scholars, in additional to the
pluralist scholars mentioned earlier. For theorists such as Nicholas Poulantzas or Claude Offe the
state is a social relation that reflects power relations within society. Yet, the apparatus of the state
enjoys autonomy that is however, bounded in its nature. Thus, society-based actors do not
necessarily control the state nor do all policies favor the class interests of the dominant group.
Instead, the state plays a mediating role, even acting against the interests of some fractions of the
capitalist class, for example, in order to preserve the stability of capitalist hegemony.
Furthermore, the state is at its most autonomous when no particular social group can achieve
hegemony over others. As hinted at in Marx's (1978) “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon,”
the state can become a powerful social actor in its own right when social classes find themselves
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deadlocked in conflict. In Marx's account, the regime of Napoleon III was not necessarily aligned
with either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie yet was ultimately accepted by each group as neither
could achieve mastery. When we apply these theoretical insights to explaining variation in the
ability of states to produce economically effective institutions, but they point to patterns of
causation revolving around the composition of social groups supporting a given regime, and the
conditions under which the state may achieve greater autonomy from social groups to build
growth enhancing institutions.
Figure 1 below above illustrates the relationship between the policy coalition, the state
apparatus and institutional effectiveness. It also provides an answer to how the same policy
coalitions ultimately produce very different outcomes. In the case of Ghana, it would appear that
historical circumstances provided the state apparatus under the Rawlings regime with a greater
degree of autonomy from its own policy coalition, whose general preferences most likely did not
change. The diagram thus provides a means of identifying a causal chain as well as relevant
independent variables that might have a bearing upon institutional effectiveness. It focuses
attention on the types of social actors that make up a given policy coalition, the policy
preferences of these actors, the relative strength of social actors, as well as the nature of state
society relations. Furthermore, factors related to the state are taken into account. These include
the bureaucratic capacities, policy preferences, and the degree of political acumen possessed by a
given political regime.
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Figure 1. Coalitions and the State
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Yet, as eloquently pointed out by Waldner, autonomy is often contingent upon the
institutional structure of the state, which is itself forged out of previous institutional choices and
policies. In this sense, previous policies then become part of the institutional structure through
which future policy is enacted. Variation in policy, driven by core related factors, thus turns into
institutional variation that ultimately helps to determine policy choice.
State society relations are largely determined by the ability of the regime to win over
supporters, and the degree to which it includes some of these supporters in the process of
creating policy. The social coalition pictured above represents those members of society that
support the regime. The regime can win their support in a variety of different ways, such as by
providing new or improved primary service provision such as roads, schools, and/or more
reliable delivery of electricity. These goods are very important in many African societies, where
the capacity of the government to provide these essential services cannot be taken for granted.
The regime may also maintain and expand its social coalition by providing goods and services
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that I refer to as “secondary developmental goods.” These goods and services are aimed at
encouraging specific economic sectors or providing an economic resource that would benefit a
large number of people. Examples of some of these “secondary” goods included processing
facilities for popular cash crops in a region, access to expanded and improved irrigation
infrastructure, and aid in transporting important agricultural commodities to processing centers.
Maintaining or expanding a social coalition can become expensive for the regime. A regime can
also win over support by including some members of society in the process of creating policy.
Building a policy coalition entails creating a regularized procedure for meeting to illicit
feedback. The institutions that connect these members of society to the state go by the name of
“coordinating institutions.” Building coordinating institutions is not always expensive for the
regime, but they do always represent a loss of complete control and autonomy over the policy
making process. As such, they represent one of the key mediators of the relative autonomy of the
state.
The size of the policy coalition, i.e. the group a regime believes it must include in the
policy making process, is an important determinant in a regime’s overall pattern of institutional
creation. A large policy coalition, for example, by necessity creates durable coordinating
institutions. These institutions, in turn, create and generate a greater amount of information about
economic activity than might otherwise be expected. A small policy coalition, on the other hand,
creates expectations of somewhat wasteful patterns of spending, apart from a few notable
exceptions. Small policy coalitions tend to undermine the political authority of social actors of
prominent members of society. Instead of consulting elites who may play a useful and productive
economic role, the lack of coordinating institutions tends to alienate elites by undercutting their
political and economic authority. The lack of coordinating institutions and the subsequent lack of
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ties to elites surrounding production accompany social coalitions that are loosely tied together
through the delivery of economic goods. Such a scenario tends to be more common in societies
where a core group is present. Therefore, large policy coalitions tend to be more cohesive, and
geared towards the creation of growth enhancing institutions in internally oriented industries.
Smaller policy coalitions, on the other hand, tend to deliver economic goods widely, but to do so
in a manner that undercuts elites and that tends to lead to growth inhibiting policy, at least in
internally oriented institutions. In this manner, the size of the policy coalition, a factor closely
related to the presence or absence of a core group, can have a definitive impact upon the growth
enhancing potential of policy.
Furthermore, suddenly attempting to alter the size of the policy coalition is perhaps easier
said than done. Enlarging a policy coalition entails a willingness to surrender both scarce
developmental funding and a degree of political power to groups within society. Such a decision
may very well challenge the common and indeed dominant logic of political survival for some
regimes. Shrinking a policy coalition, on the other hand, presents a very real risk that groups so
alienated will cease to support the regime. These patterns of institution making, therefore, are
somewhat durable; they represent a more or less fixed institutional design with which any regime
must contend.
The Horizontality of Ethnic Positionality

An assumption that underlies the behavior of ethnic groups is the horizontality of ethnic
positionality. This feature, as a general rule, is common to the states of sub-Saharan Africa, but
not necessarily North Africa, and lies at the heart of this dissertation project’s analytical
distinction between the two regions, despite their closely linked social, economic and political
history. Simply put, the horizontality of ethnic positionality is the idea that no one group,
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historically, has controlled predominant social and economic power. As a result, perceptions that
political power is up for grabs are pervasive in most African states. A second trend, which is
perhaps more important for this dissertation, is a general lack of cohesion particularly among
large ethnic groups. The maintenance of a predominant social position can in some cases,
become a powerful reason for members of the same ethnic group to put aside their differences
and to cooperate in a cohesive manner. Given the lack of predominance of an one particular
ethnic group in most African states, finding a means to unite a large and disparate ethnic group
can become particularly difficult.
This horizontality of ethnic groupings contrasts with societies where one group is
clearly predominant. In the United States, a history of settler colonialism and a plantation
economy covering a large geographic area of the country shaped definitive classes, whose
boundaries coincided with race and ethnicity. Social relations of production, and indeed the
accumulation of capital, rested on the maintenance of this positionality, which was inscribed into
the institutions of the state. This positionality structured all social and economic relations; it was
mediated by institutions of the state, shaped the costs, incentives and opportunities inherent in
the process of creating a viable social coalition to stay in power. Given this history, it is perhaps
not surprising that contemporary political coalitions often draw upon this sense of maintaining
positionality, especially among white voters, as a means of holding together an electoral alliance.
In a sense, once class identity becomes intertwined with ethnic identity and positionality, it
becomes possible to create political and social alliance which are paid for by the maintenance of
a particular social order. In this manner, a large and economically diverse social group can retain
much greater degrees of cohesion than might otherwise be expected. For most states in sub-
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Saharan Africa, however, there is little reason to expect large ethnic groups to exhibit such levels
of cohesion.
While the social classes inherent in a capitalist economy exist on the continent, as a
general rule they fail to structure economic relations and thus cannot exert social control.
Capitalist relations of production are for the most part confined to large urban agglomerations. In
the formal economy, wage labor and the rules of the market structure accumulation along the
lines of class. Class, in this case, occasionally overlaps with ethnicity; consider for example, the
economic positions and roles occupied by Asians in many African states. Their social class
positions is tied in part to their inability to own land in the rural economy, and thus as market
sellers, small scale industrialists, and marketers of agricultural commodities they are often
associated with a positionality that is above that of African peasants, given the slightly more
advantageous opportunities to accumulate that these occupations provide. While the positionality
of Africans of Asian heritage is somewhat unique, other ethnic groups are sometimes also
associated with a particular place within the economy, as is the case for the Kikuyu in Kenya, for
example, who are often associated with large scale plantation agriculture as well as a
predominate position in the financial industry of the country. The urban economy in many
African states thus contains spaces where formal class relations intertwine with the positionality
of ethnic groupings. The formal economy, however, is not entrenched enough within most
African states to structure relations between ethnic groups associated with differing economic
and social positionalities.
The penetration of capitalist relations in most African states is at best, superficial, and
confined to segments of the formal economy in urban centers. In a comparative sense, however,
the formal portions of the urban economy are shrinking rapidly in the face of an influx of
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migrants from rural regions. This pattern of migration is thus dominated by push factors
associated with the liberalization and opening of economies to cheap imports of food and
consumer commodities, that make it much more difficult for peasants to make a living off of the
land. Moving to one of the large and growing megacities of the continent, however, rarely turns
into employment in the formal economy. Instead, people find work as market sellers,
practitioners of various types of small handicrafts like show repair, or as laborers in small firms
that might employ less than a dozen people, and frequently only one or two. Work in
marginalized sectors of the informal economy, such as the sex industry and panhandling is also
common.
It is thus unsurprising that small and medium enterprises, most of them in the informal
economy, make up the largest sector of economic growth on the continent. These enterprises,
however, often exist outside of capitalist relations of production. Seldom does one entrepreneur,
at least in the informal economy, own the means of production. In many cases, for somewhat
expensive equipment, the means of production is shared by an informal collective whose
membership is somewhat fluid. Rarely, is employment based on the conditions of the market, per
se, but is often based on concepts of trust, social obligations, and the needs of the community.
These informal rules may very well structure economic relations, but they are not the
hierarchical rules of a capitalist the market. Very often, these rules are in fact a manifestation of
age-based lineage relations from the countryside, replicating themselves under different
conditions in an urban subsistence economy.
The rural regions of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa lay outside capitalist relations
of production. While some large scale plantations and processing facilities certainly exist, their
impact on the dominant relations of production in the rural economy is for the most part
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minimal. Traditional forms of lineage production, on the other hand, are much more common. In
the traditional rural economy, lineage groups, often living in the same village, hold land in
common. Permission to farm the land is given by the lineage head, and in return they appropriate
a small amount of the surplus. Villagers supplement this subsistence income with part time, or
seasonal employment though some are lucky enough to find more stable jobs that can be worked
year-round. One common means of earning extra money is work as outcroppers, which entails
growing a cash crop in a pre-arranged agreement with a buyer, generally a processing facility of
some sort. One beneficial aspect of outcropping, when it works well, is that the transport of the
crop is generally handled by the processing facility. Finally, depending on where the village is
located, peasant farmers might grow a number of different cash crops that could be sold at local
markets. The survival strategies of the rural peasantry thus include subsistence agriculture and
wage labor, and fundamental economic relations are shaped by lineage rather than by market
capitalism.
The end result of this lack of penetration of capitalist economic relations is a horizontality
that exists both within the class structure of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between
ethnic groups within the countries. In the formal sectors of the economy, there may in fact be
longstanding intersections between unequal relations of production and ethnicity. To many in
Kenya, for example, Kikuyu dominance of particular economic sectors stands out as an unequal
relations of production. Yet, even here, there are limits to the degree to which dominance within
a portion of he economy translates into power over the survival strategies of other groups whose
economic relations are predominantly structured by lineage relations in a subsistence economy.
Finally, it is worth noting that capitalism is not unique in creating distinct, unequal social
relations of production. Feudalism, for example, produced marked inequality between the
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peasantry and nobles. Similarly, there existed profound inequalities between slaves, member of
the ummah or community of believers, the ulamu religious bureaucracy, and governmental
official who often had a direct hand in controlling surplus grain in the various Islamic caliphates
of the middle ages. All of this is to say that capitalism is certainly not the only system capable of
producing hierarchy. Nevertheless, the failure of capitalist relations of production to structure
most economic activity means that the more or less flat class structure of lineage relations
imposes a horizontality upon both class relations as well as upon the positionality of ethnic
groups.
The horizontality of ethnic groupings weakens group cohesion. Groups do not necessarily
need to expend time and/or effort to maintain an ascendent position, nor is any one group able to
have enough power and influence over survival strategies of others to attain preponderant social
control. While it might be possible for an individual or a coalition to achieve social control
within a given ethnic group, particularly one whose prominent member occupy similar positions
within the economy, there is no reason to expect a large ethnic group such as a core group to
display any degree of cohesion given the variety or productive relations that exist with such a
large group entity. Furthermore, appealing to shared sense of the need to maintain group
predominance similarly falls flat, given the fundamental horizontality in economic relations.
While it may be true that ethnic groups are concerned with comparative gains, it is unlikely that
this concern would manifest itself in terms of group cohesion to maintain positionality. Instead,
all groups, especially large ones, are susceptible to becoming fragmented due to political and
economic appeals of the opposition. While social control rooted in economic relations may be
possible to achieve, as the size and economic diversity of a group increases, so too does its
propensity to fragment. Thus, while smaller sized ethnic groups may be able to retain a degree of
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cohesion, it is unlikely that larger, variegated groups would retain a sense of urgent, common
group interest. Instead, different portions of the group could potentially break off from the larger
group on questions of political, social and economic import.

Examining Types of Coordinating Institutions
The main argument of the paper is that the absence or presence of a core group drives the choice
of institutions governing development. This idea is somewhat complex, as it envisions a type of
mechanism through which policy and indeed other institutions are shaped and formed. Much of
the dissertation as it pertains to the case studies thus traces commonalities and patterns across
institutions that reflect a type of mode of state-society relations. However, while the case studies
trace durable patterns of institutional creation, it is perhaps useful to discuss the macro-level
edifice through which policy and institutions are enacted.
Social compromise not only enshrines durable relations between social actors, it puts in
place a type of guiding logic or set of ideas through which policies are enacted, bureaucracies are
governed, and development is undertaken. Taken together, this framework of ideas coalesces
into a type of modesof state-society relations, the main coordinating institution through which all
other policies or institutions are enacted. Thus, if we were to give a name to the principal
developmental institution that is impacted by the independent variables, it is the mode of statesociety relations.
Modes of state society relations, at the most basic level, are ideational constructs
grounded in the material elements of social compromise between the principal social actors in a
state. They are patterns of interaction guided by the logic that undergirds the positionality of the
social relations at the heart of the state. A mode of state-society relations may begin its life as a
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politically expedient strategy for a regime to stay in power. The Rawlings regime’s purge of the
left and reorientation of developmental policy along the lines of Bretton Woods institutions was
an abrupt pivot, meant to ensure survival. Yet, the underlying logic of such a strategy, and the
creation and reproduction of policy and institutions proved to be a stable form of compromise
and has since guided the developmental policies and institutions of the state.
There are three different modes of state society relations on the continent today, and these
modes encompass sets of institutions that are both growth enhancing and growth inhibiting. Yet,
as foundational institutions of paramount importance, these modes of interaction between state
and society remain unwritten and unspoken for the most part. Their logic remains unarticulated,
even when clear patterns emerge in the structure and shape of the institutional profile of the state.
Thus, I outline the principal modes of state-society relations below and tie them to the logic of
maintaining power in the absence or presence of a core group.
The mode of state-society relation comprises the sum total of institutional arrangements
connecting state and society, encapsulated in a relationship of relative autonomy. Individual
institutions regulating one facet of a mode of stat-society interaction are referred to as
coordinating institutions and are a central facet of the mode of state society relation. These
individual level institutions determine access to two vital economic goods in particular - access
to policy making processes and access to economic or social benefits. Coordinating institutions
can also block access to political, social and economic goods. In this manner, these institutions
regulate the basis for social compromise in a given state. Individual level institutions may stray
from the underlying logic of social compromise from time to time, but institutional structures
that threaten the basis of social compromise are generally eliminated, lest they create the basis
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for violence or contentious politics that might threaten underlying social comprise, as sometimes
occurs in states such as Kenya.
Managerial Mode of State-Society Relations

Managerial institutions take shape when the state apparatus, or rather, the regime attempting to
retain power through the state apparatus, must carefully manage financial resources. This mode
of state-society interaction is a reaction to levels of instability within the social coalition. While
there may potentially be severe circumstances that make holding a social coalition together more
difficult, I argue that the presence of a core group, by virtue of its size, undermines forms of
social control rooted in traditional and symbolic forms of power. As a result, the regime must
continually and actively manage its social coalition, both to limit the fragmentation of the core
group, and to expand beyond it. Spending on goods and services is directed at those regions of
the social coalition in danger of defecting, or those outside the social coalition who could
potentially join. Given these circumstances, the basic strategy employed is to limit the size of the
policy coalition, i.e. to limit decision making power over policy to members of the regime.
However, lacking the power of credible commitments to allies that accompanies membership in
the policy coalition, a political regime must spread potential resources widely, as the stability of
the social coalition is not assured.
Ironically, spending on maintaining a political coalition necessitates a source of income
for the state through taxation. This source of revenue must be in the form of foreign exchange, if
the state hopes to be able to undertake meaningful service provision. For states that collect rents
in the form of natural resource rights, growth enhancing institutions seldom take shape - there is
ultimately, no necessity. It is in part for this reason that resource rich countries are excluded from
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qualitative analysis. For countries that do not have access to resources rents, the creation of
growth enhancing practices becomes a matter of life or death.
The necessity to create growth and to manage spending leads to a semi-autonomous set of
coordinating institutions in all economic sectors. In sectors of the economy that produce foreign
exchange, it is likely that a technocratic engagement of state agencies takes shape. The
engagement of competent personnel working in well-organized bureaucracies is likely the result
of this type of managerial coordinating institution, at least in those segments of the economy that
deal with foreign exchange generating exports. The extant portions of the economy in a state that
utilizes managerial coordinating institutions is almost always growth enhancing.
Active management of the social coalition, however, is immensely more difficult when
the regime at the head of the state apparatus is unable to include social actors in. the policy
coalition. I hypothesize that the fragmentary nature of core groups makes it much less likely for a
regime to be able to embark on such a strategy. In such a scenario, it is much more important for
regimes to provide groups with some sort of benefit, often in the short term, rathe than taking the
time, and added effort to ensure institutions are growth enhancing. Very often, the result is a
superficial type of state - society engagement, in which the concerns of social actors are left
unaddressed, for the most part, by a semi-autonomous state focused on maintaining a broad
social coalition.
Gatekeeping Mode of State-Society Relations

When the political regime at the head of the state apparatus has the expectation of higher levels
of group loyalty, then they will be more likely to include said groups in a policy coalition,
providing access and control over key facets of policy making. Thus, a social environment
composed of smaller, more cohesive groups will be more likely to see the creation of a larger
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policy coalition as a strategy of maintaining power. Such an environment, I argue is much more
likely to occur when there is no core group within the state. The lack of a core group thus makes
it more likely for various forms of more inclusive institutions to take shape. These institutions,
by their very nature, involve important leaders from various communities within the policy
making process.
The coordinating institutions that take shape between the state and society surrounding
production in a state lacking a core group are thus likely to be gatekeeping institutions. These
institutions facilitate access to policy making processes for members of the social coalition.
Furthermore, unlike managerial institutions, which treat every group as a potential member of
the social coalition, gatekeeping institutions actively block access for those groups outside the
social coalition. That is not to say that these groups receive no forms of social services or
benefits - both in fact occur. However, rather than finding meaningful engagement with state
officials, these groups instead confront a semi-autonomous state apparatus whose ultimate goal is
to block access to policy making while staving off discontent
Gatekeeping coordinating institutions their by very nature, are both growth enhancing
and growth inhibiting. By engaging the productive needs of social groups through credible,
policy driven commitments, gatekeeping institutions can facilitate and enhance economic
growth, but such growth is much more likely to occur in industries involving groups represented
in the policy coalition. For those groups outside the policy coalition, however, the semiautonomous managerial approach of the state represents a growth inhibiting coordinating
institutions. Thus, the process of gatekeeping builds bi-furcated coordinating institutions that
both facilitate and inhibit economic growth.
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Embedded Party Mode of State Society Relations

There is potentially a third form of engagement tied to an embedded party organization. The
logic of rule for such a group is tied to the party organization’s role within society. The party, in
some situations, can become a vehicle of social compromise, or rather, it becomes the site of
social compromise. Such instances, of course, are somewhat rare. They reflect times, for
example where an independence movement becomes encompassed withing a party organization.
At this point, leadership, as well as the accumulation of capital, take place in accordance with
party structures. Economic activity, in this manner, is captured by the party organization.
In real terms the role of the party retains a type of mode of state-society relations
resembling that of a gatekeeper, but with two important differences, namely that inclusion within
policy making processes follows first, from membership and influence within the party
organization, and secondly, that accumulation outside the auspices of the party quickly turns into
a vehicle for accumulation of party members as a price for admission to the policy coalition. In
this manner, growth enhancing institutions are created in the domestic economy, but specifically
in industries and ventures that will provide a suitable payoff for the bureaucratic/party elites who
are in a position to invest. These industries and economic sectors, more often than not, are
externally oriented and foreign exchange generating.
The party and bureaucracy may provide only limited access to the policy coalition but as
their legitimacy with society relies upon on some degree of social welfare, the social coalition is
constructed in as broad a manner as possible. The state thus attempts to provide for such things
as inputs for producers and a basic level of infrastructure in urban areas.
Outside of industries that directly involve member of the state apparatus, however, the
state constructs semi-autonomous institutions. Lacking a need for these industries to produce
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foreign exchange, or tax revenue, coordinating institutions fail to take shape in an organized
manner. Thus, while institutions may not suffer from the excesses involved in actively managing
a social coalition, they are nonetheless at best neutral when it comes to creating economic
growth.
Conclusion
Modes of state-society relations occupy a central position within the state and represent a durable
nexus of framing and decision-making power as it pertains to development. Modes of statesociety relations, and their accompanying coordinating institutions are important structural
frameworks for understanding the state in Africa. As implicit structures, emanating from
unwritten social consensus, these patterns of engagement are not determinative, but nor are they
inconsequential. They provide the unwritten boundaries that shape the developmental process,
and they lay out the terrain upon which it will occur. The growth enhancing potential of
coordinating institutions is thus determined not simply by their degree of autonomy, but by the
type of state society relations that breathe life into them. These of course, are grounded within
forms of social consensus that are particular to each country but are impacted by the independent
variables.

Hypotheses
In the project I prioritize explanations that have a bearing upon state society relations over those
dealing exclusively with the state as an organization. While organizational capacities of the state
are examined within the broader context of state society relations, they are generally not treated
as key explanatory variables. My approach thus differs from much of the current research on the
African development, which takes a state centric approach to examining developmental
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outcomes. For the two cases under examination, however, there is simply a lack of evidence
suggesting that differences in developmental outcomes in either country are due to governmental
capacity alone. Instead, there is evidence that qualified and well-trained actors were present
within each state. In Ghana, the economists that would ultimately shape the regimes policies
were neither created nor trained by the Rawlings regime, but instead rose to greater power and
influence as the regime moved towards neoliberal policies. In the case of Kenya, these actors
have always been present – Kenya has historically been home to one of the most professional
bureaucracies on the continent. While there may certainly be differences between the Ghanaian
and Kenyan states, it is unlikely that these organizational differences alone are ultimately
responsible for variation in economic performance.
However, there is also reason to be skeptical of accounts that focus solely on the absence
or presence of particular groups within a policy coalition. Barrington Moore’s (1968) famous
assertion “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” (p. 418) may befit the European experience of state
building, but the presence of a strong indigenous class of entrepreneurs does not coincide with
growth enhancing institutions in Africa. Many states containing a large and healthy class of
indigenous capitalists such as Nigeria, contemporary Côte d'Ivoire, or even Ghana before the
Rawlings era were also very unsuccessful. What appears to be more important are the conditions
favoring types of ideological and programmatic compromise amongst elites, as suggested by
Waldner (1999). Elite conflict, according to Waldner, provides incentives for political actors to
build their own following using the resources of the state. In the process, institutions inimical to
economic growth are created. Indeed, the success and stability of the Rawlings regime occurred
only after the regime move closer to positions occupied by elites on the right. Thus, while it is
safe to assume that successful states are those that develop ideological and programmatic
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compromise at the elite level, and that this compromise is supported by an indigenous
bourgeoisie, it would be a mistake to argue that the the presence of such a class alone allows the
state to be successful.
Nevertheless, when examining the developmental trajectories of Ghana and Kenya
potential explanatory variables related to the nature of society rooted competition as well as the
composition of policy coalitions begin to emerge. These variables manifest themselves most
clearly when comparing policy coalitions in each country. Since independence, policy coalitions
in Ghana have pitted different classes and class groupings against one another. The "veranda
boys" who constituted the backbone of the Nkrumah supporters were workers and young
unemployed city dwelling youth. They were opposed by wealthy cocoa exporters, who even
before independence made their political influence felt through a series of cocoa embargoes in
order to gain better terms of trade with Britain. Added to this group were indigenous capitalists
as well as traditional elites in the countryside who were deeply skeptical of the reform agenda of
the Nkrumah regime. These policy coalitions differ substantially in type from those that were
present in Kenya. In Kenya, the Kenyatta and Moi regimes relied upon elites who were defined
first and foremost by their ethnic affiliation. Furthermore, certain ethnically organized business
groups rose to prominence and played a large role in supporting the regime. These groups often
benefited from their affiliation with a given political regime, such as the Kikiyu in the Kenyatta
regime whose members found themselves in control of many parastatal corporations. Thus in
Kenya, less so than in Ghana, ethnically based networks rather than social class played a much
more prominent role in the policy coalitions of the regime. While it is certainly true that social
classes existed in Kenya, they are often deeply fragmented by the nature of interethnic
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competition. In Ghana on the other hand, while there exist many different ethnic groups, political
competition is organized much more clearly along class and economic lines.
Recent research on the state in Africa points to the idea that these essential differences in
policy coalitions may have something to do with the presence of what is called a core ethnic
group. A core ethnic group contains either the majority of the population of a given state, or it is
at least 20% larger than the next largest ethnic group. As it pertains to the two cases under
examination, one, Ghana has a core ethnic group (the Akan) while Kenya, despite having a large
number of ethnic groups, does not. Literature on ethnicity and politics in Africa points to the idea
that the size of groups and politics may create vastly differing political dynamics.
One of the most well-known works to examine the political effects of the size of ethnic
groups was Posner’s (2004) article "The Political Salience of Cultural Differences: Why Chewas
and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi.” One of the main findings of the
article was that identical groups behave very differently toward one another when group size and
electoral institutions differ. Relative group size, according to Posner, can have a large bearing on
the degree to which ethnicity in the political realm is important. Elischer (2013) expands on
Posner’s analysis noting that when a core ethnic group is present, they often fragment based on
programmatic and ideological appeals. In societies that have core ethnic groups, this group is
often represented politically in numerous parties, and organizations. By contrast, when similarly
sized groups are more numerous, they are more likely to retain group loyalty and therefore
produce a system where the political salience of ethnicity becomes an important mobilizing force
in politics. Elischer’s (2013) observations point to the idea that programmatic and ideological
appeals may in fact be much more important when there is the presence of a core ethnic group,
then when there is not.
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The legacy of a core ethnic group in a state that has experienced a form of popular
socialist experimentation is a pattern of patronage and service delivery that is broad in its scope.
A core group often acts as a magnate, funneling political activity toward strategies that greatly
expand the scope of service provision. The large size of the core group means that there are
challenges to fostering social and political cohesion within it. A core group is much more likely
to fracture along class lines, or to participate in vastly different sectors of the domestic economy.
Furthermore, even when a core group contains features that promote group cohesion such as
strong traditional leadership, as was the case for the Asantehene in Ghana, it remains a visible
and prominent target for members of the political opposition. Fracturing a core group, however,
by its very nature involves direct forms of service provision such as loans, rather than forms of
patronage directed at political elites or industries as a whole. In other words, in states where a
core group is present, elites will be more likely to provide services related to development
directly to individuals, thereby expanding the overall scope of develop oriented service
provision.
The delivery of services targeted toward individuals, on a massive scale, decreases the
overall likelihood of effectiveness by undermining the value attached to developmental success.
The larger the number of individuals targeted for a loan program, for example, the smaller the
individual loans and therefore the greater the possibility that the program will fail to make its
desired impact. Furthermore, when benefits are delivered at the individual level, such benefits
take on a transactional quality; political support is exchanged for programming, whose ultimate
success or failure is not important, as long as the required political support is provided. In this
manner loans go unrepaid, and funds are used in ways that defy their original purposes. Migdal,
writing about a similar phenomena in Egypt, notes that social control and political support of
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landowners drove the process of allocatating developmental funding, not the manner in which
the funds were used. In the same manner, the direct, transactional nature of developmental
projects places an emphasis not on the quality of service provision, but on the quality of political
support which it buys.
The lack of a core ethnic group, particularly in political systems whose postindependence history included a strong articulation of a capitalist developmental pathway,
provides incentives to target specific sectors of the economy as a whole rather than to focus
service delivery at the individual level. As a general rule, political entrepreneurs build policy
coalitions in the most efficient manner possible. Absent a core ethnic group, the players in any
process of winning political support are key elites. However, in a state that articulates a clear
capitalist developmental pathway, it is very likely that key elites are involved in capitalist under
takings of one sort or another. Further, given the dependent nature of the indigenous bourgeoisie,
it is probably that these ventures are in their nature part of the internally oriented segments of the
economy. Delivering benefits in an efficient manner in this context targets industries where the
economic interests of elites are found; given the smaller relative size of ethnic groups, it is likely
that many ordinary members of the group are involved in the same industry. Therefore, policies
that are designed to deliver growth in domestic industries are more likely to occur in economies
lacking a core ethnic group, and that have subscribed to a clearly articulated capitalist
developmental pathway. While all state embark on such programming, only when pressures from
above and below focus the stat’s efforts on performance as the key to regime survivial, do we see
marked difference in development.
These characteristics of states, drawn in part from developing theory on the behavior of
ethnic groups, leads to the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis #1: The presence of a core ethnic group as well as a flirtation with socialist
inspired policies in Ghana contributed to growth inhibiting institutions in the preRawlings era. The absence of a core ethnic group in Kenya, combined with a more
fractious ethnic configuration and a more consistent recourse to capitalistic policies
facilitated the creation of more effective growth-enhancing institutions during the
same period.
Thus, key factors, the absence or presence of a core ethnic group and a societies relative
experience with a socialist pathway to development may be able to make some institutional
outcomes more likely. In the cases where these factors are present, the tendency is towards
growth inhibiting institutions. When these factors are not present, the tendency is toward the
delivery of selective benefits, and growth enhancing institutions. I assume that these are simply
general tendencies, for in the real world policy makers and politicians must deal with all manner
of internally and externally imposed constraints, such as a those relating to basic state capacity.
Thus, in the developing world no state will succeed in crafting only growth producing
institutions; indeed, it can be assumed that fiscal pressures here will assert themselves in the
tendency for a state that spreads benefits selectively, also to spread losses in a targeted manner.
In this manner, the question at the heart of variegated institution making in Kenya does not
necessarily require a separate hypothesis – it appears to be a function of the constraints placed on
any state in a peripheral region of the global economy. The question of why institutions
conducive to growth takes shape in Ghana, as an exception to this process, on the other hand, is
more of a mystery.
Like Waldner, I argue that growth enhancing institutions are the product of elite
compromise. Additionally, I argue that there must be sufficiently powerful reasons to create
social compromise at the elite level. The experience of Ghana sheds some light on how growth
producing institutions may come about in an environment where the tendency is toward broad
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distribution of goods and services. In Ghana, the cocoa sector provided stability for political
regimes, thus ensuring a successful ruling strategy. Furthermore, it is clear that the institutions
built by the Ghanaian state to produce growth and increase investment reached out far beyond
the cocoa sector alone. The state, in fact, appears to be dominated by a durable pattern of growth
producing institutions in the export sector, combined with other highly effective institutions that
both clarify and facilitate external investment, and that also attract donor funds. The presence of
a lucrative export sector in Ghana appears to have opened the way for a type of path dependent
institution building strategy cemented by social compromise.
Yet, the idea that a lucrative export sector alone leads to externally oriented institutions
bucks many of the trends we see in states in the developing world. Ghanaian regimes after
independence, for example, sought to use the revenues from cocoa to deliver benefits to
supporters. However, they ultimately struggled to invest in the sector, thus killing the goose that
laid golden eggs. In these cases, the state did not build institutions to insure external investment
or to maximize foreign reserves from cash crop sales. Furthermore, the state struggled to attract
foreign aid, even despite at one point under the Busia regime agreeing to IMF imposed
conditionality. Thus, despite the presence of the sector, the state did not embark on the
sustainable building or maintenance of externally oriented institutions that were also growth
enhancing.
The change in the process of institutional production in Ghana coincided with a major
internal shift in domestic politics as well as a slow building external change in the international
system. Internally, a socialist led regime decided definitively to embark upon neoliberal reforms;
thus it was the Rawlings regime that was able to attract the greatest amount of external capital
and donor funds, which in turn appears to have led to still greater institutional changes.
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Secondly, the range of developmental choices available to states began to narrow with the
decline and ultimate fall of the Soviet Union. The emergence of a new globalized form of
neoliberal market capital meant that regimes could not realistically hope to attract outside
investment while continuing to pursue a socialist pathway to modernization. Furthermore, it
thereby increased the chances that states who to all appearances had thrown off any hope of
developing alternatives modernizing strategies, would receive sufficient external funding to
allow them to create durable survival strategies in which growth enhancing but externally
oriented institutions play a central role. Thus, in this case, the presence of a lucrative cash crop,
in an international environment dominated by neoliberal institutions, would make it more likely
for states to develop growth enhancing but externally focused institutions.
Yet, the mere fact that Ghana and Kenya are major agricultural producers not only
highlights the idea that agricultural exports do not necessarily lead to externally oriented patterns
of but highlights the role that agricultural receipts play in social stability rather than path
selection for institution building. Kenya’s linkages to the international system appear to provide
stability, as they do in Ghana, yet this stability does not necessary lead to a developmental
pathway that leads to a clustering of growth enhancing institutions in the extant sectors of the
economy. Instead, in Kenya, export earnings combine with foreign aid to provide stability in the
form of compensation for ethnic elites. In this manner, Kenya’s pattern of providing target
benefits to specific communities is stabilized, even if, as violence surrounding elections
indicates, there are in fact a host of over politicized behaviors at the heart of the state. Thus, a
lack of state autonomy, at least in regards to dominant ethnic groups, ironically produces forms
of institution making that are more likely to produce growth enhancing institutions in regions of
the economy where ethnic elites have a greater likelihood of involving themselves. Many times,
48

these sectors are in internally oriented sectors of the economy, but there is nothing to say that
some externally oriented sectors would develop growth enhancing institutions as a means of
providing political support. Thus, the second hypothesis identifies the manner in which differing
political legacies and the absence or presence of a core ethnic group, in the neoliberal era at least,
have tended to produce different patterns of institutional development.
Hypothesis #2: In a comparison of African stats in the post-Soviet era, those possessing
a legacy of socialist development and the presence of a core ethnic group are more likely
to construct internally oriented institutions that are growth inhibiting but externally
oriented institutions that are growth enhancing than those states lacking a legacy of
socialist development and a core ethnic group.
Ghana’s flirtation with a socialist pathway to development, and the presence of a core
ethnic group, make it more prone to internally oriented economic institutions that are
growth inhibiting, while Kenya’s legacy of capitalist development and lack of a core
ethnic group facilitate the construction of growth enhancing and growth inhibiting
institutions in all sectors of the economy.

The hypotheses recognize the implicit power of countries at the core of the internal
system to alter the priorities, regime survival strategies, and ultimately at least in some cases, the
developmental trajectories of states in a peripheral position in the global economy. Yet, such a
process is not overdetermined, and indeed states can in fact succeed in shaping institutions that
are more attuned to domestic and regional needs, as the case of Kenya illustrates. Thus, at least
theoretically, the dissertation examines the many ways in which the internal characteristics of
society-based politics and the changing characteristics of policy coalitions combine with factors
in the international environment to produce policy.
The main argument that this project advances is that to understand policy, it is fist
necessary to understand the durable social groups who find themselves at the reigns of state
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power. While institutional scholars may focus on elections, I argue that these groups often more
durable than any election cycle, being the product of relations of production and/or the nature of
political competition between various factions. In Kenya, a fragmented and socially
opportunistic bourgeoisie drives policy forward, fighting over the reigns of state power both to
stimulate growth that will benefit select communities as well as to manage and mediate the
losses that go along with any developing country operating in a peripheral position in the
international economy. In Ghana, a quasi-bureaucratic bourgeoisie place a superficial hand on
the surface of Ghanaian society, and drive an institution building process that has delivered
poverty alleviation and political stability even as it has neglected important aspects of internal
development which are of little to no importance to international donors. Below the placid
surface of Ghanaian society, however, institution building focuses on development, not as a
means of delivering sustainable growth, but as a short term strategy to deliver benefits. Thus, in
each state, we see differing institutions taking shape, with vastly different developmental
consequences. The root cause, however, lies in fundamental differences in the survival strategies
of regimes that are ultimately rooted in differing social coalitions.

Variables and Concepts
The dependent variable, the growth enhancing capacity of institutions, comprises those functions
of the state that have the greatest bearing on long term economic health. I have operationalized
the term as a multi-dimensional variable that touches upon the health and effectiveness of the
bureaucracy and civil service, the quality of institutions dealing with property rights as well as
the general health of fiscal policy. Theoretically, these aspects of the dependent variable reflect
consensus on the determinants of economic success with in the developing world. A well-
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functioning and appropriately sized bureaucracy has been consistently touted as one of the
keystones of economic growth among late developing countries. Kholi (1994), Evans (1995),
Huntington (1968), and Gershenkron (1962), among others have consistently pointed to the need
for the bureaucracy to act as a catalyst of growth. Furthermore, Waldner (1999) identifies the
over staffing of the bureaucracy as one of the main stumbling blocks to sound economic policy.
Therefore, much of the discussion of the dependent variable will focus on the development and
growth of the bureaucracy and civil service.
Property rights are an equally important part of the analysis. As famously observed by
North (1981), countries that create robust property rights regimes are often the ones to foster
economic growth. Such was the case for Britain in North’s analysis, which succeeded in
implementing parliamentary taxation, and thus lowered interest rates and spurred economic
development because lenders no longer had to fear heavy and arbitrary taxation by the crown.
Finally, the operationalization of “institutional effectiveness” takes into account the stability
fiscal and economic policy. In countries plagued by cycles of underdevelopment, fiscal policy
becomes ad hoc and is manipulated in order to reward elites close to the regime (Huntington,
1968; Bayart, Hibou and Ellis, 1999). The chart below summarizes variation in the dependent
variable.
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Table 1. Defining Growth Enhancing Institutions
Growth Producing
Bureaucracy/Civil Appropriately sized;
Service
competent; non predatory.

Property Rights

Covered by a fairly
comprehensive set of laws
that are, for the most part,
respected.

Fiscal Policy

Sustainable, balanced.
Includes public service
provision and investment.

Growth Inhibiting
Large but often lacking funds
and expertise to accomplish
tasks. Sometimes predatory.
Violated to maintain social
coalition. Actions include
land confiscation, as well as
the preferential sale of
formerly state owned
companies.
In perpetual crisis. Spending
frequently out of control.
Public service provision
targeted only at select
communities. Rules
regarding important financial
institutions frequently
broken.

Levels of institutional effectiveness in most successful African countries can generally be
described as growth producing, while those of less successful African countries can be described
as growth inhibiting.
The most successful African countries, while by no means perfect in every regard, have
for the most part succeeded in fostering high degrees of institutional effectiveness. Botswana, for
example, continues to make attempts to keep compensation for civil servants at acceptable
levels, fighting pressures for wage increases. In Ghana, as I discussed earlier, the regime was
able to dramatically shrink the size of government, while still maintaining capacity. In Rwanda,
on the other hand, even when the state plundered valuable mineral resources from the
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neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo, the proceeds were not kept by individual
generals but were instead used to pay for the Rwandan war effort (Eriksen, 2005). Countries
successful at creating economic growth very often excel at creating effective institutions.
Moderately successful countries, on the other hand, often appear to enjoy advantages that
place them in a bind in regards to institutional reform. Institutional effectiveness in Gabon and
Swaziland, for example, lags behind countries at similar income level despite the fact that each
displays evidence of both state building and bureaucratic capacity. In Gabon oil revenues
allowed the regime of the late Omar Bongo to maintain itself in power largely by co-opting and
buying off the opposition, while providing well-paying jobs to educated city dwellers and ethnic
elites (Yates, 1996). The large state sector in Gabon has made many forms of production nearly
impossible, while oil revenues increase the Gabon’s currency to the point where exports are not
competitive. Today, Gabon is reliant on food exports in order to feed its population as locally
grown food is not competitive on the market (Oliveira, 2007). In Swaziland, on the other hand,
the regime of the absolute monarch has followed the strategy of massively increasing the size of
the state sector through political patronage. Given Swaziland’s small size and the revenues which
it collects from the Sothern African Customs Union, such a strategy has been relatively effective.
Yet, much like Gabon, it places the country at a comparative disadvantage in terms of economic
growth.
The most troubled economies on the continent often struggle with maintaining
basic property rights protections and maintaining sound fiscal policy. Such was briefly the case
for Kenya, when opposition to the Moi regime manifested itself in the very real possibility of a
successful coup d’état. In desperation, for example, the regime knowingly counterfeited its own
currency in order to distribute benefits to supporters (Bayart, Ellis, Hibou, 1999). According to
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Branch (2011), Moi’s “short term political objective of remaining in power trumped any worries
about the lasting effects of new fiscal or monetary policies” (p. 144). Yet, while Moi regime’s
actions were the exception rather than the rule, the actions of less successful African regimes
illustrate that such occurrences can indeed become widespread.
Yet, the impact of property rights institutions can vary even amongst successful African
economies, particularly as it relates to economic outcomes in the internally oriented sectors of
the economy. Property rights institutions facilitate growth in part, by making it more difficult to
pursue sform of development that place domestic producers at a disadvantage. The lack of a well
developed property rights regime is a rare roadblock for investment from abroad, as the thirty
plus years of foreign direct investment in China would indicate. Yet, a robust property rights
regime does have an impact on ow small producers interact with capital. In Sierra Leone,
peasants complain that communal lands have been lost to large multinational rice and pineapple
producers. In Tanzania, villagers in the … region must now put their fields to use as low paid
outcroppers for a multinational producing rice, given the lack of opportunities to market cash
crops. Thus, in cases where land is not protected by a robust property rights regime, capital is
able to make use of peasant labor and land, often in ways that detract from internally oriented
production.
In states with a well-developed property rights regime surrounding land, capital either has
a minimal impact upon peasant production or internally oriented capital produces positive
externalities for small farmers. In Mozambique, a forest and wildlife law formally recognizes the
rights of community members, and at least in principal sets forth an official negotiation with the
community surrounding land use and compensation. In Kenya, on the other hand, both large
domestic producers and peasants have formal titles to the land. While titling does not necessarily
54

eliminate disputes over the land, it does provide landowners rights vis a vis capital. In the case of
Kenya, peasant farmers have perhaps coincidentally become the beneficiaries of irrigation and
transportation infrastructure directed at large estates. Peasant production can also take advantage
of a well-developed and competitive system for agricultural marketing. In these two cases
property rights institutions appear to be conducive to, or at least not detrimental to forms of
internally oriented production. Thus, while these institutions are not necessarily critical for
externally oriented forms of production, for the domestic economy they appear to be a crucial
part of the institutional profile of states that enjoy greater degrees of growth in internally oriented
sectors of the economy.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Mobutu regime epitomizes the manner
in which institutions can become very detrimental to growth. During the turbulent early years of
Mobutu’s rule, the regime embarked upon a coalition building process which used the apparatus
of the state to distribute group specific side payments (Young, Turner, 1985). The burden,
however, proved to be too heavy; numerous revolts that took place within the country. Lacking
the means of securing his rule through the institutions of the state, Mobutu instead adopted an
approach that relied instead upon the cooptation and control of key elites from around the
country (Bayart, 2006). Fiscal policy relied much more heavily on securing foreign aid rather
than production, while service provision largely ceased and was often used an instrument to keep
control (Chabal and Deloz, 1999). The institutions of the country were systematically degraded
in order for the regime to stay in power.
The Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe ran into similar troubles during the 1990s, when an
expensive military campaign in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ended in spectacular
failure. According to Campbell (2003), intervention in the Congo on the side of Joseph Kabila
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was in large part to gain access to illicit diamonds with which to distribute to key elites, notably
those in the military. Fiscal exigencies forced the regime to look for new sources of revenue, the
end result of which was ultimately to confiscate productive agricultural land belonging to white
settlers and to redistribute it to key elites, who often lacked the expertise to successfully run
these plantations. These actions presaged the dramatic collapse of the Zimbabwean economy.
Measuring levels of institutional effectiveness is quite clear for extreme cases. However,
for cases that fall closer to the middle of the spectrum, measurement through qualitative means
can be much more difficult. Quantitative data, however, can further clarify levels of institutional
effectiveness for countries by providing an easy to understand metric. In this project I create an
index using quantitative data in order to facilitate case selection and to clarify the link between
institutional effectiveness and levels of the economic development.
One of the main working assumptions of this project is that institutional effectiveness
tells us a great deal about the ability it of a country to stimulate economic growth. While such an
assumption is probably a safe one, given the amounts of literature on the topic, operationalizing
the variable in quantitative form allows us to see more clearly the linkages between average GDP
per capita and the dependent variable of the analysis. Furthermore, as my project is not only
about development in Ghana and Kenya; I attempt to generate theory about Africa more
generally. Defining institutional effectiveness in quantitative terms will allow the tools of
statistical analysis to be used to search for important correlations.
The “institutional effectiveness index” I created is meant to place states along a
continuum from 0 to 10, utilizing commonly available information from scholarly sources such
as the University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government Dataset, as well as organizations such
as the World Bank, Polity, and etc. between the years 2000 to 2010. To create the index, I
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compile information on bureaucratic performance, fiscal policy and economic behavior, as well
as data on property rights. Each of the measures is rescaled from 0 to 10. The policy coalition
variable is a simple additive index in which each measure is weighted equally.
The measure used for the quality and size of the bureaucracy comes from the World
Bank's quality of public administration scores (average, 2000-2010). This score is part of the
organization's annual country policy and institutional assessment. It measures the organizational
capacity of the government and to a lesser degree subnational governments. It focuses on
whether procedures to ensure quality of output, such as civil service exams, are in place. It also
measures whether or not the bureaucracy and civil service are appropriately sized and trained.
When a regime uses the civil service as a patronage tool, this score will decrease even if the
bureaucracy is over staffed with qualified personnel. However, missing from the dataset are
scores from some of Africa's most successful economies such as Botswana, Namibia, South
Africa, and others. I have used closely correlated data from another source to fill in the gaps. The
World Bank indicator of governmental effectiveness is a broader but closely related measure of
the quality of the bureaucracy. The World Bank indicator focuses on the quality of public service
provision, bureaucratic performance, the quality of civil service staff and the ability of the
bureaucracy to “insulate” itself from political pressure. This measure takes into account most of
the concepts contained in the previous quality of public administration indicator. However, I
prefer the previous measures emphasis on appropriateness of staff size as well as its
concentration on central government. Therefore, I only use the government effectiveness scores
to fill in missing data. The two measures have the correlation coefficient of .78 (statistically
significant at the .05 level) indicating a very strong relationship. Using a 0 to 10 scale for each
measure, the governmental effectiveness indicator is on average is 1.49 points lower than the
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quality of public administration indicator. Thus, for countries that are missing data I use the
average score for governmental effectiveness over the past 10 years, and I add 1.49 points to it.
The second measure of the index evaluates the quality of a country’s economic
institutions. The measure I use comes from the Bertelsman Transformation Index, a widely used
index that evaluates political and economic institutions. Their measure for currency and price
stability, unfortunately, includes some ideas that move beyond the bounds of the analysis, such
as monetary policy, but it is still a close conceptual match. The metric focuses on the
sustainability of fiscal and debt policies. It also takes into account the independence of the
central bank, an institution often used to provide illicit benefits in factional alliance and
predatory clientelist coalitions. This measure too, however, contains missing data. For countries
with missing data, I use the measure for the quality of economic institutions from Kuncic (2014),
a closely related metric. The correlation coefficient for these measures is .79; it is statistically
significant at the .05 level. As these measures differ on average by 1 point, I add one point onto
the scores from Kuncic (2014).
The last measure of the index focuses on property rights. The measure I use for property
rights comes from the Heritage Foundation (average 2000-2010). The Heritage Foundation
compiles data and from a number of first hand and secondary and produces a score indicating the
degree to which a regime respects property rights. This score encompasses such things as the
independence of the judiciary in adjudicating cases related to property, as well as the structure
and effectiveness of laws meant to protect private property, including intellectual property. The
following chart provides a list of African countries ranked according to institutional effectiveness
scores averaged between 2000-2010.
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Table 2. Scores for Growth Enhancing Capacity of Institutions

Ranking Country Name
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Mauritius
Botswana
South Africa
Cape Verde
Namibia
Senegal
Ghana
Seychelles
Madagascar
Uganda
Malawi
Lesotho
Kenya
Mali
Swaziland
Burkina Faso
Gabon
Zambia
Tanzania
Gambia
Benin
Mozambique
Rwanda
Ethiopia (1993-)
Niger
Cameroon
Sao Tome and Principe
Nigeria
Mauritania
Djibouti
Congo
Central African Republic
Guinea
Togo
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Index
Score
7.52
7.39
6.69
6.42
6.09
5.82
5.65
5.59
5.44
5.33
5.31
5.18
5.14
5.13
5.11
5.07
5.01
5.01
4.94
4.91
4.88
4.87
4.78
4.63
4.58
4.54
4.48
4.45
4.29
4.22
4.11
3.97
3.87
3.78

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Comoros
3.75
Cote d'Ivoire
3.74
Burundi
3.72
Chad
3.70
Angola
3.65
Sierra Leone
3.62
Liberia
3.57
Equatorial Guinea
3.26
Guinea-Bissau
3.26
Eritrea
2.92
Congo, Democratic
45. Republic
2.83
46. Zimbabwe
1.67
Missing data for Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan
The institutional index variable appears to be correlated with economic growth.
Prosperous countries for the most part are found near the top, while countries that have generally
struggled have much lower scores. Furthermore, countries that whose wealth is derived from
natural resource production, but whose institutions are generally inimical to growth, such as
Angola or the Republic of the Congo, are found near the bottom of the list. Nevertheless, the
relationship between the dependent variable and levels of economic development appear to
follow a predictable pattern, as illustrated in the scatterplot below.
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The scatterplot provides a preliminary indication institutional effectiveness does indeed
correlate with economic outcomes. However, in order to be sure about the nature of the
relationship it is necessary to control for a number of important factors in a multiple regression. I
control for ethnic fractionalization, colonial heritage, and natural resource rents, among other
important variables. The measure for ethnic fractionalization comes from Alesina,
Deveelschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003). The authors measure how likely it is for
two randomly selected people to be of the same racial/ethnic group. To control for regime types,
I use an average measure of Freedom House and Polity scores, in which missing data has been
imputed from Hadenius & Teorell (2005). The scores range from 0, indicating a highly
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authoritarian regime to 10, indicating a democratic regime. I also control for colonial heritage
with dummy variable for British and French colonialism from Hadenius and Teorell (2005). In
addition, I account for instances of state failure. State failure is coded as 1 for 1 instance of state
failure and 0 for no instances. The scores range from 0, typical of most countries, to 13 for
Somalia; they reflect the total number of years in which a state experienced failure between 1995
and 2010; there is a maximum of 1 instance per year. This variable comes from the Polity IV
dataset, as does a related measure of political fragmentation. Political fragmentation reflects the
degree to which groups separate from the state control territory in a country. The range of the
metric is from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating no fragmentation, and 3 indicating “serious
fragmentation” in which over 25% but less than 50% off territory is uncontrolled by the central
government. The regression equation for the model is as follows:

Log(GDP/c) = 5.23 + .17 Institutional Effectiveness Index. – 1.38 Ethnic Fractionalization
(.81)
(.06)
(.51)
-.03 Freedom House/Imputed Polity +.40 Political Fragmentation - .19 State Failure+ .48 British +.27 French+ e
(.08)
(.36)
(.13)
(.34)
(.32)

Standard errors are marked below each coefficient. Figure 3.2.4 lists these coefficients and uses a
star to indicate statistical significance.
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Table 3. Institutional Effectiveness and Average per capita GDP (2000-2010)
(1)
Ave. GDP/c

VARIABLES
Institutional
Effectiveness

0.17*
(0.06)
-1.38*
(0.51)
-0.03
(0.08)
0.40

Ethnic Frac.
F.H. / I.Polity2
Political
Fragmentation

(0.36)
-0.19
(0.13)
0.48
(0.34)
0.27
(0.32)
0.034*
(0.01)
5.23*
(0.81)

State Failure
British
French
Resource Rents
Constant
Observations
R-squared

43
0.59

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05

The multiple regression indicates that three variables are of particular importance when
predicting average GDP per capita. These include rents from natural resources and levels of
ethnic fractionalization in addition to institutional effectiveness. Higher amounts of ethnic
fractionalization are negatively correlated with lower levels of predicted GDP. This finding
63

occurs frequently in the literature, in articles such as Easterly and Levine (1997), in which the
authors attribute Africa’s economic misfortunes to its high level of ethnic diversity. While I
believe the authors most likely overstate the impact of ethnicity, having numerous ethnic groups
no doubt complicates and makes more difficult processes of elite compromise. The institutional
effectiveness index also has a statistically significant effect on economic well-being. It is
predicted that a one point increase in the index is associated with a 17% rise in predicted GDP
per capita. Finally, as might be expected, natural resource rents raise predicted GDP/c. The
regression model has an r-square of .59, indicating that it accounts for roughly 59% of variation
of the average GDP per capita among states in sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2010.
Given the multiplicity of factors that can affect GDP that have not been included in the model,
such as the vagaries of the weather, the price of fuel and other inputs, foreign conflicts and etc.
such a figure represents a high degree of explanatory power.

Independent Variables
Developmental ideology and ideological legacy are two important independent variables in this
study. However, classifying a country’s developmental strategy in terms of ideology can be more
difficult than it might at first appear. On the one hand, many countries in Africa have at various
points in time declared themselves to be following some version of socialism, yet implemented
very little in the way of socialist policy. Senegal’s first president Leopold Senghor, for example,
formulated extensive theory about an African path to socialist development. Yet, despite
Senegal's championing of socialism, its policies did not differ significantly from capitalist
African countries (Jackson and Roseberg, 1982; Young, 1982). On the other hand, very few
countries in Africa have declared themselves to be capitalist, but a great many have implemented
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market oriented policy. And even ostensibly capitalist countries such as Kenya differed quite
significantly from capitalist states in the West, particularly in regard to the amount of state
intervention and hold their economies. Even today, for example, the Kenyan state plays an
important role in the economy through its many parastatals, surprisingly few of which have been
privatized over the years (Thakar, 2014). Most capitalist economies in Africa during the 1960s to
1980s also intervened in the agricultural sector as part of an import substitution industrialization
strategy. Thus defining ideology or ideological legacy is more difficult than it may appear at
first.
The first hypothesis suggests that the choice of developmental ideology, in conjunction
with modes of political competition, may have an impact on institutional effectiveness.
Clarifying the developmental ideology of the state, therefore, is important to the analysis. I will
use two different definitions of ideology in this project; ideology and ideological legacy. When I
refer to developmental ideology at a given point in time, I will assess it in terms of actual
policies, while placing a lesser emphasis on rhetoric. Thus, when discussing a country such as
Senegal in the 1970s, I will not classify it as socialist, despite its socialist rhetoric. States in
Africa since independence has generally followed one or more of three different developmental
ideologies: 1) market oriented, or capitalist; 2) African socialist; or 3) Afro-Marxist. Capitalist
countries such as Cote D’Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria have relied extensively upon the market,
attempted to attract foreign investment and taken steps to expand the growth of a class of private
indigenous capitalists. In Cote D’Ivoire, this strategy was known as Houphouët Boigny’s
“philiosphy of peanut rosters” in which state resources and forms of patronage were used to
provide opportunities for accumulation to local entrepreneurs (Akinès 2004). African Socialist
and Afro-Marxist states on the other hand took a very different approach to development. In
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Ghana under Nkrumah, economic policy focused on utilizing the state to control important
sectors of the economy, or at least to place them under popular control. While private property in
the form of private commercial plantations existed, they were starved of investment by the state,
which invested heavily in ultimately unproductive agricultural cooperatives and emerging
parastatals. Thus, while agricultural production in a capitalist country like Kenya took place
mostly on privately owned plantations and smaller privately owned plots, in Ghana production
for the market mostly took place on collectives. Tanzania, which underwent extensive
collectivization of agricultural as part of a modernization strategy, is an even clearer example of
an African socialist path to development. Given the priorities of African socialist regimes, they
have generally been somewhat wary of being over reliant upon foreign capital.
Mozambique, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo at various points in time went even
further than Tanzania and Ghana and are good examples of Afro-Marxist regimes. Drawing upon
doctrines of “scientific socialism” these states attempted to massively regulate their economies
by through the implementation of a centralized economic controls in addition to massive
collectivization. Here, the state truly attempted to control all aspects of agricultural and industrial
production, unlike African socialist regimes which had no such lofty ambitions. While these
states were almost never successful at implementing their plans (a lack of state capacity and civil
war hindered the regimes’ plans in Mozambique and Angola, for example) they did make serious
attempt to do so. The chart below summarizes these differing developmental pathways.
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Table 4. Developmental Ideologies
Regime type
Afro-Marxist

PopulistSocialist

Market
oriented/
Capitalist

Policies and behaviors
Collectivization in agricultural production
Centralized economic planning
State control of most major industries
Little or no private or foreign capital
Collectivization of agriculture
"African socialist" rhetoric
Parastatal corporations in major industries
Small amounts of private and foreign capital

Openness to foreign investment and capital
Investment in indigenous private industry
Some parastatals and state monophonies

While a country’s developmental ideology is important, in my analysis it is treated
differently from a country’s ideological legacy. The second hypotheses suggest that ideological
legacy, in conjunction with current approaches to development and modes of political
competition, have an impact upon contemporary performance. In particular, the hypotheses focus
on past legacies of African socialism or Afro-Marxism. In determining a country’s ideological
legacy, both rhetoric and policy are important. However, of the two, I place a weight on past
rhetoric; most all countries in Africa today follow some form of market-oriented capitalism. This
uniformity is no doubt encouraged by Bretton Woods institutions, as well as by the spectacular
failure of communist countries such as the USSR to produce continued economic growth. Thus,
for any country that did experience some form of radical politics, i.e. African socialism, or AfroMarxism, the policies at the heart of these developmental pathways have long since ended. Thus,
while Young (1982, p.100), questions whether Senegal was truly a popular socialist regime
67

despite Senghor’s many intellectual and political articulations of African socialism, I classify
Senegal as having a socialist legacy precisely because of the articulations of African socialism by
the Senghor regime. In this case, the rhetoric and symbols of socialism may indeed impact
politics, even if their ideology at the time could not truly be classified as socialist. However,
there are cases where the combination of rhetoric and actions does not appear to justify coding a
country as having a socialist/communist legacy. While SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in
South Africa both took a leftist, radical stance during their respective independence struggles,
like many formerly socialist organizations they quickly dropped the rhetoric and practice of
socialism upon attaining power in the 1990s. I have not classified either country as having a
socialist/Marxist legacy. In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, the rhetoric of socialist/communist
struggle on the part of the ruling Zanu-PF regime continued long after independence, even
though implementation of socialist principles may not have amounted to much. Therefore, I
classify Zimababwe as having a socialist legacy.
In order to facilitate an examination of the second hypotheses about socialist/Marxist
legacies, I have coded them in preparation for preliminary quantitative analysis. Table 1.1
displays the listing of countries with “socialist/Marxist” ideological legacies. I have included
countries that have experienced five or more years of a socialist developmental ideology.
Additionally, I have also included countries with less than five years of radical politics but whose
socialist/communist regimes occurred within two years of a transition to neo-liberal policy. In
these countries, which include the Sankara regime in Burkina Faso, the experience of socialist
policy and rhetoric may in fact become part of the dynamics of transition to a neoliberal
economy. A list of countries classified as having a socialist/Marxist developmental legacy is
found below.
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Table 5. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with Socialist/Marxist Legacies
1.
2.
3.
4.

Country
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde

5. Congo, Rep.
6. Ethiopia
7. Ghana
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mali
Mozambique
Sao Tome and
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Regime
MPLA
Kérékou
Sankara
PAIGC/PAICV
MassambeDebat
Nguesso
Derg
Nkrumah
Rawlings
Touré
PAIGC
Ratsiraka
Keita
Frelimo

Years
1975- Present
1972 - 1989
1983-1987*
1974-1991

MLSTP
Senghor
Réné
Barré
SSU
Nyerere
Obote
Kaunda
Zanu-PF

1975-1990
1960-1976
1971-1991
1969-1991
1971-1985
1964-1985
1962-1971
1964-1991
1980-Present

1963-1968
1979-1990
1974-1991
1957-1966
1981-1983*
1958-1984
1973-1980
1975-1978*
1960-1968
1975-1990

*Indicates that the regime stayed in power less than 5 years,
but within 2 years of the acceptance of IMF conditionality.

While defining ideology and ideological legacy may be a straightforward process, linking
it to current developmental outcomes is far more complicated. The literature on democratization
in Africa does not tell us much about the legacies of socialism in African states, under the
assumption that these experiments were short lived. Furthermore, there is the additional problem
that the values of African socialism were frequently espoused in the years after independence,
even in staunchly capitalist states like Nigeria. The impact of these rhetorical appeals decades
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later appears likely to be minimal; they may even be replicated in societies which had no
experience with socialism. Thus, while we can focus on the rhetoric of socialism after
independence, it is unlikely that socialist rhetoric alone had a definitive impact.
There is an inherent tension between the classification of a regime as socialist after
independence and the legacies of such a period that stem from the advent of neoliberalism and
the institutional changes thrust on African states that were a central feature of this period. The
classification of these states draws heavily on the presence and rhetoric of self-identified socialist
pathways to development in the years after independence or immediately preceding the transition
to neoliberalism. It is rhetoric, deliberate though it was, rather than the implementation of
socialist inspired policy and institutions to enact such policy that is the distinguishing
characteristic of my coding of this independent variable. Nevertheless, the legacies stemming
from this period, I argue, are institutional. This seeming contradiction makes sense when we take
into account the structure of most all African economies, socialist and nonsocialist alike, before
the neoliberal international regime came into full force during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Ideology, ironically, may be more significant in creating institutional divergences during
the neoliberal era than it ever was during the reign of ostensibly socialist regimes not because of
changed practices and institutions but because social expectations and society based pressured
pushed these states to preserve institutions that distribute benefits widely, while states lacking
this legacy may not necessarily undergo the same society based pressures and may more easily
succumb to externally imposed influences that seek their elimination. After independence, most
states on the continent utilized some form of import substitution industrialization. The state
involved itself heavily in the domestic economy, through the use of parastatal corporations, in
producing commodities that it had formerly imported. Additionally, most states on the whole,
70

greatly expanded the provision of social services like education. The state as an organization
grew, and at least at first, could afford to be generous with its citizens. This level of state
spending was justified through nationalism or even the rhetoric of African socialism in a diverse
range of states, regardless of their ideological predisposition. African states were large,
interventionist entities.
In most states this pattern changed overnight as the state was forced to shrink in size and
to become more efficient – a process that was and continues to be the subject of protracted
negotiations between African states and international organizations controlled primarily by the
West. Ghana, for instance, massively cute state spending but made sure to safeguard state control
over its cocoa sector. Cote D’Ivoire attempted to do the same, though the state was foricibly
expelled from the sector following a failed cocoa embargo. Kenya on the other hand, became
adept at maneuvering around inconvenient aspects of liberalization and even now is under
pressure to continue the process of privatizing its parastatals. In all states, to various degrees,
liberalization is a protracted process.
I propose that in states that have experienced socialism, the state give greater attention to
preserving institutions that distribute goods and services widely because of social norms and
expectations. While the state may at first eliminate or streamline these institutions as part of
structural adjustment, they quickly return. Of particular importance, more so than bureaucratic
capacity, are institutions capable of delivering funds. Bureaucracies are important to the extent
that they make credible efforts to achieve projects but bureaucratic capacity takes a back seat to
initiating, and carrying out developmental projects even if they are predictably unsuccessful.
What is often important is that the projects are widely made public, and that the regime has
fulfilled its perceive obligation of providing jobs and funds of various sorts to the citizens, even
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if these efforts are in fact short lived. Thus, I propose that a legacy of socialism may be the
preservation of a state form that delivers benefits more widely than what otherwise be expected,
The cases studies will examine whether or not this proposition has any merit.
A second set of ideology related factors revolves around the legacies of socialist
movements and their ability to harness the goodwill, or at least the acquiescence of society in
carrying out developmental work. The primary divergence of socialist economies is an
identifiable disjuncture, where institutions are reconfigured. Socialist regimes rely upon mass
mobilization and often forms of authoritarianism to generate the necessary autonomy to reshape
institutions. In principal, such a pathway to institutional reconfiguration is open to regimes of all
ideological stripes. Furthermore, this autonomy is used to create growth enhancing institutions
that are often of great benefit to the state as an institution, or at leave the regime that is in power.
For African economies, the path of least resistance is often through the extant sectors of the
economy. Thus it is that socialist ideological factors tend toward either increased autonomy or
heightened control of party institutions. I argue that each of these two pathways leads to
institutions that generally, though certainly not always, generate growth through important
export sectors.
The primacy of party organizations tends to lead to facilitate the accumulative aspirations
of elites, who are either in or closely linked to the party; the end result is a clear movement
toward the generation of growth enhancing institutions in the external rather than the internal
sectors of the economy. One of the well known finding from the literature on democratization
suggests that when a party organization exerts authoritarian control before a transition, that
democracy carries with it long term and difficult to extirpate authoritarian tendencies. Such
appears to be the case in Tanzania and Botswana, where there has been no alternation of the
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political party in power since independence. Continuity in the party organization is more likely
to occur when the party enjoys widespread society rooted support. Such an occurance frequently
takes place if the party organization plays a leading role in the independence struggle as occurred
in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Furthermore, in these, and other cases on the continent,
it is much more likely for the party to adopt some form of African socialism to facilitate mass
appeal. In this manner, the dynamics of the party organization influence developmental
trajectories after independence.
The overall impact of the prominence of the prominence of the party organization on
development is the facilitation of externally oriented sectors of the economy. When party
organizations play a leading role within the state personnel are often able to use the state to
facilitate personal accumulation. This trend is common in all African states and is the root of
such concepts as Shivji’s “bureaucratic bourgeoisie.” Development in states with prominent
party organizations, however, differ from the norm in the sense that it is the state as an
organization rather than the economic interests of society rooted actors that truly drives the
accumulative process.
When the party serves as the most important organization through which accumulation
takes place, rising through the ranks is often ties to generating opportunities for party members to
accumulate capital in the private sector. The process is linked closely to individual enrichment.
The goal is not to generate revenues for the state, in order to stay in power – its penetration of
society and its control over economic opportunity already ensure its continuation in power.
Instead, the organization tends to the economic needs of its members. Given the structure of
most African economies, such an act generally involves export agriculture or the involvement of
external capital. Thus, in this manner, the party organizations – often formerly socialist –
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facilitate externally oriented form of development when they play a dominant role within a given
social formation.
The second important independent variable, the presence or absence of a core ethnic
group, also merits greater discussion because while it can be measured statistically it is more
difficult to measure qualitatively. The precise definition of the core ethnic group is in fact quite
simple. A core ethnic group is a group that meets one of two current criteria; either the group is
20% bigger than the next largest ethnic group, or, the group contains more than 50% of the
population. Countries with core ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa are not uncommon, and
many of them reflect quite a large degree of ethnic heterogeneity. The presence or absence of the
core ethnic group has been included as an explanatory variable because of its theorized impact
upon the policy coalition but the causal mechanisms connecting the presence of a core ethnic
group to political outcomes are only hypothesized. Nevertheless, for clarity’s sake, data from
Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999), a well-known classification of the relative size social groups in
Africa, will be used to make a preliminary determination of the absence or presence of a core
group.
Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) break down ethnic groupings into larger regional groups as
well as the smaller sub-groups. This classification tends to fit the work on core ethnic groups at a
conceptual level, for it is most often these groups and the ethno-political cleavages that they
represent that play a key role in processes of institutional creation. The use of this classification
allows real and important dynamics of politics at the national level to be captured. For example,
using another popular classification of ethnic groups on the continent by Fearon (1993), Ghana
does not contain a core ethnic group because the Ashante, who make up a 28% of the population
are not at least 20% larger than the next largest ethnic group, the Mossi-Dagomba, who make up
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roughly 15% of the population. Yet, each population is part of a larger Akan speaking group,
which as the case studies indicate, display both cohesion and the possibility of fragmentation on
key political and social questions. Simply coding the individual groups that make up the larger
Akan ethnic group misses an important conceptual and empirical tendency within Ghanaian
politics. Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) identify the Akan as a large group containing 44% of the
Ghanaian population, while the next largest group is the Ewe, whose members make up roughly
18% of the population. Therefore, I coded Ghana as “1” for the presence of a core ethnic group.
Table 8. States Containing a Core Ethnic Group ,below lists the states containing “core” ethnic
groups.
Table 6. States Containing a Core Ethnic Group
Country
1 Benin
2 Botswana
3 Burkina Faso
4 Burundi
5

Central African
Republic

6 Chad
7

Comoros
8 Equatorial Guinea
9 Eritrea
10 Ethiopia (1993-)
11

Gambia

12 Ghana

Core Group and
% of Pop
Southerners
(70%)
Twsana (80%)
Mossi (50%)
Hutu-Twa (80%)
Banda (31%)
Sara (34%)
Comoros
Muslims (93%)
Fang (85%)
Tigreans (54%)
Oromo (40%)
Mandingo (41%)
Akan (44%)
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2nd Largest Group
Northerners (30%)
Kalanga (8%)
Tutsi (18%)
Riverene/Sango/ Banzeri
(8%); Sara (8%)
Arabs (14%)
Mahore Christians (7%)
Bubi (10%)
Afar (5%)
Amhara (25%)
Fulani (Fula, Peul)
(13.5%)
Mossi-Dagomba, Dagbamba, Mole Dagbani
(16%)

Guinea-Bissau
14 Malawi

Mainlanders
(95%)
Southern (51%)

15

Mande (43%)

13

Mali

16 Mauritania
17 Mauritius
18 Mozambique
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo

28 Uganda
29 Zambia

30 Zimbabwe

Moor (84%)
Indo-Mauritians
(68.4%)
Makua-Lomwe
(38.4%)
Ovambo (49.8%)
Hausa (54%)
North (53%)
Hutu-Twa (90%)
Wolof-Serer(Peul) (82%)
Africans (76%)
North (74.5)
Mainland (97%)
Ewe (44%)
Bantu Peoples
(67.4%)
Bemba
Speakers(Mambwe)
(43%)
Shona (77%)

Cape Verdeans (5%)
Central (41%)
Peul (Fulani) (15%);
Senufo (15%)
Black Africans (Kewri)
(16%)
General population
(28.7%)
Tsonga (23.7)
Kavango (9.4%)
Songhai (24)
South (47%)
Tutsi (10%)
Diola (5)
Whites (13%)
South (25.5)
Zanzibar (3%)
Kabre (23%)
Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and
Sudanic Peoples (32.6%)
Tonga-Ila-Lenje (19%)
Ndebele-Kalanga(Tonga) (20%)

Source: Data from Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999)

Conceptually, this classification remains relevant, as it includes those groups whose large
sizes help to determine policy coalitions. Each of the groups contains smaller subgroups, who
sometimes split along these group lines such as in Ghana, or who sometimes fail to cohere, as in
the case of Tanzania. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that while the classifications used by
the authors mostly refer to larger ethnic groups, they occasionally include geographical
cleavages or relevant religious cleavages. Nevertheless, this distinction is a minor one, as
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regional, sectarian and ethic cleavages all play a role in the seemingly contradictory behavior of
large groups at the national level to both cohere and fragment.
A second important observation about the data is that most states on the continent,
despite the large amounts of ethnic diversity, contain a core group. Given the literature about the
relationships between economic performance and ethnic diversity, this finding is somewhat
surprising. Furthermore, there do not appear to be any obvious connections between the states
listed on the table. Some states, such as Rwanda, simply have one major ethno-political
grouping, while others such as Nigeria are home to an estimated 1,000 different ethnic groups as
subgroups within the larger regional/sectarian/ethnic formations listed above. Furthermore, the
characteristics of these states are quite different. While Rwandan institutions are generally
considered to be conducive to stimulating economic growth, Nigeria’s institutional structures
score much lower. Thus, it is important to remember that presence of a “core” group is posited to
have an impact upon the location of growth enhancing institutions. It is not, however, posited to
have an impact on the ability of states to produce growth enhancing institutions more generally, a
supposition that I will test in the section below.
While it may be easy to measure the presence of a core ethnic group, at least
superficially, clearly identifying the mechanisms associated with their presence may be more
difficult. If a core ethnic group does indeed create more ethnically fragmented associations and
parties, then at the very least there should be identifiable attempts made within policy making to
appeal to members of this group. These factors, in the case studies, will be referred to as corerelated factors, and should represent a departure from policy making. These factors are perhaps
more important than variegated group membership, for example, as finding the composition of
members such as labor unions or trade groups is not only difficult but not necessarily related to
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the causal process. In fact, it is the broad unproductive distributions of the developmental
resources that lead to unproductive patterns of institution making, not necessarily successful
attempts to create successful parties of mass appeal although nothing is to say that such a thing
cannot occur. Most importantly, however, there should see evidence that political and economic
appeals that cut across organizations are more effective than appeals that focus on individual
ethnic communities.
For analytical purposes, the political and economic impact of a core group is measured
against a baseline of states at a similar (successful) level of socio-economic and political
development. The idea is to be able to, broadly speaking, attribute outcomes and/or behaviors to
the presence or absence of such a group rather than other unspecified factors. While this goal is
in fact the better part of the purpose of the dissertation project, I can at least outline the logic of
institution making that characterize core-related factors divergence from a theoretical baseline of
typical policymaking. These factors, at first glance, appear to be nonsensical and/or confounding
unless the political behavior of core groups is taken into account.
Core related factors – that is, the assemblage of motivation’s and micro level policy
decisions tied to the presence of a core ethnic group – produce distinct diffuse forms of service
delivery and institution making. Taken as a whole, they are grounded in contrasting logics and
discordant visions for the allocation of economic values in comparison to the prevailing patterns
of service delivery in societies where a core group is not present. Core-related factors create a
putative logic in institution building, in which state structures are built in regions with the
specific purpose of undermining the political and economic position of elites in the opposition.
Their main purpose is to create programming that liberates local actors from influential elites.
They also tend to enhance the power and efficacy of local elites ties to the regime, as occurs in
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societies where no core group is present, though these processes seldom occur in the same
region. Nevertheless, there is a degree of overlap in the institution making processes tied to corerelated factors and those that are not, though these similarities fail to nullify the wide differences
in the shape and purpose of internally oriented institutions. In fact, the sum total of these efforts
to undermine the opposition through service delivery and its accompanying institutions is a
pattern and a style of institution making in which values are distributed widely but inefficiently.
The logic of economic institution making in most successful African societies, which do
not have the presence of a core group, relies upon incentives for members of a governing
coalition and thus may produce inefficient outcomes. Nevertheless, this logic is also capable of
producing growth enhancing institutions in specific sectors by taking advantage of existing
government capacity and funding that are not being directed equally across the country. In these
societies, key constituencies in particular are rewarded with economic goods. There is no doubt
that waste and inefficiency exist with such practices, which also by nature, attempt to curry favor
with local elites who have decided to support the regime. One only needs to turn to the front
page of any African newspaper to see ample evidence of governmental waste, inefficiencies, and
outright corruption. Yet, there is also the prospect that funds will be used productively by elites,
a less than remote possibility given the fact that the logic of this system of service delivery does
not award benefits to members of the opposition. In other words, because institution making and
service delivery tends to neglect rather than to spend funding and government capacity on
regions that are home to the opposition, an opportunity emerges for the possibility of growth
enhancing policy and institutions to take shape where there is a particular demand for them. Such
a demand does not occur at all times, but it is more likely to be successful met in instances where
the state is not already overburdened.
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The contrasting logic produced by core-related factors is grounded within the
characteristics of group behavior associated with core groups. Theoretically, two different, and
contradictory, types of outcomes are associated with the presence of a core ethnic group. On the
one hand, a core ethnic group can use its combined influence to create group specific policy,
such as directing development projects towards areas inhabited by the group. Such an occurrence
is particularly common if economic and ethnic cleavages overlap (Horowitz, 1985). Rwanda,
immediately after independence fits such a scenario. Here, German and Belgian colonialism had
helped not only to shape and six in place conceptions of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic identities, but it
had also provided far greater social and economic benefits to Tutsis who were treated as the
inheritors of the colonial state. Under such a set of circumstances, it is perhaps not a surprise that
political mobilization tended to occur along ethnic lines, given the overlapping socio-economic
and political cleavages dominated Rwandan political economy. However, as Elischer (2013)
points out, solidarity amongst members of the same ethnic group is by no means given. Thus, a
second scenario points to the idea that the core ethnic group would fragment, as rival politicians
within the same group competed against one another, forming alliances that cut across ethnic
cleavages. And as politics is often the terrain of politically contingent alliances in many cases it
would behoove political actors to attract members away from the dominant group. My
hypotheses essentially adds another condition to these two observations, namely, that a Marxist
or socialist developmental program or a legacy of such an experience, makes it more likely the
core ethnic group to fragment, resulting in the high salience of class based rather ethnically based
politics.
Finally, it is important to note that ethnic fragmentation plays an important role in the
effects attributed to the presence or absence of a core ethnic group. In situations of high ethnic
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fragmentation, where a core ethnic group does not exist, politics often develops into competition
involving ethnic alliances. Thus, in Nigeria, we see that politics has traditionally involved
conflict between the three largest ethnic groups (Huasa-Falani, Igbo, Yoruba), none of which can
be considered a core ethnic group. The vast number of smaller ethnic groups in the country
inevitably align with one of the bigger groups, creating ethnic, regional and sectarian political
cleavages. This type of majoritarian system is clearly different from the case of the Akan in
Ghana, or the Mande in Mali, groups that clearly appear to be the core of a constellation of
smaller ethnic groups, and in which membership of opposing political organizations inevitably
involves members of the core group. Having no chance of defeating the core group, smaller
ethnic groups instead align with factions of the core group. Thus, in many situations the presence
of a core ethnic group takes place within an environment of modest ethnic fractionalization and
leads to low levels of ethnic tension surrounding politics.

Elaborating on the Definition of a Core Group
The conventional definition of a core group, based in numerical characteristics (Elischer 2013;
Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999) is somewhat unsatisfying in that it leaves as a mystery the most
important aspect of core groups, their political behavior. Simply elaborating the political
behavior of core groups, however, is somewhat difficult, as one of the main purposes of this
dissertation is a further exploration of this very concept. While a full elaboration of core groups
at this time may lack some degree of nuance, it is possible at least to create a clearer sense of
what makes a likely core group. Core groups appear to have somewhat unique characteristics
that account for their levels of cohesion and tendency to fragment. In a word, a core group
presents a kind of malleable block, that generally coheres, but can also be fractured; it is more
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than a simple mathematical expression. While large, macro level identities may exist in many
states, the simple act of existing, in and of itself, is by no means sufficient to generate the levels
of cohesion needed to create some semblance of a core group. Instead, a core group is
characterized as much by the forces that unite it, as it is by the perception of numerical weight
within a given state.
The very conception of a core group is rooted in some sort of shared perception of
numerical size. Yet, it is unclear that size alone is responsible for this quality of being a “core”
group. Thus, as was particularly true for regional groupings which may represent a large
proportion of the population, but which may not contain sufficient centrifugal forces to cohere in
any meaningful way, thus population size alone is unlikely to produce the entity known as a core
group.
A major assumption of this conception of a core group is that there is a reasonable
expectation of a certain degree of within-group fragmentation. In other words, I assume the core
group is composed of different constituencies, some of whom take a slightly different stand on
key questions and thus might defect from the larger group at any time. This assumption is viable
in the African context because of the sheer number of ethnic groups as well as the general degree
of horizontality among groups. In other words, groups on the whole tend to have a perception of
relative equality, as institutionalized control of the state seldom rests exclusively with one group.
Compare this situation to United States, for example, where institutionalized control of the state
has largely rested with Americans of European heritage since its inception, although the extent to
which such a claim is true of the contemporary U.S. can certainly be debated.
Core groups appear to be the result of social and economic linkages, rather than just one
or the other. For the Akan in Ghana, for example, ethnolinguistic similarities link the members of
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this larger ethnic formation together. Portions of this larger group are also linked through
traditional leadership, in this case, through the Asantehene, at least for the Asante. The
leadership of the region’s chiefs, however, whether Asante or not, has historically hinged not
upon the power of traditional titles but upon control over economic assets like valuable land to
be used in the cultivation of cocoa. The Akan appear to be a clear instance of a core group, and it
should be no surprise that numerical factors alone do not appear to be responsible for its
formation but instead a complex intertwining of regional ethno-linguistic and economic factors,
together with aspects of traditional leadership. A discussion of countries where core groups are
countries where core groups are present, as well as instances where a numerical threshold is met
but where a core group is unlikely to be present, can help to illuminate the concept.
The most clear-cut cases of core groups have overlapping sources of cohesion, and they
almost always have sources of fragmentation as well. Fragmentation is not necessarily the
defining characteristic of these groups, but it appears to be a more or less natural consequence of
any group with such a large size. These tendencies are clearly seen with the Akan ethnolinguistic group, with several forces of both cohesion and fragmentation In Ghana, the Akan
ethnolinguistic group is itself fragmented, yet has multiple sources of cohesion This situation is
similar to that of the Oromo in Ethiopia a group that makes up 40% of the population. The
Oromo are united by ethnolinguistics similarity, and shared history but they also fragmented into
smaller subgroups and/or clans, which are often reinforced by overlapping class cleavages. The
Shona, in Zimbabwe, who make up 77% of the population, are also similarly affected by the
cohesive forces of shared history and traditional institutions. Nevertheless, the Shona are also
fragmented into subgroups that sometimes enter in contentious relations with one another. Each
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of these groups are large in the sense that they meet the numerical threshold for a core group, but
they also contain sociological forces that foster cohesion despite their fragmentary tendencies.
The term “core group” does not, in some cases at least, automatically translate into an
ethnicity. Indeed, it is possible that racial groupings or even regional identities can become core
groups. The manner in which a regional grouping coheres, however, may very well involve
ethnicities that have taken root in pre-colonial social formations. The northern regions of
Nigeria, for example, are a likely core group. The areas were tied together through the Sokoto
Caliphate, a pre-colonial empire that mostly ruled regions inhabited by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic
group. This group is one of the largest of Nigeria, but it is not, in and of itself, a core group. The
Hausa Fulani exist within a region composed of numerous smaller ethnic groups. The structure
of Nigerian federalism often pits these smaller groups against portions of the Hausa Fulani.
Nevertheless, the northern region as a whole is bound together by both the nature of the agrarian
economy, and the fact that the region relies on developmental funding that is tied to the
extraction of oil from portions in the south of the country. The region, with its countervailing
centripetal and centrifugal forces is most likely a candidate to be considered a core group.
Some groups like northern Nigerians that may meet the numerical threshold of a core
group, however, ultimately lack the cohesive forces to make them a core group. Scarritt and
Mozaffar (1999), for example, classify South Africans of African descent as a socially and
politically important group, comprising 76% of the population. Nevertheless, there is little to
suggest that this group contains sufficient coherence to act as a core group. Africans in South
Africa are fractured by Ethnicity, class, geography, language, and even conceptions of race.
Apart from the struggle against apartheid, there are few, if any ongoing factors that would
balance out the much greater tendency toward fragmentation. Similarly, it is unlikely that the
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concept of a “mainlander” carries any significance as a core group in Tanzania. Indeed, this
dissertation will examine the case of Tanzania in greater detail to test the impact of a diverse but
equitable distribution of economic assets as well as the legacy of past nation building upon the
formation of lack thereof of a core group. Thus, we can say that while a numerical threshold is a
necessity for a core group, it is not sufficient to create the balance of cohesion and fragmentation
that characterizes core groups.

Methods, Data and Case Selection
I utilize the natural advantages of case study research to contribute to a general theory of African
development. The specific contribution of this project revolves around understanding the
intersections of ideology, ethnicity and the legacies of postcolonial regimes. These processes are
both complex and tightly intertwined. While it may be possible to identify patterns such as the
relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth, discussing the actual causal
mechanisms involved in such correlations is in fact quite difficult and requires detailed analysis.
By starting with case study, I first attempt to uncover the complexity of interactions in order to
shed light on new and perhaps unforeseen causal chains. Doing so takes advantage of the ability
of careful case study to bring conceptual validity and clarity to an analysis, to uncover new
mechanisms and potentially to generate new hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005). These
insights can then be applied and tested in order to inform a more generalizable theory.
This project is thus an exercise in theory building, one which starts from the assumption
that effective institutions in the developing world requires consensus at the elite level (Waldner,
1999), and that society is often capable of exercising its influence so that such consensus does
not emerge (Migdal 1988). Furthermore, I argue that history and geography may shape
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institution making in Africa in ways that are unique even in the developing world. Starting from
these two important points of departure, my method of theory building proceeds by focusing on a
means of comparison that will provide valuable data on the differing trajectories of successful
African countries, paying particular attention to complex and under conceptualized interactions
of causal variables.
Many different pathways may ultimately lead to elite consensus and effective institutions.
Yet, if the goal of the project is to formulate relevant theory about countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, then some causal pathways are more likely to occur than others. War making was central
to the European experience of development, sculpting the organizational profile of an effective
state. In Africa, with the exception of Rwanda, war making has seldom led to institutional
efficiency. And even here, Rwandan state capacity as evidenced through the efficient
marshalling, acquisition, and use of resources during war is likely due to the peculiarities of the
Rwandan state - a relatively flat and compact geography that has historically provided the state
with greater ease of access to its people and comparatively more effective levels of social
control. Indeed, enhanced state capacity played a central role in the Rwandan genocide of 1994,
which saw between 500,000 and 1,000,000 members of the Tutsi ethnic group killed primarily
through the use of rudimentary technology such a machetes in the span of roughly three months
(Straus 2008). This tragedy of course occurred long before the conflict with the Congo – a war
which for many theorists gave rise to enhanced Rwandan state capacity. Thus, a generalizable
theory about African development will focus on other relevant factors in lieu of armed conflict
between states on the continent.
In order to avoid discussing unique and non-generalizable cases, I place an emphasis on
discussing cases that share common attributes with most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These
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characteristics include, but are not limited to the following: 1) colonial conquest which reshaped
previous political boundaries but generally left in place indigenous institutions, albeit in changed
form; 2) a relatively difficult physical geography that made the extension of the state apparatus
problematic; 3) a profusion of ethnic groups far and above other regions in the world; 4) the
predominance of lineage relations before colonialism. These factors impact the most likely paths
to African development. Additionally, they provide explanations for unusual cases, such as
Rwanda’s unusual levels of state capacity. Colonialism bequeathed to Rwanda a territory
encompassing the boundaries of a pre-colonial kingdom that is flat, small in size, conducive to
the extension of state authority and home to only two major ethnic groups. Rwanda’s unique
developmental trajectory is most likely due to some or all of these outlying factors. In order to
avoid bias as a result of case selection, therefore, I choose cases whose historical, economic and
sociological characteristics resemble most other African states.
Given my theoretical goal of examining differing and complex causal pathways a
comparison between Ghana and Kenya is almost ideal. These countries provide two distinct
socio-historical perspectives from which to analyze the emergence of successful developmental
outcomes. Furthermore, there is also variation between these cases; Kenya was more successful
than Ghana up until about the mid-to late 1980s while Ghana has been more successful during
the 2000-2010 period. Methodologically, these two cases provide an excellent starting point to
examine complicated processes that may involve interactions of important independent variables.
Furthermore, they share many of the attributes of countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as their
colonial histories, levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and precolonial organization.
While the method of case selection no doubt contains the potential for novel theoretical
contributions, it is also, unfortunately, susceptible to selection bias, requiting the addition of
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secondary cases. The whole thrust of the research design, as well as the research question, lends
itself to selection bias by choosing cases based on the dependent variable of growth enhancing
institutions. Failing to examine cases where these institutions do not take shape, particularly in
cases that resemble the primary cases in some important dimension, carries with it the danger of
failing to fully grasp, or worse, mischaracterizing the causal variables in question. A second
consequence of selecting on the dependent variable is the validation of a causal narrative before
it is truly tested. Theorizing about these two cases, where both independent variables and
outcomes vary in a predictable manner, is not a rigorous test of the hypothesis but instead, a
“straw in the wind” – an analysis that notes the presence of causal variables and corresponding
outcomes. While the purpose of this dissertation is to build theory by starting with case specific
questions, and simply to test a theoretical hypothesis, finding a valid answer to the research
question requires a more rigorous test. Additional cases can address these shortcomings; some
degree of selection on the dependent variable is still necessary as an instance in which growth
enhancing institutions did not take shape must be explicitly explored. Nevertheless, secondary
cases should be chosen primarily based on theoretically interesting similarities or differences
with the primary cases, revolving primarily but not exclusively around the independent variable.
The method of case selection must also take into account omitted variable bias as a twocase analysis cannot possibly account for all relevant causal variables. A comparison between
Ghana and Kenya, for example, cannot possibly account for possible variation linked to colonial
heritage, as they are both British colonies. At least one of the secondary cases, therefore, should
have underwent at least one other form of colonialism.1 As it is never possible to predict all of
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Though Tanzania was in fact founded as a German colony, the period of British colonialism both lasted longer and
had a more profound impact upon Tanzanian institutions prior to independence.
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the relevant causal variables, simply increasing the number of cases analyzed limits to the
greatest extent possible, omitted variable bias.
While secondary cases are certainly an analytical necessity, the limitations of qualitative
analysis impose a strict limit on the number of cases under analysis, particularly given the close
intertwining of causal variables; case selection therefore will focus on both case that alleviate the
shortcomings of a two-case design, as well as privileging those cases that share theoretically
interesting background conditions, which may serve to create more concrete linkages between
the cases. For example, while most states on the continent undergo and experience international
markets in agriculture and the power relations that are involved in them, the cocoa market
contains a host of peculiarities all of its own in terms of marketing, processing and storage. As
Ghana is one of the largest cocoa producers in the world, at least one of the secondary cases
should be a major cocoa producer. Additionally, given the role of ideology in this project, case
selection should be focused on cases with a clear ideological legacy originating in the first postindependence regimes. As this project develops theory through qualitative case analysis
revolving around complex developmental narratives, discussion of additional cases occurs from
time to time. Yet, apart from two secondary cases, discussion of additional cases is, for the most
part limited.2
Cote D’Ivoire represents a case that clearly appears to be likely to contribute to the
theoretical and empirical findings of this dissertation; it possesses a rare mix of characteristics
that contributes to research design. Cote D’Ivoire has historically been one of the very few
countries on the continent to adopt an explicitly capitalist approach to development.

2

One additional case – Nigeria – will be briefly analyzed in order to shed light on the causal pathways hinted at in
the quantitative portions of the project.
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Furthermore, it was colonized by the French, unlike the other states discussed in this dissertation,
which were colonized by the United Kingdom. Last, Cote D’Ivoire, to a much greater degree
than contemporary Kenya, Ghana or other comparatively wealthy African states such as Senegal,
has struggled to build effective institutions. Like Kenya, Cote D’Ivoire does not possess a core
ethnic group, even though one of its ethnic groups – the Akan – is the same as the core group in
Ghana.
Tanzania, at least at first glance, does not appear to be a particularly good match for the
research design. Like the main cases, it underwent colonialism under British rule. Like Ghana, it
is home to relatively effective economic institutions, though by no means is it one of the best
performing states on the continent. Tanzania’s heavily agricultural based economy resembles
that of Ghana, though it lacks a cocoa sector. It is involved in some of the portions of the rural
economy as Kenya such as tea and coffee production but lack Kenya’s overall like of
industrialization, particularly in agroindustry, to say nothing of more technologically advanced
sectors like information technology. Tanzania appears to be a relevant candidate for selection as
a secondary case, but nothing more until its unique role in the history African state building
under a socialist developmental ideology is taken into consideration. Ujaama socialism, unlike
conceptions of African socialisms promulgated in states such as Senegal, produced consistent
policy over a period of roughly twenty years. These years in fact saw the transformation of
Tanzanian urban and rural life, as the state attempted to shape new patterns of economic
accumulation. No other country on the continent has such a track records, despite at first
attempting similar programs. As this project explores that long term consequences of ideological
choice, inclusion of the Tanzanian case is a near necessity. The case also introduces variables
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such as the consequences of durable party structures that the other cases do not necessarily
address.
The secondary cases thus make a unique and important contribution to the project as a
whole. While a discussion of other cases such as Senegal, Uganda, Mali or others would
certainly be worthwhile, for the moment, in the interest of both time and feasibility, I am limiting
the section of secondary cases to these highly relevant states. The method of case selection in the
qualitative portions of the project attempts to account for bias, while selecting cases most likely
to produce generalizable theory.
As theory building is the primary occupation of the dissertation, the research design is
freed from some of the stricter constraints of uncovering necessary and sufficient conditions in
order to test the hypothesis. The process of economic development and institutional formation is
of such historically contingent complexity that the various complex pathways leading to
outcomes are of greater interest than necessary or sufficient conditions, at least at this stage of
the research project, where the workings of potential causal mechanisms are at this point not
fully understood. Given this emphasis on understanding causal pathways, the case selection and
the qualitative methodologies applied will rely upon the creation of analytical historical
narrative, rather than a careful leveraging of case selection and structured focused comparison to
uncover the smoking gun of necessary and sufficient conditions for a given outcome. The
conditions that such an analysis should test, are at present, simply not sufficiently known. Thus,
the hypotheses advanced are designed in particular to test whether the role that the independent
variables of ideological legacy and presence or absence of a core group play in the analysis is in
fact determinative, and if such a role does in fact account for the differences we see in the cases.
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Such an analysis must needs come as a precursor to more fine-grained studies that could
potentially provide a hard test of more specific hypotheses.
The Configurational Historical Approach to Case Study
The measurement strategy of the dependent variable and its relationship to the independent
variables dictate my approach to the case studies. I am interested in the evolution of institutions
over a period of several decades. The dependent variable, then, is measured by aggregating and
analyzing cumulative events that affect institutional effectiveness. Individual events such as new
hiring practices within the civil service, or evidence of corruption within the central bank, are
certainly important but they will be discussed in terms of their cumulative impact at various
points of time. Furthermore, the manner in which the dependent variable is measured negates the
idea of a linear causation. While it may be possible to measure the impact of one independent
variable X upon the dependent variable Y for one event, it is unlikely that X impacts Y in quite
the same way each time. The growing political and economic power of indigenous capitalists
may not be apparent by studying one event of interest, such as a change in fiscal policy.
However, it may very well become clear when analyzing 10 different outcomes. Thus, one
particular event may not reveal much about the changing nature of state society relations that
contribute to different developmental outcomes, but it is possible to draw conclusions from a
series of events in the aggregate.
Studying the evolution of institutions over the long-term lends itself to an approach
referred to by Hall (1999) as configurational history. A configurational historical approach
assigns causation by using theory to analyze the cumulative impact of events. This approach
moves beyond simple aggregation by focusing on configurations of socioeconomic and political
forces that produce particular outcomes. In this case, I am studying both the maintenance of
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growth inhibiting state forms as well as the slow transitioning from less efficient institutional
forms to more developmentally ones, through an evolution of changing social norms and
attitudes related to the composition of the policy coalition. Theory dictates the sources of data
that the inquiry will draw upon as well as its ultimate goal. This approach to case study allows
for an efficient and effective synthesis of historical events, paying particular attention to
important breaking points that may yield valuable information about causation.
The analytical focus of the case studies is on the evolution of policy coalitions and their
relationship with the state apparatus. The term policy coalition, as discussed earlier, carries with
it analytical and theoretical weight. A policy coalition refers to supporters of a given regime; this
group is defined by its composition, policy preferences, as well as relations among the groups
constitute it addition to its relationship with other groups within society. Furthermore, many of
these relations are maintained and governed through the use of state power. Policy coalitions
thus represent a particular configuration of social forces and their attendant state society
relations. I assume that socially based policy coalitions, for the most part, change very slowly.
Regimes generally work hard to retain their followers, meaning that politics becomes a
competition between different blocks of supporters, who may attempt to win over individuals
and groups whose loyalty contested. Thus, while regimes may change, the society rooted
competition between factions retains a large degree of continuity from year to year.
Guiding this analysis is a neo-Marxist conception of the state as a “social relation” that is
reflected in its institutional and organizational profile. Within this analytical framework is an
understanding that the state at certain points may also enjoy relative autonomy from society. This
perspective occurs in both pluralist accounts of the state, such as that by Skocpol (1985) and
Rueschemeyer (1985), as well as with more traditional Marxist accounts of autonomy such as
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that found in Marx’s (1978) “The 18th Brumaire of Lois Napoleon.” Each of these works exhibits
an understanding that autonomy is not necessarily a given but may emerge at certain historical
instances, and that periods of greater autonomy may in fact lead to lesser autonomy as part of a
bargaining process. Yet, my theoretical inclinations towards neo-Marxist state theory places my
account of policy coalitions not within the institutional matrix of the state in Ghana and Kenya,
but within the interplay of society rooted political competition, even if institutions may
sometimes modify or alter this competition. Thus, in accounting for the dynamism of the state in
Ghana in the early 1980s I focus not only on Rawlings the statesman, or the Rawlings regime,
but the permissive conditions within society that allowed for such dynamic state autonomy to
emerge.
My approach to configurational history attempts to take both societal forces, as well as
the agency of political actors and the state into account when describing causation. At times its
emphasis on social class and other important groups within society bears some resemblance to
classic socio-historical works such as Perry Andersen’s (1974) Lineages of the Absolutist State
or Barrington Moore’s (1968) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant
in the Making of the Modern World. Andersen describes the emergence of modern state forms as
a product of both an anarchic, war prone international system and the emergence of new classes
(the bourgeoisie). The ultimate shape of state institutions depended on the relative strength and
the degree of development of these new emerging classes in relation to the declining but still
viable feudal order. In a similar manner, Barrington Moore’s (1968) analysis of the root causes
of differing regime types focuses on the relative power of social classes and processes of alliance
making. Underlying Moore’s work is the assumption that stronger social groups remake state
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institutions in a manner that serves their interests. This same assumption, to an extent, is present
in my analysis of policy coalitions.
However, while much of my analysis will be rooted in discussing the relative power of
social groups to explain outcomes, I also attempt to account for the agency of social actors. In
this manner, the analysis will resemble Leubbert’s (1991) Liberalism, Fascism or Social
Democracy, which attempts to account for European regime types during the interwar period.
Leubbert finds that most regime types were the product of different class based alliances but in
some cases he explains that the actions of social actors disrupt these structural tendencies. In
Denmark, for example, the failure of social democrats to mobilize the working class led to a
unexpected outcomes. Like Leubbert’s analysis, therefore, I will also pay attention to how the
actions of social actors may create unique or contingent outcomes that might not be expected or
foreseen by structural analysis.
While I take into account both structure and agency, my method should not be confused
with the accounts that place state actors and the state as an organization as the primary foci of
analysis. State centric accounts of African politics have been the norm rather than the exception
to the study of the continent, and include such well-known works as Bates’ (1980) Markets and
States in Tropical Africa. In order to clarify my approach I compare it to two well-known works
of this tradition, The Criminalization of the State in Africa by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) and
Africa Works by Chabal and Deloz (1999). Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) ask why state
sponsored criminal activity grew to such prominence during the 1990s in Africa while Chabal
and Deloz question why formal political rules and institutions are so weak in many African
countries. Like my configurational approach, the authors synthesize events taking place over
roughly a 10 to 15 year period in order to draw conclusions about the changing nature of the state
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in Africa. For Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) the lack of foreign investment in African countries
led to the necessity of finding other sources of revenue often through illicit means, or even
sometimes in coordination with criminal networks. Necessity thus drove state actors to greatly
inhibit the growth producing potential of state institutions. For Chabal and Deloz, on the other
hand, economic downturn and the lack of alternative sources of revenue led leaders to employ
political disorder stemming from a lack of conflict mediating institutions, as a political
instrument. For these authors, weak institutions may have been a consequence of a lack of state
resources, but they were also promoted by leaders searching for ways to maintain power. Thus,
in these two works we see state actors responding to a changing external environment and
thereby shaping state institutions. The primary focus of the analysis is on the means by which
actors within government, as part of a broader survival strategy, negatively impact the
institutional effectiveness of the state.
My configurational approach differs from these authors in that it places state actors
within the broader context of state society relations. Utilizing this approach shifts the focus from
the actions of actors within the state to the ways in which these actors are constrained by society,
or the situations in which they develop greater amounts of relative autonomy. While Bayart, Ellis
and Hibou (1999) spend time discussing the responses of state actors to crises, my approach
would provide a more in-depth treatment of the expansion of illicit trade and the types of new
political actors that emerged. For Chabal and Deloz’s analysis, on the other hand, my approach
would spend more time discussing how economic downturns affected the relative influence of
social groups, propelling the concerns of less developmentally minded actors to forefront. Thus,
the object of my analysis is not only the state as an organization, but the different means through
which classes, class fractions, and groups within society impact state institutions. While the
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authors rigidly assert that outcomes are the result of rational state actions, my approach allows
the priorities of a configuration of social forces to be more clearly conceptualized, and the social
conditions that facilitate or restrict state autonomy to be analyzed separately from the decision
making priorities of the state itself. The result is a more careful delineation of state society
relations that takes into account how changing dynamics within both the state and society impact
institutions, rather than the rigid assertion that the outcomes witnessed are simply the result of
actions undertaken by rational state actors.
In the case studies on Kenya and Ghana I will therefore spend time discussing not only
how the state responds to social pressures, but also the formation of group preferences within
society and coalition making processes of groups. Thus my discussion will touch upon topics
such as the political activities of large planter associations, the concerns and relative influence of
labor, activities of chambers of commerce and the degree to which the peasantry and rural elites
support or oppose a given regime. I attempt to link my evaluations of relative group strength to
these outcomes, with an understanding that there may in fact be considerable time lag, and that at
certain times state actors may be able to resist the power of important social groups.
Given this project's preoccupation with transformations of policy coalitions and state
society relations, my analysis will become most detailed in its discussion of points leading up to
and following important critical junctures. Hall refers to these key events as "breaking points;"
times that mark the transition from one structural configuration to another. In Ghana, the early
events of the Rawlings regime mark one such critical juncture, given the dramatic before and
after differences in economic development and political stability. In Kenya, the 1982 attempted
coup d'état against the Moi regime represents a significant breaking point. Here, for the first
time, the regime faced significant resistance from small business owners and professionals; such
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an event provoked a change of course as an alliance between these groups and the masses would
have destabilized the regime. The coup would ultimately reshape the policy coalition by placing
the concerns of these formerly alienated groups in a more prominent position in regard to the
regime. The case studies will thus synthesize events taking place over decades but the events
surrounding these two breaking points will receive the most detailed discussion. Furthermore,
data collection in both countries will focus on these two important historical moments.
Gender as an Analytical Lens
Finally, an analysis focusing on gender and the state as it pertains to development enriches the
larger configurational analysis by drawing attention to the manner in which the state creates in
and outgroup boundaries surrounding the social and policy coalitions. As a general rule, in
creating institutions specifically dealing with gender and service delivery, states comport
themselves in much the same manner as when they make determinations about who is and is not,
a valued member of a given social or policy coalition. Gender is a particularly useful analytical
lens, first and foremost because women make up 50% of the labor force n most Africa states.
Equally important, however, is the fact that women in rural regions, on the whole lack responsive
political representation. Political figures seldom search out the support of women in rural
regions, nor do they often appeal directly to women. Furthermore, despite attempts to increase
the number of women in politics, there remain very few. The political vulnerability of women
means that attempts to expand or contract service delivery are most clearly seen as they impact
women in rural regions. Thus, to truly understand how the state interacts with its rural
populations, we must understand its conduct toward women. I would expect states with a large
social coalition to have a more equitable and inclusive stance toward women working in
agriculture. On the other hand, I would expect states that struggle to attain a sufficient amount of
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resources to maintain the loyalty of the social coalition, to be more likely to restrict service
delivery toward women as a means of increasing the material prosperity of men, in hope of
maintaining loyalty. A gendered analysis, therefore, should highlight the central trends and
tendencies that determine patterns of development.

Data
This project will employ many different types of data in order to chart the progression of
policy coalitions over time. Given the theoretical conceptualization of state society relations at
the heart of this project, however, economic data is particularly useful to illustrate the tendencies
and interests of groups within the policy coalition. For example, while it may be possible to
argue that economic outcomes are due to the rising influence of particular social groups, cocoa
exporters for example, economic data about the growth of the cocoa sector in comparison to
other sectors may indicate if there was in fact an empirical basis for this assertion. Economic
data can also help to illustrate the class-based interests of social groups. For example, in his
analysis of the emergence socialism in Tanzania, Shivji (1976) first discusses antagonistic
economic relations between emerging indigenous Tanzanian capitalists and larger, more wellestablished and often Asian owned commercial plantations. He then goes on to illustrate how this
situation ironically led indigenous capital to support socialist policy, despite its insistence on
state ownership. Shivji’s analysis uses economic data about relations of production to describe
how the emergence of institutions normally inimical to capital was actually supported by it.
Similarly, my method will utilize data relating to the economy, differing economic sectors, and
differing relations of production between classes, class fractions, and other groups. Much of the
economic data is available through governmental sources, or organizations such as the World
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Bank. I will also take advantage of library research to identify relevant secondary sources and
analysis.
Secondary source data related to descriptions of events encompassing the dependent
variable will also be particularly important to the analysis. In synthesizing historical events over
a number of years it will be important to discuss details of important individual cases. While my
primary focus will be on the two breaking points described above, a wide reading of secondary
source material and analysis should reveal other events that merit discussion as well. These
events should either confirm or indicate changes within state society relations at a given point in
time. Data collection will not thus include newspaper accounts, and analysis contained in
periodicals. I plan on visiting the University of Ghana in Legon and the University of Nairobi in
order to consult copies of relevant periodicals.
A third important source of data pertains to the interests of social groups themselves. One
of the goals of the analysis is to chart the evolution of policy coalitions, paying attention to the
preferences and relative influence of prominent classes or groups. An important source of
information, therefore, is the records and archives of such groups within civil society. Whenever
available, therefore, this project draws up literature published by trade groups and other
institutions, in order to chart their changing preferences over time. Access to this material is
spotty at best, but nevertheless it can provide snapshots into the changing landscape of the
preferences of important political actors.
Lastly, whenever possible, this project draws upon data from both formal and informal
interview conducted from April to September of 2016, in both Accra and Nairobi. While archival
documentation of group preferences and concerns is often difficult to come by, interviews
provide valuable insights into the current preferences, priorities, and bargaining processes of
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civil society groups. Interview subjects were largely drawn from organizations that play an
influential role in helping to set policy preferences, such as the Ghana Investment Promotion
Centre or the Kenya Private Sector Alliance.

Additional Methods
Configurational history is well suited to slow moving causes and outcomes. In Kenya, for
example, a number of slowly building changes within society and the state resulted in
increasingly more efficient and effective institutions. While these events may have been
triggered by an attempted coup d'état in 1982, they unrolled in a gradual manner. Thus both the
cause and the outcome appear to be long term slow moving processes. In Ghana, however, we
see what might be called a punctuated equilibrium. Slow moving trends within society appear to
have reached a threshold where dramatic change became possible. In this case, causation is a
slow moving process but the effect takes place within a very short amount of time. A
configurational historical approach is not well suited to describing the events that led to the
emergence of more effective institutions in Ghana, although it may do an excellent job of
analyzing the structural conditions that facilitated their emergence and explaining why these
institutions proved to be durable over time. Thus, in the Ghanaian case, more so than for the case
study of Kenya, an alternative method is needed to chart the events surrounding the emergence
of neoliberalism under the Rawlings regime in the early to mid-1980s.
The emergence and maintenance of effective institutions in Ghana is of considerable
theoretical importance to understanding development in Africa. Thus, an accurate description of
how the process occurred is necessary. Theoretically, however, the reasons why Ghana made a
turn towards neoliberalism are less interesting than why the particular institutional profile the
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Rawlings regime created would ultimately prove to durable and effective. The designing of well
thought out institutions is actually quite common in the developing world; what is rare is for
these institutions to function as they were originally designed. Thus, my goal is not to explain the
decision making at the heart of the Rawlings regime but to piece together a detailed description
of the processes that produced these institutions. Such an approach necessitates the use of
process tracing as a method.
Process tracing in this project will take the form of constructing a detailed narrative; Hall
(1999) refers to this approach as "specific history." Specific history differs from configurational
history and that it forgoes constructing a theoretical and analytical framework to synthesize
historical processes (p. 211). While theory still informs the themes and events included in the
description, the end result is not a story of causation but they "detailed narrative or story
presented in the form of chronicle that purports to show light on how one event came about"
(George, Bennett p. 210). The main strength of this method lies in the level of relevant detail it
provides. It charts the progression of important events but focuses on the end results. I am
interested in the process by which events unfold, in a clear sequence, as a consequence of actions
by the state. After tracing the series of events that led to the emergence of new institutions in
Ghana, I will return to my configurational method of policy coalition analysis in order to look at
the processes that sustained or possibly altered the institutions created during the Rawlings
revolution. Since the goal of the narrative is not to trace patterns of decision-making or the
influence of new thinking within the regime, the amount of data required for this type of specific
history is modest. I will rely primarily upon secondary sources for this part of the project,
although I will also attempt to draw upon relevant governmental records if feasible. However,
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while the use of process tracing offsets some of the weaknesses of a configurational historical
approach, other potential problems with the analysis remain.
A potentially serious drawback of the research design of the project is its reliance upon
two cases. The main limitation of a two case comparison to generate theory is the potential to
introduce bias in the results. This problem is compounded because my method of case selection
has made no attempts to control for differences and similarities that could potentially be
responsible for at least some of my findings. For example, both Ghana and Kenya are British
colonies; thus, some of the conclusions I draw may be due to colonial heritage rather than
ideological legacies or differing dynamics of ethnic politics. Furthermore, factors that differ in
these two countries such as geography, agrarian structures, landholding patterns and variables
may have an impact upon the analysis. Therefore, in order to contextualize the analysis within
sub-Saharan African, and to guard against omitted variable bias, I will also discuss other cases in
the analysis.
The additional cases should control for potential alternative causal variables. These cases
will attempt to control for potentially unique characteristics of the cases. For example, Ghana's
experience with socialism was not long lasting but instead occurred in fits and spurts. Such a
scenario may very well have contributed to Ghana's unique developmental trajectory. Therefore,
I will also discuss the developmental experiences of the country with a longer more in depth
experience with socialism, Tanzania. Another case that will provide analytical leverage is Côte
d'Ivoire. Unlike Kenya, Côte D’Ivoire was a French colony that retained relatively close ties to
the metropole after independence. However, like Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire has a long-standing
history of a capitalist approach to development Yet Côte D’Ivoire’s economic well-being and
political stability suffered greatly during the 2000-2010 period. Understanding why Kenya
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succeeded while the Côte d'Ivoire failed and helps shed light on whether or not omitted variables
in the Kenyan case are responsible for some of the outcomes under examination. The discussion
of these additional cases can help to minimize the chances that omitted variable bias is disrupting
the analysis.
The comparison of the two primary cases, using additional cases to control for omitted
variable bias, should provide insights that can be tested more broadly using a larger number of
cases. Hypothesis #2b, for example, argues that among countries in sub-Saharan Africa, those
that have experienced five or more years of radical progressive politics since independence are
more likely to produce growth enhancing institutions. In order to test this hypothesis, as well as
any potential insights gleaned from the cases, I utilize the tools of quantitative analysis. In
regards specifically to the hypotheses #2a and #2b, I utilize OLS regression in order to test
correlations the independent variables of ideological legacy, core ethnic group, and patterns of
development. In carrying out the actual analysis, I also create an interactive term dealing with
the presence or absence of a core ethnic group. Data comes from many of the same sources used
to create the institutional effectiveness variable, such as the World Bank, polity, freedom house,
and others.
Quantitative Analysis of Causal Pathways
The quantitative analysis plays a key role in verifying the external validity of the cases, but it is
also plays a larger role in research design as part of a pathway analysis. The analysis of causal
pathways is used to build theory, and it focuses on leveraging information uncovered in case
study to help build theory through quantitative analysis that focuses on causal mechanisms. This
technique is applied when researchers need more information to assess the soundness of theory
that is still in a developmental phase. The method works particularly well when the hypotheses
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are geared towards understanding associations between independent and dependent variables,
that necessitate careful case study to determine the mechanisms by which these variables work.
The qualitative case studies have two primary goals, the first one being to provide a
thorough and accurate answer to the research question and hypotheses while the second is to
generate theory about the process of institutional creation, as it pertains to growth enhancing
institutions in African states. The research questions specifically addresses the question of
institutional creation, and the hypotheses links this process to the presence of absence of a core
group, as well as to the choice of developmental ideology after independence. The case studies,
and the methodology of case selection are designed to test this assertion through methods that
establish an analytical narrative linking the independent and dependent variables. The analytical
narrative in each case is then tested against each of the secondary cases to ensure that the
findings are rooted in empirical reality rather than in carious possible analytical biases. The end
result of this process is a thorough test of the hypothesis but one that perhaps provides somewhat
untested theory about the many in which growth enhancing institutions are created. Yet, the
process of building sound theory involves a research design that utilizes information gained
through case study; only then can hypothesis testing thoroughly and completely contribute to the
elaboration of theory.
Quantitative methods, therefore, can make a significant contribution to both goals of the
dissertation project. Given a more or less accurate conceptualization and operationalization of
the dependent variable, they can provide a clear cur snapshot of the impact of the causal
variables on the dependent variable. More importantly, perhaps, such an analysis can also tell us
about the individual, combine and interactive impact of the independent variables. Nevertheless,
while quantitative analysis may provide a useful test of the hypotheses, if properly designed,
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such an analysis can test specific causal pathways related to the dependent variable. In this case,
the analysis is providing relevant information related to a qualitative test of the hypothesis, rather
than preformation an additional test of the hypothesis.
While it is certainly possible to envision a study, such as this one, beginning with a
quantitative analysis to establish links between the independent and dependent variables, and
then using case study to establish causal mechanisms, such an approach introduces needless
complexity by requiring redundant analysis. Well-designed case study on its own should be able
to provide a hard test of the hypothesis, and moreover one that generates preliminary theory on
institutional creation and change. The advantage of beginning with case study, is to take
advantage of opportunities to refine quantitative analysis, either through inclusion of new
independent variables or in this case, through an operationalization of the dependent variables
that can provide a more useful test of the causal mechanisms. IF there are any unexpected
surprises uncovered through quantitative testing, the additional case study work can be carried
out to explore any discrepancies – a near impossibility of the study begins with quantitative
analysis, from the standpoint of feasibility. Therefore, the dissertation uses hypothesis testing
based on qualitative methods to generate theory. Next, it provides a preliminary test and
elaboration of theory, which adds additional leverage to the research question.
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Chapter 2: Theories of the State and Economic Development
The primary research method employed in this dissertation project is a configurational analysis,
but one drawn heavily from both the pan-African tradition and a neo-Marxist conception of the
state. Both of these terms need clarification, for they differ in important ways from the original
formulation of the concepts from which they draw inspiration. In each case, the concept is
altered to take into account a richer understanding of African societies and the society rooted
economic and political processes that create variation among states. The variation at the center of
this dissertation project is best understood through pan-African and Neo-Marxist lenses, but ones
whose powers of perception and magnification have been adjusted to the African context.
Pan-Africanism, both as an approach to research and ss a larger political and social
movement seeks economic and social justice for the continent in its relations with other regions
of the world. The pan-African movement, as it applies to political economy, seeks regional
integration as a means of generating more robust indigenous industries by creating a larger and
more unified domestic market (Nkrumah 1965). Large internal markets do not simply reclaim
market share for indigenous African companies, they decisively shift production to internal
needs, at least in principle. Over time, this shift would see the region begin to produce finished
goods of a value-added productive process. Thus, for pan-Africanists, internal markets are of
particular importance.
The dissertation’s focus on internally oriented forms of development is rooted in panAfrican aspirations for the creation of a robust market for goods and services and the backward
and forward linkages within the economy that they engender. Yet, despite the obvious
advantages of internally oriented production, it is opposed by a constellation of internal and
external forces.
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The Relational Aspects of the African State
There is an underlying set of pressures and exigencies that drive institutional formation, and by
extension, patterns of development in African states. These enduring patterns reflect growth
enhancing institutions in some sectors of the economy and their perpetual absence in other
sectors. Furthermore, these patterns appear to be resilient, and resistant at least, to even intense
external pressures. These observations point to the idea that enduring forms of society rooted
politics are shaping institutions through which developmental policy is enacted. In other words,
institutions are regulating and maintaining a social relation, or rather hitherto unspecified sets of
social relations.
The conception of the state as a social relation is most well known in neo-Marxist state
theory, drawing off of Marx’s writings in such works as the 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon
(Marx 1978), and being found prominently in Nicos Poulantzas’ (1978) work on social class and
political power in capitalist societies. Poulantzas’s work deals specifically with social class, and
he attempts to explain why despite gains made by the working class over the years, the state
itself remained firmly an instrument of bourgeoisie. For Poulantzas, the institution of the state
itself act as a regulatory structure and framework that enforce the positionality of social classes.
In a capitalist state, the state itself enforces, not day to day issues of governance but the overall
nature of relations between classes. In this manner, the state itself functions as a durable social
structure that regulates the relationships between social classes.
The application of Poulantzas’ ideas to the African context requires a careful reordering
of principals. To be clear, the analysis is no longer strictly neo-Marxist, given the demography
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and level of development of most African states. Unlike in advanced capitalist states, where a
dense arrangement of social classes and class fractions take shape, class structures in. most
countries on the continent are relatively flat. Instead of social classes, one of the main
mechanisms employed within the African context is ethnicity. Conceptions of ethnicity, and
related groupings such as lineage and clan, are in large part contributing factors when trying to
determine access to goods, services, as well as other relevant expressions of the social product.
The primacy of ethnicity over social class changes the fundamental class-based analysis
of the neo-Marxism perspective to one based on the primacy of, or more commonly, the
intractability of relative equality of ethnic groupings. In other words, the analysis seeks to
explain the stability of a particular distribution of economic and political power. Theses
agreements are generally, though not always, embedded into the very structure of the state. An
analysis that draws from the principals of neo-Marxist analysis, therefore, devotes most of its
time to explaining the boundaries of the agreements that constitute the state.
Modernization programs encapsulate the long term, society rooted agreements that
constitute the state in largely rural sub-Saharan Africa. Like the state in capitalist society, the
state in sub-Saharan Africa, where most societies are largely agrarian, contain within their center
durable social agreements that regulate a relationship within a constellation of social groups.
Only through a long-term understanding of these agreements can we have a sense of the
enduring nature of patterns of development that defy the aspirations of external and sometimes
even internal actors.
Neo-Marxist analysis, ironically, provides the durable framework by which we can
understand the modernizing process within states, even while the analysis in its adjusted form
here strictly speaking, is not be confused with a class based one. Both the constrained, relative
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autonomy of the state as well as the durability of institutions that regulate and reproduce key
relationships at the heart of the state, can be best described through a neo-Marxist framework.
Yet, it must be pointed out that this understanding of the state is being applied to ethnic groups
that exist in more or less horizontal configurations cemented through durable agreements.
Configurational analysis, drawn heavily from neo-Marxist frames of analysis, charts these
covenants that ultimately compose the structure of the state.
The dominant literature on economic development tends to treat the process as occurring
uniformly. Modernization theory tended to link economic growth and political institutions
together, noting that they exist within a type of symbiotic relationship (Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1989; Lerner 1958). Thus, economic development mobilized the population, and provided
an impetus for more open political institutions, leading to a process by which strong institutions
and strong growth went hand in hand. The literature on the developmental state, in this regard,
tends to come to some of the same conclusions as modernizing theory, though it emphasizes the
critical role of the state in ensuring that the process continues in the manner laid out by earlier
modernizing theorists (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1985). Thus, the state focuses on institution
building, particularly lean growth enhancing institutions, to ensure that new forms of
participation do not overwhelm the capacities of the state and lead to political decay (Huntington
1968). Theories of the development state take to take a slightly more nuanced view of political
institutions, understanding that at some point political order and economic efficiency have
historically been more important for modernization than the political openness that has
characterized the western experience since the French revolution.
A second branch of literature focuses the origins of political instability and
economic underdevelopment in the global South, using the path dependency of colonial
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institutions to explain relatively uniform political and economic outcomes. Unlike modernization
theory, this literature focuses attention on the manner in which economic development can have
a destabilizing impact, particularly within an environment where political and economic
institutions are not strong, property rights are not protected, and/or the rule of law is
underdeveloped (Bates 2015; Kohli 2004). The major thrust of the work focuses on the fact that
colonialism on the African continent produced inferior institutions than those in other parts of the
world (Kohli 2004; Young 1994). Thus, works such as Huntington's political order in changing
societies, urge states in the global South to focus on developing institutions particularly political
party structures, in order to alleviate the growing pains involved with participation in a changing
global economy.
The project calls into question both the institutional origins of underdevelopment as well
as the uniformity of institution making assumes in all three branches of literature. Both Ghana
and Kenya were home to some of the very best civil societies and bureaucracies on the continent,
and yet well can yell largely maintained these institutions and gone they fell into disrepair as the
state underwent bouts of political instability and military coups. Furthermore, while both Ghana
and Kenya score well on many forms of institutional capacity, there are very different patterns in
terms of the manner in which economic institutions are created in generated in each state. The
process, on the whole, is variegated, something that is not assumed in past literature on the
origins of institutions. The study, in this manner, stretches the boundaries and utilities of existing
conceptualizations of modernizing theory, the developmental state, and series of
underdevelopment in the global South, at least those from the institutionalist perspective.
The project adds to theories of institutional creation that allow for variegated outcomes,
though it tends to call into question the simple, institutional origins used to explain different
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patterns of institution making. One of the most well-known works of this tradition is Catherine
Boone's (2003) Political Topographies of the African State. Here, Boone observes that within
any given country, leaders adopt different patterns of institution making, that often vary by
region. In this manner, Boone provides a compelling explanation for why the regime of climbing
Nkrumah, for example, created institutions that penetrated society in place decision-making
power in the political center even though British governmental structures often did the very
opposite. For Boone (2003), informal institutions of governance gave leaders varying degrees of
political power and helps regimes to determine whether or not to co-opt or subvert local leaders;
in the case of Ghana, as strategy of subverting the political influence of local leaders was used by
Nkrumah because of the dominant types of existing political organization within the assigned
Asante region. In other areas the country, however, they regime instead opted to leave informal
and regional government structures with political power, and instead co-opt the leaders. Thus,
the types of hierarchies and informal institutions that exist within particular regions determine
the choice of state building strategy.
While Boone’s (2003) explanation of variegated institutional creation is compelling, it
leaves unanswered critical questions about how the state interacts with the international
economy. The decision to create institutions conducive to service delivery but not economic
growth in domestic foodstuffs processing, for example, may have little to do with the relative
power of any particular constituency nor any in formal institutions in a particular region. Instead,
factors related to the international economy, as well as the balance of power between social
groups, may ultimately determine the type of economic institution created in this particular
industry. Boone's account, though interesting, cannot explain why the most effective institutions
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in Ghana are those which mediate the state’s interaction with the international economy while
the least growth enhancing institutions are those related to domestic production.
Boone's (2003) account points to a more general tendency of the literature and
comparative politics to discount international factors when discussing the roots of African
political economy. Economic underdevelopment and political and social decay are also under
conceptualized as being rooted within a lack of institutional legacy emanating from the colonial
period (Young 1994), the extraneous effects of regime survival strategies that facilitate
underdevelopment (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Reno 2000), or a
lack of willingness and capacity within the personnel of the state to take a new direction and
policymaking (Kohli 2004; Young and Turner 1985; Young 1994). These accounts tend to
minimize the long-term impact of interaction with more powerful states within the global
economy.
Work from the world systems perspective, along with work and they Marxist tradition of
international relations provides more compelling theory about the root causes of
underdevelopment within the continent. Rodney's (1972) long-term historical analysis of the
trajectory of African development links the process European capital formation to a coinciding
underdevelopment of precolonial states within the African continent, as well as the rest of the
third world. Military and transportation advantages on the part of European states gave them the
ability to open markets and dictate terms of trade thus turning societies previously focused on
questions of internal production into reserve labor reservoirs for European agricultural
production in North and South America through the institution of slavery (Rodney 1972, 84).
The shifting balance within the international system for state new set of economic realities upon
precolonial Africa. Other well-known works describe how relationships of dependency can
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develop between states and the global periphery and those in the core, facilitated by a comprador
class of political elites (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Wallerstein 1979). Still other works in the
Marxist tradition describe how the rule of in international bourgeoisie creates enclaves like
economies that serve the needs of former colonial states such as France or Great Britain (Lenin
1920; Nkrumah 1967; Reed 1987). These works often do a better job situating the content within
the larger political and economic processes that cover the globe.
This project presents a challenge for both institutional and dependency theories by
creating a more nuanced and fragmented picture of dominant social groups. For example, while
the Kenyan bourgeoisie has many linkages to the international economy, Kenyan policy is much
more focused on domestic and regional priorities when compared to other countries within the
region. Far from relying raw material exports to core countries, the Kenyan state often attempts
to stimulate domestic solutions and industries particularly to meet regional needs rather than
those of the international system. Furthermore, while Ghanaian regimes for the past 20 years
have produced institutions geared towards facilitating growth in export sectors like the cocoa
industry, prior to 1983 the state had a much less amiable relationship with Bretton Woods
institutions and the powerful states at the core of the international economy. Thus, while insights
from world systems theory, and Marxist international relations may shed light on the research
questions, the research question tends to stretch their ability to explain outcomes.

Theories of the State
In order to provide a more nuanced theory of the determinants of developmental trajectories, this
project must grapple with theories of the state, and its interaction with society. In this regard, one
of the main contributions of the project is an exploration of what it means to be the dominant
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group associated with state power. The examination of this question, as it pertains to the main
cases, both affirms and challenges various institutional and neo-Marxist approaches to state
theory. The case of Ghana reaffirms Marx’s observations about the 18th Brumaire of Louis
Napoleon, where a nascent bourgeoisie was deadlocked in struggle factions of the urban
proletariat and the intelligentsia, with neither side able to emerge in an ascendant position. Marx
noted, that when social formations are deadlocked in conflict, there exists social space for the
apparatus of the state, acting autonomously, to take the reins of power within society acting as a
containing force (Marx 1978). Indeed, the rise of the technocrats during the Rawlings regime,
during a period where the economic agenda of the left appeared to be running into severe trouble
that might possibly end in a military coup, illustrates this concept. Furthermore, the fact that
policy continues to be driven forward by economic technocrats in a durable manner contributes
to the idea, first put forth by Shivji (1976), that a bureaucratic bourgeoisie can implant itself
within the apparatus of the state.
Yet, far from the predictions of Shivji or even Marx’s observations of 19th century
France, the autonomy of bureaucrats has clear and definite bounds, that end as economic policy
making shifts from the extant sectors of the cash crop economy to internal production.
Technocrats may have free reign to make policy as it relates to cocoa exporting, and the creation
of institutions to attract foreign investment, but their influence in other sectors of the economy is
finite. In this manner, the state may very well have different degrees of autonomy when dealing
with foreign versus domestic affairs, an observation that led Poggi (1978) to characterize the
state as a “Janus faced” entity, although he applied this observation to high politics rather than
economic affairs. Yet, in Ghana and other states in the global periphery this finding appears to
have merit in particular in relation to the economy. Power oscillates from one ruling coalition to
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another, who are differentiated not by the role the play within the broader economy but by the
groups that they attempt to provide services and patronage. Politics shifts back and forth between
traditional elites and their constituencies, while the rule of the technocratic class is tolerated as it
presents a key part of the survival strategy of any regime. Far from being an ascendant social
formation, technocrats are instead tolerated, and their rule circumscribed and delimited by an
elite defined in part by social class but much more so by status within their communities. The
state is thus associated with two major groups: the first cohesive and technocratic and the second
fragmented by regional and ethnic affiliation but otherwise similar in their outlook and intent.
In Kenya, I theorize that state power rests much more clearly with a type of fragmented
bourgeoisie, the fractions of which are denoted both by their function within the larger economy
and by their ethnic affiliations. Thus, this fragmented elite tends to both come into conflict with
one another and to cooperate jointly, in order to protect the class priorities of the larger unified
group. Critical junctures of cooperation thus occur within this elite, such as when J.R. Kariyuka
was assassinated after having mobilized the working proletariat in the cities (Branch 2011). This
account also tends to support a neo-Marxist view of the state as being associated with one
particular dominant class based social group, which though fractured and fragmented none the
less police the boundaries of relative state autonomy for the benefit of the class as a whole. Yet,
this process, as a whole, ironically may in fact be determined by factors such as the relative
comparative size of ethnic groupings, a factor which in and of itself has nothing to do with
economic relations of production by which may contribute to various types of class formation.
Neo-Marxist state theory generally conceives the fragmentations amongst the social
group as occurring along economic lines. Thus, Poulantzas (1978) details the policy struggles
amongst fractions of the bourgeoisie, which play out through the apparatus of representative
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government as a means of conflict resolution. Miliband (1969) points to the same tendency of
governance in advanced democracies to function as an arbiter of disputes within the bourgeoisie,
Chang (2010) notices the same tendencies in American government. My analysis extends these
observation, but at least in the Kenyan case, applies them to an elite group which is fragmented
not just by function within the greater economy, although that certainly takes place, but by
degrees of overlapping cleavages between ethnic affiliation and economic functions. In this
manner, neo-Marxist theories are combined with theories about class and ethnicity, and the
cohesiveness of ethnic groupings.
My main argument is that the cohesiveness of ethnic groupings, for both political and
economic institutions is a function of group size; yet this argument is also conditioned by an
understanding of the economic intersections of ethnic identity. Larger groups are more prone to
fragmentation, though this process can be offset to a degree by the economic commonalities that
may exist between members. The concept of overlapping political, economi and ethnic cleavages
lays upon well-trodden ground in comparative politics literature. Gurr (1995), Horowitz (2001)
and others have all noted that overlapping cleavages between ethnic groups and socioeconomic
class on the whole tend to exasperate ethnically motivated violence. Indeed, new literature on
ethnicity and economic relations positively associates horizontal inequalities between ethnic
groups with various types of market failures and growth inhibiting institutions (Brown and
Stewart 2012). Yet, Langer (2009), notes that groups whose members are differentiated
hierarchically often maintain solidarity, even in the face of economic conflict, when ordinary
group members share economic commonalities with elites. However, when the economic activity
of groups is spread over several different fields, these groups often fail to cooperate, and indeed
often come into conflict with one another. Thus we see in Ghana that while younger, ambitious
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farmers sought to make a political following for themselves, they were hindered by established
ethnic elites, because the Asante were vertically differentiated a social class, and thus maintained
cohesiveness (Allman 1993). In this case, a large group that would otherwise be prone to fracture
was held together both by horizontal inequalities between other ethnic groups in Ghana, and by
the fact that its members and elites shared common economic interests in cocoa. While group
size still contributes to a fracturing of the core group of Akan speakers, the group has at times
displayed more solidarity than conventional thought on ethnicity and politics might expect. In
Kenya, on the other hand, we see that horizontal inequality between ethnic groups does indeed
contribute to group solidarity. Additionally, in instances where members of the same ethnic
group share economic interests, such as dairy farming among the Kikuyu, we see a reinforcement
of the theoretically expected group solidarity. There observations do not necessarily match the
predictions of various neo-Marxist state theories, which predict economic factors alone as
driving conflict between elite groups.
Finally, by theorizing a manner in which ethnic and class cleavages come together to
constitute the ruling class of a given state, this project tends to support the arguments of scholars
in “the Kenya debate” such as Leys (1994), who believed that an indigenous form of capitalism
could in fact take shape on the African continent. The Kenyan debate was largely conducted
between scholars in the 1970s, and revisited by many of the same scholars in the late 1990s and
early 2000s over the degree to which a state in the global periphery could evolve into a capitalist
sate, i.e. a state driven by the formal economy, where the populace is dependent upon the
mechanisms of the market for their wellbeing (Apter, David Ernest and Rosberg 1994; Chege
1998; Leys 1975; Leys 1978; Leys 1994; Lonsdale and Berman 1979; Swainson 1980).
Furthermore, the debate revolved around the degree to which the international economy would in
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fact subvert processes of industrialization with the global south, preventing the types of
economic linkages that would in fact create a deeper and more complex capitalist economy. This
project charts a centrist path in regard to both major cases; in Ghana the state remains dependent
on external aid, which allows it play a predictable role in the international economy by supply
cash crops mostly in raw form. Value from these products are generally added through
processing in other parts of the world where capitalism is more firmly embedded. In Kenya, the
story is more complicated, while the economy has developed pockets of value added growth it
remains a form of growth it is still exceedingly weak in the face of external capital. Yet, the state
also develops value added industries in seeming defiance of the contradictions of political
economy that would supposedly keep states such as Kenya in a position of permanent
dependence. Indeed, while Marxist international political economy has generally been
pessimistic about the benefits of multinationals and the supposed technological transfers that
they entail, in Kenya it appears that at least some progress has been made in creating industries
such as in the telecommunications and information technologies fields, which according to
Marxist assumptions, should not have been able to take root. Thus, Kenya fits some of the more
pessimistic predictions of the debate, while it contains some surprising exceptions. Ghana, on the
other hand, at least on the surface appears to be consistent with the expectations of states who are
stuck in a dependent position in the international economy, though the mechanism behind this
seeming dependence is not the international economy so much as it is the result of a historically
contingent social struggle.
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Contributions to World Systems and Dependency Theories
Much of the project is concerned with theorizing about the composition and conflicting
preferences of those groups who find themselves at the heart of state power; this theorizing
challenges some of the central premises of world systems and dependency theories by calling
into question the power of political structures versus the social and historical processes which
may or may not give weight to dominant global economic processes. In other words, the degree
of dependency is not determined by the structure of the international system so much as it is a
combination of the outcomes of domestic social struggles, the policies enshrining their
resolution, and the opportunities that such agreements may offer opportunistic international
actors. This framework for understanding policy formulation runs contrary to many of the
dominant schools of thought on dependency from a world systems and Marxist perspective.
The most well-known world systemic theory, put forward by Emmanuelle Wallerstein
(1979), posits the source of uneven development within a broader international sphere where
social and political units tend to agglomerate. Thus, villages grow to cities, cities to city states,
republics and empires. As this process continues, the sphere of political and economic activity
begins to be shaped by the preferences and values of the most powerful states at the center of any
given system. Thus, the city, as noted by many Marx and Engels (1972), has consistently
extracted raw materials and cheap labor from the countryside, while setting the rules that govern
the process to their benefit. In a world system, the states of the center, by virtue of technological
and military advantage, shape a system that alters the development of the entire system, thus
activing as a type of central pole for economic and political development.
Rodney (1972) greatly deepened this analysis in regards to the African continent, by
rooting the European development of capitalism in a process of under developing other regions
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of what was to become a global periphery. For Rodney (1972), control of the arteries of global
trade enabled European powers to take over the advantageous portions of global trade, and
facilitated the accumulation of super profits by providing ready-made markets for subpar, excess
or outdated European goods (84). Rodney’s analysis also followed patterns of investment in
industries that played a valuable role in the west, but essentially served as a means of implicit
taxation upon African peasants and workers.
This analysis largely confirms Rodney’s observations, although in general it confers
greater degrees of agency upon indigenous social formations, particularly those whose concerns
and priorities lie with the creation of narrowly distributed group benefits in the form in growth
enhancing institutions. Nevertheless, the analysis shines light on the power of decisions to invest,
which until recently in many developing states, have been held in Western hands. While there is
a growing body of evidence that the IMF and other organizations do not in fact produce
economic growth and instead empower capital (Vreeland 2003), the case in Ghana in particular
points to the idea that IMF and similar donor organizations empower not indigenous capital, but
international capital. The idea that these organizations would serve as agents of capital is by no
means a new one, but the study sheds light on the stabilizing tendencies of these organizations. I
argue that the sum total of their actions, despite improving poverty and other outcomes, is to
perpetuate dependence while providing international capital continued means of investing and
earning super profits.
This analysis also differs in important respects from those studies that frame international
aid as an intrinsically growth retarding process. Moyo (2009) and Maren (2009), for example,
argue that aid tends to deaden the capacity of states to improve institutional outcomes by
removing the incentive to do so. My analysis, on the other hand, targets not aid per se, but its
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distribution and the logic governing its delivery. In this manner, the study tends to reinforce
works that focus on the combination of internal and external dynamics (Sangmpam 1992), in
thinking about economic and political outcomes in the developing world. In the process it draws
attention to the fact that the combination of political interests attached to aid, and the internal
political economy of states, have an impact on its ultimate effect. Developing theory along these
lines creates more nuanced explanations, which can account for why some countries such as
South Korea have indeed benefitted handsomely from aid, while in other aid can serve as a
means of stabilizing and perpetuating a subservient position in the international economy. In this
manner, my analysis points to powerful ways in which international organizations can sometimes
act not as agents of development but protectors of the status quo interests of global capital. Yet,
the ability to play this role is not an intrinsic part of the global economy, but instead is heavily
conditioned by the internal dynamics of state society relations of a given state.
Though south-south relations are only a distant secondary point of analysis, the project
tends to support some of the main theoretical contentions about the nature of aid between
countries in the periphery or semi-periphery of the global economy. Namely, that there appears
at least on the surface to be qualitative differences in the types of aid monies that circulate
between countries in the global south than those that stem from north-south relations (Odeh
2014). Monies for developmental projects that were not attractive to Western organizations or
states, or Bretton Woods Institutions, for example, often come from some of the larger states in
the global south. Thus, the Indian Export Bank extended the needed funding for the expansion of
sugar processing facilities in Ghana (Davis 2017), while the Chinese government provided the
seed money for the Ghanaian government’s venture capital investment fund. South-south
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relations appear to be providing states with investment dollars that are normally not attractive to
circuits of global capital, and instead more closely represent the priorities of the receiving states.
Nevertheless, the study certainly does not contest growing evidence that states in the
global periphery are also continuing to serve as a type of dumping ground for industries that
would otherwise be unable to survive in both core and semi-peripheral states. Thus, cheap
manufactures from China make the manufacture of certain goods such as clothing and other
textiles more difficult, although the abundance of cheap second hand clothing and other products
lacking obvious markets in countries like the United States represent some of the major
challenges to African textile makers for example. Thus, while this study supports the contention
that states in the semi-periphery in the global economy such as China may benefit from access to
African markets, this process is uneven and applies even more so to state of the core, whose
more advantageous interactions such as those between states in the global south are
conspicuously absent.

Patronage and the Distribution of Services and Benefits
Finally, the project tends to confirm the observations of writers such as David Waldner (1999)
who note that the institutions of state themselves can serve as a means of service delivery and
patronage. Waldner (1999) believes that this process, which is fueled by elite conflict, lies at the
heart of underperforming economies in the developing world. While my analysis also observes
that such forms of service delivery are not necessarily conducive to economic growth, the project
identifies ways in which this process is held in check, and therefore not necessarily harmful. A
large bureaucracy may drive up wages, and indeed, Kenyan textile manufacturers are having to
deal with the challenge of higher wages to stay competitive. Yet, higher wages, in and of
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themselves, are not a negative outcome but they do mean that Kenya must focus its institutions
on developing efficiencies in energy and transport, goals in which it has already made progress.
Furthermore, though extraneous building projects in Ghana are wasteful (Williams 2017), they
also provide much needed employment and resources for communities even if these benefits are
delivered only in the short and medium term. Thus, the project tends to support more nuanced
view of the role of patronage delivery, rather than characterization of patronage as an entrenched
mechanism leading to endemic economic slowdown. The research departs from much of the
literature on institution making that tends to see the enforcement of rules as an all or nothing
phenomena, and instead understands that there are some variations of economic activity that may
not be optimal but may provide much needed benefits particularly to groups such as peasants and
workers.3 Furthermore, the analysis also points to idea that producing growth enhancing
economic institutions involves risk, and thus is a contracted process not only between leaders at
the helm of the state but that within society as well. The process of creating an efficiency cocoa
growing sector in Ghana, for example, involved not decisions between policy makers but a long
term historical process of struggle.
Finally, the project stands in sharp contrast to rational choice schools of institutional
creation and instead stresses the socio-historical processes. The strength of rational choice
theorizing on institutional creation, and the perpetuation of historical institutions, lies in its
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In the country of Swaziland, now referred to as eSwatini, the state places quotas on the amount of sugar cane that
can be harvested through a mechanized process. While this practice was no doubt inefficient, it provided much
needed benefits to the rural peasantry, and provided a visible symbol of service delivery from the state to peasants.
Such a strategy is by no means growth enhancing, per se, but it provides a means of sustaining the population in an
environment devoid of economic opportunities for the peasantry. In this manner, the project tends to disagree with
conventional economic analysis, with its stress on efficiency and returns on investment rather than the well being of
workers and peasants.
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ability to show the logic of maintaining suboptimal economic practices. Thus, Bueno de
Mesquito et. al (2003), among others, shows quite clearly the many incentives and policy
coalitions that develop around the prolongation of policies such as import substitution
industrialization despite its failure to produce continued growth in countries like Brazil. While
these accounts are clear and logical, they tend to reify the process of institutional change,
neglecting the long term development of new social formations. In the process, rational choice
accounts sometimes contain a bias for outcomes that are both stable and suboptimal, neglecting
the origins of social change. As institutional creation is tied largely to the changing dynamics of
social struggles, and the ascendency of differing social formations, rational choice accounts
which largely ignore these variables or treat them in an oversimplified manner, largely failing to
explain why enduring patterns of suboptimal development are replaced by new efficient forms.
The project tends reflect the fact that the creation of new institutions often comes at historically
contingent critical junctures when new alignments of social forces take shape (Gramsci 1971). It
links the reconfiguration of the state to a change in institutions, and in this manner address a
weakness of rational choice theorizing about institutional creation that is often embedded in past
practices.

Conclusion
The process of creating economic institutions, particularly those that represent a break from the
past, is messy. It involves changes at the heart of societal and policy coalitions, and these
processes are often historically contingent. The analysis thus interacts with several different
branches of literature by mudding the waters, so to speak, to capture the historical origins of
institutions. It tends to support a neo-Marxist perspective on state society relations, while
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allowing the possibility that not all predictions of this field of analysis bare out in the real world.
Furthermore, the project complicates the pictures of ascendant social groups and dominant policy
coalitions by conceptualizing a complicated relationship between race and ethnicity, conditioned
in part by relative group size and within group economic differentiation. Finally, the project
highlights the manner in which some states in the global periphery can become vulnerable to
prioritizing externally imposed patterns of development, even as they attempt to push forward
with domestic priorities. The dissertation thus makes an urgent plea to look toward long term,
and sometimes slow moving social processes to understand the dynamics of successful patterns
of economic growth on the continent.
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Chapter 3: The Social Roots of Contemporary Institutional
Bifurcation in Ghana

There is a discernible bifurcation in the economic institution making of the contemporary
Ghanaian state. Ghana’s connections to the international economy are mediated through
institutions that are, generally speaking, both effective and conducive to economic growth, albeit
along the lines of a raw material exporting economy. The institutions regulating the development
of agriculture and agro-industry within Ghana, however, display much greater variation and are
less likely to be growth enhancing. Furthermore, these institutions are more likely to be
subverted by the goals and priorities of various social and political actors. I argue that this “Janis
faced” nature of the Ghanaian state is the result of logical choices made by political regimes to
address the challenges of holding and maintaining power in a society where a core group is
present.
The central contention of this project, at least in regard to the Ghanaian case, is that the
presence of a core ethnic group provides incentives that are hard to resist but which lead to
institutional bifurcation. The tradable sectors of the economy, in conjunction with external
capital, are promoted and in return, a moderate surplus is made available for broader social needs
and is supplemented by continuous aid from the international donor community. This type of
approach to development, however, is seldom likely to please members to the social coalition,
who want to see benefits directed in their direction. Under these circumstances, expanding the
policy coalition to a broader group of elites becomes a dangerous proposition – it may very well
empower those that the regime is seeking to undermine. Thus, the regime choses to narrow the
policy coalition; just as the state is distributing economic benefits to a wider range of groups, it is

127

also cutting off ties to civil society members who might otherwise provide valuable information
about how to make policy more effective. At this point, conflict or the establishment of durable
consensus causes this state form to either come crashing down, or to reproduce itself. While
conflict has succeeded in throwing developmental plans into disarray, a stable consensus
beginning in the 1980s has emerged in Ghana, allowing it to prosper economically through a
type of bifurcated economic institution making.
The key phenomena driving this behavior is the instability of socio-political coalitions
brought on by the presence of a core group. Given the large size of this group, it is almost
inevitable that certain factions or regions will become dissatisfied with the level of resources
they receive from the regime. This dissatisfaction leads to the fragmentation of the core group; it
also leads the regime to make connections and to provide resources outside of its social coalition
to offset this fragmentary tendency. Regimes whose social coalition falls outside the core group,
on the other hand, have no choice but to attempt to lure away factions or members of the core
group. The instability of coalitions thus leas to the widespread distribution of social, economic
and developmental goods. This factor weighs on the chances of success of any program; the state
simply cannot fund all its endeavors and its institutions are geared not towards enhancing growth
but to creating the necessary autonomy to keep the regime in power. This latter tendency is seen
most clearly in a generalized hesitancy to build coordinating institutions. These institutions are
costly and can lock the state into difficult to keep commitments. Foregoing their forging and/or
maintenance provides a regime with much more autonomy and flexibility about how resources
are spent. The downside, however, is that while coordinating institutions are no guarantee of
growth enhancing policies and practices their absence makes them much less likely to emerge
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Regimes without coordinating institutions are far too often blind to the needs of important social
actors.
The invisible but all too real pressures, incentives and expectations shaping regime
behavior, I argue, are intrinsically linked to the presence of a core group. As such, I label these
motivating incentives and disincentives “core-related factors.” Core related factors themselves
are not causal variables. However, they are an observable portion of the causal chain linking the
presence of a core group to outcomes. These core-related factors should be readily observable
within the Ghanaian case, while they would be unobservable in cases without a core ethnic group
thus distinguishing them from other potential causal variables. In fact, I argue that they are
responsible for the political instability of Ghanaian developmental history from 1957-1983, as
they provoked periods of sever economic crisis resulting in regime change often through
extralegal means.4 The terminology of core-related factors can help to distinguish these added
constraints to the policy making process from the normal host of obstacles present in developing
states, I term them core-related factors, as they create additional and complex obstacles to the
establishment of growth enhancing institutions.
Process tracing will target three periods that satisfy the theoretical goals of the project,
both in regard to the external pressures facing the state in Ghana as well as the internal interplay
of developmental strategy choice. The periods are as follows: 1) Institution building during the
Nkrumah presidency; 2) the NLC and Busia’s transition back to an externally focused strategy;
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In fact, in chapter 7, I attempt to use statistics to identify possible correlations between core ethnic groups and
patterns of internal institution making, but do not find any correlation. I believe that part of the problem lies in
determining a coding scheme to take advantage of the overlap between perceptions of the core ethnic group’s
sectoral interests, and the creation of important economic institutions. Qualitative evidence in this chapter and Ch.6
however, tends to support this idea.
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3) the contemporary era, starting with the Rawlings presidency and including Akufo-Addo
regime’s one district, one factory project. The Nkrumah period should illuminate core-related
factors tied to overlaps between ethnic identity and sector specific economic interests. The Busia
period should illustrate most clearly the constraints placed upon the state, particularly in regard
to interactions with the international system that make the success of externally oriented
economic institutions contingent, at least to an extent, upon outside actors. Finally, if these
claims are correct, the contemporary period should illustrate historically contingent variations of
similar regime behavior, albeit in a vastly different social, political and economic context.

Background: African Socialism and the Nkrumah Regime, 1957-1966
Ghana’s history of modernization is somewhat different from both self-declared Afro-Marxist
regimes and more traditionally pragmatic capitalist regimes such as Kenya. Although the
Nkrumah regime espoused socialist rhetoric, its reforms were not as far reaching as those
attempted in Mozambique or Tanzania during the same period. Ghana, for example, did not
attempt rural collectivization on a massive scale, nor did it nationalize foreign owned business.
Nonetheless, in Ghana, like Tanzania and Mozambique, it was the state, as opposed to the
market, that was the principal actor in development. Parastatal corporations and state owned
agricultural marketing boards dominated the rural economy (Young 1982). When compared to
Kenya under Kenyatta, or the Ivory Coast under Houphouët-Boigny, each of which focused on
the development of private industry and market based reform, Ghana’s socialist legacies become
readily apparent; socialism was chosen as a vehicle with which to push forward an internally
focused developmental process.
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In Ghana, as in Tanzania and Mozambique, state-run farms became one of the main
vehicles of rural development. These publicly owned organizations, it was thought, would
increase agricultural output while blocking the creation of a capitalist market economy and
perhaps more importantly the formation of a powerful indigenous class of planters (Young 1982,
p.158). These farms received massive investments in mechanized equipment, infrastructure, and
inputs such as fertilizer. In addition, the state also provided subsidized inputs to small producers,
although its first priority was the large state-run farms.
Parastatal corporations, which would eventually dominate entire industries, were also a
central part of the Ghanaian developmental strategy. While Nkrumah often railed against the
dangers of recolonization through the economic dominance of foreign companies, nationalization
of foreign enterprises, for the most part, did not occur. The regime did however make it
increasingly difficult for foreign owned business to compete with Ghana’s own indigenous
parastals (Esseks 1972, 62). Eventually, the production of agriculture-based commodities such as
flour or vegetable oil was handled entirely by these enterprises, whose products were made
competitive as a result of favorable state policies and subsidies.
Finally, state run agricultural marketing boards were a key component of Ghana's overall
developmental strategy, as they were in a diverse range of African states. By paying producers a
below market price for their produce, especially for cash crops such as cocoa, the state could, at
least in principle, effectively extract funds to be used for development. Ghana, at this time, tried
to invest in value added industries through import substitution industrialization (Austin 2005).
Thus, revenues from agricultural marketing boards would play an increasingly important role in
providing foreign exchange with which to purchase industrial capital and inputs.
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The state in Ghana during this period enjoyed a great degree of penetration in society
through its various enterprises and agents. However, it is important to note that its role in
modernization and state building was mostly managerial. Policy choices emanated from the
center and representatives of the state in rural areas tended to implement national policies, and to
manage local authorities. Local governmental bodies had very little in the way of decisionmaking power over rural development and they generally did not have access to governmental
revenues. In other words, the policy coalition of the regime was small, and centered around the
President. While this arrangement sometimes worked very well, the production of rice steadily
increased between the 1960s and 1980s, for example, there were also clear failures both of
modernization and state building. Coordinating institutions, at least in the formal sense, were few
and far between as the Nkrumah regime rarely sought to consult social actors, even those whom
they provided with developmental benefits.
In Ghana, as noted by Frimpong-Ansah (1992), political coalition making often created
disastrous policies for both state building and modernization of the agricultural sector. Especially
hard-hit was the cocoa industry. By utilizing the monopsony power of the state to pay low prices
to producers, successive governments starting with the Nkrumah regime were able to supply
public and private goods to their supporters, allowing them to stay in power (albeit, sometimes
only for a few years). However, as was noted by Robert Bates (1981) and many other scholars,
these policies depressed agricultural output. Since producers were not being paid adequately,
they often turned either to the black market or to other various cash crops which would yield a
greater profit. The cocoa sector was not the only failure, however, as state-run farms in Ghana
also failed to produce the higher crop yields for which they were intended. In fact, Young (1982)
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notes that peasants, working for the most part without tractors and other mechanized equipment,
were generally more productive than these large, technologically sophisticated state farms.
The regime’s stance toward the performance of these programs was somewhat
ambivalent. On the one hand the creation of successful parastatals was near and dear to the goals
of the regime. Ghana was finally beginning to manufacture finished products in the field of agroprocessing, in particular. On the other hand however, there were clearly a number of projects that
were not necessarily expected to succeed. Loans to famers in the Asante regions of the country,
home to the largest concentration of Akan speakers were notoriously generous, with the state
often failing to follow up on repayment as a political expedient. Political concerns, left
unchecked by a more substantial policy coalition, tended to simply reflect the political exigencies
of the Nkrumah regime much to the detriment of the economic performance.
Ghana’s international relations, which tended to reinforce its subordinate position within
the international economy, contributed to its developmental hardships during this period. Ghana
chose a carefully articulated policy of non-alignment, designed to safeguard its internal
sovereignty from either capitalist and imperialist exploitation or the dictates of a command
economy promulgated from abroad (Nkrumah 1967). Thus, while the regime engaged with both
the Soviet block and the west, it found in neither camp states willing to shoulder significant
burdens to ease its development. The west tended to look skeptically towards the regime and its
socialist rhetoric, and while the Soviet block on the whole was more sympathetic to Ghana’s
anti-imperialist stance, it was constrained in its resources even for those states that were clearly
aligned with its interests, which Ghana was not (Rooney 2007). Thus, nonalignment meant that
neither power block would ease Ghana’s developmental burdens and its subordinate position and
need for infrastructure and expertise would come at significant cost.
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Nowhere were the costs associated with a subordinate position in the global economy
more evident than in Ghana’s attempts to create an aluminum industry. The decision to focus on
aluminum had a clear and simple logic; Ghana has both abundant raw metallurgical materials
such as bauxite as well as an ideal topography for hydroelectric production which comprise the
essential ingredients for the efficient production of aluminum. Nevertheless, any strategy that
attempted to position Ghana as a producer would require massive amounts of infrastructure,
particularly in the form of power generation. While it was necessary to create the infrastructure
for electricity generation, industry might take the better part of a decade to be fully poised to take
advantage of any new generating capacity. Thus, a focus on the creation of power generating
resources in addition to the foundation of an industry that relies upon electrolysis as an important
part of the production process, should have in principal insured both the development of an
important value added product, as well as additional industrial infrastructure.
The conditions under which international capital partnered in the project, however, would
inflict heavy damage on Ghana’s attempts to build an aluminum industry. The costs associated
with building a large dam complex on the Volta River were massive, and after being rebuffed by
both the Soviet Union and the United States, the regime turned towards private investors (Noer
1984). The price demanded by international capital however, was almost prohibitively costly.
Allied Steel, an American firm, would eventually build a production facility but in exchange
demanded electricity at such a low cost as to cripple any potential development for low term
sustainable profits from the project to be used to develop an indigenous industry surrounding
bauxite and the inputs necessary for aluminum production (Davidson 1973). Furthermore, Allied
Steel was unable and unwilling to develop local sources for inputs, preferring to import them
from well-known sources abroad. Thus, the Nkrumah regime found the structures of the
134

international system to be a stumbling block along its journey to valued added production of an
important global commodity.
While global finance and investment certainly presented difficulties for the Ghanaian
state under Nkrumah, these difficulties were also encountered by other states in the developing
world. Finding the necessary capital for the foundation of major industries is a consistent
problem for countries in the process of industrializing. Sadat’s Aswan Dam project, which
sparked a war between Egypt on one side, and Britain, France and Israel on the other illustrates
the political strings and conflicting interests involved in large infrastructure projects at the heart
of development, as do the many smaller projects funded by both the US and USSR during the
Cold War. Yet, in addition to the lack of enthusiasm that the unaligned regime encountered in
regards to the Volta Dam project, this outcome does not necessarily fall too far outside the norm
of developmental experience of countries on the continent. A broad scale program aimed at
domestic production, for example was quite typical of states that embarked upon a socialist or
Marxist developmental program. Nevertheless, these factors in Ghana would contribute to the
eventual breakdown of social compromise built on service provision. This incident, and many
others, would mean that the Nkrumah regime would have to rely on agriculture, not industry, to
provide the foreign exchange and revenues so sorely needed to hang onto power. The regime,
however, would be unable to make this transition.

Core-Related Factors, Subverted Institutions, and the Nkrumah Regime
The origins of many growth inhibiting economic institutions were found in the Nkrumah
regime’s efforts to destabilize the powerful planter chiefs of the Ashanti region. The chiefs, as a
class, exerted economic control over the surplus derived from cocoa through control over land,
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leadership in farmer’s cooperatives, and through ownership of cocoa purchasing enterprises.
Furthermore, these planter chiefs were often the principle money lenders of their region, a
position that allowed them to appropriate large proportions of the cocoa harvest as indebted
farmers struggled to meet their obligations (Boone 2003; Davidson 1973). Lastly, though some
traditional authority structures placed checks on the power of chiefs, namely through the
influence of elders who retained the power to remove or de-stool the chief, on the whole
traditional practices such as religious customs provided planters chiefs with elements of social
control that reinforced the economic control they already exerted within society.
Nkrumah’s struggles with chiefs revolved around the creation of government institutions
designed to undermine both the social and economic clout of the planter chiefs. In the process,
Nkrumah hoped to provide the basis for an independent peasantry, closely linked to state power,
to serve as the foundation of an African socialist state. Loan programs were critical in breaking
the social and economic bonds tying the peasantry to the chiefs. As noted by Boone (2012), these
loans were seldom repaid but they did indeed create peasants loyal to the party and no longer
under the influence of the chiefs, at least in the short term. The creation of state farms also served
this purpose, and it was hoped that their success would indeed create not only a new mode of
production, but new relations of production unaffected by traditional authority structures.
Finally, Nkrumah’s use of local councils, whose members were primarily appointed by party
cadres rather than by the chiefs, served to further undermine traditional authority (Apter 1968).
Nkrumah succeeded spectacularly in his bid to destroy the social and political
foundations of the rural elite. According to Chazan (1982), only two regimes in the post
Nkrumah era even be claimed to support the interest of chiefs, and these regimes did so only
partially. While post Nkrumah regimes generally sympathized with the plight of farmers and
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large producers, the exigencies of maintaining a political alliance required the use of funds
earned from cocoa to provide benefits in the form of development projects and other services. As
a class, the chiefs no longer held enough political and social clout to serve as the social
foundation for a political regime and thus this group never definitively shaped the institutions of
the state. But while Nkrumah envisioned a new class of small farmers closely linked to the state
apparatus to shape the contours of a strong independent Ghanaian state, the failure of a socialist
path to development, and the disastrous experiment of state farms, condemned this dream to the
same fate as the CPP, which collapsed soon after Nkrumah was overthrown.
Evidence of core-related factors, as opposed to ideological choice, is found in Nkrumah’s
approach in regions of the country friendlier to the CPP agenda which differed markedly from
those regions where mass benefits sought to win away members of the core ethnic group. Like
the colonial government, Nkrumah’s CPP directed its most ambitious projects in the southern
portions of the country, although the regime continued to maintain irrigation projects that
benefitted the northern territories. The regime fell back on a strategy of co-optation in which
chiefs and other traditional authorities who backed the CPP, or who were willing to switch sides.
These actors would quickly find their traditional positions formally recognized in Accra (Boone
2003; Shepherd 1981). Such recognition brought with it prestige, official responsibilities, and
access to numerous opportunities that would prove to be very lucrative for members of this
quasi-governmental elite. One chief in Tamale, for example, made use of his position to become
a board member of several large enterprises, such as those involved in gold extraction (Lentz
1998). In the north, at least, the CPP was relying upon a narrow distribution of patronage,
combined with spending on developmental projects such as roads and schools. Importantly,
however, these chiefs often felt compelled to accept what they were offered; they rarely took part
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in discussion over policy and so when the Busia regime offered some of the same types of social
benefits, they would simply switch their support. The regime, by avoiding the creation of
coordinating institutions, could simply buy support without risking run-away spending, at least in
one particular region.
As occurred in other ostensibly socialist states, a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” took shape
linking the state apparatus to the market and private sector. The core of the CPP economic
program was geared toward kick starting indigenous Ghanaian industries, many of whom would
need significant government support. Management of these enterprises fell into the hands of
trusted members of the CPP as well as career bureaucrats whose loyalty was without question.
Management over these particular segments of the economy was patronage in so much as it was
designed to promote loyalty and to perpetuate the power of the CPP. Yet, it would be a mistake
to characterize the institutions that went along with these enterprises simply as patronage
producing. The ultimate failure of these enterprises, which relied upon imported capital,
replacement parts from abroad, and other necessities requiring a ready access to foreign
exchange, was directly linked to the failings of export agriculture. Low prices on the world
markets combined with high rates of indirect taxation upon growers to pay for industrial
development. Thus, farmers stopped making investments in their land and cocoa trees, new trees
ceased to be planted, and Ghanaian industrial development ground to a halt (Frimpong-Ansah
1991). In the long term, though patronage in these industrial sectors was distributed narrowly,
these sectors ultimately proved to be unsuccessful.
Thus, long term lasting linkages between state and society surrounding industry did not
take shape in part because of the difficulties faced by indigenous producers, whether in parastatal
corporations or in the private sector. The failure of these linkages to take shape, however, was
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also a result of deliberate policy that sought to increase state autonomy to carry out its own form
of development, while avoiding possible contestation or pushback even from branches of the
state apparatus. The regime was, in a sense, both investing in industry and tightly controlling the
industrialization process to create a very narrow policy coalition. This coalition provided the
regime with sufficient autonomy to carry forward its ambitious developmental program that
ultimately stretched resources very thin as the program was as much of a social and political
initiative as it was a developmental strategy.
The fall of the Nkrumah regime occurred when the sectors upon which the regime had
planned to rely on to produce sustainable surpluses failed to earn sufficient revenue. Neither
agro-processing, nor electric and steel production, nor manufacturing would perform well
enough to provide sufficient or even predictable revenues. The result was a series of massive
fiscal shortfalls, contentious politics, and a coup by military officers upset by the lack of basic
facilities in 1966.

The NLC, Busia and the Limits of State Autonomy: 1966-1972
The two regimes that followed Kwame Nkrumah’s tenure in power, the National Liberation
Council (NLC) and the Second Republic under Kofi Abrefa Busia, a prominent Asante politician
and businessman, share such a great number of similarities that I do not make an analytical
distinction between the two in the chapter. The similarities between these regimes, of course,
were anything but accidental. The NLC was a military government primarily composed of those
members of the armed services and police that helped to topple Nkrumah through a coup d’état
in February of 1966. The NLC stayed in power until October 1st of 1969, when they stepped
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down after elections brought the Busia regime to power.5 Upon taking power in 1966, the NLC
immediately announced a dramatic change in their approach to development, moving policy
away from a state centric approach and firmly in the direction of a more capitalist, market driven
orientation. The regime would actively promote private industry while privatizing many
parastatal corporations. These measures were accompanied by an abrupt about face in foreign
affairs in which the regime made a series of definitive steps towards the West and minimized or
canceled cooperative ventures involving the Soviet Union or other states in the Soviet bloc. The
transition to civilian rule, what was to become the Second Republic, was heavily managed from
above, in part to ensure Nkrumah and his allies did not return to power. On the other hand, the
conservative Progress Party (PP), whose head (Busia) was a member of the NLC, found itself
actively encouraged by the regime. Thus, it is perhaps of little to no surprise that the conservative
Progress Party, whose platform and policies were nearly indistinguishable from the NLC, was
swept into power by the elections of 1969. The similarities and political continuities that these
regimes present has led me to treat them as an analytical unit, rather than as two unrelated
political regimes.
This period can be broken up into roughly two stages, that correspond not with the
regime in power per se, so much as the manner in which the policy coalition and coordinating
institutions underwent change over time, roughly halfway through the Busia regime. In the first
stage a somewhat small policy coalition, though the use of rather robust coordinating institutions,
led to strategically applied service provision. In the second stage, the policy coalition contracted
and coordinating institutions broke down. The result was actually more widespread service

5

The Busia government would stay in power until 1972, when it too succumbed to a coup d’état by factions of the
military.
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provision, in regions outside those occupied by the policy coalition, who did not appear to be
consulted as often. The end result was more widespread service provision but little feedback
about its overall utility. This strategy, lacking international cooperation and more importantly
funding from the global north, would place fiscal pressure on the state and undermine any
serious attempt at social compromise.
The approach pursued by both regimes was to embrace fiscal austerity, all the while
attempting to redirect any scant funds available to internal industries; needless to say, it was a
difficult task. One of the regime’s top priorities was to increase the amount paid to producers of
cocoa, particularly in the Ashanti areas (Goldsworthy 1973). These groups made up the core of
support for the regime, and boosting production held the potential of economic benefits in
addition to the political gains critical to the regimes’ survival. It was clear that both regimes
consulted with chiefs and growers’ associations – the ad hoc coordinating institutions gave birth
to a number of changes of course in policy, the biggest one being both a change in the amount
collected by Cocobad, as well as subsidies for inputs in growing cocoa. Busia in particular acted
as an important go-between, linking the regime and the chiefs in the Asante region. As someone
well connected with the local business community, he helped to incorporate their suggestions
into policy even if he failed to create much needed coordinating institutions.
Yet, the low price of cocoa on the world market meant that even though rates were raised
production did not significantly increase. Furthermore, there were limits to the degree that the
price of cocoa could be raised, given the fiscal imperatives facing the regime. It was under these
circumstances that Busia’s Progress Party (or PP) pushed for the renewed ability of chiefs to
collect and to use proceeds from local taxes. This act was accomplished through new the
Secretariat for the Affairs of Chiefs, a new coordinating institution set up by the regime. Yet,
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while such a measure might earn them some degree of accommodation from traditional
authority, it did not make up for the shortfall that the low price of coca on the world market
imposed on this group (Owusu 1972). Real incomes for cocoa producers continued to decline,
despite the creation of institutions that were potentially more conducive to growth during this
period. Thus, though each regime attempted to champion the cause of the Ashanti chiefs, there
were definite limits in the degree to which they could satisfy this constituency.
The same can be said of the Busia regime’s attempts to win over the business sector;
fiscal constrains insured that meaningful reforms were unavailable leaving largely symbolic and
unproductive options for institution building. The regime actively tried to support indigenous
production through loans and other programs, yet there were definite limits to these efforts
(Owusu 1972). Factory owners in particular demanded state support for the repression of labor,
in order to stay more competitive in the face of stiff competition from abroad, which was
exacerbated by deals struck with the world bank and IMF. Business groups met regularly with
the regime, though it is clear that they did not get everything that they demanded, especially as
the task of labor repression became much more complicated in the face of entrenched union
action. Strikes and other disturbances were a natural part of such a state of affairs, and in these
matters, the regime was firmly on the side of owners of capital.
The second type of non-monetary service provision that the regime offered was trade
protection. Lacking the resources to provide productive improvements for the business
community, the regime attempted to shield indigenous enterprises for “foreign” competition.
Thus, like the Amin regime in Uganda, Ghana saw a persecution of Asians as well as parts of the
business community from Lebanon, as well as the expulsion of foreigners from the region
(Goldsworthy 1973). These policies allowed small storekeepers and small producers in particular
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to avoid incurring short term costs, but deterred external investment, which the region was
attempting to court. In addition, the Busia regime placed import duties on manufactured goods in
order to allow Ghanaian manufacturers to dominate the internal market, though no attempt was
made to push for greater efficiency, given the regime’s lack of ability to provide investment in
these industries.
Lastly, the Busia regime made one final effort to “pay” members of the policy coalition
by using the state to deliver privileges in the form of jobs in the bureaucracy, However, given the
scale of government debt, the regime could not afford to hire new personnel. So it was that the
regime began to purge members of the Ga and Ewe ethnic group from the ranks of the
bureaucracy. Not every position was refilled, as the bureaucracy was already quite large, but
those who were hired tended to be from Akan speaking groups. Despite distributing economic
goods quite widely, the Busia regime paid close attention to its social and political coalition
Nevertheless, lacking sufficient funds, it produced policy that was at best growth inhibiting, as it
attempted to satisfy its supporters after having expended the resources to do so properly. The
idea of cajoling enterprise to become more efficient was simply not in the cards.
While the regime attempted to reorient the institutions of the state toward domestic
production, its relationship with external capital constrained its ability to do so. Securing loans
from the IMF and World Bank came at the cost of opening up the Ghanaian market to foreign
competition, without the benefit of state support in creating more efficient enterprise (Libby
1976). Furthermore, externally imposed austerity had an impact upon education and health
services, as well as state capacity. At the local level, the state had ceased to be a valid and active
developmental partner, as loan programs came to an end, and staff were cut.
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The downfall of the Busia regime came at the hands of disgruntled city dwellers and
neglected peasants. These groups, who had formed part of the coalition that brought Nkrumah to
power, finally rebelled against a regime that fundamentally neglected their interests. The Busia
regime had thus mobilized its enemies, while failing to please its core constituencies. The
exigencies forced on the regime under the circumstances in which it took power were ultimately
too much for it to overcome.
The Busia regime, more than any other in Ghana, attempted to champion the interests of
domestic industry and export agriculture. Yet, even here, the fundamental tensions and
contradictions between internal production and the necessities of access to foreign exchange and
the development of external sources of government revenue complicated this process. Thus,
ironically, though the regime attempted to forge connections with domestic industry and indeed
championed these ties, the institutions and policies that it developed were at best a mixed in
regards to the interests of the domestic producers that they ostensibly championed. The lack of
state autonomy in regards to both external and internal forces imposed upon the state a
complicated balancing act that ultimately proved too difficult to overcome.
This period, however, resembled many of the fraught attempts of African states to push
ahead with forms of value added production in the absence of adequate resources. The creation
of growth producing institutions and programs was often simply too expensive; in its place,
subverted, patronage producing institutions were created that provided for short term support but
did not necessarily encourage efficiency or competitiveness.
The root cause of this lack of growth enhancing institutions, however, can be found in the
pressures, incentives, and hazards associated with and brought on by core-related factors. These
factors ultimately pushed the regime to embark upon costly forms of service provision that
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would ultimately undermine the state’s ability to spur investment and production along more
efficient lines.
The pressures faced by the two regimes, while difficult, were not truly a departure from
the pressures exerted upon regimes on other parts of the continent. Nor in fact was the response
of the NLC or the Busia regime to these pressures, at least on the surface. Faced with mass
opposition to cuts in important infrastructure projects, the regimes backtracked. Thus, even as
Ghana was meeting with Western powers usch as the United States, France and Great Britain to
reschedule its debt it continued to spend massively on projects, the most important of which were
the Tamale Airfield in the Northern Region and the Axim-Half-Assini Road in the Western
Region. These projects were restarted after the regime was pressured by potentially important
constituencies such as the House of Chiefs in the Western Region (Petchenkine 1993, 38).
While the response of the regimes was not completely out of character in comparison to
other states on the continent, their generosity in meeting these social demands was unusual.
While the state did not restart all stalled infrastructure projects begun under Nkrumah, the ones
that it did restart were particularly expensive and had a negative impact upon budget making and
the state’s overall financial health. Yet, importantly, as later mass protests would make clear, the
NLC was under no great pressure to act when it decided to stay the course on these hugely
expensive projects. Indeed, funding these projects appears to have been the beginning of a
broader agenda, namely, to lure an important opposition constituency away from the opposition.
For both the NLC and the Busia regime, however, courting the opposition was a costly
proposition. The process first involved the construction of coordinating institutions in the form of
the Secretariat for the Affairs of Chiefs – a group that brought together influential chiefs in
contact with policy makers. The goal of this institution was clear – the regimes were attempting
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to expand the policy coalition, thereby lay claim to a region that was historically, outside their
staunchest bases of support. Yet, extending membership in the policy coalition would entail the
forfeiture of political power, and/or resources.
The coordinating institutions set up by the NLC and the Busia regime were aimed at
insuring loyalty in exchange for control. Thus, one of the first acts of the Secretariat for the
Affairs of Chiefs was to interject itself into the politics of destoolment – the process by which a
chief is removed from power. In coordination within influential chiefs acting through the
secretariat, the state removed hundreds of chiefs from power, often those who refused to give up
some of their traditional rights and privileges. The ones who remained were rewarded for their
loyalty, through preferential policy. Thus, it was in this manner that chiefs who found favor with
the regime, or at least survived the purge of traditional leaders, came to collect taxes in their
region, and were even able to retain 40% of revenues on land that they owned. This policy
carried with it tremendous costs over the long term, but it also bore fruit as well; nearly all of the
most influential chiefs would support these two regimes during their tenure in power.
Nevertheless, the cost in tax revenues and in continuing hugely expensive infrastructure projects
would come to dominate the choice available to other more established members of the policy
coalition.
The Busia regime’s ethno-nationalist policies targeting foreigners doing business in
Ghana, as well as the purging of members of the Ga and Ewe ethnic groups from the
governmental bureaucracy can be rightly judged as a desperate, growth inhibiting policy of a
regime that no longer possessed the necessary resources to create growth enhancing policy or the
political capital to push industry and agriculture to adopt more efficient practices. Lacking
resources, the state “paid” the policy coalition with policies that were beneficial in the short term
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but disastrous in the long term. Thus, in this manner, core related factors helped to shape and
frame policy that ultimately became growth inhibiting.

The Post 1983 Period: Patterns of Ghanaian Development
The post 1983 period, in some ways represents a break from the contentious politics of the past.
After the early chaotic years of the Rawlings administration the regime became more stable, in
part by demobilizing its most ardent supports. The PNDC dictatorship would eventually morph
into the NDC, a party that would contest and even lose democratic elections starting in 1992.
Close relations with donors and an overall easing of dire economic conditions meant that the
contentious politics of the first twenty-five or so years of the Republic had, for the most part,
come to an end. Political regimes in Ghana still erred in their calculations, and certainly caused
discontent from time to time, but these episodes on the whole did not reach the level of national
crisis. The relative tranquility of this period creates an analytical challenge, namely, that critical
junctures in the life of the regime are somewhat more difficult to identify.
The working method of the analysis thus far has focused on understanding patterns of
institution building that persist during moments of crisis. This approach is guided by the logic
that secondary priorities fall to the wayside during a time of crisis but that the social processes
that drive the creation of institutions remains present. Thus, the previous sections revealed that
even in a time of severe constraints, the Nkrumah regime provided cocoa farmers in the Asante
region with loans that had little hope of ever being repaid at tremendous cost to the state. The
NLC regime, not to be outdone, continued to build expensive infrastructure in key regions, even
as it worked to reschedule its loans with donor countries. These observations from the cases
reveal essential information about the processes driving economic policy and institution making.
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Finding these key junctures after 1983, however, is somewhat more difficult, as periods
of strain are not marked any momentous events, per se, but instead may result in a close election
or perhaps a loss at the polls. While it is certainly possible to chart moments of crisis – and
indeed the section on the Rawlings regime does precisely that, the emphasis of this section
moves to identifying recurrent causal patterns rather than zooming in on moment of crisis which
may or may not have significant ramifications. In this manner, I can carry out concentric
mapping by combining observations over time even if it is not possible to deeply investigate key
moments of crisis.
The Rawlings Regime
For better or for worse, the Rawlings regime created a durable mold that all subsequent regimes
in Ghana attempted or felt compelled to emulate. The Rawlings regime that emerged after the
purges and attempted coups of 1982 and 1983 bore little resemblance to the one that took power
in 1981 and declared a people’s revolution. The committees for the defense of the revolution that
were so powerful early on saw their role become more circumscribed, their freedom of action
more limited. Power was being more guarded and the free for all of “the Rawlings revolution”
was giving way to a type of managed rule. The Rawlings regime was in effect, cutting the size of
its policy coalition and thereby and thereby freeing itself from both costly financial obligations
and an approach to policy making over which it had little control. The old Congolese expression
“le pouvoir se mange entirerement”6 was becoming more and more accurate as the regime pulled
back decision making power and concentrated it with Rawlings and the small circle of
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The literal translation is “power is eaten whole,” with eating or consuming being a metaphor for using power in
both its manifest and latent forms. The contrast here, is with the idea that power should be shared, and/or negotiated
rather than used.
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technocrats upon which he relied. Rawlings may not have been alone in wielding power, but
those who had a say over policy and the general goals and aims of the group were becoming
fewer. This new concentration of power was essential for the production of both growth
enhancing institutions and the distribution of secondary services and provisions to a broad
audience often found outside the social coalition. The regime would ultimately use
developmental dollars to build allies among elements of the core group, while restricting who
had a say over policy. And in its actions, particularly as they relate to labor, the old adage that
“those who do not have a seat at the table find themselves on the menu” rang true.
The approach of the Rawlings regime to building internally oriented institutions was
somewhat atypical for Ghanaian regimes, as a great degree of experimentation was involved in
the process. The most defining characteristic of the Rawlings approach was close fiscal
management under structural adjustment, combined with broad scale service provision (often pad
for through foreign aid) and a careful focus and attention to the main exporting subsector of the
economy, cocoa. Indeed, the regime insured that scare governmental funds went toward insuring
cocoa producers had access to inputs, extension services, and government funded research and
development. Yet, the Rawlings regime traditional emphasis on the working class and on social
benefits meant that service provision in the form of schools, road construction, hospital facilities
(even a floating hospital in remote areas around Lake Volta) was generous (often thanks to
external donors) and made available to a wide cross section of the population. The regime
delivered services and benefits to underserved regions in the north, where it drew immense
political support, but it also carried out a wide array of projects all over the country. Like
Nkrumah, Rawlings provided benefits to small farmers especially in the cocoa industry, in areas
where the opposition was generally at its strongest. The regimes attempts at internally oriented
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institution building in the countryside, on the other hand, were circumscribed, and on the whole
only played a modest role in facilitating growth for average Ghanaians.
Economically, the Rawlings regime continued the outward orientation that it set in
motion in 1983. While it is certainly true that institution making sometimes created inefficient
and growth inhibiting practices in the domestic economy, such as when the regime suddenly
raised the salaries of public employees by 80% in advance of the 1993 elections (English 1999,
9), it is difficult to find mass based programs that were specifically wasteful in their attempts to
lure away members of the opposition. While a loan program that catered to emerging business
leaders came under scrutiny for cronyism (Kelsall et al. 2013), mass based programs tied to corerelated factors tended to be somewhat less wasteful, though they remained as expensive as ever.
Nevertheless, the sheer amount of service provision during the Rawlings regime, combined with
the necessary autonomy needed to ensure that the main export sectors were free of such growth
inhibiting institution making, points to a high probability of core-related factors driving patterns
of institution making.
One of the first steps of the regime was to circumscribe or eliminate coordinating
institutions that inhibited their autonomy from internal actors. Ironically, such autonomy freed
the regime to implement policies designed by external actors, compromising Ghanaian autonomy
at least to an extent, as it appears that the regime willingly implemented at least part of the
austerity program. In order to maintain a secure grip on power, the Rawlings administration
demobilized its most ardent supports. Though many Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution would continue to play a role in service delivery, their role as an agent of internally
oriented institution making would effectively come to an end (Herbst 1993). Into this gap came
structural adjustments policies favored by the IMF, and a series of suggestions about rural
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development and extension work from the World Bank. The most striking impact of these
policies on ordinary Ghanaians from 1983 until the mid-1990s would be a massive cut in
subsidies for inputs and the removal of price controls for farmers growing food crops (Seini
2002, 20-21). These cuts were accompanied by a push to both liberalize the economy by
removing tariff barriers and to privatize existing parastatal corporations. The state had effectively
disengaged from playing an active role in the rural food producing economy.
Engagement with social forces surrounding production, at least at first, revolved around
key supporters and their economic needs. In the1980s and early 1990s, finding a reliable source
of foreign aid proved to be the most pressing priority for many elites. Thus, capitalizing on cheap
air freight in comparison to its neighbors, a coalition of politicians and businessmen set out to
use the apparatus of government to help create economic growth of which they would be the
direct beneficiaries (Kelsall et al. 2013, 85). Policies and practices surrounding the industry
greatly facilitated growth, as the government allocated funds for irrigation, fertilizers, credit and
other support (Takane 2004). Ghanaian pineapples proved to be especially successful on the
European market, where they had a large comparative advantage.
The Rawlings administration’s efforts in pineapple production were clearly growth
enhancing; but they were also clearly circumscribed. The sector itself was very small, as was the
area where the crop was grown. Transportation needs were simple, and clearly defined, and the
program itself was administered by people who clearly had a stake its chances of success.
Extension work was a success, and Ghanaian pineapple exports rose until at least a new sweeter
variety of pineapple began to dominate the market in the early 2000s (Kelsall et al. 2013, ). At
that time, however, a new administration was in power, and the politicians who had a stake in the
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business were no longer active. The pineapple sector thus declined precipitously, and has only
recently started to recover.
Yet, policy in regards to the pineapple sector, even for the Rawlings administration, was
exceptional in its outlook and perspective; the administration’s approach to rural development,
on the other hand, was much more similar to later patterns of development, particularly on the
part of the NDC. Drawing upon the advice and recommendations of the World Bank, the
Rawlings administration cut subsidies to most food producers in Ghana after 1983. And while
this program may have earned the regime praise from international organizations, it did not sit
well with ordinary Ghanaians. Thus in the early 1990s the regime set about increasing the
amount of subsidies it paid farmers, in part, in anticipation of the coming elections of 1992
(English 1999). Nevertheless, the decision to expand subsidies was circumscribed, in that it
followed the World Bank’s training and visitation protocols regarding extension services. The
regime extended subsidies and credit to farmers, though it exerted discretion about which
cultivators were given support. The idea was that farmers who adopted new methods and
technology would receive incentives and support, in order to encourage the adoption of better
practices and to facilitate efficiency amongst smallholders (World Bank 1991). Along the same
lines, small holders were encouraged to join together in cooperative associations to further
capitalize upon economies of scale. These reforms would eventually become the basis for a
block farming program instituted by president Mills in 2009.
While the regime succeeded in stabilizing deteriorating prices paid to producers for major
food commodities, and while the cocoa sector in particular made a rebounded spectacularly, the
same cannot be said for the economic well-being of smallholders in Ghana. While overall
harvests increased, yields for most crops did not – Ghanaians were simply clearing more land for
152

planting. And while subsidies in the mid-1990s were again made available, they were selectively
distributed. Rural Ghana continued to struggle with a lack of roads, irrigation and other critical
infrastructure that plagued these efforts. Furthermore, while efforts were made to align inputs
with extension agents and farmers, these inputs were often materials purchased from abroad, as
Ghana’s parastatals and private factories struggled to meet demand in a competitive manner.
While Rawling’s approach may have increased the incomes of some smallholders, on the whole
its gains were truly modest. The regime’s programming had a long reach, though its efforts to
limit spending resulted in a less generous approach than the regimes that preceded or followed it.
The Rawlings regime set a pattern for economic institution making by being the first to
provide a viable survival strategy through economic institution making. The most consistent part
of this strategy was to provide full support and funding for the cocoa sector, in order to ensure
sufficient foreign exchange revenue. Secondly, attempts were made to control spending and to
facilitate external investment. These steps then insured that aid, along with revenues, could pay
for the large amount of service provision that the regime was undertaking. The regime
experimented with two different approaches to constructing internally oriented institutions or
new institutions outside of the traditional export sector. While constructing growth enhancing
institutions surrounding pineapple production for export was no doubt important to the small
number of politically important individuals involved in the business, it is clear that this approach
alone would not place the regime upon a secure footing. Nor was it particularly evident that
service provision alone, in the form of hospitals, schools and infrastructure, even if garbed in the
language of revolution, would be sufficient to garner support, especially after the demobilization
of many committees for the defense of the revolution. The administration’s decision to provide
subsidies and support for the more technologically advanced farmers, in every region of the
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country, points to the idea that some sort of broad scale outreach was necessary to earn
legitimacy and thereby retain power. While Rawlings’s approach may have been conservative
and circumscribed, it retained a core element of populism in the construction of modestly
successful internally oriented institutions.
The Kufuor Regime
The Kurfuor regime’s rise to power, though the result of diligent campaigning, also occurred at a
time when fragmentation within NDC supporters was in effect stealing defeat from the jaws of
victory for John Atta Mills, the NDC candidate. At the heart of the issue was the choice of who
would succeed Rawlings, with northern regions split over whether in fact to support Mills, who
though a member of the NDC’s old guard, hailed from the western region and Fante ethnic
group, located in the south of the country. In the midst of this dispute, the Kufuor campaign
launched a program that claimed to respond to the innate entrepreneurial instincts of ordinary
Ghanaians in all regions of the country. The regime promised massive new industrializing
initiatives aimed at numerous branches of the economy such as textile production, cassava
production, salt and palm oil. The choice of initiatives was particularly strategic, as each region
of the country produced at least one, or sometimes more than one of these commodities. Cassava
and palm oil, for example, are two of the most widely produced products by smallholders in
Ghana. Kufuor’s programs promised hope of a healthier livelihood at a time when a leadership
split within the NDC prompted many loyal voters to stay home from the polls in 2000 (Nugent
2001).
Upon taking power, however, the regime largely followed in the institution building
footsteps of the Rawlings regime. Some of its signature programs included revamping the
systems of laws and regulations dealing with foreign investment, as well as continuing and
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expanding programs to support new businesses. This well intentioned program was generally
successful, but limited in scope. Nevertheless, the striking similarities between the Kufuor
regime, and that of its predecessors have led one researcher to note that “with the notable
exception of the PSI [presidential special initiatives], the initiatives that embody the NPP
government’s strategy to support the private sector have been around for a long time, largely as
offshoots of the reform program begun by the Rawlings administration” (Arthur 2006, p.40). The
Kufuor administration, in other words, placed special emphasis on maintaining the external
orientation of the economic institutions of greatest growth enhancing potential.
Yet, despite this predilection for facilitating traditional exports, the Kufuor regime also
invested heavily in the domestic economy, in ways that were designed to increase value added
production in Ghana. In the agricultural field, the primary means of increasing rural livelihoods
was to target to widely grown food commodities, and to attempt not only to increase yields but to
work on the supply chain to link farmers with factories in order to provide credible incentives for
production. The program, at least at first, was immensely popular as rural extension agents made
their way from town to town to inform farmers about opportunities to join new cooperatives
(Tonah 2006). The regime also contacted private investors, the majority of which were
Ghanaian, in order to line up funding for these initiatives. Lastly, the Kufuor administration
helped to set up new nationwide organization, the Ayensu Cassava Farmer’s Cooperative, in
order to pool resources. As most cassava and palm farmers on average work with less than one
hectare of land, pooling the resources of multiple farmers and communities was critical to the
success of the project. Equally critical was infrastructure such as electricity, access roads, and
transport.
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The Kufuor regime, however, had spread development resources far too thin to create
successful projects, particularly for its large signature programs. Its efforts to spur cassava
production in particular highlight the issues the regime faced. Of particular note are the struggles
of the Ayensu starch factory at Bawjiase in the Central Region. The company’s problems began
almost as soon as construction was completed in 2004. Company management struggled to hire
employees, while those they did hire were unlikely to work efficiently as wages were paid in a
sporadic and unpredictable manner (Tonah 2006). To further complicate matters, equipment
failures and poor management meant that the area immediately surrounding the plant, which was
supposed to be devoted to cassava production, largely went uncultivated. Nearby farmers, on the
other hand, switched the variety of cassava that they grew in order to appeal to local markets, as
the prices that were paid by the company were far below other buyers. This trend, however,
meant that even if some farmers would sell to the processing facility, the variety of cassava
which they were growing was not suitable. Finally, breakdowns in machinery necessitated costly
imported parts, and sometimes labor, which in some years led to a halt in production of several
months (Ahlijah 2016, 56). As a result, producers often sell their crop to other buyers, despite the
fact that the plant was located specifically in an area where cassava production predominates.
Thus, the plan also suffers from a lack of available inputs and survives only due to a small
number of large customers, including a Guinness bottling plant, who are located in the same
vicinity (Bright 2015, 65-66).
A failure of operations at the plant quickly turned into a serious issue for smallholders
growing cassava. Cassava can safely stay in the ground for up to 24 months before it needs to be
harvested. However, upon harvesting, for critical products such as cassava starch, flour and etc.,
the crop needs to be processed in roughly twenty hours. This key element of the harvesting
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process makes transportation of the crop critically important, but given the poor state of roads in
rural regions this goal was extremely hard to attain. As a result of inevitable delays in transport,
many farmers lost a large portion of their crop, before they had been paid for it by the factory
(Andoh and Bosiakoh 2010). As a result, in addition to growing different varieties of cassava,
many farmers are giving up on growing cassava altogether.
The cassava initiative, though by no means a success, was not a complete failure. The
most important aspect of policy, at least from the perspective of peasant production, was that it
again made available subsidies and aid for important inputs like fertilizer. This added aid, along
with the newfound and albeit temporary attention of extension agents, led to larger yields per
acre small holders, even if it did not lead to new types of commoditized production for cassava
as a cash crop. The following graph compares average cassava yields in Ghana and a number of
other countries in the region.

157

0

Annual Cassava Yield (hg/ha)

50000 100000 150000 200000

Figure 3.Cassava Yields in Kilograms per Hectare

1990

1995

2000

Year

2005

Cameroon
Ghana
Senegal
Tanzania

2010

2015

Cote d'Ivoire
Kenya
Nigeria

Source: UNFAO Data

While the cassava initiative did not have an immediate impact, more free access to
subsidized inputs and extension services slowly created greater efficiencies even for
smallholders.
The cassava initiative was by no means an exceptional case for the Kufuor regime.
Presidential Special Initiatives under the Kurfuor regime were by their very nature bold and
ambitious. They were also very broad, targeting a wide geographic area far outside of the NPP’s
core region of support in the Ashanti lands. This unique combination meant that it was rare for
these internally oriented programs to receive sufficient monetary and governmental support to
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truly success. Nevertheless, even partial successes were capable of generating goodwill, and no
doubt contributed to the reelection of Kuofor in 2004.

The Mills and Mahama Regimes
The regime of John Atta Mills, and his successor upon his death, John Mahama, signify a return
to the internally oriented institution building that characterized the last period of the Rawlings
regime. The administrations, like their predecessors, continued to build strong growth enhancing
institutions in sectors of the economy tied to export, especially cocoa. However, unlike the
previous NPP regime, they did not embark on a new mass based program of development and
industrialization. Instead, they tended instead to revisit past programs, and they campaigned
upon the promise to finally deliver what ordinary Ghanaians had been promised by previous
governments. The approach of these administrations, was therefore, more circumscribed at least
within the Ghanaian context. Yet, while they limited the scope of their involvement in the
economy, the projects that they did undertake while smaller in number were in all consideration,
both massive and challenging in comparison with for example, institutions making that took
shape around the pineapple sub-sector during Rawlings’ presidency. The Mills and Mahama
regimes point to the idea that a conservative approach to internally oriented development, in
Ghana at least, is still quite broad in its outlook and still carries with it a greater propensity
toward growth inhibiting institution making rooted in the overextension of resources and a
hesitancy to create coordinating institutions.
During the Mills regime, in particular, the state in Ghana earned high praise from
international organizations and governments in the global north, for the quality of its economic
institutions particularly those focused on facilitating international investment as well as its
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progress in structural adjustment. It was during this time that Ghana shot up in the World Bank’s
Doing Business analysis, and earned a reputation for sound fiscal management (Gouillart 2009,
201). In fact, the Mills regime was known for its efforts both to shrink the size of the government
by eliminating unnecessary positions, as well as for its attempts to revitalize the revenue
collection services of the Ghanaian state. The Mills regime, and later the Mahama regime, would
in general receive widespread praise for its stewardship of the Ghanaian economy, albeit from
the perspective of powerful international actors.7
Despite the appeal of improving externally oriented institution to international actors,
such measures alone could not insure the popularity and support for these two regimes; instead,
real improvements in day to day livelihoods were needed. The Mills and Mahama
administrations tended to continue in the footsteps of previous regimes, albeit on a slightly
smaller scale. For example, in the countryside, the regime tended to rely on the previous
Rawlings administration approach of targeted subsidies administered through extensions services
and non-governmental organizations. The Mills regime systematized this approach to a greater
degree, creating a type of “block farming” program in which groups of peasants in nearby town
were encouraged to cooperate in growing a single agricultural commodity. The program
continued when John Mahama took over leadership.8
Despite the inclination of Mills and Mahama to continue programs undertaken by
previous regimes, their programming, like those of similar regimes, was still vast in its scope.

7

For the Mahama regime, however, such praise was to be short lived as it greatly increased all forms of spending
and service provision in advance of the 2016 election.
8
John Atta Mills passed away three and a half years into a four year term in office. His vice president, John
Mahama, took over, winning the 2012 election. The Mahama regime largely continued with Mill’s programming
and retained most of the same ministers.

160

Two programs focused on revitalizing the institutions and practices of the rural economy in two
key fields, cocoa and sugar production. Placing the emphasis on the indigenous processing of
cocoa was particularly challenging, as the sector was dominated by multinational corporations,
who tended to locate the most lucrative aspects of value added processing in the global north.
Nevertheless, for some cocoa products, even multinationals had begun to carry out some forms
of local processing (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). The challenges of sugar production, on the
other hand, were also large in scale as numerous Ghanaian regimes since independence had
struggled with a plan to take advantage of this widely grown commodity. While the sugar
initiative was originally formulated during the Kufuor regime, it would be up to the Mills and
Mahama regimes to coordinate the procurement of equipment and construction of a facility to
meet Ghana’s internal sugar needs.
The sugar strategy was encapsulated in policy session in the ministry of trade in the early
2000s though it reflects the efforts of an unusually broad policy coalition. The plans called for
the creation of a production facility capable of meeting the needs of the country, as well as a
series of policies aimed at promoting the growing of sugar cane by producers and assistance in
transportation. The creation of the document largely took place within the ministry of trade and
industry, and though it received input from numerous international organizations, it received
little in the way of financial support or even input from traditional donors such as the World
Bank, USAID, or ministries of trade from Western countries (Ministry of Trade and Agriculture,
Republic of Ghana). Instead, the Ghanaian state looked to other states in the global south,
ultimately receiving funds from the Indian development bank, which became the primary donor
for the project (Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 2017).
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Construction of the new facility took place under the Mills administration and was
completed during the Mahama presidency. While the actual construction proceeded as planned,
the state has ultimately struggled to both to produce sugar from raw sugar cane and to organize
production of the crop. A lack of predictability has led many area farmers to forgo planting sugar
cane, as the state first made promises of buying the crop then only later reneged, when it became
clear that all was not well at the facility. In some cases, other buyers have emerged to harvest
some of the crop, though the effort was too little too late for many farmers (Citifmonline 2017).
The state was unable to make accurate guarantees of prices to be paid for sugar cane, or even at
some points to produce sugar from raw cane in large quantities (Citifmonline 2017). Needless to
say, they the state did not succeed in winning over traditional authorities who may have
influenced their village members and tenants to produce sugar cane. The improved use of
fertilizer and access to irrigation systems could potentially create a lasting avenue for securing an
adequate supply of raw material for the plant but the Mahama regime was at first unwilling to
devote the necessary funds, although the Akuffo regime later succeeded in securing more funds
from the Indian Development Bank (Davis 2017). Lastly, incentives such as investment in
tractors and other facilities failed to materialize, while private sector actors have become weary
of making investments in a facility without a proven track record. The state of indigenous sugar
cane production remains tenuous. Production at the Komenda sugar facility has ground to a halt,
and the state is in the process of seeking private buyers.
The project in many ways fell victim to the same sort of patterns of development that
plague countries in the developing world, namely, a lack of critical infrastructure and resources
to create credible incentives for farmers, as well as for investors. In this manner, Komenda sugar
facility does not stick out as an unusual outcome, but rather as yet another example of the
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extraordinary difficulties of development along the peripheries of the global economy.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the regime’s hesitancy to invest greater funds is no
doubt linked to its commitment to widespread investment in rural areas in the form of block
farming projects.
Indigenous chocolate production, on the other hand, has met with some degree of
success, although the various public-private partnerships at the heart of cocoa processing remain
a somewhat complicating factor. The processing of cocoa beans into cocoa butter, cocoa liquor,
powder and other products is the exception rather than the norm in Ghana (Essegbey and OforiGyamfi 2012a). The predominant form of cocoa exports are raw cocoa beans, whose final
destinations are grinders and processors in Europe, Asia and the United States.
Market forces no doubt play a role in promoting cocoa exports in raw rather than finished
form. Many processed cocoa products, such as cocoa butter and cocoa paste have a limited shelf
life; multinational corporations thus prefer to have processing taking place close to the final
destination markets. This trend is further compounded by the small size of Ghana’s market for
cocoa products. While consumption is rising, consumption of chocolate and other cocoa products
remains tiny in comparison to countries North America or Europe (Essegbey and Ofori-Gyamfi
2012b). The lack of cocoa processing, at least to an extent, is driven by market forces.
The Ghanaian state, however, has been slow to promote the competitive advantages of
processing cocoa in Ghana. Cocoa butter and cocoa paste, if processed and shipped in a timely
manner, can actually be made more cheaply close to the source in Ghana than in the global north
(Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). Yet, the structure of the Ghanaian market has not facilitated these
efforts, particularly in the purchase of less expensive beans that are suitable for cocoa butter and
related products. Both foreign and Ghanaian processing facilities often worry about access to
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these smaller beans; failure to source enough of these beans often means importing them from
nearby countries, which is not nearly as profitable as using locally sourced inputs (Fold 2002).
Thus, while processors have recognized the potential profitability involved in undertaking value
added manufacturing in Ghana, they have found Cocobod to be a hesitant partner in part,
because of its primary concern lies in maintaining an increased export price for the highest
quality beans.
The Ghanaian state’s cocoa sector, however, has succeeded in attracting both foreign and
domestic capital. A shortage of smaller beans suitable for cocoa butter, cocoa liquor, and powder
is in many ways a reflection of the increase in manufacturers that have chosen to locate facilities
in Ghana. Large international companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland and Barry
Callebaut have recently decided to build cocoa processing facilities in Ghana, no doubt drawn by
tax incentives and access to low rates of financing for the importation of equipment (Otoo 2016).
In addition, local processors such as Afrotropics have also recently invested in capital to expand
value added processing in Ghana. The institutions of the Ghanaian state, while far from perfect,
appear to be promoting value added processing the cocoa sector even if they have struggled to
ensure that a suitable supply of raw materials is available to these processors. The Mills and
Mahama administrations, for example, have invested public funds in Ghanaian owned processors
such as Plot Enterprise, in order to help reach the goal of 50% local processing of cocoa beans
(Ghana Business News 2011).
The state, however, has done a poorer job of ensuring that parastatals and public private
partnerships prosper, especially given the constraints associated with importing equipment and
proper management. Plans for increased production at the Tema industrial park, for example,
have undergone years of delay despite its ideal location for processing and transport (Breisinger
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et al. 2008). Furthermore, public private partnerships such as the West African Mills, which
produced cocoa powder, liquor, paste and butter were ultimately shuttered amidst difficulties
stemming from delayed maintenance, aging equipment, and inefficiencies in both the supply of
raw materials and in the productive process. Processing in the coca industry appears to be
making halting progress, though much of its success relies on institutions that were originally
tasked to provide high quality exports in mostly raw form. Indeed, it appears that exporting high
quality beans still takes precedence over developing the capacity to produce and market cocoa
products at home. The regime would not endanger the source of its budgetary revenues, nor
could it afford to spend more on one single project.
The Akufo-Addo Regime
The Akufo-Addo regime, like the previous NPP regime, came to power on a platform that
promised sweeping industrialization. While it is too early to access the overall impact of the
regime, it is clear that if is following a clearly marked pathway, namely that of paying close
attention to export sectors, while pushing forward internally oriented developmental projects that
appeal to the broadest cross section of the population possible. Preliminary outcomes appear to
confirm some of the tendencies of Ghanaian regimes to overstretch in the creation of internally
oriented economic institutions.
Like most all Ghanaian regimes of the fourth republic, the Akufo-Addo regimes appears
to be paying careful attention to maintaining and building growth enhancing economic
institutions in important exporting sectors. Thus, producer prices to cocoa famers have been
maintained, despite the dropping value of the crop (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). This
policy, though costly, is particularly important as Ghana’s stock of cocoa bearing trees has
increasingly been affected by disease, as well as by old age. The regime is also attempting to
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take advantage of oil production by building refining capability in Ghana (The Star Online
2017). Finally, though there does appear to be some evidence of an increase in the size of
government, with added ministers compared to the Mahama regime, the regime is generally
praised for its responsible fiscal policies.
The regimes signature program, the one-district one-factory (1D1F) is massive in its
scale; it seeks to fund proposals for one factory from each of Ghana’s 216 electoral districts.
Most programs are targeted at some sort of agro-processing, as Ghanaian producers at least in
principle, would enjoy a comparative advantage (notwithstanding local inefficiencies in
transport, marketing, and etc.). While it is perhaps too early for in depth commentary on the
program, it is clear that some initiatives such as the Komenda sugar factory are clearly going
astray while others while not yet operational are at the very least attracting investment (Business
Ghana 2018). The propensity to work on so many projects at one time has left some analysts to
conclude that the program is over ambitious in its scope, despite the benefits that it might
potentially bring in the medium to long term (EIC 2019, p.4). Such an approach, however,
appears to be typical of Ghanaian efforts at the construction of internally oriented economic
institutions.
Unlike its predecessor, however, the institutionalized process of taking and evaluating
proposals appears to be acting as a type of rudimentary coordinating institution. The regime will
this face a choice – either to deepen these institutions and risk losing power, or to deepen only
some of them and thereby risk creating an overly narrow and unsustainable social coalition; a
third choice is simply to choke off the formation of these coordinating institutions but to
continue to provide widespread developmental funds. Ghanaian regimes have generally opted for
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the third option. So far, however, it is a bit too early to tell in which direction the regime is
leaning.

State Society Linkages in Ghana
There are some relatively clear patterns that all the Ghanaian regimes in the analysis share. These
patterns transcend ideology, temperament and indeed the stated goals and priorities of each
administration. All Ghanaian governments spend a significant amount of money and time
developing non-primary programming for regions and groups outside of their traditional social
coalition. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that both the longevity of this process as well as its
durability. Every Ghanaian regime in the post independence period has to an extent utilized
pages from this basic playbook, often even during adverse conditions. The Nkrumah and Busia
regimes each continued expensive programs in regions far from their social coalitions, even
when they were in the midst of negotiating their international debt in the case of the Busia
regime or when they were clearly creating unsustainable debts during a time of crisis as
Nkrumah’s aid to cocoa farmers in the Asante region. These two regimes, polar opposites though
they were, embarked upon similar strategies. The continual presence of an underlying causal
factor can still be seen in such actions as the NDC’s active suppression of labor or the AkkufoAddo regime’s decision to commit to financing the construction of at least one factory in each of
the 200 plus districts in Ghana. These actions carry real and significant costs for the regimes that
undertake them. Nevertheless, a logic of maintaining political power, consistent with the
presence of a core group, provides a powerful impetus that give shape to domestic economic
policy, practices and institutions.
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Core-related factors encourage not simply politically costly strategy but the formation of
growth inhibiting domestic institutions. These internally oriented institutions so often fail to
produce growth because they are either constrained and underfunded, such as the Ayensu starch
factory, or they are overfunded and wasteful for purely political reasons, as occurred for
Nkrumah’s program for cocoa farmers in the Ashanti region. Only by examining core-related
factors over time can we see how wasteful spending in one particular region, or parsimonious
spending in numerous regions are two basic strategies for addressing the same issues emanating
from the presence of a core group.
Institutions are also part of this causal process though they are by no means
determinative. Their absence or presence is particularly telling. When they are absent, the policy
coalition contracts within the state; however, it is important to keep in mind that for different
policies there are different policy coalitions. The agencies, research institutes, and foreign actors
involved in the promulgation of policy in the export sectors is comparatively large. The presence
of technocrats in formulating policy ensure a well-conceived approach. Thus, at least in Ghana,
the absence of coordinating institutions does not immediately lead to poorly conceived policy,
particularly in profitable export sectors like cocoa.9 The institutions of development, at least in
this case, remain growth enhancing.
The absence of effective coordinating institutions in other spheres of the domestic
economy, however, has clearly had a detrimental impact upon policy and economic performance.
During the Nkrumah regime, cocoa farmers were clearly not part of discussion about the loan
program, lest the discussion veer into how to best design and distribute aid to be of sue to

9

A more full discussion of the institutions surrounding cocoa is found in the next section.
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farmers including large the landowners and chiefs that the regime was so desperate to exclude.
Likewise, coordinating institutions that failed to materialize plagued the development of the
region surrounding the Ayensu starch factory. Providing farmers input into policy, in this case,
may have alleviated critical issues of supply, though the problems of this particular factory went
far beyond those of coordinating institutions. Outside of a few key exporting sectors, the lack of
coordinating institutions has for the most part led to growth inhibiting practices and policies.
Formal coordinating mechanisms connecting the state and social forces in policy have
somewhat of a troubled history in Ghana. One of the first major formal mechanism connecting
the state and private sector came about through the influence of the World Bank and IMF, which
helped to found the Private Sector Advisory Group, a short lived consultative mechanism tied to
a World Bank conference to encourage external investment in Ghana (Charles et al. 2016). The
incorporation of the private sector into policy formulation processes, however, was not in any
way a linear process and indeed suffered many reversals. In this case it is clear to all actors
involved that the process is to a degree externally imposed, limiting its perceived legitimacy.10
The PNDC, as a political organization dedicated to the preservation of what they styled a
people’s revolution, was by nature hesitant to cede power to business interests. Business had for
the most part opposed the Rawlings regime and historically had been tied to the Busia tradition
of politics, while the PNDC claimed the mantle of their political rivals, Nkrumah’s CPP. Ceding
power to these interests, let alone to more well-established entrepreneurs who had already proven
hostile to the PNDC program, carried with it the very real fear of losing control not only over the
political process but the key revenues that the PNDC used to distribute widely to its followers as
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Joseph RA Ayee, Michael F. Lofchie, and Carolina Wieland, Government-business relations in Ghana:
Experience with consultative mechanisms, World Bank, Private Sector Development Department, 1999)7-8
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well as new elements whose support it meant to win over. The end result was a system of
informal consultations with the private sector, in which some of the concerns of the private
sector are to a degree reflected in policy, some of the time.11
While the failure to create formal consultative institutions during the reign of the PNDC
was by no means a surprising outcome, political regimes in the intervening decades since the end
of single party rule have been just as hesitant to cede political power because doing so would
mean ceding control over important developmental revenues. The revenues accruing to the state,
and by extension the political regime in power, are a valuable commodity for the maintenance of
political coalitions, as seen by spending in the approach to elections as well as the numerous
inefficient country-wide developmental programs undertaken by both major political parties
(EIU 2008). Ghanaian developmental efforts and service delivery almost always occur on a
grand scale, and generate numerous constituencies that rely on the projects, whether they are
construction efforts, or attempts to expand irrigation infrastructure. Thus, while control over
developmental spending does not necessarily prevent the creation of formalized consultative
mechanisms, there are few incentives for such a practice. In fact, these institutions are
characteristic patterns of bi-furcated development within the state.
The presence of coordinating institutions, thus, has not necessarily been associated with
growth enhancing practices and policies because these interactions surrounding production are
shaped and constrained by the larger constellation of state society interactions surrounding the
presence of a core group. For example, if the regime’s strategy for maintaining power entails a
widespread distribution of secondary developmental goods and services, to account for the
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Augustine Otoo, "Interview with Augustine Otoo, Director of Research and Business Development, Ghana
Investment Promotion Center," (2016).
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instability of coalitions, it is unlikely that they have much in the way of resources to devote to
any one particular constituency. In these cases, the regime having built coordinating institutions,
cedes important non-monetary resources to this constituency to make up for the monetary
resources that it did not possess. For the Busia regime, this meant allowing chiefs to collect
taxes, a large percentage of which they kept for themselves. It also meant the scapegoating of
foreigners to prevent the possibility of increased competition for business owners. These policies
were the result of collaboration between the state and society, in an environment where
coordinating institutions were being used to disperse non-monetary benefits, because the logic of
maintaining power in a society dominated by the presence of a core group necessitated more
widespread spending.
Ironically, in Ghana, it is somewhat of a rarity for formal or even informal coordinating
institutions to result in growth enhancing practices and policies. The early growth of the
pineapple sector in this case tends to be the exception that proves the rule. Formal coordinating
institutions never took root, as those most involved were already in government, or closely
connected to it. Policy was thus designed to meet the needs of a fast-growing portion of the
export economy. Yet, the lack of formal coordinating institutions proved to be highly detrimental
for the industry. Those involved in the sector exited government, and when new and important
changes came to the industry in the form of a new variety of pineapple, the state failed to act to
support the industry.
Considering Gender in the Ghanaian Case
A consideration of gender as it relates to rural development leads to a more complicated view of
state society relations, albeit one that continues to conform to the informal forms of compromise
that constitute the contemporary Ghanaian state. The state, on the whole, fails to provide
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meaningful internally oriented development, even as it attempts to distribute some forms of
benefits to maintain its legitimacy. A gendered analysis reveals that the state is in fact playing a
primary role in rural development, even as we consider the impact of NGO activity and its
general failure to develop growth enhancing institutions and policy. Nevertheless, a failure to
effectively engage rural women - fully one half of all farmers in Ghana - points to a decidedly
less generous stance on rural service delivery than what might be gleaned from examining
overall level of aid to rural regions. Women appear to be considered at best, as junior partners in
any social coalition, despite their contributions to food production and to the economics of the
family.
Examining rural development and gender reveals a state that is perhaps more interested in
appearing to deliver benefits than in making the necessary reforms to truly expand the social
coalition. Expansive benefits that do not truly materialize, of course, are a central facet of
contemporary Ghanaian political economy. The state does a particularly poor job of providing
extension services to women, with most regions of the country failing to connect female farmers
with any extension agents whatsoever (World Bank 2010, p.133). Furthermore, while most plans
aimed at rural development envision an important place to farmer organizations, rates of
participation among women are at best, notoriously low (World Bank et al 2010, p.157). A law
aimed at aimed at driving up the number of women in district assembly has failed to have an
impact. Lastly, while NGOs have on occasion succeeded in creating new forms of governmental
entities aimed at organizing female farmers, the reality is that the impact and presence of NGOs
in rural regions is if anything lower than that of the state. NGOs have neither succeeded in
altering the gendered nature of state society relations in rural regions, nor have they filled the
vacuum left by a lack of penetration into rural regions by the formal apparatus of the state.
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Strategies of rule and institutional creation
The analysis reveals that at least in Ghana, a consistent causal process focused on the presence of
a core group, along with, though to a lesser extent, the inclinations of larger international donors,
plays a determinative role in shaping institutions and outcomes. The logic of survival in an
environment containing a core group constrains the overall number of choices available to a
regime. In order to earn sufficient revenues and foreign exchange the regime is essentially locked
into a technocratic management of lucrative export-oriented industries. Only in the heady,
optimistic days following independence did political regimes on the continent such as that of
Kwame Nkrumah risk everything on a plan for rapid and successful industrialization; the
catastrophic experiences of these early regimes served as a stark warning to those that would
come after.
Political regimes, however, have greater leeway with dealing with core related factors
that impact internally oriented production. These portions of the domestic economy, which
employ the majority of Ghanaians, are almost always in need of greater investment whether it be
in the form of loans, or in much needed developmental goods like irrigation canals or the
expansion of the road network. Political power is both won and maintained by those regimes
who can provide these essential goods. The presence of a core group, however, is problematic for
political regimes as it greatly complicates the process of holding together a viable socio-political
coalition.
Holding together a political coalition in a society with a core ethnic group is a
complicated affair. For those regimes aligned with the core group, distributing funds through-out
a vast coalition is bound to make some faction unhappy, and susceptible to capture. On the other
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hand, regimes that are aligned with the non-core group have no choice but to attempt to win over
a portion of the core group. The two regime types, therefore, must expend significant resources
outside their main social coalition. The effect, of course, is to make these regions susceptible to
capture.
All Ghanaian regimes, regardless of their ideological predilections, have dealt with this
uncertainty by largely limiting the creation of coordinating institutions. The state thus pulls back
from its own social coalition to become more centralized and autonomous. This remote stance
allows it to spend outside of its social base with less resistance. Yet, by eliminating meaningful
coordinating institutions the state undermines its ability to stimulate production in meaningful
ways. Nevertheless, some Ghanaian regimes choose to build coordinating institutions though
they do so selectively, and away from their base of support.
The decision to build coordinating institutions is often an act of desperation, undertaken
in the absence of other viable means of winning political support. Functional, working
coordinating institutions involve the state relinquishing power and delegating it to social actors.
Doing so, however, is particularly problematic as the logic of maintaining control in a society
with a core group very often means that the regimes is attempting to win over areas, regions or
constituencies that have traditionally opposed it. Given the choice, most regimes have opted to
provide material benefits, rather than delegating real political power through institutions. The
major exceptions to this rule, the Busia regime, was forced to give up substantial revenue
collection power, and a large portion of the revenues themselves, when it extended coordinating
institutions to chiefs. It is perhaps no surprise that the regime made this decision only when its
loans were in the process of being restructured by the governments from which it had lent
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money, necessitating a mandatory period of fiscal austerity as well as what essentially amounted
to a zero-growth economy.
The result of these core-related factors is institutional bifurcation, where the foreign
exchange earning portions of the economy are technocratically managed while the other
segments of economic activity are funded in a half hazard and politically expedient manner.
Growth inhibiting institutions, in this case, were the result of a lack of adequate funds, given the
dispersed manner in which available funds are spent, and a lack of coordinating institutions.
Core-related factors thus provide regimes with a set of choice and strategies that make
institutional bifurcation in the economy much more likely to occur.

Bifurcated Institutional Performance in Ghana
The previous section links core-related factors to patterns of economic institution making and
policy. These institutions, ultimately, play a significant role in economic outcomes by forming a
durable structure that delimits the policy choices available to the regime. In Ghana, I argue that a
type of logic of political survival tied to the presence of a core group permeates the state’s efforts
at institution building and has done so since independence. And while economic outcomes were
not always similar when we compare early post-independence regimes to Ghana’s Fourth
Republic (1993-Present) this difference does not represent a fundamental change in the logic of
institution making but rather a new form of political compromise brought on by both a
technocratic shift in policy making and the financial support for such a change by donor states
and international organizations. The underlying core related factors continue to influence policy
and outcomes. Thus, the previous chapter comes to relatively clear conclusions about the
primacy of core-related factors in determining patterns of institutions. This chapter serves as a
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test of this proposition by examining the relationship between core-related factors and long term,
macro-level economic institutions. The chapter also takes a closer look at economic data to
illustrate the impact of economic institutions.
There is an inherent tension between the political and economic institutions of the state,
and the policies and aspirations of a political regime. Any government must navigate institutions
that not of its own making, and over which it has only partial control. The programs of previous
regimes often take on a life of their own, and structure the array of policy options available to a
regime. Oftentimes it is the costliest programming, for example, that is the most difficult to
eliminate.
While programs in all states have a life of their own independent of the regime that
created them, in Ghana the institutions that structure policy choices are particularly durable in
part, because so many of them were parts of agreements with international organizations such as
the IMF, or are in other ways tied to long term commitments of support on behalf of external
actors. In this manner, long term developmental programs and frameworks act as institutions
through which contemporary policies are enacted. The chapter thus evaluates both longstanding
developmental frameworks, and the policies that are enacted through them.
From the outset, I assume two important trends hold true in this and other cases: 1) that
the state always retains some degree of agency vis a vis external actors; and, 2) that institutions
reflect, at least to a degree, ongoing social processes within the state. These assumptions are
particularly important when we consider the growth enhancing potential of economic institutions
and attempt to attribute causation. They point to the idea that it is unlikely for institutions to
simply be imposed upon a state. While the initial form of an institution may be largely directed
from outside the state, institutions are malleable, and thus the experience of the developing world
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is often one in which official institutions are changed and/or subverted by states and societies.
These changes, of course, impact the degree to which institutions foster or inhibit growth.
Evaluating economic institutions, particular when trying to categorize the impact of one
single institution, is not always a straightforward proposition as institutions often work together
as an ensemble, rather than as a set of stand-alone procedures. For example, political regimes in
the developing world are often hesitant to liberalize their economy on the same timetable
demanded by Western donors. They may instead choose to continue tariff barriers or other
protections for a valuable industry. In subverting a liberalizing developmental framework,
economic analysis conducted primarily from a Western perspective often characterizes such an
institution as growth inhibiting. Yet, this new, altered institution exists within a broader
economic context situated between institutions that may or may not be functioning as they were
intended. Thus, if tariff barriers in one industry are also paired with investment and bureaucratic
support or extension work, it is more than likely that these institutions will have a positive
impact upon growth. The reverse, of course is also true, that some institutions can change to
become more likely to inhibit growth – yet in either case, the larger institutional context matter.
The variation in performance amongst macro-level frameworks and institutions follows
the same general pattern as the institutions discussed in chapter three. However, as these
institutions persist over the tenure of several regime, it is often difficult to make connections
between their structure and performance and specific events, unlike the more micro-level
policies that are in principal an offshoot of these macro level frameworks. Nevertheless, the
cumulative impact over time is that of institutional bifurcation, with growth enhancing
institutions being located primarily in the extant sectors of the economy.
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The main contention of this chapter, therefore, is that core related factors have over time
created bifurcation in the macro-level institutions of the state, through which policy is enacted.
The chapter first outlines institutional performance by taking a closer look at the data. Next,
causation attributed through concentric mapping focusing on exceptional cases. Aspects of
institutional performance in the Ghanaian case are clearly attributable to the country’s peripheral
position in the global economy. Many of Ghana’s macro level institutions and policies also
clearly show the influence of international donors. Yet, for many institutions it is hard to explain
their content through anything other than the effects of core-related factors.
Generally thought to be one of the healthier economies of Africa, the economy of Ghana
is heavily oriented towards commercial agriculture, as well as the export of raw materials such as
lumber, gold and oil (EIU 2008, 13). Indigenous manufacturing, on the whole, remains weak,
although some sectors such as agro processing have shown some signs of growth and attracted
investment both from the state and external sources (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Larsen, Kim,
and Theus 2009). The textile sector on the other hand has struggled to grow, under pressure from
foreign manufacturers located in Asia (EIU 2008). The only major industrial sector that has
performed above expectation has been construction, although welfare of the industry is closely
linked to government expenditure (EIU 2008; Williams 2017). The economy certainly hosts
bright spots, such as the expansion of the Ghanaian multinationals such as the beverage company
Kaspareko, whose products including its well known “Alomo Bitters” line of alcoholic
beverages are widely exported in Western Africa, and Dignity DTRT Apparel, a major textile
supplier to well-known American companies such as Eddie Bauer, Fruit of the Loom, Hanes and
Nike. Yet, on the whole, the economy, like many in the developing world, is heavily geared
towards raw material export, with some value-added processing particularly in agro-industry.
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The service sector, as in many developing economies, also makes up a large portion of economic
activity but reflects government expenditures on education, healthcare and the civil service.
Table 6. Economic Activity as a Percentage of GDP provides a sector-by-sector breakdown of
the Ghanaian economy below.
Table 7. Economic Activity as Percent of GDP
Average Percentage of GDP 2006-2016*
Agriculture Total
Cocoa
Industry Total
Oil and Natural Gas
Construction
Service Total
Public Administration and
Defense; Social Security
GDP at base prices

25.76%
2.55%
23.39%
3.31%
10.11%
50.85%
6.07%
100.00%

Source: Data from Ghana Statistical Service (2017)

The general shape and character of Ghanaian economic institutions is provided through a
constellation of policy documents emanating both from the Ghanaian government as well as
prominent intergovernmental and international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and
USAID. These documents provide a bird’s eye view of the important aspirations and policy
formulations of the state, as well succinct summaries of the issues that the policies seek to
address. The contents of these documents move far beyond the scope of this inquiry, which seeks
to understand the social roots of institutions governing value added processing in agriculture and
industry. The documents set out a general direct for the shape of Ghanaian economic policy,
covering roughly the period from 2000-2017. They include the following:
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•

Medium Term National Development Policy Framework: Ghana Shared Growth and
Development Agenda (2010-2013)

•

Ghana Industrial Policy

•

Ghana Industrial Sector Support Programme (2011-2015)

•

Private Sector Development Strategy, Phase I (2005-2009); Phase II (2010-2015)

•

National Trade Policy (Feb. 2005)

•

Financial Sector Strategic Plan I, II
Many of these documents provide a framework for the essential institutions of doing

business in Ghana, such as the legal framework for opening business or transferring land for
industrial purposes. While these steps are no doubt essential to growth, of particular importance
are documents that examine critical institutions specifically for industry and agro processing, the
most important of which are the Industrial Policies and the Industrial Sector Support programs.
It is important to note that these documents carry with them weight and power, though
not in ways that are immediately obvious at first. These frameworks, for example, frequently
comment upon the shortcomings of current developmental patterns, and make policy
assumptions that are all too often ignored. It would, therefore, be somewhat misleading to
characterize these documents as institutions, that in and of themselves, structure policy. While
this occur in a small number of important fields, the work of structuring policy choice more
accurately belongs to the constellation of more micro level policies and programs and the myriad
of institutions which they engender. This institutional structure serves to magnify core-related
factors, providing a set of institutions and expectations that constrain any Ghanaian regime’s
approach to development.
The most important exception to this general rule on the functioning of macro-level
institutions concerns the cocoa sector. As the cocoa sector is home to the country’s most
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effective, growth enhancing institutions, it is perhaps surprising that policy at the macro level
helps to structure and frame policies that are implemented at the local and regional levels. It is
perhaps for this reason that national level policies that impact the cocoa industry, particularly
those that involve international organizations, are so heavily contested. The state literally
attempts to secure its autonomy in the sector through the use of institutional design. Needless to
say, policy making in this instance involves only the policy coalition and is in general as
removed as possible from large social forces. External actors, by necessity, are part of this policy
making process, though it must be said that aspects of macro level policy documents that go
unheeded are almost inevitably those favored by external actors. The same cannot be said for
other areas of Ghanaian policy, which are often worked out in coordination with these actors as
well as with other major stakeholders in Ghana.
The critical role of these policy documents is to reveal the existing institutional structures
of the state. The documents, as frameworks to guide policy rather than programs that deliver
goods and services, represent rare occasions in which all major stakeholders, rather than simply
the members of the policy coalition, are actively consulted. As such, they tend to represent a
rather candid summary of the cumulative impact of several regimes’ politics upon economic
development. The documents, therefore, provide a more accurate way to make connections
between policy and economic institutions. It is for this reason that the chapter explores the
linkages in such detail.
Ghanaian industrial policy at the national level, as well as the Industrial Sector Support
Programme takes a holistic approach to development. The documents were created under formal
consultation with all major stake holders, especially the small and medium enterprises that most
developing countries rely on to promote GDP and job growth. The documents recognize the
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challenges facing Ghanaian industry and agro processing, noting that “increased competition in
the domestic and export markets and high production and distribution costs arising from high
interest rates, aged and obsolete equipment, [and] inefficient infrastructural services” have
plagued Ghanaian industry (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2015, 55). The documents, in
principal, create a framework for addressing the various challenges of the manufacturing and
agro industrial sector, creating recommendations for future action. Among the recommendations
pertinent to this study are to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Encourage value added agricultural processing by addressing shortages in locally grown
raw materials, and crops such as sugarcane, palm nuts, and etc.
Increase access to irrigation to allow producers to increase yields of relevant crops to be
used in value added processing
o Public private partnerships
Limit government spending in order to lower the cost of borrowing
Promote venture capital markets and firms
Set aside funding for an Industrial Development Fund
Encourage enterprises to make investments in retooling factories

The policy prescriptions contained in the industrial policy and the Industrial Sector
Support Programme however, point to contradictions whose resolution, while central to
promoting development, is nevertheless illusive. The document calls for massive state
investment, yet at the same time, limits state spending in order to insure lower loan rates for
businesses whose principal obstacle to growth and competitiveness is often the ability to
modernize the capital used in production. Some of these obstacles are addressed in national
policies governing trade.
Trade policy, as a whole, generally attempts to address the need for massive investment
in order to make industry competitive, within the context of strict limits on spending. Both trade
and industrial policy seek to facilitate external investment, by providing incentives to import
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productive capital on the part of both indigenous and international corporations with exemptions
from Value Added Tax (VAT) for industrial inputs Ministry of Trade and Industry 2015, 12).
Additional incentives include access loans at favorable rates for foreign companies importing
capital to Ghana, to allow for expanded production as well as the hiring of workers and the
purchase of land (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2012). Furthermore, the industrial
policy and the financial strategy allows for special financing for the purchase of more modern
equipment for Ghanaian companies, although this reform as well is subject to the ability of funds
from the government of Ghana as well as from the international development community
(Ministry of Trade and Industry Republic of Ghana 2010). Trade policy on the whole recognizes the
potential harmful impacts of liberalization, even as it attempts to keep trade barriers to a
minimum in hopes of taking advantage of some of the benefits of trade. The national trade policy
document for example sets the goal of taking advantage of preferential market access to the US
through such facilities as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which provides most
favored nation status to textile producers, although it provides little in the way of concrete policy
to achieve this goal (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2015, 6-7). Similarly lacking are plans to
ensure that the increased competitiveness of domestic industry that the policy optimistically
expects to occur alongside continued liberalization. Nevertheless, the document attempts to plot
a way forward through liberalization in a manner designed to mitigate its most harmful impacts.
Agriculture, Agro-processing, and the Limitations of State Power
Growth in agriculture, and agro-processing in Ghana, has generally been healthy since the early
1990s. The sector has been responsible for a large degree of Ghana’s current economic
prosperity, contributing thirty percent of total GDP growth (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017, 158).
The cocoa sector in particular has fueled export growth, as it rebounded from extremely low
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levels in the early 1980s to produce an estimated 30% of total Ghanaian export earnings by 2012
(Ashitey 2012, 2). Additionally, horticultural production for export has increased dramatically,
particularly for crops such as pineapples, although this trend does not necessarily benefit the
average Ghanaian farmer and often relies upon donor investment (Takane 2004, 34). Growth in
the agro processing sector has not been quite as pronounced, although it too has seen growth.
Attempts to process cocoa in Ghana, for example, despite tripling between 1991-2004 have still
tended to fall short of expectations because of the difficulties involved in the transport of coca
products internationally, as well as the lack of an internal market for cocoa consumption
(Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011, 207). Although investments have been made in capital and
machinery, Ghana continues to export the vast majority of its cocoa crop in raw form.
The positive growth in the sector as a whole, however, obscure struggles in food
production for the domestic market. In Ghana, agriculture as a percentage of GDP is growing,
despite struggles with food insecurity and unmet demand for processed food items domestically.
There is a marked difference in the distribution of resources for food production and processing,
when comparing crops that are consumed domestically with those destined for export. The
developmental framework laid out by the government of Ghana has been applied with a degree
of success particularly in the cocoa and horticulture sectors, along with the associated branches
of agro industry. The resources devoted to domestic production both by the state and by
developmental partners pale in comparison. Of particular concern for this study are the linkages
in the domestic economy between growers and agro industry, as well as the role of the state in
facilitating these linkages. Earlier developmental programs, such as those during the Nkrumah
regime, focused on state run processing center to produce products for local consumption,
although issues of quality and efficiency often plagued these enterprises. In the post 1983 era,
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such areas of the economy have suffered from a lack of resources. Asenso-Okeyere (2001),
describes the situation in the early 2000s in the following manner:
Agroindustry is weak, and so food processing remains largely artisanal in nature. There is a sad case for
cocoa processing. After almost 100 years of cocoa production, only 25,000 mt of cocoa beans, representing
about 6% total production are processed. The shelf life of food therefore tends to be short. As a result of
inadequate storage and processing there are large seasonal fluctuations in supplies and prices (9).

In other words, the difficulties of linking producers to industry created distortions in the market,
which create greater uncertainty and disincentivizing the adoption of techniques which might
provide for greater crop yields. In the recent opening of a sugar processing facility in Komenda,
for example, has been accompanied by troubles in production that have left farmers in the
surrounding area who invested in growing sugar cane for the factory without a primary purchaser
(Citifmonline 2017; Davis 2017). Creating lasting linkages between producers and industry is
complex, involving addressing issues of transportation and infrastructure, as well as marketing.
Figure 4. Food Production Index 1960-2015 and Figure 5. Arable Land as a Percentage of
Total Land Area, listed below, reveal a somewhat mixed picture of the trends in food production.
On the one hand, the amount of food produced has consistently gone up since the early 1980s. In
fact, there is evidence that the economic recovery of the 1980s allowed producers to bounce back
after a period of drought that caused starvation in parts of the country. These trends have
continued, with the food production index steadily rising. Yet, the rise in food production has not
necessarily been accompanied with a rise in productivity, but instead the amount of arable
agricultural land has increased massively, mostly due to the clearing of forest regions. Population
pressures have obviously played a role in this process. The following two charts illustrate this
trend. While Ghana’s food production index has risen dramatically, this rise was accompanied
only by very modest growth in yields per hectare. Instead, growth in overall food production was
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fueled by increases in the total land area under cultivation, a trend often seen in African
countries.
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There have been modest productivity gains in food crops particularly compared to other
countries in the region. Ghanaian small farmers in fact are often in a better position than farmers
in other regions of the continent as they have greater access to small loans for basic inputs and
while food crops are often impacted by the vagaries of the weather, conflict and instability have
not negatively impacted production. Yet, it is no mistake that a growing population, and rising
incomes, have not manifested themselves in more investment in producing food for domestic
production. Maize production per hectare, for example, only reached the highs it attained during
the 1960s in the early 1990s. Measures of productivity for maize are particularly important
because though it is the primary food crop in Ghana, along with rice, it is overwhelmingly grown
by producers on small land holdings, using traditional labor-intensive methods of cultivation. By
contrast, in the more capital-intensive areas of the agrarian economy, such as the cocoa sector,
yields per hectare have risen much more dramatically. Figure 6. Cereal Yield in Kilograms per
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Hectare shows that Ghana’s yields per acre are low in comparison to middle income countries,
and even some of its neighbors such as Cote D’Ivoire, although its productivity has consistently
been above the average in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s. Figure 7. Maize Yields in
Kilograms per Hectare in Ghana shows more or less consistent growth in the productivity of the
maize industry since the early 1980s.
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Crop yields in important food commodities have certainly risen, although perhaps not
quite as much as those in important export crops such as cocoa. Productivity growth in cocoa has
been impressive, given the degradation of cocoa trees in the 1980s and the need to plant new
types of trees whose yields took years to achieve, and which required more careful and regular
fertilization (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011, 204). Nevertheless, even here, yields per hectare in cocoa
as shown in Figure 8. Cocoa Production – Kg per Hectare are not significantly higher than the
increases in food production, and in fact ae only roughly 60% of those found in Côte D’Ivoire,
and 39% of those in Malaysia (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017, 162). These figures are offset to an
extent by gains in quality; the Ghanaian crop enjoys a reputation for high quality beans and so on
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average earns roughly a three to five percent premium in comparison to cocoa produced in Côte
D’Ivoire (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011, 206).
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Liberalization in Agriculture After 1983
The economic institutions of the Ghanaian state in the period immediately before the structural
reforms of the 1980s, were to put it mildly, under severe distress. By the time the Rawlings
regime embarked on a liberalization program in 1983, the economy was in the depths of severe
crisis. A drought in portions of the country had created famine conditions, while years of low
prices for key agricultural commodities such as cocoa had combined with high levels of indirect
taxation upon producers to severely limit production. Thus a combination of adverse conditions
and growth inhibiting institutions created severe economic pain throughout the country that was
felt most severely by families struggling to put food on the table.
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The immediate causes of the duress of the Ghanaian economy in 1983 were not solely
institutional. Nevertheless, the major economic institutions contributed to a long-term decline in
agricultural production. The state through its control of a cocoa marketing board, paid producers
only a fraction of the price on the world market, leading to smuggling, evasion, and a long term
decline in production as growers chose to forgo investing in the industry (Frimpong-Ansah 1991).
The state bureaucracy itself, as in many developing country, was used as a means to distribute
patronage and thus became a major constraint on the ability of the state to facilitate development.
The institutions of the state, prior to the beginnings of liberalization in 1983 were thus primed for
change.
Institutional changes, undertaken in concert with or under pressure from international
capital and the IMF, would follow the paths of least resistance toward the exporting sectors of
the economy. Aid money and investments from abroad would be directed toward the cocoa
sector and other tradable sectors of the economy. In the study of the agricultural sector Anaman
et. al (2012) characterize the impact of structural adjustment in the following manner:
Since 1984, there has been continuous annual growth in Ghana, as measured by changes in real gross
domestic product (GDP). This continuous annual economic growth has included modest improvements in
the agricultural sector. However, the period of intense structural adjustment from 1984 to 2000 also saw
increasing disinvestment of the State in the agricultural sector through elimination of fertilizer subsidies,
reduced support for extension services, especially for the non-cocoa sub-sectors and significantly reduced
work on irrigation infrastructure. As a result, Ghana’s total irrigated land remains at less than one per cent
of all cultivated land and this proportion is one of the lowest in Africa (138).

Thus, while some sectors of the agricultural economy received a degree of support liberalization
was also accompanied by curtailment of state spending on projects designed to improve the
sector as a whole. Farmers growing food crops in particular were particularly hard hit by this
trend. While the cocoa institute pursued programs to encourage farmers to adopt new higher
yield varieties of trees, and funds were made available to increase fertilizer use and to massively
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increase spraying, the sections of the rural economy that focused on food production underwent
stagnation and struggled to compete against more efficient foreign producers. Small producers of
food commodities were particularly hard hit though the major impact was not felt until rising
incomes led to massive increases in imports as indigenous producers struggled to compete. The
struggles of small producers were felt in particular in food crops that were consumed heavily by
Ghanaian society, in particular rice. Ghanaian rice producers quickly found that while increased
incomes allowed Ghanaians to purchase larger quantities of rice, imports from abroad made it
much more difficult to meet the demands of the Ghanaian market. The following table illustrates
this trend; although Ghanaian production increased, much of the increased consumption was met
not by domestic producers but by imports from abroad. Figure 9. Rice Imports 1961-2012
reveals illustrates trends in imports of rice.
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The liberalization of mid 1980s was initially followed by only modest increases in
imports; the devaluation of the cedi allowed domestic producers to compete in terms of price,
despite the removal of input subsidies and price protections that were instituted in the 1970s
(Abdulai and Huffman 2000, 505). Nevertheless, the increased prosperity that followed policy
reforms in the 1980s was accompanied by massive increases in rice imports; Ghanaian farmers
were simply unable to produce enough of the crop to meet domestic production. Domestic
production has certainly increased, yet the efficiency of Ghanaian farmers in the sector is only a
fraction of that of farmers in other parts of the developing world (UNFAO 2014). The gains from
liberalization were transferred large producers of export crops such as cocoa producers, or
horticultural exporters while the losses were laid heavily upon the shoulders of peasants in rural
areas.
Liberalization may have changed patterns of institution making in key sectors, but control
over these sectors, was not simply delegated to the policy making expertise of the IMF – the state
retained important decision making power even in the face of criticism from donors. While the
Rawlings regime embarked upon an economic recovery plan worked out in conjunction with
external actors, the regime retained a final control over how the process unfolded. For example,
though the IMF pushed for complete liberalization, it was not until the early 2000s that the
Ghanaian state made a conscious decision to reduce the state apparatus in the cocoa sector and to
delegate the purchasing of cocoa beans from growers to private corporations. Despite pressures,
and recommendations, the manner in which liberalization unfolded in the sector was driven
forward by the Ghanaian state rather than external influences.
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The stark contrast between exporting sectors of the economy and those dealing with
internal production and consumption can in the developmental priorities of the state during
liberalization. A turn-around in the sector began with the introduction of new policies during the
Rawlings regime. The Cocoa recovery act contained the following reforms, which along with
policies and directives governing trade and industry, continue to have a positive impact on the
sector:
•
•
•
•
•

The partial liberalization of cocoa purchases. The coco board serves as a buyer of last
resort.
o Cocoa board retains negotiating power on international sales
Liberalization of transportation and logistics
Subsidies for capital investment and the planting of new more productive varieties of
cocoa trees
Subsidies for fertilizer
Increases in the share of revenues paid to farmers to encourage investment

The cocoa recovery act transformed the sector and allowed it to take advantage of previous state
support functions, including research on tree varieties and best practices undertaken by the
Cocoa Institute. The combined effect of these programs can be seen in data on the amount of
fertilizer used in the sector, as well as in the overall crop yields, which have grown substantially
since the mid 1980s.
Institutions meant to encourage value added processing, however, appear to conflict with
the nature of cocoa production. There has been an increase in the amount of capital used in value
added processing in the sector; however, transportation of processed coca products is often more
difficult for multi-national corporations and given the very small domestic market for cocoa
products, it is perhaps no surprise that the cocoa marketing board reserves the highest grade
cocoa for export. Nevertheless, the institutions impacting the production of cocoa in Ghana have
largely played a positive, growth enhancing role. Figure 10. Consumption of Fertilizer in Metric
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Tons and Figure 11. Cocoa Production in Metric Tons illustrate some of these positive trends in
growth.
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Finally, it is important to note just how contested the process of liberalization in the
cocoa sector has been in Ghana. The first structural adjustment plan worked out between the
Rawlings regime and the World Bank envisioned almost a complete withdrawal of the state from
production, particularly in terms of the landholdings and processing facilities of the state-run
cocoa board, Cocobod. These reforms were consistently delayed as Cocobod maintained its role
in producing insecticides and other important inputs while it only slowly and relinquished its
processing facilities (Gibbon 1992, 65). The same is true for state subsidies for the inputs of
production, most important fertilizer, as the new varieties of trees developed by the cocoa
institute required more regular infusions of fertilizer. In fact, state officials vigorously protested
some aspects of reform, arguing that the mechanisms of the free market alone did not provide
enough stability in producer prices to provide incentive for increased production on the part of
farmers (Gibbon 1992, 65). While the state occasionally gave ground strategically, its
developmental policy of state support for the cocoa ultimately prevailed. The state used
liberalization as a strategic tool to be implemented when it presented opportunities but not to do
so in a blind or overreaching manner. Other sectors of the economy, particularly in the
production of food commodities, were not nearly as lucky.

Conclusions
The research question driving this inquiry relates to the manner in which economic institutions
that produce growth are formed. In Ghana, that process is bifurcated - growth enhancing
institutions are located primarily in important export sectors dealing with cash crops like cocoa
or pineapples. Outside of these areas of economic activity, growth enhancing institutions become
a bit harder to find. The research questions take this trend into account asking why Ghana
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produces growth enhancing institutions in general, and why its institutions both outperform and
in turn are outperformed by those of Kenya. The principal hypotheses revolve around the
presence of a core group, or its absence, and the role and legacies of African socialism.
The case study uses process tracing and concentric mapping to evaluate causal
mechanisms related to the presence of a core ethnic group but it largely leaves unaddressed
questions of ideology. Unlike ideological legacies, there is a clear and discernible logic that
shapes political coalition making that I refer to as “core-related factors.” The presence of these
factors can be charted over time, as can their impact upon policies and institutions. Thus, the
principal claim of this chapter - that core related factors are largely responsible for institutional
bifurcation largely confirms the hypothesis. On the other hand, the social and organizational
legacies of African socialism leave no such readily discernible causal mechanisms and so I will
utilize across case comparisons and quantitative analysis to explore the impact of ideology.
Nevertheless, these subsequent analytical chapters will be informed by the unique patterns of
institutional creation which process tracing has uncovered.
Patterns of Institutional Creation
Process tracing has revealed several unique patterns of institutional creation that any compelling
explanation of Ghanaian development must be able to account for. The institutional and
economic outcome that characterizes Ghanaian development - bifurcated performance - also
afflicts many other regimes on the periphery of the global economy. While many states in the
developing world make much of their foreign exchange from a few key commodities, it is
actually somewhat rare for institutions in these sectors to produce growth. Instead, as noted by
Bates (1981), it is far more common for states to use these sectors in ways that are ultimately
detrimental to growth but politically expedient for the regime in power. Thus, it must be pointed
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out that Ghana’s institutional profile, at least in regards to key export sectors, resembles the close
connections between state institutions, state bureaucracy, and producers found in more
developed economies. This institutional framework, however, has definite limits. While sectors
dealing with, or supplying a key product to the international market are often home to institutions
that produce growth, those economic sectors tend to be the exception rather than the rule Most
sectors of the Ghanaian economy in fact reflect the struggles of states in the developing world.
Unlike most states, Ghana is one of sharp institutional contrasts.
Ironically, despite the sectors where growth is continually positive, Ghana is home to
very few coordinating institutions linking state and society. This unusual scenario is perhaps due
to the fact that such institutions have proven to be very costly. Paying regime allies has thus
included several non-monetary forms of compensation, such as the ability to collect revenues, or
the promulgation of various preferential treatment policies, such as those, that, for example make
it more difficult for non-Ghanaians to conduct business. Nevertheless, most Ghanaian business
organizations report that though they might have access to elected officials, they are generally
not party to policy making processes.
The hesitancy to build coordinating institutions no doubt is linked to a third unique
feature of Ghanaian political economy - the widespread distribution of developmental goods
often in regions outside the principal geographic areas supporting the regime. The latest iteration
of this tendency, the “one district, one factory” program is already building developmental
infrastructure across the entire country. An while this particular program is in its infancy, this
practice of using developmental funds to capture portions of the opposition almost always occurs
alongside a general unwillingness to creative more inclusion in decision making.
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Finally, it must be pointed out that Ghanain regimes exercise a large degree of autonomy,
even from their main supporters. Thus, the Rawlings regime at one point suppressed labor, while
the Kufuor regime implemented a sweeping development program that was, in effect, first
developed by their rivals, the NDC. Regardless of the regime, the state in Ghana has managed to
keep social forces at much greater of a distance than in other regions of the continent, a
phenomena that this chapter on its own cannot fully explain.
Evaluating Competing Causal Claims
The most compelling theory to describe and explain the trajectory of Ghanaian development
must take into account not only the institutional bifurcation that feature prominently in the
research question, but the unique features of Ghanaian development itself. Many prominent
paradigms and frameworks can explain aspects of Ghanaian development. However, only the
impact of core related factors can truly explain the developmental patterns we witness over time.
Even then, it still remains somewhat difficult to explain the generous levels of autonomy
accorded to any Ghanaian regime. However, as this autonomy was most clearly present during
the Nkrumah and Rawlings regimes, I speculate that it might be a social and political legacy of
African socialism. Testing this proposition, however, will occur later on in the dissertation.
The trajectory of Ghanaian development contains within it multiple contradictions that
make generalized developmental theories difficult to apply. In some respects, Ghana’s political
economy resembles the tension between the political power of urban centers and the well being
of the agricultural economy written about by Robert Bates (1981). In Ghana, especially before
1983, the cocoa sector was starved of investment, as the state used its proceeds to pay for various
forms of economic development. Though Bates frames spending as being targeted at urban
center it is clear that revenues from Ghana’s cocoa marketing board were being spent all over the
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country, even as the sector declined. Bate’s analysis can thus provide some insight into Ghana’s
developmental troubles before the early 1980s, but it cannot offer much insight on Ghana’s
contemporary bifurcated development, which features a strong cocoa sector.
Furthermore, Bate’s emphasis on cities appears to be somewhat misplaced.
Developmental dollars from agriculture were actually making their way into programming that,
more often than not, was occurring in rural regions. Bate’s emphasis on the social, political and
economic power of urban centers does not quite accurately predict patterns of spending or
explain the widespread distribution of developmental resources.
Ghana and the Developmental State
Literature on the developmental state does not generally have in mind states such as Ghana, who
have only recently achieved middle income status. Instead, it most frequently applies to
countries, often in East Asia, who have climbed up the value-added chain in various aspects of
economic development. The literature does provide some potentially useful observations that can
provide some aspects of an alternative narrative for Ghanaian development. These themes,
however, contain inconsistencies that are somewhat difficult to explain.
The causal mechanism at the heart of most developmental state literature is a social
coalition that involves members of the state and a rising capitalist class. The immediate problem,
at least in the Ghanaian context, is that the capitalist class remains small in size and somewhat
bereft of political allies. The very idea of a close policy-oriented alliance between the state and
the capitalist class directly contradicts the Ghanaian historical experience of a state that has
generally been loathe to give up control by implementing formalized coordinating institutions.
Even in the instance of the pineapples sector’s spectacular growth, coordinating institutions
remained informal. The problem with informal mechanisms, of course, is that they can easily be
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changed when political circumstances change. The institutions surrounding the pineapple sector,
for example, changed over time when officials linked to the regime were no longer active. Thus,
the very idea that a durable social alliance is shaping institutional development is problematic, at
least for most segments of the economy.
The durable social alliances that result in growth enhancing policy in Ghana, ironically,
do not create coordinating institutions. Cocoa growers have effectively been excluded from
policy coalitions since the Busia regime. And while growers and business interests tend to
support the NPP, this support has not turned into durable institutions that help to formulate
policy.
Developmental state literature, however, despite the lack of coordinating institutions,
tends to accurately describe the relationship between the bureaucracy and producers in Ghana.
Peter Evan’s (1995) Embedded Autonomy or Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) MITI and the Japanese
Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 envision close coordination surrounding
policy, implementation and the behavior of firms. In Ghana, extension work in the cocoa
industry is both thorough and wide ranging. Furthermore, it is clear that farmers embrace many
of the suggested changes and that agents, researchers and technocrats apply the dta and lessons
they have learned from working with these groups. The state, in this case, plays the role of a
handmaiden for development. This role is in keeping with developmental state literature, which
envisions state autonomy as something to be used to push, prod, or cajole private enterprise to
make it more competitive. In Ghana, however, state autonomy is also used to ensure that the
regime has enough flexibility to direct developmental funds elsewhere. Nevertheless, despite an
abundance of autonomy, the bureaucracy and its assorted institutions on the whole, promote
growth. But while this growth in the developmental state literature is supported by a durable
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social alliance, in Ghana no such alliance exists, and growth producing institutions cease to find
purchase beyond these original sectors.
Developmental state literature is thus surprisingly useful in describing certain aspects of
Ghanaian development, even though it is a far cry from offering a complete explanation. The
literature, though useful, cannot explain why growth enhancing institutions are located
strategically. Nor can it explain the reluctance to build coordinating institutions. Works like
Kohli’s (2004) State-Directed Development on the other hand tend to cast developmental failures
in terms of a lack of capacity. The roots of this lack of capacity for Kohli are historical, and date
back to colonialism. Yet in Ghana, we see instances where a change in political circumstance such as governmental officials entering the pineapple industry in a private capacity - leads to a
change in institutional performance. Thus, the case points to the idea that underlying sociopolitical factors, as opposed to bureaucratic capacity drive patterns of institutional performance.
Finally, though it might be tempting to chalk up Ghana’s developmental experience to
factors that impact all countries in the developing world, such an assertion does not account for
the unique facets of Ghanaian development. Ghana, for example, not only receives a premium on
their cocoa beans, Cocoabod, the state marketing board, is one of the most effective regulators of
bean quality in the world. Clearly, Ghana’s success in this regard is not dure to its peripheral
position in the world economy. On the other hand, Ghana’s struggles in comparison to other
African countries at similar income levels are also unique. Ghana’s woes in sugar production, for
example, contrast sharply with other states with a suitable climate for sugar such as eSwatini,
which exports sugar all over the continent. Thus, it is not Ghana’s position in the international
economy that creates its unique institutional performance but factors that are at least partially
endogenous to Ghana’s society and political economy.
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In contrast to the alternative explanations of Ghanaian institutional bifurcation, only the
presence of a core group and is associated core related factors can explain the unique aspects of
Ghanaian development. Only by envisioning the distributive pressures that the state encounters
as being conditioned by core related factors that can impact group cohesion, can we understand
the absolute necessity of building growth enhancing institutions in foreign exchange generating
sectors like cocoa, as well as the state’s reluctance to build coordinating institutions. Core related
factors also provide other useful explanations of Ghanaian practices and policies such as the
wide distribution of economic goods, or the tendency of regimes to spend heavily outside their
base of support, contributing to the promulgation of growth inhibiting policies by limiting the
viable policy choices available to a given regime. While some alternative explanations of
Ghanaian development might contribute to a partial understanding of Ghanaian political
economy, only by understanding the role of core-related factors can we explain the unique
patterns of Ghanaian development that led to the bifurcated institutional performance that
characterizes contemporary Ghana.
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Chapter 4: The Uneven Landscape of Distributional Struggles in
Kenya
Processes of institutional production in Kenya, at least at the macro level, have largely been
determined by social struggle between elites representing their respective ethnic communities.
This process is occasionally punctuated by periods of class cohesion amongst the Kenyan
bourgeoisie, which though admittedly rare, have asserted themselves more forcefully particularly
from the Kibaki regime onward as management of economic affairs has more fallen to more
technocratic factions of the state. Nevertheless, the policy coalitions of Kenyan regimes are often
deeply rooted in the kaleidoscope of changing ethnically based alliances. These alliances,
historically, have shaped institution making in both growth enhancing and growth inhibiting
directions. Yet, the state has certainly not been omnipotent in making economic institutions, but
it often plays a role in picking winners and losers. Doing so, of course, has required institutional
penetration within society. Thus, in Kenya, more so than Ghana, the state remains deeply
intertwined with the domestic economy.
Social pressures emanating from various policy coalitions have meant that while Kenyan
regimes have undertaken large scale service provision, it has certainly been more common that
resources are divided unequally. The construction of both internally and externally oriented
institutions are thus more carefully circumscribed than in the Ghanaian context. Yet, it is perhaps
for this reason that the state in Kenya has undergone severe form of over politicization in recent
years, leading to electoral violence in 2007-2008 and 2016. The formulation of a new
constitution in 2010, which allocated funds for service provision to the county level was
designed in part to address and mollify these tensions. Yet, with the exception of Kenyatta’s
second term in office, it is rare for Kenyan politicians to propose sweeping legislation of the sort
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that commonly takes place within the Ghanaian context. Kenyan regimes simply do not attempt
to construct growth enhancing institutions in a manner that is widespread throughout the country.
Yet, because their projects are generally smaller in scope, they often have greater chances of
facilitating growth, resulting in a more variegated institutional structure.
Kenyan regimes, on the whole, do not have the expectation that the opposition will
fragment. Core-related factors, in this case, are based on the absence of a core group. In such
cases, the maintenance of a viable social coalition focuses on pleasing the supporters of a regime,
rather than winning over fragments of a large social group. That is not to say that political
regimes in Kenya do not attempt to win over the opposition. Doing so, of course, remains critical
to the successful pursuit and maintenance of political power. Yet, core-related factors in this case
push states to adopt a somewhat targeted approach to the expansion of the social coalition, lest
valuable funds be spent wastefully. Smaller group size in Kenya provides incentives for elites to
use their influence within the economy to create within group cohesion. Policy coalitions are
thus generally larger than those in Ghana, and they relative abundance has led to a proliferation
of coordinating institutions. Core related factors, in the absence of a core group, are providing
incentives to foster closer state-society connections that often, though not always, lead to growth
enhancing institutions.
The Kenyan case also differs from that of Ghana in the sense that the expansion of
coordinating institutions has taken on a life of its own and is not exclusively ties to the need for
political regimes to maintain a policy coalition. In a very real way, class-based interests are
coming to challenge and occasionally supersede those of ethnicity. Nevertheless, the origin of
this relatively new set of coordinating institutions lies in ethnically based conflict surrounding
political and economic goods, and who has the right to them. Many of the large national-level
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institutions are a reflection of attempts to share power, and thereby diminish the possibility of
recurring cycles of violence that feature prominently in the 2010 Kenyan constitution.
As the Ghanaian case illustrates, the mere existence of coordinating institutions is no
guarantee of growth enhancing policy. Nevertheless, when coordinating institutions are
purposefully designed to be inclusive it appears that growth enhancing policy is much more
likely to occur. The decision to massively expand coordinating institutions and to make them
more accessible, which occurred during the Kibaki regime, is in fact a reflection of core related
factors in a society lacking a core ethnic group. While political regimes in Kenya may have been
forced to create more accessible coordinating institutions their ultimate utility lies in the fact that
they can be used to effectively develop policy that helps to maintain or even to expand a policy
coalition. In states where a core related ethnic group is present, core-related factors would
instead lead such expansive coordinating institutions to be set aside or subverted and thereby
rendered useless, as occurred in Ghana when the Rawlings regime undermined and set aside an
elaborate set of coordinating institutions put in place by the IMF. While coordinating institutions
may take on a life of their own outside of any one particular regime, their vibrancy is rooted in
the fact that once set up, political regimes can in fact make use of them. Their ability and
willingness to do so, however, is a function of core-related factors.

The Kenyatta Regime – Distribution and Social Conflict
The state’s role as an arbiter of community specific economic benefits began with independence
in 1963, as the Kenyatta regime undertook the redistribution of lands in the former white
highlands. The end of colonial rule in Kenya coincided with the transfer of economic assets to
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Africans, from former British settlers. The British government provided funding and loans for
Africans to acquire lands that had been taken over in the “white highlands” of the Rift valley, the
most productive agricultural region in the country and home to Kenya’s commercial farming
industry. The Kenyatta regime on the whole, used this process strategically, rewarding its allies,
while the British government saw the value in creating a class of black African capitalists, who
would respect property rights and ultimately maintain the economic status quo with Kenya
serving as a producer of products such as tea, that British firms would then process and
distribute. During this period Britain, despite growing no tea of its own, was home to the world’s
most lucrative tea industry (Rodney 1972). The structural constraints of this transition led many
political scientists, including Stephen Langdon (1977) and Colin Leys (1975), at least in his early
work, to question the degree to which emerging African capital would play a productive role in
Kenyan economic development. Echoing world systems theorists such as Wallerstein, these
authors claimed that this new Kenyan bourgeoisie was in fact heavily dependent on international
capital, which undermined the ability of Kenyan firms to greater added value from their own
exports and served instead to develop British society. Nevertheless, this perspective of the
African bourgeoisie was heavily contested, particularly from the traditional Marxist perspective.
Scholars such as Leys in his later work (1978, 1994), Cowen (1981) and Swainson (1980)
pointed to the efficient use of state power, on behalf of Kenyan capitalists, to blunt the most
pervasive aspects of dependent development. State marketing boards, state run facilities and the
process of aligning investment in a manner that benefitted indigenous Africans according to
these scholars all clearly pointed to the capacity of an indigenous bourgeoisie to lead Kenya
along the path to development.
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While the degree to which Kenyan capital would contribute to development was hotly
contested among scholars, what was clear but unmentioned in the literature of the time was the
degree to which land redistribution created a fragmented bourgeoisie within Kenya. Kenyans of
Asian origin were excluded from the process of land distribution, even if they had lived in
coastal communities for hundreds of years (Himbara 1994). The Africans who received land
grants, on the other hand, were those who had close ties to the regime, predominantly the most
successful and connected Kikuyu families, as well as key allies from other ethnic groups. Thus,
the most successful African elites gradually migrated towards patterns of accumulation having to
do with export agriculture.
African agricultural elites often expanded their holdings by moving into fields related to
agriculture, or in fields that presented limited risk and could leverage close connections to
government. Thus, the GEMA group of investors – an organization founded by Charles Njonjo
in cooperation with Kenyatta - expanded holdings in finance and real-estate, as well as a
properties in the hospitality industry by taking advantage of government connections and access
to land and infrastructure (Hornsby 2012). These groups also worked in close coordination with
the state to move into agro-processing, particularly corn, ground nuts, and palm oil sub-sectors of
the industry. Thus, there was clear evidence that an African bourgeoisie was expanding the role
that it was playing in sectors that would create value within the Kenyan economy, through use of
state connections to provide an advantageous investment climate during the Kenyatta regime
(Cowen and Kinyanjui 1977). In the Kenyan case it is clear that patterns of accumulation in the
private sector are closely related to the quality and profundity of social actor’s ties to
government.
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Given the advantages that accrue to groups held state power, it is perhaps of no surprise
that the most bitter distributional struggles amongst elites in Kenya were over who held the reins
of state power and the form of the post-independence government. Elites representing the Luo,
Luhya and other groups, fearing Kikuyu ascendancy in economic affairs while often seeking to
expand their own interests, pushed for constitutional reforms that would allow for a greater
degree of devolution of political and economic power (Branch 2011). An important
representative of this trend was Odgina Odinga, a prominent and wealthy Luo, who was both a
large landowner and had extensive interests in Agro processing. Odinga was thus a member of an
emerging African capitalist class that started to take shape during the colonial period. And while
he would be an important ally of Kenyatta early on, the two would split over economic tensions
surrounding Kikuyu political and economic dominance, particularly in the land redistribution
process. While the Masaii and other groups historically had controlled lands in what were then
the white highlands of the Rift Valley, the dynamics of commercial agriculture were such that
groups like the Kikuyu had migrated to the region under wage employment during colonialism,
and were often squatting on lands that they had worked for over a generation but which
traditionally belonged to other ethnic communities. Thus, it was no surprise that one of the most
contentious battles in early post-independence history in Kenya was over the shape of the
constitution and the degree to which it would be centralized. At risk was enormous potential for
economic success and the well-being of various communities. Ultimately, the force of Kenyatta's
dynamic personalized style of rule, and the ability to dole out various forms of patronage led to
the ascendance of the Kikuyu within government as well as the restructuring of the Kenyan
constitution along centralized statist lines.
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The patterns of accumulation of African capitalists differed markedly from Asians from
coastal regions. These groups, along with the Swahili, had represented much of the merchant
capital of the East African region, carrying out trade between the Swahili coast, the Gulf states,
and India. The region, in essence, had experienced tight processes of cultural and economic
interconnectedness which had lasted for centuries. This process was to a degree facilitated by
colonialism, as the British tended to import labor from the Indian subcontinent to undertake large
projects such as the Ugandan railway. Yet, the trading connections along the coast also
facilitated penetration inland, in the marketing and distribution of foodstuffs, as well as an
assortment of small businesses and enterprises (Himbara 1994). While many Indians at the time
of independence were engaged in these small enterprises, many of the larger manufacturers were
also of Indian origin. This dominance of manufacturing among Asian elite stood in stark contrast
to the African dominance in export agriculture or construction. Thus, for two important fractions
of capital in Kenya, the space they occupied in the economy overlapped with their ethnic
identity.
Economically, the years after independence were generally good ones for the average
Kenyan, although the country’s economic fortunes were as much to do with the high prices of
commodities on international markets as they were to policy. Nevertheless, the Kenyatta
facilitated farm loans, often working in coordination with international agencies, which allowed
small farmers to invest in their enterprises. This policy was highlighted in Kenya’s Development
Plan 1966-1970, as part of the regime’s strategy to increase the productivity of small holders,
which indeed, it did. Additionally, the regime’s agencies, such as the Maize Marketing Board,
subjected small farmers to strict rules about the growing and marketing of corn, but also helped
to maintain producer prices for important commodities (Heyer 1977, 111). The regime attempted
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to implement a sweeping Special Rural Development Program, but unlike mass-based programs
in Ghana, for example, this one had clear preferences for the central region in particular, where
much of Kenyatta’s supporters were located. The region tended to be the beneficiary of increased
funding for roads and irrigation infrastructure often aimed at coffee and tea production but in the
process helping those who grew food crops as well (Cowen and Kinyanjui 1977). Policy in
Kenya during the early years of the Kenyatta regime was generally growth enhancing, at least for
smallholders, but the regime tended to direct benefits carefully. Here, we see clear evidence of
economic power being used to leverage social control, in an attempt to maintain a social
coalition.
The Kenyan state created close ties to indigenous African capital, and as such economic
institutions tended to favor this group at the expense of others including smallholders.
Entrepreneurs and large landowners were clearly part of the policy coalition; small holders,
though sometimes the beneficiaries of service provision, clearly were not. While African
capitalist were firmly established in export agriculture, agro-processing, real estate and other
fields, the horizons for small African producers and petite bourgeoisie were much more
constrained. Government policy had encouraged growth within the former reserves, land titling
in general did not favor these areas, which often produced crops critical to the domestic economy
(Heyer 1977). The process of land titling was essential to the success of large commercial
establishments. By having a legally recognized right to the land, farmers could use their property
as collateral in order to finance large purchases and other capital investments for such things as
tractors, combines, or other essentials for a capital intensive agrarian economy. This process
greatly facilitated growth, at least for the export of lucrative cash crops.
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The impact of titling on smaller family plots, however, was disastrous for domestic
production of essential food crops such as corn. Peasant production of corn rose greatly after
independence, due in part to access to larger plots of land in the reserves and the exit of many
British firms who formerly supplied maize to urban areas (Heyer 1977, 98-99). Furthermore,
peasant production of maize found a ready market in most urban areas of the country, being one
of the principal foodstuffs consumed there. The impact of land titling upon peasant production
was at first minimal; small holders either did not possess enough land to use as collateral for
loans nor was land titling formalized to the extent they could take advantage of these facilities
(Vandenberg 2006, 113). Nevertheless, a population boom in the 1960s through the 1990s meant
that land was becoming a sparser commodity. Thus, when the owner of a piece of land died, his
children most likely did not possess land of their own. The result was a process of subdivision
which made small land holdings even smaller. The result upon peasant production was
dramatically negative; while most maize in Kenya was produced by smallholders farming family
plots during the 1960s, by the mid-1980s the state was importing the vast majority of maize
consumed.
Small producers were also constrained by institutions designed to fulfill the labor needs
of indigenous and external capital, while protecting the interests of larger estate production. The
spread of maize as a crop grown by peasants was greatly facilitated by both the colonial state, as
well as the state after independence in Kenya. For large British multinationals, corn production
allowed companies to keep down producer prices for an important export, wattle, which after
processing was used in leather production and other industrial applications (Heyer 1977; Leys
1975). Keeping producer prices down could only be accomplished by shifting the cost of the
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input to small Kenyan producers, yet doing so required that additional options for foodstuffs be
produced in rural areas.
The state, in coordination with multinational capital, expanded the local production of
sale of maize in rural regions using cooperatives to organize the process. Yet, cooperatives of
small maize producers were severely constrained in terms of where they could sell and market
their products. Maize was intended to be a cheap food source to sustain low producer prices in
rural areas, not a means to enrich peasants who were in the process of creating linkages with
local merchant capital to serve urban areas. Thus, the sale of corn, through purchasing licenses,
as well as rules about the precise moisture content allowed, served to protect larger producers,
confining peasant based corn production and marketing to the former labor reserves (Cowen
1981; Leys 1975). The impact of this particular pattern of institution making, of course, was
disastrous for the long term health of peasant produced corn. The institutions designed by the
state were effective, but their ultimate aim was not development, per se, so much as it was to
manage the gains and losses of economic production. Coordinating institutions clearly did not
include small scale producers, even if they were more extensive and elaborate than those found
in Ghana.
Small producers were not the only ones negatively impact by socially rooted processes of
institution making during the first Kenyatta regime; the lack of opportunities for an emerging
African petite bourgeoisie led the state to adopt policies that ultimately negatively impacted its
retail sector by dispossessing Asian producers. While land redistribution had served as an
important social safety valve, allowing the regime to appease the demands of its core supporters,
the pressures facing the regime particularly from those who had moved into large urban centers
were not diminished by these schemes. On the whole, this new urban petite bourgeoisie lacked
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the connections and wealth of those who had succeeded in the rural economy. Having newly
arrived in urban areas, they often failed to compete effectively against Asian owned businesses,
as Kenyan Asians had long been entrenched in urban areas having been excluded from the rural
economy and from land redistribution. More importantly, perhaps, Asians in Kenya, as in other
parts of East Africa, often lack close political ties that might have served as a protection again
growth inhibiting policy. That is not to say that the group as a whole had no connections to the
state, but this group lacked the influence necessary to set the course of institution building.
The result of this lack of political influence, of course, was that Kenyans and non
Kenyans of Asian origin were largely pushed out of the retail and wholesale sectors of the urban
economy, at least temporarily. Acting through the Kenyan chamber of commerce, Kenya's
African petit bourgeoisie succeeded in pushing forward legislation to enable them to take over
Asian owned businesses in the form of the Trade and Licensing Act (TLA) of 1967. According
to Vandenberg (2006):
The TAL restricted the sale of goods in specified areas to Africans. It required that non-citizens (often
interpreted to mean non-Africans) could not trade outside of core business areas in cities and towns in a list
of (mostly basic) commodities. In consequence, a large number of Asian-owned businesses had to be
vacated with the express intent that they be taken over by Africans. The focus was on retail trade although
it was directly linked to wholesale trade, much of it controlled by Asians. In 1974, the act was amended to
include the manufacture of some basic commodities but this was repealed two years late (118).

The state made a concerted effort, through the granting of import export and trading
licenses, to promote the interests of Kenyon's of African origin over those of Asian origin.
Furthermore, the state attempted to facilitate a redistribution of Asian owned businesses,
particularly those in wholesale distribution, to African buyers. The Kenyan petite bourgeoisie
thus found itself included I the policy coalition, but truly as a junior member. And in place of
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economic resources, they were granted preferential policy, which ultimately turned out to be
growth inhibiting.
Africanzation of the urban economy, as a policy, had a negative impact on growth and
economic performance. Africans who took over Asian businesses often lacked expertise and
experience, and as a result many were forced out of business or in some cases made
arrangements to sell the original business back to their previous owners (Himbara 1994, 59-60;
Swainson 1987, 148). These new African entrepreneurs often focused on making quick gains,
but failed to make investments in capital and machinery that while painful in the short term,
might have provided a feasible foundation and the long-term. Vandenberg (2006) argues that
these new businesses often failed because they lacked the long term support networks that Asian
firms had taken constructed over decades (p. 124). Perhaps it is for this reasons that African
capitalists of the rural economy tended to be very wary of venturing into new fields outside of
agriculture and agro processing, because of the inherent risk involved in these enterprises. In
fact, those few who ventured into other forms of manufacturing tended to be very well
established already, and often had to be induced with subsidized loans from the Industrialization
and Commerical Development Corporation or other state entities (Swaison 1987, 151). Thus,
though there is latent support for a policy of Africanization, this policy was not championed by
the capitalist class.
Africanization ran into a large roadblock when it attempted to make incursions into large
industrial and manufacturing facilities. From a purely practical standpoint, leveraging a buyout
from a small local producer presents many fewer difficulties then taking over the assets of a
large, wealthy, and potentially politically connected manufacturing facility. Though the rhetoric
of Africanization played well for politicians within KANU, the reality was that accomplishing it
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presented severe difficulties. It was at this point that other fractions of Kenyan capital united
behind Asian owned capital, in an effort to block the state from taking over private enterprise.
The Kenyan Association of Manufacturers, which represents not only manufacturing within
urban areas but the many African owned businesses in Agro processing in other fields, put up
fierce opposition to the policy which was quickly rolled back (Himbara 1994, 62). The result,
was that while small shops and manufacturing facilities were initially bought out and transfered
to African ownership, large-scale industry was left out of this process. These policies resulted in
turbulence and lower-than-expected growth within the sectors, but ultimately did very little for
expanding the reach of African owned capital in Kenya, in large part because it was already
heavily engaged in other parts of the economy. Thus, despite being fragmented, capital presented
a united front when essential property rights were threatened; in this manner, destructive
economic policies were held in check by the temporary cohesion of capital. While the various
fractions of Kenyan capital, often separated by overlapping cleavages of both ethnicity and
economic sector, were more often than not in conflict with one another, through the auspices of
the state it tended to dampen extreme modulations of policy acting as a type of regulator to
ensure the perpetuation of the status quo.
The line dividing membership in the policy coalition from outside is somewhat blurred.
Clearly there are different gradients of membership, at least there was during the Kenyatta
regime. Growth enhancing institutions are clearly aimed at capital, to the point of causing
economic harm to smallholders and those outside the policy coalition. Furthermore, small
holders in the central region, as an important par of the social coalition received economic
benefits such as irrigation infrastructure, though this service delivery was a positive externality
of benefits directed at large landowners. The petite bourgeoisie, on the other hand, appeared to
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be part of the policy coalition if they were of African origin. These members, however, had little
influence over policy when it conflicted with indigenous and Asian capital.

The Moi Regime – Contested Distribution and Fiscal Challenges
The Kenyatta regime was characterized by its ability to craft growth enhancing institutions,
which however, tended to be somewhat narrow in their scope, tailored as they were to particular
ethnic communities. And a whole class if we consider indigenous manufacturing capital. The
beneficiaries of this approach were Kikuyu farmers in the central region, who were primarily
involved in the production of coffee and tea, Kenya’s primary export commodities. Farmers in
the central region were not the only beneficiaries however, as the regime also attempted to
cultivate a powerful indigenous bourgeoisie in part through appropriating the property of smallscale Asian entrepreneurs. Here, the regime received pushback from capital as a whole, as
organizations like the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers began to fear the regime’s attitude
toward private property. While the selective creation of growth enhancing institutions was the
norm, a fragmented and fractured bourgeoisie came together to provide some sort of opposition
when these policies ventured into potentially dangerous territory for a capitalist economy. This
ability of capital to provide some sort of a check to growth inhibiting institutions would be
severely tested during the long tenure of president Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta upon his death
in 1978, and only relinquished power in 2002.
Kenyatta, in choosing Moi as successor, attempted to cultivate not only Moi the politician
but the Kalenjin community as a whole. In fact, a Kalenjin alliance with Kikuyu interests was by
no means a logical, forgone conclusion. In fact, in the lead up to independence Kikuyu elites
tended to ally themselves with Luo elites such as Oginga Odinga, who were involved large-scale
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farming interests often involving crops such as sugarcane. Kikuyu interests, on the other hand,
tended to revolve around coffee, tea, as well as animal husbandry. Elites from these two groups
(the Kikuyu and the Luo) formed the core of rural capitalist interests in Kenya. Each group
owned large commercial agricultural holdings and had expanded into Agro processing, real
estate, and construction (Branch 2011). Had these two groups not been so bitterly divided over
key questions related to land distribution, it is possible that they may have ultimately ended up
cooperating.
The Kalenjin, on the other hand, were a conglomeration of several subgroups united only
in the role in which they played in the rural economy. Elites from this ethnic group tended to be
ranchers, involved primarily in the raising of cattle although they would eventually expand their
interests to real estate and the hospitality sector (Lynch 2011). Kalenjin elites, on the whole,
were neither as wealthy nor well-connected as there would be Kikuyu allies. Furthermore, areas
occupied by the Kalenjin received only superficial penetration by missionary groups during the
colonial era, leaving the region with a comparative lack of schools and other educational
facilities. The Kalenjin thus made unlikely allies to carry the torch of the Kenyatta legacy.
Formation of an alliance between Kalenjin and Kikuyu elites involved the incorporation
of the Kalenjin into the mainstream rural economy. Under Kenyatta, Kalenjin families were the
beneficiaries of large productive commercial farms, a process that would continue during the
Moi presidency (Hornsby 2012). Solidifying the alliance, however, was alignment in the policy
priorities of Kalenjin and Kikuyu elites surrounding the pastoral economy. Under Kenyatta and
Moi economic institutions lowered the price of inputs such as feed for animals, and provided aid
in terms of transportation and marketing of meat and leather products to urban areas (Leonard
1991). While the alliance may not of been a perfect one, there were enough similarities in the
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economic interests of these two groups, and the fractions of capital that they represented, to
allow for a fruitful working relationship. That is not to say that tensions did not exist between
these groups, particularly over the allocation of land over whose conflicting claims predated
colonialism. Nevertheless, at least until the end of the Moi presidency, cooperation rather than
conflict between these two groups was the norm.
The Moi regime, from an institutional level continued the variegated patterns of
institution making that have so characterized Kenyan political economy. Like Kenyatta, the
regime attempted to make broad sweeping gestures to provide essential services to all Kenyans.
Thus, one of Moi’s first programs was to provide free primary school education for all children,
although the regime was not quite successful as it ran out of funds to cover all of the grades. The
regime also halted land transfers until they could be properly investigated for fairness (Khapoya
1980, 24). Lastly, the regime also released a host of political prisoners and dissidents of the
Kenyatta regime. These, and other measures, allowed Moi to begin his term in office as a wildly
popular politician.
Sweeping gestures to provide essential services however, quickly gave way to more
carefully circumscribed programs that delivered benefits to key constituencies. Strong support
for Kikuyu and Kalenjin dominated dairy and cattle industries continued during Moi’s tenure. A
school milk program that went along with the provision of free schooling for most of primary
school was a huge boon to the dairy industry. In the coffee and tea industry, the prices paid to
producers in the coffee and tea industries were kept high despite tight budgetary restrictions
(Lofchie 1990). In addition, Smallholder Coffee Improvement Acts passed in 1979 and 1989, to
provided added processing facilities, as well as access to credit and loans for small farmers. Moi,
indeed, was operating under similar pressures to the Kenyatta regime and building carefully
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targeted growth enhancing institutions proved to be a tried and true survival strategy. Like
Kenyatta, the institutions that were built were both internally and externally oriented. The most
successful ones, of course, were directed at key constituencies.
The only major deviation from Kenyatta’s approach to institution making was in the
regime’s pivot toward the production of cereals for internal consumption to reflect the concerns
of new key members of the policy coalition. The regime paid particular attention to the
production of wheat, a commodity grown in the Rift valley in areas occupied by the Kalenjin. In
order to stimulate wheat production, producers under Moi were given paid prices that were
sometimes even higher than the marketed price of the crop (Lofchie 1990, 222). Other cereal
crops such as maize and sorghum were also given support, though the levels of prices paid to
producers though sometimes quite high, did not approach the amount paid for wheat (Leonard
1991). Wheat was particularly important as it was one of the main food commodities purchased
by urban dwelling Kenyans, who tended to favor it over corn; its production also directly
benefitted the most powerful Kalenjin families who now formed the inner circle of the new
administration.
Moi, like Kenyatta, packed aid for smallholders and large landowners together in policy
bundles. Thus, coffee processing facilities greatly aided large Kikuyu and Kalenjin owned
plantations even as access to loans helped small farmers. Aid to what farmers, on the other hand,
greatly aided both large landowners and small farmers in a region populated primarily by the
Kalenjin ethnic group. Moi appeared to be constructing a relatively large Kalenjin and Kikuyu
policy coalition, that distributed benefits both to elites and smallholders in the rural economy.
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Economic Troubles during the Moi Regime
In the 1980s Kenya underwent a severe and prolonged economic slump, as prices in the main
export sectors or tea and coffee fell dramatically on the world market. In response, the
institutional profile of the Kenyan state as a changed as the regime transitioned from one that
maintained its policy coalition through growth enhancing institutions to one that used a
combination of growth inhibiting but inexpensive policy and intimidation to maintain a grip
upon power. A foiled coup attempt in 1982 gave Moi the impetus to continue a shakeup of
ministers that had begun earlier that year, as well as to take a more firm grip of the security
apparatus. Moi thus began to surround himself a group of colleagues, often from the Kalenjin
ethnic group, who earned their positions as ministers not through talent so much as through
loyalty (Hornsby 2012, 375). The impact on all forms of economic institution making was
devastating. While growth enhancing institutions in major export sectors had in the past had
clearly benefitted groups such as the Kalenjin and Kikuyu, they had also created positive
externalities such as improved roads and a competent approach to extension services. As the
institutional profile of the state changed, these positive externalities that were essential for
support began to erode away.
The drastic decrease in government revenues meant that the Moi regime had fewer
sources of revenue with which to sustain the loyalty of its social coalition. While the prices paid
to tea and coffee producers, for example, did not decline to disastrous levels the concerns of this
sector particularly of the large planters, began to fall on deaf ears (Leonard 1991, 171). Even
programs that were important to the Kalenjin constituency of the Moi regime felt the crunch of a
tightening fiscal environment. Livestock, for example, was particularly hard hit, with Leonard
(1991) noting:
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As the budgetary crisis dragged on, however, the ability and willingness of Livestock Development to
respond effectively to it was dissipated. None of the innovative policy proposals that the ministry had put
up were adopted by the cabinet or the president. This might not have been so debilitating if other priorities
had been imposed in their place. But no choices were made between services; all continued with
increasingly inadequate levels of budgetary provision… Other services throughout the Veterinary
Department declined as well and morale suffered. Staff could see little point in trying to change things if
resources were going to bear so little relationship to real needs and if the cabinet was going to be unwilling
to set any deliberate kind of priorities. There was particular despair at the government's failure to shut down
the Uplands Bacon Factory. The parastatal had declined to the point where it was serving no useful
purpose. But President Moi could not bring himself to lay off workers. The sums that were used to keep it
alive would have served livestock producers far better in adequate provision for vital Veterinary
Department services…. There were inadequate funds for the purchase of required drugs and for the travel
of veterinarians. The paraprofessional support staff did an increasing proportion of the work on their own,
bought their own drugs, and began to accept illegal payments for their services. This informal
commercialization actually had mixed benefits. At least it permitted veterinary care to continue to be
available… But the quality of veterinary care declined, for the professional veterinarians were increasingly
isolated from its provision (180).

In livestock, institutions which had facilitated growth first stopped functioning due to a
lack of funds. Yet, instead of curtailing services and employment, the regime instead chose to
continue dysfunctional services in the form of the Uplands Beacon Facility, in order to avoid
laying off workers and the political impact that such an action might reap. Budgetary constraints
were in effect subverting what had been growth producing institutions into policies that
continued to drag the economy down. Economic institutions in the coffee and tea industry were
subject to the same types of degradation. The social and policy coalitions were thus maintained,
but the tool through which this outcome was achieve was growth inhibiting institutions.
Gaining the necessary funds to stay in power sometimes meant that the regime would
appropriate funds from businesses, particularly those without influential political backers. The
Asian business community in particular tended to be susceptible to such threats, as they often
lacked powerful allies. One of the principal means employed by the regime to garner official
support was campaign contributions, where members of the community would be asked to
donate at public events. Business community members, despite being dissatisfied with the
regime, particularly in terms of fiscal policy and infrastructure, seldom failed to cooperate for
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fear that politicians could retaliate through the state apparatus (Vandenberg 2013). Instead, a
cautious approach tended to be employed by business owners, one which would allow them to
continue with business as usual, despite the many encumbrances, while avoiding the potential
fallout of bad relations with government.
The lack of viable alternatives also posed a challenge for reluctant members of the Moi
policy coalition, as well as the opposition. While indigenous capital may have generally
preferred a regime that was more responsive to their needs and that was making a more
concerted effort to create economic growth, the destabilization of the Moi regime presented real
dangers. Urban unrest in particular was threatening to business, who believed that elements of
the lumpen proletariat, if they were allowed to come to power, would directly threaten their
interests. These fears, though unlikely, appeared to briefly come to fruition with urban unrest in
the mid-1990s as well as in the war of arrows in the highlands of the Rift valley. For Chabal and
Daloz (1999), these displays were a deliberate use of disorder as political instrument; Moi, they
reasoned, was utilizing the threat of violence in order to shock and cajole his policy coalition,
particularly those members who could potentially defect to the opposition.
The Moi regime’s relative autonomy from social forces was greatly facilitated by state
intervention in the economy, particularly in the financial sector. The regime set up a series of
“political banks,” whose loan portfolio’s consisted of a high percentage of nonpaying, but
politically well-connected customers (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999). These banks, though
useful for sustaining the regime in power, were obviously an economic drag on the overall
performance of the financial system. Furthermore, Arriola (2015) argues that they played a much
more sinister role, namely, limiting the ability of the opposition to finance campaigns and to
solidify alliances through the payment of campaign related debts. Arrioloa links the coming of
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IMF reforms in the financial sector, which firmly ousted the state from control over the financial
system, as allowing for the first time for more cohesive and multiethnic opposition coalitions,
because credit to finance campaigns was more widely available.
Finally, the Moi regime was also characterized by a deft management of the losses what
were incurred during liberalization, during the early 1990s. During the heyday of import
substitution industrialization strategies in Kenya, the textile sector on the whole saw strong
performance being shielded by high tariff barriers; the performance of the sector was bolstered
by the relatively effective market interventions of the Kenyan Cotton Board, which sought to
ensure high quality cotton to the mills (Chemengich et al. 2013). These policies, while
functional, however, did not represent any particular dispensation on the part of Kenyan regimes.
The textile sector, at least the larger enterprises, was until the early 1990s mostly owned by
Kenyans of Asian descent. Cotton growing areas in Kenya, on the other hand, were often found
in areas peripheral to economy. The crop was grown almost exclusively in regions that were low
lying and semi-arid, regions of the country that did not have any particular political following in
the Kenyatta or Moi regimes. Perhaps it is for this reason that market liberalization during the
early 1990s hit cotton growers, processors, and textile mills so hard.
The textile sector in Kenya, as in other African states, had to quickly contend with
increased competition and reduced state support for industry during the advent of market
liberalization, which in Kenya occurred in 1993. The state no longer provided subsidies on
important inputs for small producers, and resources to aid in marketing and transportation of raw
cotton to processing facilities was greatly curtailed. At the same time, the regime stopped
investing in parastatals within the sector, leaving many facilities to process raw cotton into
useable thread in a state of disrepair. Sales of these enterprises were slow, as buyers were
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reluctant to invest given the political and economic climate of the 1990s. The impact on the
sector as a whole was devastating; mills could no longer reliably and cheaply source inputs, and
as a result, problems of production forced a number to shut down. As in many part of the
developing world, the fiscal constraints that accompanied conditionality and liberalization
proved to be too burdensome for industry to survive intact.
If failures in the procurement of raw material and the expense and unavailability of
capital severely damaged the textile sector in Kenya, it was competition from Asian firms and
inexpensive imports of used clothing from the West that sounded its death knell. With
liberalization, imports of inexpensive clothing from China flooded the Kenyan market. While
these clothing articles were not necessarily of the highest quality, the price made them appealing
to consumers. Used clothing imports from the United States and other countries, on the other
hand, were both inexpensive and generally high quality. Imports of used clothing began to grow
in the 1990s and have continued to rise to historic levels. Today, there are few textile
manufacturers left in Kenya, and those that persist tend to produce clothing that is specific to
Kenyan society such as school uniforms, or that by necessity needs to be manufactured
domestically, such as police uniforms.
The sector on whole, appeared to receive a break with the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which potentially provided a comparative advantage to Kenyan firms
seeking to export to the United States. The manner in which liberalization occurred within
Kenya, however, meant that the benefits of AGOA tended to disproportionately favor external
capital rather than Kenya peasants and producers. The legislation was accompanied by an influx
of foreign firms, taking advantage of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) to conduct what was
ostensibly value added production in Kenya destined form the US market. Yet, the legislation
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surrounding EPZs meant that firms were granted tax holidays to invest, which many firms did in
the short term in order to take advantage of AGOA. Workers no doubt benefitted from this
increased economic activity, but peasants who could have potentially worked to provide inputs to
these new facilities did not. By the time that foreign manufacturers moved to Kenya, cotton
production had already fallen to historically low levels, and government was slow to make the
necessary long term investments to increase overall cotton yields. Furthermore, the fact that
AGOA was conditional on renewals, and could expire, discouraged foreign firms from making
the types of backward linkages within the Kenyan economy that could have produced more
widespread economic wellbeing. Thus, these producers, who were often from east Asia, tended
to import raw materials including cotton thread, rather than utilizing Kenyan production (Ngulu
2010, 4). Furthermore, they also tended to repatriate profits, rather than working to invest in the
vertical integration of their businesses in Kenya. Thus while the sector has seen investment, the
allocation of foreign owned factories has in many ways contributed to Kenya underdevelopment,
rather than creating more valuable value added linkages within the economy. Underdevelopment
during the Moi regime, at least, was symptomatic of efforts to channel of economic benefits to
specific constituencies.
Theoretically, the Moi regime is of great interest because it clearly became more
autonomous from its social coalition. It shielded its policy coalition from the worst aspects of
liberalization, but also circumscribed the goods and services paid to smallholders. Eventually,
the regime would cease to provide effective policy and instead resort to threats of violence to
maintain its grip on power. The policy coalition shrank, institutions became more growth
inhibiting and the regime acted more as the manager of the costs of globalization rather than as a
driver of developmental policy.
226

The Kibaki Regime
The end of the Moi era was thus marked by a new, more assertive stance of business groups. In
the mid-1990s various Kenyan business interests such as the GEMA group began to openly
support members of the opposition candidates, one of the primary ones being Mwi Kibaki. These
and other potential presidential candidates appeared to offer a new beginning, after the sandals
and fiscal constraints of Moi’s tenure in office. Kibaki emerged as a rival to Moi in the mid1990s, and he quickly attracted the attention of support of the Kikuyu business community,
which had been relatively secluded from active involvement with the state since the end of the
Kenyatta regime. Kibaki, however, was unable to court public support from influential donors
until the prospects of real democratic change appeared to be maturing in the late 1990s.
Kibaki won the 2002 presidential election and he drew popularity both from his ethnic
affiliations as a somewhat conservative member of the Kikuyu business community, and his
credentials as a regime technocrat under Moi. He was largely seen as one of the least sullied
members of the Moi administration, being a leader of a technocratic faction within the
administration that also included Charles Njojo, before his fall from power in the late 1980s
(Hornsby 2012). As a trained economist Kibaki opposed many of the measures put forward by
the regime, such as use of bank funds to distribute patronage. In this manner, he was able to draw
multiethnic support, particularly from various business communities.
As president, Kibaki oversaw the resurgence of the political influence of the indigenous
Kenyan bourgeoisie, an outcome he helped to initiate. The regime helped to organize civil
society into broad based umbrella groups representing industry and small business. Anthony
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Weru (2016), a representative of the The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), credits the
regime for providing the impetus to bring groups such as KEPSA together. Indeed, while the
Kibaki presidency saw resurgence in the power of civil society to advocate for policy, this
process has largely been driven from the top down. As an organization the Kenya Private Sector
Alliance brings together both indigenous capital as well as the petite bourgeoisie, groups who
were previously split between the Kenyan National Chamber of Commerce and the Kenyan
Association of manufacturers. An active role in organizing civil society group provided a wealth
of good will on behalf of a broad cross section of Kenyan capital.
The institutional form of the contemporary Kenyan state differs from the previous
political era under Moi in the greater profusion of both internally and externally oriented
institutions of growth enhancing potential. While a recovery in the principal export sectors no
doubt contributed to this process, so too did the ability of the Kibaki regime to collaborate with
civil society surrounding growth enhancing institutions. The state in Kenya has always enjoyed a
large degree of penetration in society, from the utilization of cooperative societies to organize
labor to the profusion of state run banks distributing patronage and economic opportunities.
These institutions, on the whole, have served to manage processes of accumulation; they have
acted in many different sectors of the economy, both those dealing with the domestic market, as
well as international markets and the linkages between the two. In numerous interviews
conducted in 2016, trade groups and donor affiliated organizations indicated that the regime was
largely receptive to their suggestions, beginning with the Kibaki regime. 12 This antidotal
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Interviews conducted during July and August of 2016 with the following: Thomas Mukhebi, from the Kenya
Agrobusiness and Agroindustry Alliance; Michael Okelo from the Kenyan Union of Savings and Cooperatives;
Anthony Weru, of the Kenyan Private Sector Alliance; Kariuki Waweru of the Business Advocacy Fund (affiliated
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evidence also corresponds to quantitative measures of business climate, such as the World
Bank’s annual Doing Business survey. The Kibaki regime appeared to be listening to concerns of
both the business community, as well as policy makers of major international organizations.
Nevertheless, while the regime generally listened to concerns about doing business, its track
record particularly with smallholders was remained somewhat mixed.
The fate of smallholders in the tea and coffee industry illustrates the mixed record of the Kibaki
regime in institutional creation. While big producers largely continued with business as usual,
smallholders who were required by law to be members of cooperatives, saw a host of legislation
that accompanied liberalization in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The changes to the tea sector
opened up the market by allowing growers to sell to whichever purchasing agent they preferred,
as well as by removing restrictions on the type of tea processing acceptable to buys (Mitchell
2012, 258). The result has been steadily increasing growth, which was a boon to agro processors
in particular. The coffee sector on the other hand, has struggled against agreements that have
largely placed small producers at a disadvantage in relationship larger indigenous and foreign
firms. While growers were still required to process beans through cooperatives, cooperatives
were now given a limited set of choices for where to grind the beans, as well as added flexibility
in terms of how to invest cooperative funds. Such policy, unfortunately, has been disastrous in an
era in which cooperatives now can choose with whom they wish to do business. Such freedom,
while in principal positive, has contributed to graft and waste within the cooperatives, as
attempts have been made to coopt cooperative leadership through nefarious means (Mitchell
2012; Witwer, Mulinge, and Monroy 2013). The state was able to maintain some elements of its

with the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs); various representatives from the American Chamber of Commerce in
Nairobi, as well informal conversations with various NGO representatives and foreign businessmen and women.
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presence as a coffee purchaser, though with the changes in the cooperative structure it is unclear
whether this role continues to pass along sufficient value to consumers. The result has been a
decline in yields for smallholders. Thus, while new institutions for tea have largely been
successful, in the coffee industry small producers in particular have largely struggled.

Saccos and the State
Institutions surrounding Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCOs) illustrate the
unintentional manner in which the formation of growth enhancing institutions aimed at particular
communities spreads wider than the intended beneficiaries. The SACCO subsector of the
financial industry is closely linked to the state as an organization. SACCOs, by law, link together
members who share a common bond, often through the workplace, or industry (Republic of
Kenya 2012, 54). Members of the bureaucracy, as high wage earners, have traditionally made up
a high percentage of SACCO members in Kenya. SACCOs, as nonprofit institutions capable of
offering favorable rates of financing, have often served as an instrument of transformation,
changing ordinary members of the bureaucracy into a burgeoning bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It is
therefore not surprising, in and of itself, that institutions surrounding SACCOs have generally
facilitated growth. Yet, the success of SACCOs is contested, as traditional finance capital
attempts to undermine and control the sector, though with only various degrees of success. But
while the Kibaki regime generally found itself on the side of capital, maintaining its policy
coalition meant providing at least some support to this sector backed by such a large swath of the
bureaucracy. Yet, in granting benefits to a potentially influential constituency, the regime in
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effect granted these benefits to everyone. In this manner institution building that was broad based
took effect, though in this case it appeared to be the exception rather than the norm.
Most SACCOs play a functional role in the economy, and are closely aligned with the
cooperatives of which they are often a part. Thus, SACCOs are often attached to small
businesses, such as transport cooperatives that run small city buses called matutus. SACCOs are
also instrumental in planter’s cooperatives, in such fields as tea and coffee farming, and their
activities often revolve around facilitating farm loans, or processing payments to members. Since
the signing of the 1967 SACCO Act by the Kenyatta administration, SACCOs for the most part
have operated in a similar manner to revolving credit societies; after depositing funds to become
a member, members can generally expect to receive a loan at some point.
SACCOs that are not immersed in the day-to-day operations of a business, however, can and
often to play a more diverse and expansive role within the economy. One of the most coveted
jobs within Kenya, as in many African states, is within the bureaucracy, it is perhaps
unsurprising that some of the biggest SACCOs are affiliated with members of various branches
of public service. In 2017, some of the largest SACCOs included the Kenya Police SACCO,
Mwalimu, the public teachers SACCO, which is also the largest in the country, and the
Harambee Sacco whose membership is open to those working for parastatals, county
governments, and the national armed forces amongst others (Business Daily 2018). SACCOs can
loan money for a variety purposes, including home and car loans. Yet, for more well to do
members of society, often affiliated with the state, using funds invest in various fields related to
business is not unusual. A representative from Sheria Sacco, whose members represent various
branches of the Kenyan judiciary, indicated that the organization had made loans for large farm
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operations, stakes in transport companies, and financed the start up a private school in Nairobi.13
While it is true that members of these prominent SACCOs could also get loans from commercial
banks, interest rates at SACCOs are often more attractive, while the process of obtaining a loan
from a SACCO is generally more straightforward. SACCOs, in this manner, are a convenient
route for accumulation on the part of the more well to do sections of the bureaucratic class.
The Kibaki regime, on the whole, has supported the SACCO sub-sector, but this support has
often been qualified with increased regulation. An amendment to the Cooperative Societies in
1997 under the Moi regime allowed SACCOs to begin operating front office operations, as a
normal bank though only open to members. While cooperative financial institutions in other
parts of the world operate both as commercial banks open to members and as savings and loan
granting organizations, in Kenya before 1997, the sector could only operate as the latter. While
this newfound financial freedom was certainly welcome by the sector, it was accompanied by a
host of regulations inhibiting the ability of SACCOs to invest fruitfully. Representatives at the
Kenyan Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (KUSCC), the national umbrella organization
that coordinates lending and policy amongst all SACCOs, reported that this situation changed
dramatically during the Kibaki regime. Most important were changes in the law allowing
SACCOs to invest in a wider array of fields such as real estate. The impact on the sector appears
to have been significant, as SACCOs represent a fast growing part of the Kenyan financial
sector, with over 3 million members nationwide (Business Daily 2018).
The opening of the SACCO sector to retail banking, however, has always been a
contested process. Commercial banks in particular have pushed back against what they see as
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Meeting with employees of Sheria Sacco, and Michael Okelo, deputy director of education and training at the
Kenyan Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives, August 23, 2016 at Sheira Sacco, Nairobi.
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unfair competition from not-for-profit organizations. The opening of SACCO front office
operations in particular forced down interest rates across financial institutions in Kenya as
commercial banks were forced to complete. SACCOs, coordinating policy through KUSCCO,
have from time to time cut interest rates in order to retain a financial edge of the banks (Business
Daily 2016). These periodic bouts of competition have also resulted in legislation to more
closely monitor the sector, resulting in reforms in 2008 that created a watchdog, the Sacco
Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA). While it was hoped by some that increased regulation
would level the playing field in favor of banks, in fact it appears that a well-regulated SACCO
sector, at least at first glance, has led to increased revenues (Gweyi and Karanja 2014).
While political infighting surrounding SACCOs will most likely never abate, the growth
enhancing benefits of the support of the industry have had far reaching consequences. Each
SACCO contributes to the national umbrella organization, KUSCCO, which helps to coordinate
the industry and ensure that it continues to grow. One of the principal tools that KUSCCO
employs are loans to fund the programming of local SACCOs who might not have the resources
to lend given the modest means of their membership base. Regional offices of KUSCCO lend
monies to SACCO in regional and local offices all over the country. One manager of a regional
branch in Athi River, a rural area south east of Nairobi, described the activity of his branch as
being vital to the local economy, lending to SACCOs involved in vegetable farming, motorbike
transport, poultry farming, and various small businesses that might not be able to otherwise
extend credit to its members.14 Indeed, KUSCCO played a vital role in the local economy,
helping to finance the construction of a slate of 120 homes to meet growing housing demand

14

Interview conducted at KUSCCO, Athi River Kenya, August 23, 2016. The manager preferred not to have his
name appear in this project.
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(Agutu 2014). The sector, in part through working on cooperative principals, uses funds from an
emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie to help fund a wide array of projects throughout the country.
In this manner, at an institutional level, legislation surrounding SACCOs appears to be delivering
non targeted benefits, very widely. Yet, when we take into consideration the close political
connections of the SACCO sub sector’s most ardent supporters, it is perhaps no surprise that a
benefit that appears to offer open access to all, is skewed towards benefitting the regime’s social
and policy coalitions. Indeed, the Kibaki regime’s actions may at first glance appear to fly in the
face of the logic of core related factors. The administration appeared to be using performance in
the formal economy, as well as class based rather than ethnically based appeals to gain political
support. The result was growth enhancing institutions and a modest expansion of the policy
coalition through the creation of new civil society groups such as KEPSA. While these trends
had a positive impact on economic performance, this strategy would not be sufficient to keep the
regime in power. Instead, they would begin to craft institutions and policy to meet the needs of
their social and policy coalitions.

Dairy Production and the Politics of Political Survival
Unlike the SACCO sub-sector, reforms undertaken in the dairy sector more closely resemble
dominant patterns of growth enhancing institution making in Kenya. Government reforms in the
early 2000s led to a revival of the Kenyan dairy sector, and are generally seen as a case of
successful state intervention into the rural economy, though perhaps it is ironic that a regime that
touted the power of private investors and market solutions would be the architect of such a
program. Nevertheless, in this case we see the clear reemergence of core related factors that
ultimately create benefits that were widely distributed, but in a carefully circumscribed
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geographic area that aligned with the regime’s social coalition. It is important to note than
ranching and diary farming in particular, are fields with a strong Kikuyu and Kalenjin presence.
Growth enhancing institutions were created in a narrow fashion; a central tenant of both the
Kibaki regime’s survival strategy, and that of most post-independence Kenyan regimes.
The institutional legacies of the dairy sector are grounded in the attempts to protect and
sustain settler production. In this manner, the dairy industry fit into the larger constellation of
programs designed to sustain white settler farming in the central highlands, and as such received
generous support from the colonial government (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008, 4-5). To insure
sustainable pricing and economies of scale, the state created the Kenyan Cooperative Creameries
(KCC) in 1922, in order to collect milk in its raw form and to process it into powder. Before
liberalization, the KCC was the primary processer and distributer of milk related products in
Kenya. While it did not have a monopoly in the market, it provided producers with stable pricing
and facilitated investment in the sector.
The end of colonialism and the opening up of the highlands saw the collapse of the estate
centered dairy production and the profusion of small scale production and cooperatives aimed at
local markets, and located close to urban centers (Rademaker et al. 2016, 25; Thorpe et al. 2000,
1). State policy continued along the same lines, with a central cooperative acting as a buying
agent and also running collection and processing facilities. In addition, numerous private
processors also entered in the market connecting farmers in rural area to urban conglomerations
(Rademaker et al. 2016, 16). Given the close linkages between the state and areas that were
producing dairy, many top officials in the first Kenyatta administration took lucrative positions
in the market, acting distributors connecting producers and the urban market (Atieno and
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Kanyinga 2008). The family of the current president Kenyatta, for example, currently owns the
largest dairy distributor in the country.
Liberalization within the industry, as in other industries with important domestic
followings, proved to be a contested and somewhat convoluted process. Liberalization was
perhaps most thorough in the collection of milk, thus opening the market to a Kenya’s petite
bourgeoisie, who acted as formal and informal traders to manage transactions between farmers
and consumers. Many of these transactions cut out processing facilities, as Kenyans tend to
prefer cheaper raw milk that must be boiled before consumption (Rademaker et al. 2016).
Furthermore, the role of the Kenyan Cooperative Creameries was reduced to one processor, in a
competitive field. Given the fiscal exigencies that accompanied the decision to liberalize the
sector, funds were not made available to invest in equipment and upgrade the capacity of the
cooperative. Yet the struggles of the cooperative also attracted attention:
Political and economic interests intertwined to undermine the growth of KCC. The monopoly that KCC
enjoyed in the dairy sector and its elaborate infrastructure attracted powerful elites from the day
liberalization reforms were introduced in the agricultural sector. Proliferation of small holder cooperatives
and other new private dairy firms that begun to compete with KCC provided an opportunity for influential
politicians and their business associates to argue for privatization of KCC (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008, 15).

The KCC became a potentially important economic asset, and a small group of investors,
containing influential ministers quietly purchased the ailing parastatal corporation in 2000.15
The sale of the KCC led to a public outcry, particularly among farmers in the central
region. A strong KCC had helped to stabilize producer prices is an essential component for the
livelihood of many farmers, as the vast majority of milk in Kenya is produced by households

15

A dispute between Moi and his former lawyer would later reveal that the former president himself was one of the
investors who purchased the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (Daily Nation 2007).
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owning one of two dairy cows (Thorpe et al. 2000, 1). Within the central region, the sale, which
occurred quietly, far from the eye of public scrutiny, was widely seen as theft. Outside the
region, however, it became part of the longer narrative of abuses of the state, particularly those
associated with the Moi regime. Thus, when the Kibaki regime came to power in 2002, it is
perhaps no surprise that one of their first tasks was to repurchase the KCC, and to reinvigorate
the dairy sector.
The Kibaki regimes reforms, in the same manner as those carried out during Kenyatta’s
tenure as well as the early part of the Moi regime, packaged together regionally circumscribed
service delivery with benefits for important members of the bureaucracy. The KCC was quickly
repurchased with public funds, and its facilities were rehabilitated. This initial investment was
followed by others; amounts invested were generous, especially in comparison to the relative
austerity of the Moi years. Framers were provided with subsidies for important inputs such as
animal feed and extension services to provide care and help in breeding. These reforms, in turn,
attracted investment both from commercial banks and KUSCCO as it became clear that the
sector had state support and was thus safer bet. While there are some aspects of dairy production
that continue to present difficulties for farmers seeking credit, in comparison to other industries,
credit remains widely available (Rademaker et al. 2016, 24). In the process, important regime
officials who owned businesses were among those who took advantage of new investment with
the sector (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008).
The Kibaki regime’s dairy program is widely seen as a success. Farmers in particular saw
producer prices stabilize, and thus made investments in their herds. Distributors, on the other
hand were able to benefit from lower priced processing, as well as a greater ease in transport and
marketing as loans for such things as trucks and motorcycles became easier to obtain. The
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regime’s new economic institutions were largely seen as facilitating growth. Yet, the program
was also narrow in its scope, with almost all of the benefits accruing to the central region as well
as important politically connected elites.

The Presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta
The regime of Uhuru Kenyatta, and its approach to institution building illustrate the manner in
which society in Kenya constrains the scope of state action by shifting the patterns of institution
making to fit the preferences of the policy coalition. The regimes approach to economic policy
making and service provision, within social proscribed limits, is on the whole, more broad than
previous Kenyan regimes. This outcome, in important respects, was driven by violence and
discontent surrounding the 2007-2008 and 2017 elections, which highlighted the absolute
necessity of a more equitable distribution of the social product. Institutionally, a new 2010
constitution, crafted as part of the 2007-2008 election settlement, provided funds to county level
governments and a procedural blueprint for involving local stakeholders in the development
process.
These governmental reforms, at least in principle, created a massive expansion of the
policy coalition by mandating a nationwide procedure - Presidential Economic Roundtables - for
discussing developmental goals, verifying progress on those goals, and prescribing policy
recommendations whose progress would then be reviewed at a later date. As a set of institutions,
these presidential roundtables and their associated ministerial meetings are perhaps the most
thorough set of coordinating institutions on the continent. Nevertheless, as the Ghanaian case
illustrates access to elected officials alone does not constitute membership in the policy coalition;
membership is denoted by influence over policy. While the policy coalition has no doubt
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expanded on matters of lesser importance, it is unclear whether these new institutions represent a
break with the past approach of the selective dispersal of developmental funds, or whether they
simply provide a new means of social control and cooptation. While an analysis of these new
institutions would require a study all of its own, the dissertation finds little change in the broad
patterns of development. Core-related factors, rather than these comparatively new institutions,
can generally explain new patterns of development better than any institutional changes. These
new institutions, however, certainly have an impact particularly in the formal sectors of the urban
economy. Perhaps equally important from the perspective of Kenyan regimes, is a perception
that developmental funding is being spread over a larger number of communities - a perception
than contains at least a grain of truth, even if veracity is somewhat debatable.
The Kenyatta regime has tried to take advantage of this new institutional environment to
build growth enhancing institutions more widely, though there are of course limits to the
magnanimity of the state. When program funding is tight, as is so often the case, or where there
is conflict between two important sectors, the concerns of the regimes policy coalition take
precedence. In this manner, the regime represents a continuation, rather than a transformation of
previous patterns of institution making whose underlying logic of core related factors remains
constant.
In many ways, the Kenyatta regime is quite conventional, particularly in its support for
strong externally oriented institutions. The regime continues to provide support and resources to
the tea and coffee sectors, a relatively easy policy position given its base of support in the central
region. The regime has also continued to host economic round table forums, and to continue to
fund important infrastructure projects such as the ongoing efforts to extend the country’s electric
infrastructure (EIC 2018), as well as to negotiate an extension to the African Growth and
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Opportunities Act (AGOA) allowing textile manufacturers preferential access to American
markets. Institutional reforms such as streamlining the licensing process to open a business have
seen Kenya’s rankings in the UN Doing Business Ranking skyrocket. Corruption in the
administration of public funds, on the other hand, continues to be a problem but this issue is of
course not unique to the Kenyatta presidency and in fact indicates that in many ways, the regime
shares key traits with those that have come before it.
Like previous regimes, Kenyatta began his presidency with broad sweeping gestures of
goodwill that included service provision. One of the regime’s early successes was a popular
policy to eliminate fees for giving birth in public hospitals, which was accomplished through an
executive decree in 2013. Other popular policies were promised, and though many – such as a
successful initiative to improve leather production – were clearly aimed at the regimes core
supporters in the central region, others were not.
A large and expensive irrigation initiative provides a qualified counter example to the
general targeted manner in which Kenyan economic institutions are normally built. While
smallholders, in general, are underserved by irrigation infrastructure, they are especially
vulnerable in areas of the country that lie outside of the main exporting zones in the Rift Valley.
While the state, and multinational corporations have invested heavily in water resources for tea
and coffee exporting regions, funds from private sources are almost unheard of in areas that
primarily produce food for local consumption (Mendes and Paglietti 2015, 6). It is thus
incumbent on the state, acting in coordination with developmental partners to fill this vital
developmental gap. The Kenyatta regime made a concerted effort to address this deficiency in
small holder irrigation, devoting $42 million to a fund to massive increase irrigation to small
farmers throughout the country (The New Humanitarian 2014). The regime has clearly made
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headway in expanding the amount of land under irrigation, from 354,775 acres in 2013 to
483,670 acres in 2017 (Wanambisi 2017). Many small farmers, without doubt, have access to
drip irrigation for the very first time. Yet, successes aside, controversies within the program shed
doubt on the degree to which the Kenyatta regime is truly distributing economic benefits widely.
At the heart of the irrigation controversy is the idea that the institutional devolution of
power is in fact providing the state with a greater penetration into society. Instead of devolution,
critics of the regime point to a new and resurgent recentralization of power in which local elites
are coopted by the center. Many of these claims center around the Tana River, which is the
longest in the country. The river provides 50% of Kenya’s power generation capacity through
hydroelectric dams and it also supplies Nairobi with upwards of 80% of its water (Siegel 2017).
Those that live in close proximity to the river, often far away from major urban centers, claim
that the project is literally stealing water from their communities. In the Tana River Delta, for
example, an isolated region far from the capital, fishermen report being about to catch only a
fraction of what they caught before the project (Siegel 2017). Community activities and NGOs
point often point to the fact that the river’s resources, in light of a draught, are being overtaxed
while little in the way of constitutionally mandated participation in policy making is taking
place. According to (Secorun 2016):
Experts, however, warn the river’s resources are not unlimited. “Ignoring nature has a price,” says Julie
Mulonga, programme manager of Wetlands International in Kenya. According to Mulonga, the government’s
water management style focuses on the short-term benefit of industries around the capital, such as flower
farms and breweries, and disregards the needs of people and animals downstream.

While politically important constituencies benefit from the program, less well protected groups
such as sugarcane farmers, whose farms are often found in areas inhabited by groups such as the
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Luo who often oppose the regime, have been losing acreage as new reservoirs in areas such as
the Galana irrigation project flood their land (Otleno 2015).
Another broad signature program of the regime, an initiative to build 500,000 units of
affordable housing by 2022, appears to make an attempt to distribute economic resources more
equitably. Nevertheless, the project, which is in its infancy, suffers from a clear lack of funding.
The project features prominently in Kenyatta’s post 2017 election programming, and is one
component of the regime’s “Big Four Agenda.” While the increased attention to housing may be
new, it is actually a guiding component of Kenya’s Vision 2030 developmental framework. The
Kibaki regime, for example, pledged to construct 200,000 units of affordable housing between
2009 and 2012. A failure to create realistic plans for funding and implementation meant that only
3,000 units were ultimately constructed (Arucy 2019, 594). The Kenyatta regime appears to be
running into similar difficulties and so it is attempting to keep costs down by partnering with
private enterprise for roughly 80% of all new construction (Gardner et al. 2019, 7). Yet, even the
cost saving measures do not appear to be sufficient, as the regime attempted, unsuccessfully, to
impose a payroll tax of 1.5% on all Kenyans, with matching contributions from employers.
Kenyatta attempted to sell the levy to the public as “savings for a new home” but the tax was
ultimately blocked by the courts (BBC 2019). While it is too early to assess the program, its start
has not been particularly auspicious.

Sugar Production in Kenya
For the sugar industry, home to a particularly productive geographic region that has historically
been on the periphery of Kenyan politics, institution building has been aimed at political control
or at the very least cooptation of important elites. Such patterns of institution building are
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common in the contemporary political economy of African states (Boone 2003), and at their
heart lies the idea that running a successful economy sometimes means building institutions in
regions that are unlikely to provide political support to the regime in power. The sugar industry,
historically, has been one of the largest subsectors of the Kenyan economy, at various points
providing a livelihood for upwards of 20% of the population (Harding 2005, 2). Given the
economic importance of sugar in Kenya, the industry has always received a degree of state
support but strategies of rule often mean that it often falls behind other more favored industries
in receiving scarce developmental funding. In this regard the policies of the Kenyatta regime are
fairly typical of Kenyan governments, and represent some of the broader trends that have shaped
Kenyan political economy since independence. Despite a willingness to try to build broad based
growth enhancing institutions and policy, the regime has clear limits in the set of policy choices
it has available to it.
During the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta, the current president’s father, state ownership
of the sugar processing facilities was paired with intervention in marketing under the Kenyan
sugar authority, in order to insure producers a fair price and production facilities a reliable source
of inputs. A host of sugar processing facilities were set up by the government throughout the
1960s and 1970s, including the Muhorini Sugar factor (1966), the Chemil Sugar Factory (1968)
and facilities at Mumias (1973), Nzoia (1978), and the SONY factory at Awendo (1979). The
facilities are located in the south western regions of the country, where the vast majority of sugar
cane production takes place (Odek, Kegode, and Ochola 2003, 10). Additionally, the state forced
small farmers, who grow upwards of 90% of the crop (Kenya Sugar Board 2010), to become
members of cooperatives both to facilitate extension services and research and to coordinate
purchases of raw inputs. This approach fit well with the formal official import substitution policy
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of the state; as an added bonus it was an extremely effective way to distribute patronage, though
on the whole the competence of the bureaucracy, the protections afforded by tariff barriers and
the need for cooperative leadership to produce tangible results all served as a break on the
inherent pitfalls of a sugar policy subject to political manipulation.
The economic importance of the industry, however, did not shield it from potentially
damaging fallout due to both a declining economy in the 1980s and liberalization in the 1990s.
As government revenues dried up with the end of the coffee boom in the 1970s, the sugar
industry was slowly starved of funds, with the Kenya Sugar Authority (KSA) being almost
moribund by the early 1990s when an IMF sponsored structural adjustment lowered tariff
barriers and encouraged privatization. The primary aim of liberalization was to transform the
distribution of sugar cane by allowing farmers to sell their product to any processor. On the eve
of liberalization, the KSA and most of the parastatals were heavily in debt, and far behind on
making payments to producers. Given this situation, selling to those who could pay made sense,
yet, problems of transport and the intricacies of navigating a convoluted non transparent
marketing system meant that farmers often ended selling to mill owners who could at least
before the 2001 Sugar Act, drive a much harder bargain on price. The removal of price controls
thus created additional hardship for farmers (Odek, Kegode, and Ochola 2003, 24).
Liberalization also cut essential subsidies on inputs, leaving the cooperatives to play a
more central role in procuring these important goods for farmers through its financial resources
as a credit giving institution. However, given the somewhat expanded role of cooperatives, the
leadership of these organizations became a clearer source of political patronage and corruption.
Thus, cooperative leadership became contested, and was used as a means not only to extract
surplus but to distribute patronage. By shifting the structure of the market, liberalization
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effectively crippled the growth enhancing power of institutions that were already somewhat
constrained by social forces. These reforms thus put the sector at a productive disadvantage just
as trade liberalization was clearing the way for more efficient producers from Europe, Asia and
southern Africa to enter the Kenyan market. Given that many mills relied on direct support from
the government (UNFAO 2013, 5), the fiscal tightening that followed liberalization was
particularly damaging.
The immediate causes of the current crisis in sugar production are directly related to both
the weather and to the lack of investment in rural infrastructure such as irrigation systems, as
well as a lack of investment on the part of the state which still holds significant stakes in
processing companies. The industry has benefitted from increased access to drip irrigation under
Kenyatta’s irrigation initiative, though there have also been reports of some farmers losing
acreage due to the creation of new fresh water reservoirs (Otleno 2015). Nevertheless, the dire
straits that the industry is in can be best illustrated by the fact that after fulfilling roughly 70% of
the needs of the Kenyan domestic market in 2015, is currently close to near total collapse with
facilities like Muhorini, which used to supply 9% of all domestically produced sugar, shutting
their doors (Muteshi and Bolo 2017, 3). In the absence of a growth enhancing agenda on the part
of the state, policy has developed in ways that favor political expediency, for both influential
county level and national elites. The result has been policy that neither cajoles business into
becoming more efficient nor that truly supports the efforts of small producers who rely upon it to
make a living.
Negotiations over trade, which have pitted the sugar industry against dairy producers,
vividly illustrate the Kenyatta regime’s political priorities in regards to the sector. Kenya is a
member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), an agreement that
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lowers tariffs and other trade barriers in a number of important industries. Access to the South
African market, in particular, has greatly aided Kenyan exports of meat, dairy and tea. Yet,
liberalization, for the sugar industry represented a huge threat; after 1992 foreign imports flooded
the Kenyan market, and the pressure put on the industry was so extreme that it applied for and
successful received tariff protections, that were first meant to last one year but have been
extended until 2018 (Muteshi and Bolo 2017, 2). The end of tariff protections, coinciding with a
drought that has severely affected the industry, has made life increasingly difficult for sugar cane
farmers and processors.
A recent trade deal negotiated by Kenyatta and President Museveni of Uganda, has
increased the pressure put on industry. The deal allows for increased dairy and beef imports into
Uganda in exchange for access to the Kenyan market for Ugandan sugar makers, which was
under the protection of tariff barriers. Ugandan sugar imports were a particularly difficult pill to
swallow for the sugar producers of western Kenya, as Ugandan sugar had previously been
banned under suspicion that the product was not made in Uganda but consisted of low price
repackaged imports from abroad. Leading the charge against the agreement was Kenyatta’s main
political rival Raila Odinga, whose main Luo constituency would be adversely impacted by these
policies (Njagih and Ochiel 2015). Thus, sectoral disputes also pull in their overlapping ethnic
constituencies, highlighting the contested nature of economic institution making in Kenya.

Considering Gender in the Kenyan Case
The central tendencies of the state in Kenya - powerful indigenous elites, a highly capitalist
approach to development, a partnering of state and society surrounding specific industries create a powerful social dynamic whose inequalities and contradictions are highlighted most
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vividly when we take gender in rural development in account. Female agricultural workers are
not necessarily neglected by the state so much as the institutions of neoliberal Kenya assign them
to marginal role within Kenya’s rural economy. They are, at best, peripheral members of any
social coalition.
The proliferation of credit that has been a hallmark of Kenyan political economy under
neo-liberalism has similarly passed by both the rural peasantry and female farmers in particular
(Omollo 2014). While access to credit is much more widespread in Kenya than other regions,
women have a more difficult time securing loans through farmer run cooperatives. Luckily,
opportunities to secure funding in the form of microloans geared specifically toward women are
often available. However, these loans are often so small that they fail to have a discernible
impact on the ability of female farmers to succeed in their farming activities. Neorealism has, in
the end, disproportionately impacted female agricultural workers.
The peasantry in Africa, on the whole, have suffered in the transformation of African
political economy along neo-liberal lines. In Kenya, this process has been a boon to capitalists,
particularly those involved in plantation agriculture. And while the boom in available credit has
certainly aided large and medium enterprises, it has been much slower to deliver benefits to the
peasantry who make up the vast majority of rural workers. And for women in particular, access
to loans of such a small size, though helpful, have by no means been transformative.

Institutional Effectiveness and the Kenyan Economy
The logic of core-related factors is clearly present in repeated patterns of economic development
in the Kenyan case. Building a coalition of clearly defined con-core groups has led Kenyan
regimes to focus on building group cohesion by exercising economic power in ways that
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leverage social control. Kenya thus generally builds a more comprehensive set of coordinating
institutions, and constructs larger policy coalitions than states with a core group such as Ghana;
these trends pre-date the adoption of the system presidential roundtable meetings. Ironically,
larger policy coalitions mean that economic policies and the distribution of non-primary
developmental goods in Kenya is thus carefully circumscribed. This tendency, to clearly define
the scope of development is evident in accumulated state policies and institutions over the years
and the economic trends associated with these institutions. The end result is that growth
enhancing institutions often occur in the internally oriented segments of the domestic economy,
in addition to well established regions linked to the international economy.
The Kenyan economy, more so than other African economies has fostered value added
industries16. It is one of the biggest producers of textiles on the continent and its industries are
often geared towards internal production, meeting a high degree of popular demand for products
such as corn, millet, various grains, milk, sugar, inexpensive clothing, as well as other useful
facets of household economy. Kenya is also the premier destination for information and
telecommunications services on the continent, and as many African states move towards the
digitization of important government records and functions, it is often to Kenyan companies
located in Nairobi to which they turn. The Kenyan economy, at least on the surface, appears to
enjoy success in generating growth for industries that are geared towards the regional and
domestic economy.

16

Kenya ranks high in measures of agricultural value added, as recorded by the UNFAO. However, as these
statistics also record value added as a result of price premiums for quality on export crops, countries such as Ghana
also score high on this measure.
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The Kenyan economy does not appear to manifest signs of strong institutional
bifurcation; institutions for different segment of the economy appear to operate in a more or less
similar manner. In Kenya, the coffee and tea sectors, cash crops that are primarily destined for
export, are supported by well thought out policies that have, generally speaking over the years,
provided the sector a measure of economic health. Yet, valed added food processing, aimed
primarily at the domestic market, has also been well served by Kenyan policy as have industries
like cattle ranching. Food, Beverage and Tobacco processing, as well as various related agroindustries account for a large percentage of value added production in the Kenyan economy.
Kenya, on the whole, tends to focus more on products that are consumed by Kenyans or exported
to nearby countries in the region. Thus, in comparison to Ghana, it much more inward facing in
its economic posture. Yet, at the same time, gains in these internally focused sectors of the
economy do not necessarily come at the expense of the tradable sector. Instead, it would be best
to describe the Kenyan institutions and the greater Kenyan economy as variegated, with both
strong and weak economic institutions regardless of whether they are internally or externally
oriented.
Variation in the patterns of institutional performance in Kenya, unlike Ghana, follows
sectors and the constituencies that are often associated with them. As might be expected,
government institutions and policy are at their best when powerful constituencies are aligned
with a particular sector and worst, where, as in the case of foreign aid, constituencies lack
political and economic power to enforce more productive policy. In this sense, Kenya reflects the
institution building patterns of the Senegalese economy, for example, where the sectors
associated with politically important constituencies such as the Wolof groundnut basin fare much
better than the sectors of groups whose political influence is not necessary in order to cobble
249

together (Boone 2003). The variation in Kenyan performance, therefore, is often complex,
though on the whole it tends to favor the development of stronger institutions geared towards
internally rather than externally oriented patterns, if only because these sectors are more likely to
contain politically important constituencies.
Industrial Policy
Kenya’s industrial policies, particularly after independence, were protectionist; yet, unlike many
states in the developing world, protectionism did not necessarily mean that domestic industry
was unprofitable or unhealthy. The domestic economy on the whole contained a large amount of
state intervention. Tariffs were imposed on imported products, particularly food stuffs and
clothing, to promote domestic producers. Starting in a 1965 policy document, which articulated a
type of conservative “African socialism,” the Kenyatta regime embarked upon a policy of import
substitution industrialization (Swainson 1980). Thus, the state would attempt to orient production
to meet domestic needs, thus ensuring that value added processing on Kenyan soil took place. A
large number of parastatal corporations were formed to meet these needs, yet in Kenya there was
also a large number of private firms that also took advantage of producing for the Kenyan
market. Thus, particularly in food processing and textiles, larger Kenyan firms emerged that
would largely help to meet domestic needs.
Externally imposed liberalization would represent a challenge to Kenyan industries, but it
did not result in the wholesale collapse of domestic industry. Most hard hit were textile firms,
whose smaller economies of scale could not compete with large manufacturers abroad (Ngulu
2010). Many firms closed their doors as a result, and the ones that survived were often forced to
merge, as well as to make changes to improve their efficiency. The surviving firms thus tended
to be able to compete more effectively with those from abroad but the share of the market in
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which they occupied was greatly diminished. Food processors, on the other hand, tended to fare
better than firms in the textile sector. While they still lost market share, competition between
these firms was still on ongoing part of Kenya’s import substitution strategy; thus, these firms
were somewhat better positioned to compete internationally as they had to implement
efficiencies in their domestic production in order to compete successfully against one another.
The two main policy documents governing industrial policy in Kenya are the National
Industrial Plan as well as the sections of Vision 2030 which deal specifically with the challenges
of the industrial sector. As occurs in Ghana, these institutions do not necessarily structure policy
making so much as they reflect the constraints on policy making imposed by core-related factors.
The documents first acknowledge one of the most pressing issues affecting Kenyan
industrialization, the fact that manufacturing contributes only a small percentage to the Kenyan
economy as a whole (Ministry of Industrialization and Enterprise Development 2015).
Furthermore, they point out that most manufacturing that takes place in Kenya is relatively
simple in its nature, with the food, beverage, and tobacco sub-sector (FBT) taking a leading role.
Advanced forms of manufacturing, requiring a high level of technical competence, unfortunately
are relatively rare on Kenyan soil. Thus, despite the success of Kenyan manufacturers in
weathering a tumultuous liberalization process, the document points to the fact that ultimately,
industrial policy must focus on not only the expansion of Kenyan industry but provide impetus
for the development of more technical forms of value added production (Ministry of
Industrialization and Enterprise Development 2015).
The policy documents attempt to address the expansion of Kenyan manufacturing by
strongly encouraging enterprises to grow larger in size in order to compete more effectively.
Organizationally, there is also an emphasis on strengthening civil society organizations active in
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the sector, as well as other relevant trade groups. In addition, the state is attempting to increase
the number of extension officers and representatives from the ministry of industry and
enterprises, in order to help facilitate the process. Thus, state strategies appear to aim towards
greater penetration within society to push forward with its implicit goals. By placing officers in
close contact with civil societal organizations, the state thus has a high degree of influence and
receives feedback more readily. The state ironically appears to be playing a leading role in
helping to organize civil society to pursue policy objectives.
The policy documents make amply clear, however, that Kenyan enterprises continue to
suffer from many of the same issues impacting states in the developing world. Kenyan firms, for
example, often suffer from low levels of productivity, in part because of the use of aging or
outmoded equipment (Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Cooperatives and State Department for
Trade 2017). As a general rule, Kenyan enterprises, like those in most parts of the developing
world, do not have the resources of large multinationals. They do not have the most modern
equipment, inputs cost more than in other parts of the world, furthermore, the workforce is
politically powerful and thus wages tend to be higher than in other countries (Ngui, Chege, and
Kimuyu 2016). Kenyan enterprises struggle in any number of ways, but their struggles are very
similar to those in other parts of the developing world where intermediate inputs might have to
be imported, as well as machinery, or where foreign exchange can sometimes represent a
problem for financing large and small purchases for items such as spare parts. Thus, despite the
many consultative mechanisms in place, Kenyan manufacturing in particular still faces many
important challenges.
Policy making to address the challenges presented by increased imports attempts to push
firms to adapt paths of least resistance. Policy documents encourage textile and apparel firms to
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move into niche markets, or to adopt strategies in the short to medium term that allow them to
compete in areas where cost alone is not the determining factor of consumer preference (PKF
Consulting Ltd 2005; World Bank Group and The Ministry of Industrialization and Enterprise
Development 2015). Thus, they outline strategies for firms including the creation of niche
market boutique goods, fair trade items, or consumer goods with clear green manufacturing
origins. Despite these stated preferences, which are communicated through government officials
and extension officers, many of these strategies have in fact already been adopted by those
manufacturers that have successfully stayed in business. Policy, in a sense, seems only to be
reconfirming the survival strategies already undertaken by states.
Finally, it must be said that even though manufacturing and industry apart from a few
exceptional sectors such as sugar is dominated by private enterprises, the state sets out a
sweeping interventionary role for itself in organizing various industrial sectors. Policy
documents outline the need for consolidation of firms to improve efficiency (Ministry of
Industry, Trade, and Cooperatives and State Department for Trade 2017; PKF Consulting Ltd
2005; World Bank Group and The Ministry of Industrialization and Enterprise Development
2015), they point out the necessity of greater penetration of the informal sectors of the economy
by extension agents, and they set aside an expansive role in promoting wholesale and retail
marketing for members of the bureaucracy. It is perhaps a reflection of the constrained nature of
Kenyan policy making that the policy documents outline such an expansive role for the state.
These documents, as a type of non-binding and inclusive articulation of policy, tend to be a more
accurate reflection of the desires of a large cross section of society.
The reality of Kenyan institutions and policy is that of sometimes tragic missed
opportunities. Core-related factors do not necessarily provide incentives for promoting the most
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promising industries. Accumulated policy choices thus solidify into institutional hurdles that
have the potential to inhibit economic growth. This trend is particularly true of industries that do
not involve the social coalition of a given regime. In Kenya, a prime example of this trend is the
sugar industry, a sub-sector of the economy in which the Luo ethnic group has a strong presence.
The sector has been a strong performer traditionally, but it is not in steep decline as decades of
poor policy choices are not creating practices and obstacles that are difficult to overcome. Figure
12. Comparative Sugar Production in Metric Tons shows the historically strong performance of
the sugar sector, which is in within the past few years in steep decline.

600000
400000
200000
0

Sugar Production (Metric Tons)

Figure 12. Comparative Sugar Production in Metric Tons

1960

1980

Year

Cote D'Ivoire
Kenya
Senegal
Tanzania

2000

2020

Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda

Source: UNFAO Data

While the industry in the past has been a solid performer, it is currently plagued by a lack
of backwards linkages in the economy, that in particular impact its ability to source enough raw
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sugar. Furthermore, the industry lost out in trade agreements, in which Kenyans sought to open
regional markets to exports of products such as beef, but at the cost of allowing in less highly
taxed imports on sugar among other products (Njagih and Ochiel 2015; Shimanyula 2015). Sugar
policy however, appears to be evolving, or more specifically retrenching and consolidating in
anticipation of far dramatically lower sales in the near future. While new investments in
irrigation are being made in the two of the main parastatals, in the three other facilities appear to
be left with little in the way of a viable strategy to compete (Muteshi and Bolo 2017). Thus, in
this case, consolidation does in fact appear to be taking place. The fact that the affected regions
are on the whole outside of areas that traditionally vote for the ruling party, certainly does not
auger well for a uniform and well applied industrial policy (Kim 2016b). Policy appears to be
more like a survival strategy, whose ultimate aim is to manage the destructive tendencies of the
international economy, giving the state a degree of implicit leverage over who wins and loses
within the broader scheme of economic competition. Yet the sugar industry’s disfunctions are
not new, they have simply intensified. Years of neglect are giving way to managed decline. It is
not growth but rather a soft landing that policies and institutions appear to be trying to achieve.
Agricultural Policy and Performance
Kenyan agriculture shares many similarities with agriculture in other parts of the developing
world, namely, that it is for the most part labor intensive, and that the most productive aspects of
the field are closely tied not to internal production but to the needs of the international market.
The vast majority of food production is carried out peasant working small plots of land. In fact,
agriculture as an economic sector employs roughly 75% of the population and contributes close
to 25% of annual GDP (ASCU 2012a). As is often the case in the developing world, a lack of
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transportation infrastructure, irrigation, and overall investment hamper the production of food
commodities. The quote below outlines the dire situation for food producers:
“Productivity for some key commodities is among the lowest in the world: the average yield of maize, the
staple food crop, is about 1.5 tons per hectare, even though crop varieties exist with potential yields of 5 to
7 tons per hectare. These weak results are partly explained by low adoption of science, technology and
innovation by smallholder farmers, because of illiteracy, lack of capital and poor technology transfer
mechanisms” (ASCU 2012a, 6-7).

Food producers, who make up the vast majority of farmers in Kenya, thus face hurdles that are
similar to those in other regions of sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ghana. Yet, not all those
involved in agriculture and agro-industry face such steep hurdles, particularly those with close
ties to the state and bureaucracy.
Fractions of the bourgeoisie often involved in various facets of agribusiness generally
enjoy more substantive and often institutionalized interactions with the state. Membership in the
policy coalition thus carries with it economically important benefits. The privileges of
membership, however, are seldom extended to smallholders within the rural economy. As a
result, particular subsectors of the agricultural economy are generally well served. Funds for
research and development are often targeted at lucrative cash crops (Alila, Atieno 2006, 8), while
for food crops even such vital things as extension services are in the process of being privatized
(ASCU 2012b, .iv). Furthermore, while formal consultative institutions, such as the Agriculture
Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU), which in principal serve all members of the rural community,
tend to facilitate the dominance of large firms over key aspects of the rural economy. As
described by a representative from the Kenya Agribusiness and Agro-Industry Alliance, one of
the primary evolutions in Kenyan agriculture, with state support, is the development of new
supply chains linking small producers with larger enterprises (Mukhebi 2016). In this manner,
large enterprises play a large role in structuring state policy and investment.
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Kenyan policy documents, on the whole, struggle to reconcile the need to invest in
productive sectors of the agricultural economy with the need to address poverty alleviate and
food security concerns of the larger population. The contradictions are expressed, oftentimes
quite candidly, in Kenyan agricultural policies. As in Ghana, agricultural policy is shaped not by
one document but by an assemblage of different strategies, initiatives, frameworks and policies.
Some of the major components of agricultural policy include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (a component of Vision 2030)
Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy
National Agricultural Sector Extension Policy (2012)
Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Implementation Framework
National Food and Nutrition Policy
National AgriBusiness Strategy

While the purpose of each document is slightly different, common themes run through them all.
Every document, for example, highlights a lack of value added production in the field. Even the
agro-processing sector, which is home to many successful industries, is described as a “sleeping
giant” (ASCU 2012b, p.4) which could be activated with greater investment and access to state
supported finance. Yet, at the same time, the documents also decry the need to support small
holders, in particular in insuring that farmers growing important food commodities are not
relying upon rainfall alone, as a means of attaining greater food security (ASCU 2011, 17). The
myriad of demands for spending and investment on such a number of projects, of course,
provides a great deal of flexibility for hierarchies of production and social control to reassert
themselves. There are simply too many choices, and into this void the policy coalition reasserts
itself.
As in Ghana, political regimes in Kenya have shown discipline in constructing sound
institutions and policies to maintain profitability in key exporting sub-sectors. Kenya is the
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number four exporter of tea and the world, while it has historically been a top exporter of coffee
as well. The state has played an active role in supporting these industries, in particular with
research and development on plant varieties as well as with a brokering system for ensuring that
prices remain relatively stable. In the tea industry, the Kenyan Tea Development Agency
coordinates the activities of roughly 51 factories spread across tea growing regions, and the Tea
Board of Kenya facilitates access to an adequate transportation network as well as and other
necessary inputs for growers. Coffee and tea production receive large amounts of investment on
the state, particularly in regards to transportation, storage and irrigation infrastructure. Simply
put, the bulk of investment, both public and private, tends to be focus on this rich sub-sector of
the rural economy.
While tea and coffee are the main earners for foreign exchange, the vast majority of the
rural population is involved in the cultivation of food crops. The main crops include maize,
sorghum, wheat, rice and yams. The vast majority of peasant food production in Kenya is rain
fed, and as a consequence, yields per hectare are on average low in comparison to developing
countries in Asia. An important policy paper, the Strategy for the Revitalization of Agriculture,
specifically identifies maize production as an area of critical concern and offers suggestions for
programming and funding. Nevertheless, failures of policies and institutions appear to be
durable, leaving ordinary farmers with continued low yields (UNFAO 2012, p.3). .As Figure 13.
Maize Yields per Hectare in Metric Tons indicates, Kenyan yields do no depart significantly
from those of other developing countries in the region.
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The economic situation of small holders in Kenya bears some resemblance peasants in
other regions of the continent; the state often finds itself constrained in the amount of support it
can give, or is willing to give. Small holders are to a great extent capital deficient, while access
to important inputs such as fertilizer and mechanization is difficult to come by. As in many
developing countries, the state tended to support small holders through subsidies on inputs until
fiscal constraints forced a paring back of aid programs to peasants. Agricultural policy aims to
provide added assistance to small holders by providing greater access to critical imports and by
allocating greater funding to research institutes specifically focused on food production (Alila
and Atieno 2006; Bager 1980; Government of Kenya 2010). Nevertheless, results have been
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mixed, as the state while willing in principal to support smallholders is in practice less than
generous with its funding, which as of the 2010 constitution, has in part been allocated to
regional governments.
Finally, it must be said that the state’s approach to governance and development in Kenya
continues to be managerial in its nature. The state facilitates the involvement of farmers in
various associations, which often play a critical role in production, not simply of food crops but
of major export crops as well. Over sixty percent of tea production in Kenya, for example, is
grown by small holders while multinationals and capital intensive operations are responsible for
the other forty percent (Kagira, Kimani, and Githii 2012; Onduru et al. 2012). Thus, small
holders play a critical economic role in the rural economy. The state, both by fostering
cooperative and sector based organizations and by deploying extension officers, creates a more
highly penetrative state apparatus. The goal of this state activity, however, is not always clear
cut. In some instances, state agents appear to be managing and mediating the peripheral status of
agricultural sub-sectors. By promulgating common sense survival strategies, the state appears to
be alleviating the most potentially hazardous losses resulting from a withholding of state aid.
Nevertheless, such actions also appear to be aimed at ensuring that small scale production
remains a reliably peripheral part of the Kenyan economy.

Conclusion
There are no common causal stories for understanding the relative uniformity of institutional
performance between internally and externally oriented segments of the Kenyan economy. The
story of Kenyan economic institutions is one of variation. Growth enhancing practices exist
alongside practices and policies that drain the vibrancy from otherwise healthy and profitable
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industries. Running concurrently alongside these trends is a growing awareness of common
interests of the capitalist class in Kenya, which exerts pressure aimed at the fair treatment of
capital as a whole, particularly in the major urban centers. Institutional performance in
contemporary Kenya is thus the logical outcome of conflict between core-related factors and the
comparatively newer norms and obligations of capitalism, particularly as they apply to the
wealthier members of property-owning classes. But while Kenyan capital may have some
headway in urban centers, the logic of core-related factors as a means of maintaining power I a
society only partially structured by the rules of the formal market necessitates a structure of
economic institution making of variegated performance. To stay in power, a regime must
carefully cultivate cohesion within its social coalition. In order to accomplish this goal, the
regime leverages its social control through the policy coalition, shaping policies and institutions
in a manner to benefit the social coalition. The result, of course, are policies and institutions that
differ greatly in their performance as scarce resources are spent selectively. While core-related
factors are contested, they still play a preeminent role in shaping the overall structure of Kenyan
institutions.
It is difficult to explain Kenya’s economic performance through frameworks normally
used to explain economic or political outcomes on the continent, or in the developing world more
generally. Most research today focuses on the development of institutions to encourage growth,
as does this dissertation. Yet, while this dissertation explores the social and behavior roots of
institution making, much of the research on economic development in the former third world
conceptualizes the process as one relying on the routinization of new norms. In other words, as
new economic rules are enforced, they slowly become part of a new set of social expectations.
This approach to institutional performance place a heavy burden on state institutions like the
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judiciary as well as the actions of influential members of the regime. The approach originated
with Lipset’s (1959) studies of political culture and economic change, and appears in various
forms in works such as Huntington’s (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies which
questions some of the fundamental premises of Lipset’s work but employs a similar
understanding of the routinization of social and political norms though one that stresses the role
of party institutions, as well as the numerous studies of development that stress the autonomy of
the state as an organization capable of resisting social pressures while implementing sound
policy (Evans1995; Johnson 1982; Kohli 2004). These works, to varying degrees, stress the
importance of a state that actively pursue developmental goals while at the same time enforcing
“strong” institutions.
This approach is problematic in the Kenyan context because the process of institutional
design fails to adequately explain outcomes. In other words, institutions that on the whole work
well still fail to reconfigure economic behavior at the macro level. For example, the coordinating
institutions of Kenya, particularly the system of presidential roundtables, are elaborate, complex
and well designed in that they contain mechanisms for enforcement and accountability. Their
efficacy was evident, that in speaking with several major business organizations in Nairobi, from
a diverse range of fields, every group was contended with their level of access to elected officials
and felt that their concerns were taken into account in the formulation of policy. In Ghana, a state
with far fewer formal coordinating institutions, the result was the opposite - almost none of the
industry groups who would speak with men reported feeling satisfied in their interactions with
elected officials. Routinized institutions in Kenya may not be perfect, but they do have an impact
in perceptions of policy making, at least among organizations representing various subsectors of
industry. Nevertheless, when we consider Kenyan political economy as a whole, these
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institutions do not structure patterns of Kenyan development, which is ultimately tied to the
means by which a regime could exert social control. Strictly capitalist relations of production
may exist in the formal economy of Kenya’s major population centers, but they do not exist in
the informal sectors of the economy nor do they extend into rural areas. While exercising social
and political control through coordinating institutions works in these segments of the rural
economy, it is the logic of core-related factors rather than the equal access approach of the
presidential roundtables that predominates.
Kenya’s Presidential Roundtables, and the other associated institutions of the formal
capitalist economy do not structure Kenya’s political economy because regimes are forced to
cater to the needs of their social coalition, who are composed primarily of people living on the
peripheries or on the outside of capitalist relations of production and thus organizing themselves
by lineage and ethnicity. The type of open access rules that structure facets of a capitalist
economy fail to find purchase in a society that is not organized, at the level of relations of
production, along class lines. Thus, social control and the cohesion of political coalitions attaches
itself to the dominant survival strategies of the social coalition and is articulated through the
language of group specific benefits. This logic, i.e. logic of core related factors, is the dominant
agent of structuration in the Kenyan economy.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the economic rules of the formal economy, and
class-based consciousness on the part of Kenyan capital, are coming into conflict with, and
sometimes blunting the impact of growth inhibiting practices on the part of the state. This trend
is more complex than a simply conflict between the state on one side, and society on the other.
While capital has organized to protect their collective rights, such as when the Moi regime
attempted to Africanize Asian owned factories, it was the state itself under the Kibaki regime
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that served as the main creator an proliferator of the types of durable, open access coordinating
institutions that are not only critical to the smooth function of a capitalist economy but which
distinguish Kenyan political economy from other strong African economies. While core-related
factors play a predominant role in structuring the Kenyan economy, the processes of variegated
institution making which it engenders is contested by a more unified approach tied to relations of
production in a capitalist economy.
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Chapter 5: Examining Variation in Secondary Cases
The secondary cases of Tanzania and Côte D’Ivoire illustrate both the accuracy and
incompleteness of a two case comparison of the primary cases magnifying differences within the
causal chain. The Tanzanian case sheds light on conceptual ambiguity surrounding the concept
of a core ethnic group. Côte D’Ivoire on the other hand provides much needed insights on the
dynamics of destabilization and institutional collapse. Finally, the dynamics of institutional
failure, as well as successful policy creation provide much needed clarification by focusing
attention on the key role of state autonomy in the causal chain, while also ruling out common
variables that could potentially be omitted in a two case study. Taken as a whole, these case
studies provide nuanced but strong confirmation of the findings from the main cases, while also
providing important methodological signposts for continued testing.
Process tracing for the principal cases reveals the presence of potential causal variables
that a two case design alone, cannot sufficiently test, given the method of case selection. Ghana
and Kenya are countries that have enjoyed a degree of economic success; they have each
succeeded in creating effective institutions, though these institutions tend to apply to different
parts of their economy. While the inquiry is focused on the impact of political legacies and the
structure of ethnic cleavages to explain variation, there are other important potentially omitted
variables that need to be addressed. There are regional differences between the principal cases,
with Ghana located in West Africa while Kenya is part of east Africa, a region shaped by greater
penetration of settlers and a deeper presence of long standing trading and cultural links stretching
across the Indian Ocean. Thus, the analysis must account for regional differences in institution
making, as well as the presence of a significant settler community.
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The cases of Tanzania and Côte D’Ivoire are explored to distill and separate, to the
greatest extent possible, the impacts of regionalism and status as a settler colony. Tanzania has
been shaped by the same historical dynamics as Kenya, being located in the same region, but
unlike Kenya is home to a core ethnic group. Like Kenya, Tanzania is home to a large population
of Asians who lived in the country for centuries but were largely excluded from landowning and
thus often occupied positions as traders and urban entrepreneurs. Furthermore, while the
numbers of Europeans that settled in Tanzania was less than Kenya, Tanzania was also a settler
colony of both Germany and the United Kingdom. Côte D’Ivoire, on the other hand was shaped
by very different set of pressures revolving around French colonialism and the international
dynamics of coco. While these pressures may in some respects resemble Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire is
not home to a core ethnic group nor does it have the experience of undergoing a type of radical
socialism. Yet, like Ghana, the state in Côte D’Ivoire experiences periods of instability and
collapse, providing a key counterpoint for understanding the role of ethnicity in broad economic
successes and failures. Exploring the dynamics and causal mechanisms of these two cases,
therefore, can help to refine the causal process at work from potentially omitted variables. The
key differences between these cases are illustrated in the chart below:
Table 8. Qualitative Comparison of Principal and Secondary Cases

Ghana
Kenya
Tanzania
Cote
D'Ivoire

Socialism?

Core?

Region

Y
N

Y
N

W
E

Y

Y

E

N

N

W

Colonial
Heritage

Instability?

British
British
German/
British

Y
N

French

Y
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N

Settler
Colony?
N
Y
Y
N

Outcome
External
Mixed
External
Mixed

“Socialism” refers to experience with a form of Afro-Marxist or socialist development;
“Core” refers to the absence or presence of a core ethnic group; “Region” refers to west Africa
(W) or east Africa (E); “Colonial Heritage” refers to the dominant European colonizer(s);
“Instability” refers to a largescale institutional collapse such as might occur in a civil war or a
coup d’etat; “Settler Colony” refers to the absence or presence of significant European
settlement; and finally, “Outcome” refers to the dominant pattern of institution making, with
“External” signifying growth enhancing institutions that occur primarily in economic sectors that
service the international economy while “Mixed” refers to institutions that promote added value
in production or that are geared towards internal and/or regional consumption.
The chart approximates Mill’s joint method of agreement and difference, in which both
potential causal variables and their outcomes differ, providing added analytical leverage by
ruling out common biases potentially caused by case selection or omitted variables. Yet, there
are limitations in what these cases alone can tell us, especially in light of the greater theory
building goals of the project. While the Tanzanian case, for example, might be able to confirm
that Ghana is not an outlier, it cannot ultimately separate out the impact of an experience with
socialism from the presence of a core ethnic group. Neither can the addition of these case studies
reveal whether or not the interaction of these variables is truly the root cause of the particular
type of state autonomy that leads to a bifurcated institutional performance. At the very least this
task would require the study of one or more additional cases, a task that is ultimately beyond its
scope. Yet, even if such a task were indeed possible, the concept being measured, the autonomy
of the state, defies easy measurement through comparative qualitative analysis. Thus, while this
case design may succeed at measuring and accurately describing the root causes of internally and
externally oriented patterns of institution making, a full and accurate account to the hypotheses
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will require a quantitative method better suited to uncovering the causal pathways that contribute
to varying levels of state autonomy. The case studies thus reveal interesting causal pathways, but
they also show the limitations of a qualitative approach, necessitating the mixed-method
“pathway analysis” that is the focus of next chapter.
On the whole, these cases confirm the findings of the original cases but provide
compelling reasons to pursue further investigation to answer the research question. Tanzanian
socialism gave birth to forms of state autonomy which have allowed the contemporary
Tanzanian state to produce growth enhancing institutions that are externally oriented, as in
Ghana. Yet, Tanzania’s particular variant of centralized socialism both leaves it open to both to
more growth inhibiting institutions and practices in these sectors than Ghana. Ironically, the
institutional legacies of Tanzanian socialism also have left it more open to the growth enhancing
demands of indigenous capital in rural region acting in coordination with multinationals. The
Ivoirian case reveals, on the other hand, reveals that while French colonialism may have brought
particularities, these were not determinative in any institution making processes. Yet, when
Ivoirian institution making challenged the hegemony of multinationals in the cocoa trade, this
relationship was used opportunistically to facilitate the take over and liberalization of essential
Ivoirian institutions used by the state to direct the proceeds of cocoa and thus insure social
stability. The Ivoirian case thus reinforces the idea that state within the global periphery, is
fundamentally constrained by the power of the center, even as they seek to create growth
enhancing institutions.
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Economic Institutions in Tanzania
Tanzania’s economic institutions, like those in many parts of the global south, exhibit a type of
checkerboard pattern of growth enhancing and growth inhibiting policy; nevertheless, there is a
clearly discernable external focus of growth enhancing policy. While not nearly as uniform as
the Ghanian case, most growth enhancing insitutions in Tanzania are those that mediate the
state’s relationship with external capital. That is not to say that there are not pockets of growth
inhibiting policies within this economic sphere – in fact, Tanzania’s “Doing Business” by the
World Bank, an index closely watched by those looking to invest in the country, has consistently
gone down for the past three years (The World Bank 2019). Yet, on the whole, Tanzania’s most
effective policies tend to be aimed squarely at providing raw materials to the international
economy, or to allow foreign capital to produce cheaply within the Tanzanian market. Tanzania
displays the same tendencies as Ghana toward an external orientation of its growth producing
economic institutions. However, the case illustrates the theoretical limits of conceptions of
“core” groups, as well as the degree to which core-related factors drive policy making in certain
states. Tanzania illustrates, in a sense, that there may in fact be multiple avenues to the
development of the specific types of state autonomy that lead growth enhancing institutions to be
located primarily in the externally oriented segments of the economy.
These multiple avenues to state autonomy can be best understood in comparative
perspective. Coordinating institutions in Kenya link the state to multiple forms of production,
and the best performing segments of the economy clearly reflect the interests of the policy
coalition. In Ghana, on the other hand, the state is much less closely tied to economic actors.
This lack of connectivity clear appears in the dearth of coordinating institutions that
characterizes Ghanaian political economy. Even in the most productive externally oriented
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economic sectors the state tends to take the role of detached, technocratic manager, skilled at
collecting data but seldom offering important social and economic actors input or control over
policy. This lack of connection to economic production has on the whole allowed the state to
become autonomous from society at least in regard to the demands of economic actors.
Both Ghanaian autonomy and the relative lack of autonomy in Kenya, are rooted in the
dynamics associated with core-related factors. The presence of a core group in Ghana provides
incentives to distribute economic goods and services widely, necessitating a detachment of the
state from society that is seen most clearly in Ghana’s lack of coordinating institutions.
Differing levels of autonomy lead to differing patterns of economic development. The
state, as a general rule, takes an organizational interest in industries more likely to earn foreign
exchange. Doing so provides any given political regime the ability to provide their supporters
with goods and services that often must be imported from abroad. Furthermore, during those rare
instances when members of the state apparatus become directly involved in the economy, it is
often foreign exchange earnings that are the main motivator. Thus, state autonomy has the
propensity to create growth enhancing institutions primarily in the economy’s extant sectors.
Core-related factors also have the tendency to push the state to collect greater revenues outside
of taxes, as spending widely creates added budgetary constraints. This pressure provides added
motivation to ensure that extant sectors are governed with an eye towards growth.
Lower levels of state autonomy, at least in successful African states, generally lead to
more variegated patterns of institution making. In other words, the state is motivated to create
growth enhancing institutions in the extant sector and in regions of the domestic economic that
are particularly important for the policy coalition. Lower levels of state autonomy are generally
driven by core-related factors that accompany the absence of a core group and thus push political
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regimes to create policy-based coalitions in order to promote the coherence and loyalty of their
social coalition. These types of institutions take shape in both internally and externally oriented
economic sectors.
Tanzania’s political economy more closely resembles that of Ghana, then it does Kenya.
The state has historically enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from society. Such autonomy has
allowed the state to pursue vast, sweeping programing such as Julius Nyerere’s ujamaa
socialism, complete with forced villagization. While Nyerere’s programming was not always
popular, it did not provoke overpoliticized behaviors such as military coups. The state in
Tanzania thus enjoyed a type of isolation from social forces seldom seen on the continent.
Perhaps, it is for this reason that the state, has been able to craft such effective institutions in
certain parts of the economy. These institutions, however, are almost always located in the extant
sectors of the economy. Like Ghana, the state clearly plays a detached, technocratic role in
managing the economy’s foreign exchange earning sectors. Yet, unlike most Ghanaian regimes,
members of the state apparatus involve themselves in the economy in a rather direct manner. In
Tanzania, members of the state apparatus often play a major role in the rural economy. These
efforts are often created in coordination with multinational capital, and this contribute to the
external orientation of Tanzania’s political economy. While the state in Tanzania operates in a
manner that is autonomous from society, this autonomy does not preclude members of the state
apparatus from intervening the rural economy as private interests.
While the state in Ghana and Tanzania enjoys high degrees of autonomy from society,
the source of this autonomy differs in ways that are theoretically and conceptually significant in
regard to the theory building goals of the dissertation project. The autonomy of the state in
Ghana has its roots both in core-related factors and in the advent of neoliberalism. And while
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Tanzania, like most African states has undergone the trauma of liberalization, there is in fact
little evidence to suggest that the external focus of its economy is due to core-related factors. The
Tanzanian case thus illustrates the limitations of theorizing about the impact of core related
factors. The autonomy of the state in Tanzania appears to have its roots not in the drive to weld
together a viable social coalition but in the physical and demographic characteristics specific to
Tanzania itself. In particular, low population densities and low levels of inequality appear to be
acting as blocks to collective action, granting the state greater leeway to act than in similar
societies such as Ghana. The high levels of autonomy create somewhat similar outcomes in
Tanzania, but the roots of autonomy are markedly different.
Tanzanian political economy, on the whole, is much more state centric than other regions
of the continent; its policy coalition appears to be small and it hosts few coordinating institutions.
Low population densities, and relative economic equality do not, in and of themselves, create
distributional pressures. Instead, they provide an opening for the technocratic management of the
economy. This approach was clearly on display during the country largest developmental
program, ujamaa socialism. While various facets of ujamaa socialism would eventually face
massive opposition, particularly during the more poorly implemented aspects of forced
villagization, it is important to recognize that claims to regional or ethnic identities were never
associated with the various forms of resistance. Lacking the distributionary pressures emanating
from various communities, Tanzanian political economy generally features a relatively even
distribution of economic assets as elites are coopted into the state and party machinery.
Conflict over the direction of policy in Tanzania generally pits class groupings against
one another. Furthermore, these class groupings - at least the wealthier ones - are outgrowths of
the organizational structure of the party-state. In other words, influential members of the CCM,
272

along with their allies both within the lower ranks of the party as well as within Tanzanian
society more broadly, confront each other in battles over policy. The overall direction of policy
depends on the manner in which state and society form connections surrounding the economy.
These connections however, at least when they involve high ranking members of the state,
frequently rely on capital imported from abroad. These groups often partner with multinational
capital for agricultural commodities that have a ready market abroad. In this manner, policies
favoring peasant production clash with those meant to enable multinationals and their indigenous
allies.
The end result of both Tanzania’s technocratic management of the economy, as well as
the various alliances between state personnel and multinational capital, is perhaps not
surprisingly, economic institutions that are externally oriented. Technocratic management is
most diligently applied in foreign exchange earning sectors of the economy, as these funds are so
critical to the smooth functioning of the Tanzanian state and the party’s grip on political power.
Furthermore, the most capable developmental partners for those members of the state and CCM
party apparatus involved in the rural economy is generally speaking external capital. These two
concurrent trends, the technocratic management of the main export sectors and the enabling of
foreign capital, often in partnership with members of the state apparatus create a definite shift
towards creating growth enhancing institutions in the extant sectors of the economy. These
trends also preclude the expansion of the policy coalition for numerous aspects of rural
development.
The external orientation of growth enhancing institutions withing the Tanzanian economy
is paired with robust service delivery. The form that service delivery takes, however, is often
growth inhibiting institutions. These institutions primarily impact the domestic economy, not
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because of any specific preference but simply because they do not negatively impact revenue that
is needed by the state or its personnel. The production of patronage producing institutions has its
roots both in the need to appeal to important constituencies, and in the factional competition and
struggles that take place over CCM leadership. While these struggles do not fall along the
dividing line of ethnicity, they are nevertheless capable of creating growth inhibiting institutions.

A Core Group? An Examination of Group Identity in Tanzania
The analytical role of group identity is to provide differing levels of state autonomy. In other
words, the state, or rather, the given political regime in power, uses the absence or presence of a
core group to determine a distributive strategy. This strategy ultimately determines the location
of growth enhancing institutions. These patterns repeat themselves over time, and become part of
the long term institutional framework of the state. At the root of differing institutional
frameworks, however, lies a state-society connection. These connections reveal themselves most
clearly in the presence or absence of coordinating institutions. In states that are internally
oriented or mixed, the state has no choice but to partner with allies within society to facilitate
production. These allies are often directly involved in areas of production that serve domestic
and regional needs. In state that are externally oriented, the state attempts to provide services and
goods to a large number of groups located in all areas of the country. Lacking this ability, they
attempt to at least be seen as an organization that delivers goods and services. As a consequence,
many of the institutions that they use to complete these tasks are in fact growth inhibiting. On the
other hand, in order to ensure sufficient funds for social programming, political regimes in states
with a core group tend to build growth enhancing institutions in the extant sectors of the
economy.
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Core related factors dictate the degree to which the state maintains autonomy from
society by determining patterns of distribution. While a political regime may draw support from
a core group, the large size of the group effectively means that there is always the possibility of
defection. Defection is of course the goal of opposition groups, who have no choice but to win
over members of the core group. The resulting high degrees of autonomy are linked to the very
nature of core groups themselves. The same is also true for core related factors in the absence of
a core group. The high levels of group coherence in an environment lacking a core group allows
the policy coalition to demand growth enhancing institutions in the sectors of the economy most
important to their branches of economic activity, often in the internally oriented segments of the
economy. Thus, when a core group is present, the state maintains high levels of autonomy as a
means of distancing itself from its own policy coalition. When a core group is absent, the state
becomes less autonomous as it seeks to fulfill the needs of its policy coalition.
Tanzania displays the characteristics we associate with a state where a core group is
present. The state attempts to provide goods and services to a large proportion of the population,
though often with great difficulty and with the aid of external actors. The institutions of the state
in Tanzania, at least as they pertain to the economy, tend to be externally oriented, and
classifications of politically relevant social groupings such as Scarriff and Mozaffar (1999)
further reinforce the perception that Tanzania is home to a core group.
There is, however, good reason to be skeptical of the idea that Tanzania posses to a core
group. The politically salient identities upon which the conception of a core group is based are in
fact quite recent. Ethnic politics is generally all but absent in political discourse in Tanzania. If
there is one politically salient divide in the country, it is between the mainland and the islands of
Zanzibar. In fact, contentious, politically salient cleavages are much more prevalent on the
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islands than on the mainland. At the national level, Zanzibar is accorded a larger share of
representation in parliament than its population would normally allow, while it also has a large
say in the internal politics of the CCM including and perhaps especially over the choice of
President. In Zanzibar, on the other hand, there is a general dissatisfaction with CCM rule,
especially as the party failed to concede elections in 2016 for the islands’ legislature and
presidency, after appearing to have lost the contest. The close connections between the local and
national level party have led critics to accuse the CCM of effectively acting as an agent of
imperialism, as the main opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF) has advocated an end to
the Zanzibar - Tanganyika union. Thus, national level politics, at least to an extent, feature a
cleavage between Zanzibar and the mainland.
The existence of a political cleavage at the national level does not automatically translate,
at a conceptual or theoretical level, into the presence or absence of a core group. The group
identity of “mainlander” according to Scarrit and Mazaffar (1999) comprises 97% of the
population thus technically making it a core group. Yet, conceptually, it would be a stretch to
argue that most Tanzanians consider themselves to be “mainlanders.” Instead, numerous Afrobarometer polls, in addition to antidotal accounts of Tanzanian politics all point to the idea that
outside of Zanzibar, the overwhelming majority of Tanzanians do not consider themselves as
mainlanders, per se, but simply Tanzanians. While a core group technically exists, in reality the
identities of mainlander and islander are not truly relevant when we consider the location of
growth enhancing institutions and overall patterns of socio-economic development.
A second factor that augurs against a conception of “mainlander” as a core group is the
impossibility of this identity as serving as a basis for the developmental autonomy of the
Tanzanian state. The state in Tanzania is the result of a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar
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which occurred in 1964. This point, however, came just three years before the introduction of
Nyerere’s Arusha declaration, with large scale and intrusive developmental programming soon to
follow thereafter. Given the short interval between these events, it is unlikely that the union itself
gave Nyerere the ability to begin the collectivization of agriculture or other major projects
without widespread opposition from society. A “mainlander” identity would have had only a
very short period with which to exert distributional preferences upon the state. Similarly, it is
also unlikely that a Tanzanian identity forged out of the 100 plus groups on mainland Tanzania,
by the Nyerere regime’s state building efforts, is in fact the source of state autonomy upon which
these efforts relied. The source of state autonomy in Tanzania is rooted neither in the presence of
a core group, nor is it due to conceptions of Tanzanian nationalism or conceptions of group
identity.
Ujaama socialism, or at least its longevity, clearly illustrates a degree of state autonomy
that is not found in states with similar developmental histories. Ghana’s experiments in African
socialism lasted only six years before they were brought short by a coup d’état. In Mozambique,
socialism prompted the outbreak of a violent civil war. In Burkina Faso, Sankara’s revolution
lasted only four years. These few examples serve to illustrate that in Tanzania, there appears to
be a substantive difference in the degree of autonomy accorded to the state.
Determining the source of this autonomy is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, recent work tends trace the roots of Tanzanian exceptionalism to low levels of
investment, low population densities, and low levels of inequality (Green, 2011). In a word,
Tanzanian ethnic groups were never politicized because no one group appeared to be more
prosperous than the others. Furthermore, low population densities, an after effect of the slave
trade in the late 1800s, may also act as a block on collective action, lending the state more
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autonomy then it might otherwise have reason to expect. Whatever the reason, ethnic identity is
not the motivating political forces within society; politics in Tanzania is animated by other, more
important trends.
At a theoretical level, the role of state autonomy is particularly important because it
informs a discussion of both the limitations and the potential causal mechanisms associated with
a core ethnic group. Process tracing will attempt to uncover whether or not the same causal
process, beginning from state autonomy, is at work in the Tanzanian case. A divergence of
outcomes and processes could shine light on aspects of theory development that need work, or
potentially uncover causal processes that merit further exploration. Thus, although the Tanzanian
case, unlike the other cases, does not contain core-related factors, its causal process is
nonetheless of critical importance for theory development.

Policy Coalitions and State Autonomy After Independence
While Tanzania, like Kenya, underwent a period of settler colonialism, it was the country’s
experience with socialism after colonialism ended that had the most significant impact on
Tanzanian political economy. Tanzanian socialism, starting under Nyerere, demobilized society
by absorbing it into the state and party apparatus. The regime created numerous field offices,
employed legions of extension officers, and encouraged the formation of numerous civil society
groups linked to the regime. This strategy, which to an extent began during colonialism, created
an enormous degree of state penetration into society, linked to the CCM17 as a party
organization. Even today the CCM has enormous support in the countryside. Yet, this
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Otherwise known as “Chama cha Mapinduzi,” or “The Party of the Revolution.” The CCM was the party of Julius
Nyerere, formed after the original Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) merged with Zanzibar’s AfroShirazi Party after the union with Zanzibar in 1964.
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combination of centralization with penetration into rural society means that the state greatly
limited the potential size of the policy coalition by subjecting coalition membership to
hierarchically organized party structures. As a result, Tanzanian regimes generally enjoy a high
degree of autonomy from society, even over and above the autonomy that originally allowed the
CCM to carry out sweeping reform in the first place. A second consequence of this structure,
however, is that the collective private interests of elites in the CCM can quickly become policy.
These policies often deepen the external orientation of the Tanzanian economy.
Tanzania’s similarities and differences with Kenya in particular, throw light on important
causal processes in those two cases. Tanzania’s institutional outcomes resemble those of Ghana,
at least in the manner in which its economic institutions tend towards an external orientation.
Yet, many of the same causal processes found in the Kenyan case also occurred in Tanzania,
such as the settlement of Europeans and a strategy of institutional penetration during colonial
times that favored some productive forces over others. Thus, it would be difficult to make a case
for Tanzanian patterns of development being rooted in the political and economic practices of the
colonial period. Both Kenyan and Tanzanian institutions during the early independence period
attempted to pick winners and losers among the productive elements of the economy, often
hindering growth in the process. Yet contemporary Kenyan institution making tends to be closely
tied not only to patronage but productive economic activity, while the Tanzanian state has mostly
disengaged from the productive forces within society, creating the outward orientation of most
major economic institutions apart from a few important industries containing durable factions
capable of advocacy within the CCM. The Tanzanian case appears to highlight the importance of
durable and long-lasting party structures in shaping patterns of state society engagement in an
environment characterized by high levels of state autonomy. Though Ujaama socialism allowed
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the Tanzanian state to develop along its own pathway, in the era of neoliberalism it bequeathed a
centralized managerial state and an indigenous bourgeoisie whose factional struggles within the
state shaped internally oriented policy making in ways that defy the managerial tendencies of the
state apparatus in the externally oriented segments of the economy.
During the colonial period Tanzania may not have been subject to the same intensity of
European settlement as occurred in Kenya, but it developed a similar institutional architecture
out of the need to prioritize European and to a lesser extent Asian economic predominance.
German colonialism envisioned Tanzania as a major source of agricultural commodities, and so
it set about claiming the most productive farmland, a practice that was continued by the British.
Major exports during the colonial period included rubber, sisal, and other important raw
materials used in industry. In order to provide labor for the production of cash crops, as well as
for the mines, both the Germans and the British administered a hut tax, payable in cash only. In
Kenya, this act was combined with intensive legislation on the types of crops that could and
could not be grown in “reserve” areas. In Tanzania such a prohibition was not needed as white
settlers were not numerous enough to shape and control the labor markets (Shiviji 1976, 41).
Thus, cash crops were produced by both peasant labor and by hired labor on large estates.
Tanzanian economic institutions were less penetrative but they still served similar
functions in organizing the economy based on splits between the economic positions employed
by whites, Asians, and Africans. The marketing and distribution of crops, for example, was
placed into Asian hands, while Africans were discouraged from taking part in this retail trade.
Critical infrastructure, such as railroad lines and key roads, on the whole served European owned
estates rather than villages, which even in colonial times were encouraged to move closer to
major roadways. Cooperatives in were also founded as a means of facilitating the marketing of
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agricultural products, and as in the case of Kenya, these cooperatives were not farmer run so
much as they served as a means for the state to penetrate rural society and to enforce rules about
land use. While these organizations often acted as facilitators of production for large estates, they
worked in conjunction for agricultural extension officers whose role was essentially to police
African farmers in Tanzania (Coulson 1981, 64). While these tendencies would continue in both
states to an extent after independence, they would intensify in Tanzania. The colonial institutions
of Tanzania, therefore, resembled those found in Kenya as well as other settler states.
The immediate period after independence in both Tanzania and Kenya contained many
more institutional similarities, albeit with some case specific differences. The withdrawal of
Europeans in Kenya led the state to play a critical role in redistributing the most lucrative and
important farming regions in the country. In fact, the importance of these regions allowed the
Kenyatta regime to cement together a multiethnic policy coalition, and created enduring
overlapping ethnic and economic cleavages. In Tanzania, on the other hand, Africans did not see
nearly the amount of displacement that they did in Kenya. While there was indeed an exodus of
European settlers, who tended to take with them the capital they had imported, there was no
frenzied grab for the most important tracks of land. While the parcels occupied by Europeans
were important economic resources that were bought and sold, the fact that some large estates
were left abandoned signifies the degree to which land pressures in Tanzania were indeed much
less than in Kenya.
Despite the differences in land pressure, and subsequent allocation of agricultural areas,
the economic institutions of Tanzania after independence resembled those of Kenya. Export
oriented, capitalist agriculture was supported by the state through extension services and research
institutes, while the state moved to begin an import substitution industrialization strategy. In both
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states, institution making in the early years, even after the Arusha declaration, sought
opportunities to push Asian traders out of the most lucrative areas of the indigenous commodities
trade (Shivji 1976, 42-43). In Kenya, this meant that licensing for the imports and agricultural
purchases were granted primarily to Africans, while Asians were excluded. In Tanzania, the state
formed marketing boards, which worked in conjunction with cooperatives, to transport produce
to its point of sale and to guarantee prices. After the Arusha accords, these marketing boards, in
which African farmers played a central role, morphed into parastatal corporations, run by
government officials. In the Kenyan case, Asian intermediaries were replaced with African ones,
while in Tanzania, African farmers and later state personnel took on the role of independent
Asian traders. Early economic institution making in each state thus chose winners and losers in
the broader economy, though in Tanzania the state generally did not choose between different
African groups, but rather favored general African economic interests above those of Tanzanian
Asians.
Institutional divergence between Tanzania and Kenya, which would result in the
dislocation of the Tanzanian state from productive processes, is rooted in the development of
Ujaama socialism, which is itself rooted in and a product of generally high barriers to collective
action in Tanzania that resulted from historical circumstance. Fearing economic inequality and
the specter of dependent development, the Nyerere regime embarked on a socialist
developmental pathway. Industries and financial institutions were nationalized, villages were
encouraged to embark upon collective production, and state investment would ultimately drive
the economy. Ujaama socialism also coincided with a reduction in the salary of all civil servants,
even as many of them were placed at the helm of new parastatal corporations charged with vital
task such as Agro production, and the transport and marketing of important agricultural
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commodities. Furthermore, legislation banned these government officials from direct ownership
of enterprises and the private sector or even making investments.18 Ujaama socialism also
represented a centralization of the state in Tanzania, as cooperatives displaying too much
independence were disbanded while the labor movement was reorganized and place firmly and
state control (Shivji 2006, 3-5). Along the Way, Tanzania, like Kenya, became a one-party state
composed of various factions vying for power.
Embarking upon ujaama socialism created in Tanzania, unlike Kenya, a management
class that was intricately involved in directing the economy but who had no stake in economic
affairs. This new class of top state managers, parastatal officials, and others were intricately
involved in all facets of the economy, and for this reason Shivji (1976) observed that they
constituted a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" within the larger Tanzanian social formation. As a
group, they made poor entrepreneurs as they sought to balance the social consequences of
production that ripple out into the greater community against sheer profitability. Thus,
companies that did not turn a profit were kept afloat by those that did. While Tanzania and
parastatal's were not necessarily profitable, and indeed production in many fields declined, they
allowed Tanzanian citizens to enjoy a higher standard of living than might otherwise have been
possible.
Mismanagement practices tied to the highly centralized form of socialist economic
management developed by the Nyerere regime had a detrimental impact upon the Tanzanian
economy. Creating a managed economy required new forms of state penetration, in the hands of
competent officials. The result, unfortunately, was to place key decision-making power with

18

This legislation was abandoned with liberalization.
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officials not on the ground but in the political center (Young 1982; Scott 1999). As a result, topdown decision-making became the norm and it seldom fit the conditions in the regions. Villages
were required to move to sites without adequate water, or where crops that they traditionally
grew would not be able to thrive. Palm oil and sugar factories were located in regions close to
transportation infrastructure, yet the communities meant to supply them with crops found it
difficult to grow them in these regions. The result was both declining production and a
clampdown on political liberties, as dissenting voices were silenced lest the regime lose its hold
on power.

Tanzania’s Contemporary Political Economy
Liberalization changed the structure of the Tanzanian economy, but it did not necessarily change
the centralized nature of decision-making within the state. While the state has supposedly
undergone numerous institutional changes to make it more decentralized, key decisions must still
be made in the center, which is also the only reliable source of project funding. In this manner,
many scholars have claimed that instead of decentralization, Tanzania is undergoing a recentralization of important administrative functions. In some industries, such as gold, this trend
has gone to extremes with many key decisions over contracts being moved to the executive
branch (Kelsall 2013, 63). This continued centralization is of course helped by the fact that
Nyerere's political party, CCM/TANU continues to remain in power.
The true tragedy of the failure of the ujaama socialism, however, lies not in the
centralization of power per se but in the fact that it left the Tanzanian economy much more
vulnerable to the power and influence of international capital, and the processes of
underdevelopment which can often accompany such influence. The Nyerere regime made strides
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in such industry as agro-processing and the production of important commodities such as leather
and textiles. The manner in which liberalization occurred, however, greatly injured these
industries, as occurred in Ghana. Furthermore, the failure of ujaama village agriculture meant
that peasant production remained fundamentally small-scale, and unable to meet the food needs
of the population. Thus, Tanzania would spend much-needed foreign exchange simply importing
food while its entrepreneurs and political elites instead of being productively involved in the
domestic economy, instead turn towards foreign capital for economic patronage. The result has
been a type of political cronyism reminiscent of a comprador class, where political and economic
elites enable some of the worst excesses of international capital while failing to work
productively for economic development within the country.
Tanzania thus illustrates differences both with Ghana and with Kenya rooted in the
longevity of its ruling party apparatus. In Ghana, a clear technocratic presence within the state
guides the production of economic institutions that mediate the relationships with external actors.
The actions of this technocratic class, are reinforced by underlying social consensus, contributing
to the Janis faced nature of the Ghanaian state; growth enhancing institutions that are externally
oriented in exchange for patronage producing institutions that are directed at service delivery and
the development of internal and regional markets. In Tanzania, while growth enhancing
institutions are generally externally oriented, there appears to be less consensus surrounding the
need for this type of institution making to produce economic growth. While there may be a
recognition of the necessity to toe the line in order to receive donor funding, patronage extends
into externally oriented policies and practices. Eriksen (2018, 4), while quoting other authors,
notes that a strategy of maintaining power through hierarchical systems of patronage:
ensured that a relatively broad coalition of interests across state and party was managed through state
structures, creating a ‘ruling class’ of politicians, and administrators in the party, the civil service, and
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parastatal organizations. Rents management was broadly decentralized under Ujamaa (Cooksey 2011), but
became unsustainable as the economy deteriorated. Operating under a broadly authoritarian regime, such an
elite had neither the skills nor the incentives to support capital accumulation through productive investment
(Coulson 2013).

Additionally, while there are similarities in terms of projects that are meant to deliver
services but not necessarily long-term economic growth in both Ghana and Kenya, in Tanzania
there is also a greater propensity to attempt to coopt elites through patronage.
In this manner, Tanzania bears a resemblance to forms of political and economic
corruption in Kenya during the Moi regime, when fiscal constraints prevented the regime from
distributing benefits more broadly through institutions. In one of the most notorious scandals of
Tanzanian history the prime minister conspired with Richmond-Downs, an American company
in a scheme to increase electricity production in Tanzania. The company was able to secure a
contract that allowed it to be paid whether or whether or not it was successful at electricity
delivery, which allowed it to collect funds from the state despite the fact that the company made
no effort at electricity production, and had no experience in the field (Kelsall 2013, 59). Along
the same lines, the accessibility of the Tanzanian market to external investors is no doubt
facilitated by compradors within the state, whose accumulative practices are based in large part
on their close relations with both domestic and foreign capital. Yet, the Tanzanian case also
illustrates more fruitful and growth enhancing forms of engagement which are driven by
influential socio-economic and political factions. In this manner, Tanzania political economy,
and the institutions it develops, present a more variegated pattern than those of Ghana.
The principal export sectors in Tanzania are governed by institutions that, on the whole,
facilitate economic growth. Yet, unlike Ghana, the sectors are not overseen by regime
technocrats who carefully monitor and shape institution making. Instead, the state tends to be
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somewhat less responsive to these important areas of economic activity and sources of foreign
exchange. While the careful management of cocoa was an essential ingredient in the stability of
the state, in Ghana, managing important export sectors is simply an important survival strategy
for any regime in Tanzania but not by any means the only one. While important export sectors
like coffee and horticulture are governed by growth enhancing institutions, there are also clear
ways for the state to improve performance, if it were so inclined.
The manner in which the coffee sector was liberalized in the early 1990s clearly
illustrates this trend toward institutions that are growth enhancing, yet also underperforming. The
state in Tanzania agreed to fully liberalize the coffee sector in the early 1990s. For the industry,
this effectively meant that price setting power left the hands of the coffee board, operating
through a system of cooperatives, and instead was placed with the free market as private buyers
often from outside the country were allowed to purchase the crop and to grind it at facilities of
their own choosing. The impact on small holders in particular was devastating, with many
quickly diversifying their holdings by growing food crops both for subsistence as well as to sell
to local markets (Mhando and Itani 2007, 40). Ironically, the period after liberalization led to an
overall decline in the coffee industry as farmers held back investing in new plants and
international investment failed to immediately materialize, given Tanzania's previous experience
with nationalization (Baffes 2004).
The Tanzanian case diverges dramatically from that of Ghana, a state whose social
stability depended on the health of the cocoa sector, its main export, as well as the well-being of
cocoa farmers. The Ghanaian state aggressively protected COCOBOD, the cocoa marketing
board. The board is currently one of the few in existence in the industry, internationally, and its
quality controls are largely responsible for the premium paid for Ghanaian cocoa on international
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markets. Ghana made massive concessions in industries such as textiles, which was all but wiped
out by lower tariffs and the importation of clothing from abroad. While Ghana could not protect
all of its industries, it moved to ensure the continued well-being and prosperity of the cocoa
sector. Tanzanian policymakers, on the other hand, did neglect the coffee industry but its
protection from the harsh realities of liberalization was not an existential necessity for the party,
whose grip on the state apparatus remained secure. While Tanzanian coffee attracts investment
from the state in the form of input vouchers and projects to be increase production, the industry
still lacks adequate extension services and access to credit for small farmers (Mtaki 2018).
The horticulture sector, another top foreign exchange earner, displays similar tendencies.
The sector has steadily grown, thanks to favorable climate, location, and a close proximity to
European markets. An institutional environment which allowed easier access to land for foreign
companies also helped to spur investment. Nevertheless, the state has been slow to exploit the
promise of growth represented by the sector, which continues to have high tax rates and a host of
administrative hurdles surrounding the establishment of larger operations (Kelsall 2013, 67-68),
not to mention the ever-present issue of access to water for large farms. In other words,
roadblocks to further expansion of the sector linger, with no signs of resolution in sight.
While these important export sectors do not always appear to have the full backing of the
state, they received far more support than food crops which do not bring in valuable foreign
exchange and are thus prone to the type of patronage politics that maintain networks within the
CCM. An initiative aimed at the rice sector during the Kikwete administration, for example,
delegated the construction of irrigation infrastructure to local level governments. This method of
implementation served as an effective means of patronage delivery. As a consequence, however,
very little of the promised infrastructure was ever constructed. Thus, the policies and institutions
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that help to maintain personal networks, rather than to undertake growth enhancing institutions,
plague internally oriented institutions. A growth oriented pattern of institution making for
domestic markets and value-added exports certainly exists but it is far from the first choice for
policymakers. In this manner, Tanzanian institutions, similarly to those in Ghana, are externally
oriented.

Sugar Cane and Tanzania’s Departure from Bifurcated Development
While patterns of Tanzanian development on the whole resemble those of Ghana, there are
theoretically significant differences tied to the presences of a strong and well-established party
apparatus that merit further exploration as they pertain to specific industries and regions of the
economy. Tanzania’s divergence from Ghana in creating a more variegated pattern of institution
making is best illustrated by examining the sugar industry. Sugar is a profitable sector within the
rural economy, and as Tanzania is a net sugar importer, there exists great social and economic
pressure to produce a greater proportion of the sugar that Tanzanians consumed every year, at
home. This general social impetus led to a massive increase in domestic investment, which was
facilitated by multinational capital, in the wake of liberalization. This alliance of domestic and
multinational capital constrained the state, and limited its capacity to stand apart from society.
The alliance, at least on the domestic front, succeeded in mobilizing society rooted social and
political factions, which because of Tanzania's political legacies, became impossible to ignore.
Growth enhancing institutions that were internally oriented were the result of this process,
although given the need to mobilize a dense alliance of interests, such a scenario is much less
common than in the Kenyan case.
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Liberalization within the sugar industry greatly empowered multinational capital by
providing a host of incentives and opportunities, often at the expense of the peasantry.
Enterprises that the state had developed over years suddenly became available for outside sale.
Sugar cane, in addition to commodities such as rice and maize which formally had to be
purchased through state marketing boards were now available for sale locally, often at a cheaper
price. The combination of lower operating costs, access to land and tax incentives all served to
attract external capital, who operated large estate farms attached to processing facilities that were
formerly parastatal corporations (Norris, Worby 2012). State programming such as the SAGCOT
Initiative and Kilimo Kwanza pushed the state to actively recruit multinational corporations to
develop the agricultural sector.19
The widespread use of contract farming, or outcropping, in sugar cane production
employed by multinationals presented opportunities for indigenous African capital, even as it
increased economic insecurity and political oppression amongst the peasantry. Liberalization and
the various outcropping schemes cut away many of the supports such as input subsidies and
access to marketing and transportation resources, as well as extension services, that peasants
previously had access to before liberalization. Furthermore, outcropping contracts for supplying
sugar cane generally passed along the risks associated with fluctuations in the price of sugar to
producers (Sulle 2017). Tanzanian peasants were essentially left with little in the way of support.
Into this void left by the state stepped indigenous African capital, who took advantage of
both opportunities to provide processing facilities with sugar cane efficiently and to offer
peasants much-needed access to services for a price. The absence of the state provided
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These initiatives will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
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indigenous capital, many of whom were city dwelling members of the bureaucracy, with new
opportunities and strategies for accumulation. This group, by providing access to trucks, tractors
and other inputs soon took over positions of leadership within planter cooperatives (Poulton
2018; Sulle 2017). Leadership provided still more benefits, as each cooperative is only
contracted for a limited amount of sugar cane. Leaders of cooperatives are free to distribute these
quotas in whatever way they see fit. Being denied a quota has serious consequences as it means
that the crop will not be harvested for an individual farmer who has spent both time and money
to grow it. Liberalization, in this manner, gave indigenous capital a new means of accumulation
rooted in the social control and exploitation of the peasantry, in coordination with and on behalf
of international capital.
Clear hierarchies of social and economic control, however, quickly translated into
political power and influence within the CCM. The CCM is the only party of standing within
rural regions. Leadership and decision-making within the party is heavily centralized, with power
being exercised by elites who control various factions within the CCM (Anyimadu 2016, 5).
Wealthy and well-connected farmers have tapped into these networks, and created influential
factions within the party that could not be ignored (Poulton 2018, 5). In this manner, an alliance
of international and domestic capital succeeded in shaping institutions that have facilitated
growth but have done so at the expense of the rural peasantry. As institutions, the SAGCOT and
Kilimo Kwanza both highlight the manner in which the state is deeply and fundamentally
constrained by social forces. The penetration of the state within society led to a blurring of the
lines between party and state, while in Ghana party and state remained two separate entities. This
peculiarity of Tanzanian politics has led to institution making patterns that diverge from those of
Ghana by creating a slight expansion of the policy coalition in a region that blurs the line
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between state and society. Institutions in Tanzania thus mediate an unstable and tenuous
hierarchy of social groupings, which offsets some of the autonomous tendencies of state action.
These characteristics of the Tanzanian state, however, are not new but emerged slowly during its
experience with socialism.
Tanzanian Economic Institutions
Tanzanian institutions, on the whole, reflect both the power of a policy coalition whose
preferences are easily written into law, as well as the attempts by those less powerful classes to
influence policy with the help of international organizations. The policy documents also contain
other, similar contradictions at the heart of the Tanzanian state, namely the tension between a
technocratic impulse of a managed economy and the tendency of social forces to try to use the
state to further their own agendas. It is perhaps for this reason that Tanzania’s political economy
is governed by a dizzying array of policy documents and initiatives that both overlap one
another, or in some cases contradict one another. Some of the principal economic institutions
include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Vision 2025
Poverty Reduction Strategy
Medium Term Development Strategy
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS)
Integrated Industrial Development Strategy
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
The Big Results Now Framework for Development
The Kilimo Kwanza Initiative
Economic institutions in Tanzania, as in many African states, were formulated under

pressure from Bretton Woods institutions to liberalize, yet there were limits to the degree to
which economic openness reshaped the Tanzanian economy. As it did in most societies in the
global south, structural adjustment starting in the early 1980s tended to create policies that
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presented opportunities for elites while stripping away some of the supports and security of
peasants and workers. Thus peasants saw generous subsidies for agricultural inputs disappear,
while state funding for storage and transportation of agriculture crops disappeared or was greatly
limited in scope (Mhando and Itani 2007). The state also cut back upon extension services, as
well as research and development, especially in food crops such as maize. Yet, ironically, the
extant sectors of the economy did not see major investments from foreign donors. In fact, tea and
coffee production has actually seen a decline in liberalization, in part, due to the increased costs
associated with shipping from Dar es Salam’s port facilities, at least in comparison with those in
Mombasa, Kenya, just to the north (Kelsall et al. 2013). Thus, liberalizations impact, though
thorough particularly in terms of restructuring the rural economy, did not completely change the
pattern of institution making found within the state.
The documents address many of the challenges afflicting the Tanzanian economy. Vision
2025 is the country’s guiding development framework, created in consultation with international
organizations such as the World Bank as well as important donors. It lays out a pathway for a
long term transition to guide Tanzania to middle income status, and was launched in 2000 during
the tenure of President William Mkapa. While the document set a series of ambitious goals, such
as a highly commercialized and profitable agricultural sector, the host of additional policies and
initiatives lay out more specific strategies to attain them.
The Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), which has served as the
fundamental framework to help spur agricultural development since liberalization, champions
the cause of small subsistence producers. While the document envisions a commercialized sector
in line with Vision 2025 as the final goal, it places a great emphasis on facilitating the ability of
smallholders to be productive, and to join together with each other in cooperatives (Ministry of
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Agriculture and Food Security 2001, 12-13). Additional measures such as subsidies for inputs,
transport and micro finance all seem to be aimed at a peasant-led strategy for rural development.
Other related documents point critical areas for the economic wellbeing of the state such as road
systems, electricity infrastructure, and irrigation, which by extension would help peasants living
in the countryside (Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives 2001; Ministry of
Industry and Trade 2001). These policies and institutions, like those of Ghana, identify broad
areas of need; they differ from Kenyan institutions which identify specific industries to target for
investment while placing other areas of the economy in a less important role. Not surprisingly,
the port facilities at Dar es Salam preoccupy many of the documents, as it serves as Tanzania’s
major linkage to international markets. Discussion of the port facility is also highlighted in the
Integrated Industrial Development Strategy. Yet, despite the need to invest in infrastructure, and
inputs for farmers, among other priorities, the state is of course constrained in the resources it
provides to stimulate economic growth.
Despite a focus on small farmers, however, the most functional and growth enhancing
institutions in Tanzania deal with facilitating external investment. Like Ghana, and many other
countries that undergo liberalization, Tanzania created a new set of legislation enabling foreign
investment and creating rules to prevent nationalization of industries, a critical safeguard given
Tanzania’s past. The Tanzania Investment Center is widely considered one of the most
competent in the world, and provides institutional support for investors looking to acquire land
and to set up business in the country (Kelsall et al. 2013, 55). The liberalization process, in this
manner, tended to empower external capital as investors were able to make bids on important
parastatals, agricultural produce or on large tracts of land for export agriculture.
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Tanzanian institutions also reflect the tensions between the economic interests of
members of the state apparatus vs the well-being of the state itself. Some economic institutions,
for example, facilitate external investment but the degree to which such investment benefits the
state is unclear at best. The minerals sector, for example, utilizes export processing zones and tax
incentives to attract large multinationals, a strategy which has met with some success. Yet, the
tax incentives are so great that Tanzania is reaping only a small amount of the total export value
of valuable minerals such as gold (Kelsall 2013, 63). Other projects envision state and private
sector investment, in order to facilitate numerous industries. This approach, in which the state
facilitates private investment is at the heart of the Kilimo Kwanza (“Agriculture First”) Initiative,
a plan designed to shift the trajectory of rural development in direct opposition to peasant
focused approach of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy which preceded it by over a
decade.
The Kilimo Kwanza Initiative was unique in its close partnering of the state with private
investors. In particular, it allowed for easier and clearer demarcation of land upon which to build
large commercial facilities packaged with tax incentives and other measures to attract both
domestic and international capital. Yet, while it facilitated the establishment of large-scale
commercial agriculture, the programs impact on poverty reduction was questionable. In one
particularly famous case, Agrica, a UK based agribusiness firm, took advantage of tax incentives
and access to land to become the biggest rice producer in East Africa. Yet, company operations,
according to report by the Oakland initiative, Greenpeace, and Global Justice Now (2015), has
resulted in a loss of access to land and a negative impact on the livelihoods of smallholders in the
region. Peasant labor was an essential part of the company's operations, as it purchases rice from
smallholders in the region, in addition to growing its own on company plots. Yet, the various
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outcropping schemes which it employs ensure that peasants do not come close to attaining
market value for the rice which they grow. These negative reports about the company, and their
operations, echo broader criticisms of the Big Results Now framework,20 of which it was a part
namely in its emphasis on short term gains (Janus, Keijzer 2015, 23).
While policy documents often, inadvertently highlight contradictions within the
institution making process – such as a need to cut budgets while also making massive
investments in infrastructure – Tanzanian documents are unusual in that they reflect and codify
ongoing disputes between social groups. The conflicting priorities in Kenyan and Ghanaian
documents, on the whole, mirror the very contradictions of development in a peripheral region of
the world, a process which must carefully balance the need for investment with tight fiscal
constraints. While Ghanaian and Kenyan documents clearly contain optimistic thinking about the
possibilities of achieving those goals, they each enshrine a clear social order within the context
of these constraints. In this manner, the Ghanaian and Kenyan documents are similar in that they
reflect a sense of social compromise. These societies, by no means are free from social struggle
and conflict, but such conflicts do not play out in the institutional design of the state. Thus, the
contradictions found within developmental documents are generally exogenous to socially rooted
political and economic processes. Tanzanian documents, in this manner, represent unrest or at
the very least a more complex and conditional autonomy on the part of the state, that may
represent cracks in what might otherwise be a hegemonic organization within society.
It is important to point out that the contradictions found in Tanzanian documents differ in
important ways from being institutional exceptions identified in previous cases. While Ghanaian

20

Big Results Now was initiated in 2009 but formally discontinued in 2017, although many of its policies and
institutions remain active (The Citizen 2017).
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institution making was generally broad in its patterns of service provision, occasionally
institutions that were targeted at a narrow group of beneficiaries would actually help spur
development. In these cases, in particular for the horticulture sector, groups within the state
organization temporarily changed policies and institutions to fit their short-term interests. Yet
this action had little to no impact on the long-term organizational needs and interests of the state;
the state maintained its degree of autonomy from society. In Tanzania, this autonomy appears to
be, at least to an extent, contested. Conflicting policy within the Tanzanian case pits smallholder
farmers against capital and its support for institutions that facilitate external investment, land
acquisition, and supports for capital intensive farming found in the Kilimo Kwanza initiative as
well as the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) projects.21 The lack
of state autonomy within the Tanzanian case is puzzling, as its institutions, on the whole,
generally resemble those of Ghana. Yet, this seeming lack of autonomy creates institutions in
Tanzania that are more variegated than the Ghanaian case, although to a lesser extent than the
economic institutions of Kenya. The Tanzanian state appears to contain features that are unique
in comparison to the other two principal cases.
The state in both Kenya and Ghana enjoys relative autonomy from social forces, even
while their institutions enshrine both the social ascendancy of the dominant group and a viable
survival strategy for the reproduction of the state. In Ghana, a type of Bonapartist state
ascendancy over other social formations produces policy that favors the export sector in an overt
manner. A survival strategy predicated on the pervasive presence of a core ethnic group leads to
a very broad set of internally oriented institutions. In Kenya, the state has clearly never occupied
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A piece of legislation that supplements the Kilimo Kwanza initiative.
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an ascendant position within society, which is generally belongs to an alliance of wealthy
ranchers, farmers, and financiers centered around the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups. A
survival strategy predicated on the needs of an ethnic alliance in an environment lacking a core
ethnic group has generally led internally oriented economic institutions to be relatively narrow in
their scope. Kenyan economic documents direct funding not to different regions of the economy
but industries within specific subsectors that have important constituencies, such as leather
processing, an industry that benefits Kikuyu and Kalenjin ranchers. A broader provision of social
services, as well as the positive externalities that some internally oriented institutions provide
allows for a degree of social and political stability in Kenya.
Tanzanian institutions are unique in their blend of features, although the state more
closely resembles that of Ghana particularly in the close attention paid to externally oriented
institutions. The shared history of popular socialist development could perhaps explain the
similarities to the Ghanaian case. Tanzanian institutions like those of Ghana also tend to be
broad. The Big Results Now framework is what passes for a targeted approach to development in
Tanzania, and it focuses on no less than six major areas of economic and social development.
Thus, on the surface at least, the Tanzanian case roughly approximates that of Ghana.
The Tanzanian state, however, clearly enjoys far less autonomy than the state in Ghana in
regards to medium and large enterprises in the agricultural sector. This area the economy
comprises three major groups, the urban petite/bureaucratic bourgeoisie, wealthier segments of
the rural peasantry, and multinational capital, all of whom stand to benefit from the
commoditization of peasant labor for the production of products such as rice, sugar and Palm oil.
According to most perspectives in the Tanzanian press, Kilimo Kwanza, with its uncharacteristic
departure from the interests of smallholders, is a direct response from Tanzania’s petite and
298

bureaucratic bourgeoisie to the state centric approach of the ASDS (Poulton 2018, 3). The
ascendancy of the state in Tanzania, however, has its roots in the history of socialist
development, as it does in Ghana. In order to understand why the state in Tanzania appears to
produce institutions that are more variegated, rather than simply externally oriented, it is first
necessary to get a sense of how socialism in Ghana represented a fundamental break with its
manifestation in post Arusha declaration Tanzania and might it might open the door to socially
rooted factions whose interests are generally disregarded by the state in Ghana.
Considering Gender in Tanzanian Development
The Tanzanian case is ambiguous because while it does not disconfirm the tendency of rural
development programs to marginalize the interests and concerns of female agricultural workers,
neither is there clear evidence of institutionalized networks and widespread practices that prevent
women from acquiring wealth and status. Instead, what we see are manifestations of neoliberalism that take advantage of a highly penetrative party apparatus to facilitate forms of
private accumulation. This process often comes at the expense of the peasantry as a whole,
though institutions sometimes inflict inadvertent harm upon female farms workers, even if such
practices tend to be fewer in number than in the other cases.
The remnants of party rule, ironically, serve as a breakwater against a larger set of
potentially marginalizing institutions. As the accumulation of wealth is channeled through socioeconomic and political leverage of the party-state (Shivji 2006), it is incumbent upon aspiring
and ambitious party members to manage a local following, and to make allies through successful
business ventures (Poulton 2018). This implicit pressure, combined with the congoing presence
of the party in rural regions, means that great care in development projects taken to insure both
profitability and the continued political following of the politician that initiated the project. The
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impact of this penetrative party state is, in general, to lessen the impact of the worst aspects of
neoliberal reform.
Nevertheless, there is nothing particular in Tanzanian institutions that differentiates them
from other African states, at least in terms of gender. The main differences generally have to do
with planning and execution of rural development plans, at least those involving the Tanzanian
bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In numerous ventures, often involving multinational capital, care is
taken to ensure that the wage labor and outcropping portions of these plans provide viable
survival strategies alongside or in place of subsistence agriculture. Peasants, of course, still lose
land and many of them, perhaps deliberately, become dependent on wage labor on plantations
feeding foreign owned agro-processing facilities, often set up by members of the bureaucracy
acting in capacity of private citizens. The relative success of these ventures, at least in the short
term, means that the loss of economic resources is at least compensated in part, with viable
opportunities for wage labor or outcropping. Furthermore, the necessity of profit making tends to
ensure a more uniform delivery of vital services such as access to extension agents.
The examination of gender in the Tanzanian case highlights the extent to which party
institutions, in some instances at least, shape developmental processes in profound ways. While
inequities in access to important inputs and governmental aid in the form of extension agents are
the norm in Tanzania, we find little evidence of the most glaring forms of gendered oppression in
accessibility to developmental resources. In regions where governmental officials partner with
multinational capital, often in conjunction with international organizations, the desire for profit is
compounded by a drive for political power and the future profits that success in both fields may
bring. In Tanzanian rural development, at least in areas where a constellation of state and party
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managers, NGOs, and multi-national capital come together, centrality of the party in rural
matters blunts the very worst forms of sexism in development.
Preliminary conclusions
Tanzania’s unique mix of externally oriented and variegated institutional production appears to
be the result not of the presence of a “core” ethnic group, but a set of historical conditions that
gave rise to a state which at first enjoyed a large degree of autonomy from society, allowing it to
create a variety of socialism that was particularly centralized. As in the case of contemporary
Ghana, Tanzanian institution making, at least as it pertains to the domestic market, does not
appear to favor any ethnic group in particular. This tendency to intervene broadly, without any
ostensible regard to ethno-regional grouping can be seen in such programs as the current NPP
regime’s “One District, One Factory” programing in Ghana. Like Ghana, Tanzania’s
developmental initiatives and even forms of patronage distribution do not follow ethnic or
regional lines. Instead, the play a role in the factional competition between different segment of
the CCM, as well as the splinter parties that appear to be focused not on policy but on the
followers of charismatic leaders. Tanzania, and Ghana Ghana at least in their contemporary
politics, do not show a tendency for state intervention at the behest of ethnic alliances. Yet,
ironically, when such intervention is paired with sectoral overlaps as we see in the case of
Kenya, there is the potential for growth producing institutions to take shape.
The origin of Tanzania’s lack of ethnic alliances, however, appears to be different than
that found in Ghana. In Ghana, ethno-regional alliances certainly exist despite the presence of a
core ethnic group. In fact, broad patterns of voting suggest that control of state power oscillates
between two regional groupings with swing voters deciding the race for the presidency and
legislature. Yet, even during the Nkrumah regime, it was possible for some regions of a larger
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ethno-regional block to break away. This possibility forced the Nkrumah regime to invest
resources relatively uniformly, rather than intervening only to benefit one region in particular a
process that has continued to this day. On the contrary in Tanzania, the precolonial histories and
structures of ethnic groups appear to be the main cause of this lack of ethnic alliance making. A
decentralized form of political organization appears to have been dominant among these groups,
and thus the most meaningful differentiation appears to be between those on the mainland and
those Tanzanian located on the island of Zanzibar. This differentiation, however, does not reflect
any sense of identity among Tanzanians, whose primary identity is simply “Tanzanian” (Eifert,
et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the lack of state intervention in policy to benefit specific ethnic groups
associated with economic sectors in both cases, appears to contribute to the dislocation of the
state from the productive sectors of the economy. Thus, while there are qualitative differences
surrounding the core ethnic group, in both cases a lack of ethnic alliance making and a broad
distribution of economic services is the result.
Ghana and Tanzania differ greatly in the institutional legacies of a socialist approach to
development, however. The Rawlings revolution in Ghana unleashed the productive social forces
of the masses in ways that inserted the state into the productive lives of its citizens. The Nyerere
regime’s Arusha declaration energized society and saw groups like cooperatives and labor unions
ready to take a more prominent place in the economy. Yet, once unleashed, these social groups
proved to be a threat to the regimes that birthed them. In Ghana, the regime was forced to purge
the left, and to create a general demobilization of social forces. In Tanzania, the state quashed
political opposition and took more centralized control of economic production by taking over the
unions, reshaping the military, and disbanding cooperatives that were potentially problematic
(Shivji 2006, 3-4). In each case, the state gained autonomy, and thus administered policy in a
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manner that it saw fit. Yet, while productive institutions were sometimes the result, in particular
in Ghana’s cocoa sector, this enforced sense of autonomy removed the state from valuable
sources of information and input emanating from society and the market. In each state, the
regime tends to rely on externally oriented institutions to stay in power, while delivering
patronage widely in the domestic economy to provide social stability.
Yet, the centralization at the heart of Tanzania’s experience with socialism created a
policy making process outside of the state, that nevertheless succeeded in creating growth
enhancing and internally oriented institutions. The centralization within the party meant that
powerful factions could not be ignored, and indeed, factions that contained a mix of domestic
and international capital, combined with social control over elements of the peasantry, found
ways to reshape institutions to favor their interests. Thus, the sugar cane industry actively helped
to shape institutions like SAGCOT and Kilimo Kwanza, which, despite representing growth
enhancing opportunities also codified a type of dependent development in which domestic and
international capital profit from the exploitation of peasant labor.
Finally, an analysis of the Tanzanian case undermines the potential causal role of the
institutions common to settler colonies. While Tanzania experienced a less pervasive form of
European settlement than Kenya, it delivered similar economic structures. Yet, while the state in
Kenya distributed resources emanating from the end of colonialism unequally along the logic of
ethnic alliances, in Tanzania socialism developed in part, as a means of clamping down on the
inequalities that grew out of the inherited capitalist institutions that dominated the Tanzanian
economy. The role of path dependency developing from settler agriculture and shaping long term
institutional development, therefore, appears to be minimal.

303

Economic Institutions in Cote D’Ivoire
Cote D’Ivoire has historically been one of the most prosperous countries on the African
continent. Among African states it has been unusual in the diversity of its successful industries,
which include cocoa and coffee production, as well as various types of manufacturing linked
primarily to the food and beverage industry. Cote D’Ivoire is also exceptional in the close ties it
established with France, its former colonizer. Indeed, the majority of managers in important
enterprises, and the overwhelming amount of capital, for example, came from France during this
period (Young 1982, 197). Links to France - particularly French capital - and strong economic
growth allowed Cote D’Ivoire’s long time leader, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, to use the state itself
as the primary means of shaping a social coalition. The outsized role of the state was due in part
to the structure of pre-colonial Cote D’Ivoire, where the abundance of land tended to encourage
migration within the territory, and at the same time undermined the power of potentially
centralizing authorities. This relative weakness of traditional authority allowed the Ivoirian state
for decades, to create a variegated form of development which used growth enhancing
institutions to elevate elites, and to provide them with credibility in their own communities. In
this manner, the stat maintained a cohesive social coalition, creating growth enhancing
institutions in both internally and externally oriented sectors of the economy.
Côte d’Ivoire’s successful developmental strategy, however, suffered major setbacks
after a calamitous fall in the world prices of cocoa and coffee, as well as the death of its longtime
leader, President Houphouet-Boigny. Houphouet-Boigny’s rule had been characterized by a
delicate balancing between internal factions, shaped in part by ethnicity, sectarian differences
and regional identities. Largess from cocoa and other cash crops had solidified a relatively
cohesive elite, unified under a ruling style which facilitated their own private accumulation
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through the auspices of the state. The disappearance of a charismatic personality, combined with
the dearth of resources and the fiscal constraints that they created, greatly contributed to an
intensification of competition between regional factions. These processes would eventually lead
to violence, and a brief war between 2011-2012 after Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede the
presidency after losing a democratic election in 2010.
Côte d'Ivoire, unfortunately, does not serve as a prime example of successful institution
building in contemporary Africa. In fact, since the early 2000s it has been plagued with political
instability and conflict, most recently in the form of a civil war between 2011 and 2012. While
Ivoirian institutions mediate the social relationships at the heart of the state, it is uncertain
whether these relationships are cemented with a form of social compromise, or if the period
following the cessation of violence, which includes the permanent stationing of French military
forces, represents an imposed and temporary social contract. While it is possible that
contemporary Ivoirian institutions represent durable social compromise, there are far better cases
to study the internal and external orientations of economic institutions, and the social
compromise which they embody. However, as a state that has undergone institutional
breakdown, the Ivoirian case can provide much needed analytical insight into the reasons why
Ghana and Kenya have been able to create growth enhancing economic institutions and avoid the
problems that have plagued it.
Analytically, Cote D’Ivoire’s inclusion in this dissertation was made in hope of tracing
points of disjuncture with Kenya, a similar case but one which continues to manage political
conflict in such a manner as to maintain patterns of growth enhancing institutional performance.
The Ivoirian case does indeed contain elements of similarity with the patterns of institution
making found in Kenya; these trends are particularly striking when we examine the two decades
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following independence. Process tracing reveals clear effects resulting from the manner in which
core related factors manifest themselves in an environment lacking a core group. In Cote
D’Ivoire, as in Kenya, the state was incentivized to create cohesive alliances, based upon ethnolinguistic affiliation. Many of the institutions of the domestic economy, therefore, were by
necessity growth enhancing as they served the political ends of elites. These trends stand in stark
contrast to the cases of Ghana, and Tanzania.
Nevertheless, we also see theoretically important disjunctures with the Kenyan state, that
provide clues as to why Cote D’Ivoire failed to attain the necessary level of social compromise to
continue to create growth enhancing institutions, unlike Kenya. The causes of Ivoirian state
failure were both exogenous and endogenous. International actors, largely based in the global
north, in an opportunistic gambit following the collapse of the country’s cocoa industry after
Houphouet-Boigny’s “cocoa war” of the 1980s, forcefully interjected themselves into the
Ivoirian cocoa economy under the guise of liberalization, altering many of the well-established
patterns of patronage that helped to stabilize a somewhat fragile ruling coalition. Thus, as in
Ghana, the global north had an important impact upon the elite level processes of social
compromise upon which growth enhancing institutions are built.
A second point of disjuncture, and perhaps a more important one, relates to the function
of the state in Ivoirian society. In Cote D’Ivoire, much more so than in Kenya, historical
contingencies have produced an elite class that is dependent upon the state for the very resources
needed to lead their own communities. In other words, it is the state that actively cultivates a
dependent class of elites, who rely upon their positions as part of the state bureaucracy to
maintain a leadership role in their communities. This situation is unlike that which we find in
both Ghana and Kenya, where the state interacts with and mediates between elites who clearly
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have the necessary social control to exert leadership within their communities. Thus while
coalition making processes reflect those that occur in Kenya, in Cote D’Ivoire they produce an
elite tethered much more closely to the apron strings of the state, and as a consequence the policy
coalition in Cote D’Ivoire was much smaller than in Kenya, and lacked coordinating institutions,
while competition over the state apparatus became much more strident as elites who are out of
power had much more to lose than in Kenya. In this manner, the Ivoirian case highlights some of
the reasons why Kenya has been able to overcome elite conflict while Cote D’Ivoire fell victim
to it.
Social and Economic Processes and the Ivoirian State
The Ivoirian states is characterized by a similar pattern of ethnic alliance making that we find in
Kenya. The state maintains a cohesive social coalition, that is for the most part, a product of
ethnolinguistic and regional cleavages. Unlike Kenya, however, benefits tend to accrue to
regions, rather than individual ethnic groups. At the root of this uniquely Ivoirian developmental
dynamic is the primacy of the Ivoirian state over society in crafting a social coalition. The state
in Cote D’Ivoire is not so much autonomous from society as is often argued, so much as it has
been able to control the terms of its social obligations surrounding the production of growth
enhancing institutions for specific communities. The result has been a variegated pattern of
development, in which the state locates institutions of growth enhancing potential in both
internally oriented and extant sectors of the economy. In this manner, the Ivoirian case resembles
that of Kenya, at least in regard to its overall orientation of economic institutions.
Despite these similarities, Cote D’Ivoire and Kenya have profound differences
surrounding the manner in which ethnic elites create cohesion within their communities. In both
Ghana and Kenya, elites create political authority through control of economic assets such as
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access to land, livestock, and forms of capital needed for the agrarian economy. In Kenya, the
formation of these accumulations of land and capital was greatly aided by the process of
decolonization, which saw both large scale land reform as well as British attempts to actively
create a wealthy and prosperous class of farmers sympathetic to the interests of white colonists.
In both pre-colonial and colonial Cote D’Ivoire, social structures as well as geography and
demographic factors auger against the development of political authority based on control of
economic assets. An abundance of unsettled land in the forest zone, for example, meant that
peasants did not have to rely on chiefs for access to land, they simply cleared more land outside
their jurisdiction. And while patron client relations certainly existed, and could provide material
benefits to peasants, these benefits rarely translated in political authority - Ivoirian peasants were
far too autonomous and there were far too many potential patrons for any one to attain a truly
loyal following. These demographic, ecological and historical conditions have produced a
situation in Cote D’Ivoire where historically, access to the resources of the state provided
political power and social control to elites; they were thus a dependent class.
Crafting a viable social coalition in Cote D’Ivoire after independence has generally
involved providing carefully chosen individuals with the economic resources to exert leadership
within their communities. The economic institutions produced as a result, by necessity, had to
contain at least the potential to produce economic growth. Political regimes in Cote D’Ivoire,
especially that of Felix Houphouet-Boigny whose long tenure in office last from 1960-1993,
would use appointment to important posts within the state apparatus as a means of building a
social coalition through the empowerment of individuals whose control over programming could
provide a measure of social, and thereby political control. This type of access to the state, of
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course, was doled out carefully, often to individuals who might be relatively unknown within
their community.
In order to ensure the growth producing potential of economic institutions, and by
extension the stability of the policy coalition under the leadership of the state’s chosen elites, the
Houphouet-Boigny regime leaned heavily upon its relationship with France. While Côte D’Ivoire
has historically been one of the foremost manufacturers on the African continent, ranking ahead
of both Ghana and Kenya and only slightly behind South Africa, the close ties that it made with
European states, France in particular, meant that manufacturing was majority foreign owned,
with big firms taking a lead role. While Cote D’Ivoire was indeed open to foreign investment,
oftentimes the structure of agreements between the state and foreign firms tended to provide
generous benefits, while failing to transfer important skills, technology and other essential nonmonetary benefits to the Ivorian economy.
Nevertheless, the state resolutely pushed forward with parastatal organizations focused
on manufacturing in two important fields, the processing of foodstuffs for domestic production
as well as the grinding of beans for cocoa products (Anyang’Nyong’o 1987, 226-227). Today,
these industries remain the backbone of Ivoirian manufacturing, although each has underwent
fundamental changes. Food stuffs, particularly maize, rice and cassava were privatized in the
1990s while the cocoa sector was liberalized in the 1990s under pressure from external donors,
which facilitated the purchasing of processing facilities by external capital. The impact of
liberalization for foodstuffs was generally positive, although the political and social crisis of the
past decade and a half has been particularly challenging for the sector. In cocoa processing,
liberalization had served as a means of empowering multinational firms while calling into
question the ability of the state and local enterprises to increase value added production.
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The social coalition of the Houphouet-Boigny regime was dictated by both convenience
as well as the structure of Ivoirian society. The Akan speaking zones in the southern portions of
the country, areas often involved in cocoa and coffee production, became the stronghold of the
regime. Members of the presidents’ Baule ethnic group frequently found themselves appointed to
parastatals active in agro-processing or in important positions overseeing the construction of
such things as irrigation infrastructure. Members of other prominent ethnic groups in the south
such as the Dyula, who had migrated to the south in the early 20th century and who were
involved in the transport and marketing of food commodities, similarly found themselves
involved in the rural economy in a manner that benefitted their region.
The primacy of the state apparatus within Ivoirian society meant that developmental
funding, even when it was spent strategically in areas outside the social coalition, did not provide
social control to local elites. Thus, during the 1970s when Ivoirian economic managers made
plans to jump start palm production in the norther portions of the country, it was the parastatals,
largely staffed with southerners, who led the charge. And while the factory certainly took
advantage of the labor of the Voltaic peoples of the region, no one from this group would be
involved in leadership of the project nor would the project deliver anything beyond subsistence
levels of accumulation for those smaller northern ethnic groups in the region. While the regime
may have carried out projects in many regions of the country, as noted by Lemarchand (1981)
and others, its social coalition lay firmly in the south. Yet, even here, decision making power
remained centralized, confined to an inner group around the president.
The policy coalition during the Houphouet-Boigny regime remained stubbornly small,
and generally lacked coordinating institutions. While it is certainly possible, as argued by Boone
(2003), that the regime wanted to prevent elites and members of the bureaucracy from becoming
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too powerful, the logic of core related factors tells us that membership in the policy coalition is
often only given grudgingly, for it involves the surrendering of a small (or sometimes large)
measure of control over policy and spending. The regime, therefore, would have little reason to
surrender policy making power to elites in the south, who were already dependent upon the
largess of the state to maintain social control within their communities.
Ironically, the policy coalition in Cote D’Ivoire tended to include elites from those
regions of the country that were more often than not hostile to the Houphouet-Boigny regime,
but who were capable of mounting serious opposition to the regime. In some cases, such as in the
southeastern reaches of the country, slight changes in policy and the ability of some elites to join
the bureaucracy might suffice to diffuse opposition. This nominal inclusion in the social
coalition, for some problematic regions, however, simply did not suffice; in these rare cases,
elites are brought into the policy making process in a last ditch effort to nullify potentially
serious opposition. So it was that northern elites, in a region whose historical and demographic
characteristics were exceptional in the Ivoirian context, came to shape growth enhancing
institutions and practices in the production of cotton (Chappell 1989). Yet, as with members of
the bureaucracy, the regime tended to forgo creating formalized coordinating institutions.
Elites outside of the orbit of the regime face a difficult challenge, as the state utilized
institutions to perpetuate the dominance of southern elites. Local merchants and wholesalers, for
example, soon found that their rise to prominence was blocked by the state, which in conjunction
with international capital, had set about carrying out the functions of wholesale traders in
agricultural commodities (Boone 1993). When peripheral regions outside the country attempted
to take over transportation, the state set transport prices at such low levels that the only real
profits took place at the retail and export levels.
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It was in this manner that the nature of the opposition to the regime grew not from rural
elites outside the regime, who often lacked the power to lead their communities, but from local
organically grown farmers’ organizations. These groups often benefitted from the input of
educated Ivorians who had traveled to other regions of the country, only to come home to find a
general lack of opportunity. These rural associations managed to put pressure on the regime, and
by the mid 1970s they had succeeded in forcing the regime to provide more meaningful projects
such as attempting to jump start the sugar industry, a venture generally considered to have been a
potential wasteful failure by most members of bureaucracy (Crook 1990, 659). Nevertheless,
these new ventures were not growth enhancing in quite the same manner as industries located in
the south, or those such as cotton production which were located in the north but included newly
expanded members of the policy coalition. Furthermore, this expansion of the social coalition
would entail a tremendous expense that would contribute to the destabilization the regime.
Perhaps it is for these fiscal reasons, so essential to keeping the policy coalition together,
that the state paid such close attention to connections between growers and foreign sources of
investment. The relationship between southern planters and international capital was carefully
mediated through the auspices of state policy. Côte D’Ivoire was in fact no different from most
other developing countries in its utilization of profits from key exporting sectors like tea and
cocoa to finance parastatals and state investment in key industries and infrastructure (Young
1982; Campbell 1987). One of the most important roles played by the Houphoet-Boigny regime
was to determine access to key resources, such as bank loans. These loans, which often used land
as collateral, were used to provide starter funds for industry or much more commonly, the ability
to buy stakes in existing often foreign industries operating in Cote D’Ivoire (Campbell 1987,
294-295). Thus, a profusion of Ivoirian companies existed in the domestic sphere, and these
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companies often retained French nationals in key roles, or in many other cases, production had
simply slowed passed from French to Ivoirian hands with the aid of French finance arranged
through the state (Losch 2002). Thus, the landed classes, as elsewhere in Africa, moved into
agro-processing and related light manufacturing, but they did so in a manner that allowed them
to buy up or partner with existing successful European firms. Furthermore, the state worked in
conjunction with external capital to market both finished manufactured products as well as
agricultural commodities. Through joint ventures Côte D’Ivoire developed a dense retail sector
that proved to be especially important for marketing locally grown cash crops. In this sector as
well, however, elite close to the regime operated alongside foreign capital as well as parastatal
industries. The opportunities for accumulation were great, but also narrowly bound within
specific channels (Boone 1993).
The tight relations between the post independence ruling class and French capital would
ultimately exclude and subvert the rising bourgeoisie in other regions of the country, as these
was only so much room within these networks of accumulation (Campbell 1987). Rural elites in
other sectors, particularly those involved with lower value cash crops such as sisal, grown in the
north of Côte D’Ivoire, were often far removed from the higher circles of power in the south.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly for the regime, they were more integrated within the
fabric of rural life and could potentially create regional followings. Elites that the regime had
coopted, on the other hand, were often pulled into southern circles of accumulation, and thus
remained removed from local affairs. Those with ties to the regime were often given access to
land an capital through rural cooperatives set up by the regime (Woods 1999). Membership in
these groups was mandatory, and so locals were often deeply distrustful of these organizations,
especially as they were often used to distribute patronage to those loyal to the political center
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(Woods 1999, 499). Cooptation, therefore, tended to cement the ties of rural elites to the regime,
and to include them in southern circles of accumulation, but it also diminished their local
standing and influence.
Development and the Politics of Gender in Cote D’Ivoire
The Ivoirian case illustrates, and indeed exemplifies the manner in which a narrow social
coalition curtails benefits. The analytical lens of gender helps to illustrate both of this trend in
clear detail. The state in Cote D’Ivoire is not only unresponsive to the needs of women in rural
areas but seeks to cut them out of the social coalition so that benefits can accrue to male heads of
families. In the cotton industry, at least, the idea is to force women to use the labor that they
were using to grow their own cotton on their own individual plots and to instead apply this time,
labor and productivity to familial plots controlled by their husbands (Bassett 2002, 359). The
lack of aid in producing cotton is particularly notable when we consider that these cotton
producing regions are generally the recipient of various forms of service delivery. In fact, they
form a vital segment of the Ivorian social coalition. The sharp divide surrounding gender in fact
mirrors the larger ethno-geographic divides in the country, in which the institutions of the state
serve to facilitate accumulation on the part of the social coalition oftentimes at the expense of
those outside this group.
Contemporary economic institutions and performance
It would be impossible to discuss economic institutions in contemporary Cote D’Ivoire without
tracing the process of liberalization to cote D’Ivoire’s disastrous attempt to lay claim to a greater
share of the value produced by its cocoa industry in the 1980s. This episode set the stage for a
process of liberalization that would place Ivoirian economic assets in the hands of multi-national
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capital, and disrupt processes of patronage distribution, ultimately destabilizing the state. To
understand Cote D’Ivoire’s contemporary political economy is to understand its “cocoa war,” a
conflict over the terms of trade that would ultimately have disastrous consequences for the state.
By the early 1980s Côte D’Ivoire was producing almost 45% of the world cocoa beans
(Losch 2002, 206), and like the Ghanaian cocoa protests of the 1930s, aimed at British
imperialism, it attempted impact the price of beans by withholding them from the market. It is
important to note that the attempt to increase prices paid for cocoa also included a demand for a
greater share of valued added economic activity; thus the state invested heavily in cocoa grinding
facilities as well. The prices of cocoa had climbed during the 1970s but had quickly come down
by the end of the decade, creating the making of a fiscal crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, as the state
increased spending during the boom but found it difficult to cut spending when prices fell
(Crooker 1990). Exerting more influence over the international price paid for cocoa would
greatly stabilize economic uncertainty for both farmers and the state as a whole.
The response from large multinationals was understandably, that of concerted defiance.
Using large stockpiles of cocoa beans, which are much easier to store at the lower temperatures
found in European countries, the firms stoutly resisted Ivoirian demands. By sourcing beans
from elsewhere, and by drawing upon warehoused stocks, they simply waited out the Ivoirian
government, which did not have sufficient refrigerated storage to preserve their crop, creating a
deeper financial crisis in Cote D’Ivoire that would eventually bankrupt the state. The
multinationals, because of their great storage capacity, could simply outlast the Ivoirian regime
(Losch 2002, 211). Provoked in large part by the crisis, Côte D’Ivoire would be forced to
liberalize its cocoa sector.
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The liberalization of the cocoa industry was particularly disastrous because it not only
transferred control of major parts of the industry to external interests, but it facilitated the
transfer of Ivoirian investment in processing facilities to multinational corporations. The IMF
spearheaded the process, which dismantled the state monopsony in cocoa purchasing and instead
replaced it with a system of private wholesalers. Yet, while funding was provided to encourage
the growing and maintenance of the cocoa crop, this funding was contingent on the privatization
of parastatals involved in value added grinding. Since Ivoirian financial institutions essentially
acted as branches of larger French banks, a legacy of both colonialism as well as the HouphouëtBoigny regime’s approach to development, financing and ultimately partnerships involving
larger European parent firms were quickly arrange through French financial institutions (Losch
2002, 216). This development gave large multinationals a firm foothold in the industry, and
played into a larger trend of driving down the price of cocoa beans by utilizing beans of poorer
quality in the processing of bulk cocoa products.
The contrast with Ghanaian institutions in the cocoa sector could not be greater; while
Ghana grinds far fewer beans than Côte D’Ivoire, it remains much more firmly in control of the
price paid for cocoa as well as the manner in which the beans are sorted and graded. Unlike Côte
D’Ivoire, the state in Ghana resisted pressure to dismantle its state purchasing agent, Cocobod
(Fold 2002, 231-232). Its resistance was based largely in the opinions of technocrats, who
believe that doing so would negatively impact the ability of the state to control this valuable
resource. In Cote D’Ivoire, technocrats played a similar role, yet the urgent resolution that the
state needed to the fiscal crisis meant that their concerns took a back seat to staying in power.
Had it not been for the crisis of the failed cocoa embargo, Ivoirian institutions to say
nothing of the Ivoirian bourgeoisie that relied upon state patronage, may well have stood up to
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the power of the IMF. Yet, even so, Ivoirian resistance the liberalization of the sector continued
during negotiations, and direct access to Ivoirian cocoa beans was granted only to those firms
who invest in Côte D’Ivoire. This important stipulation could have potentially given the state
more control over pricing. However, the lack of financing available, the unwillingness of
external donors to provide financing for value added production, and most importantly the close
ties between Ivoirian and French financial establishments undercut the ability of indigenous
interests to retain ownership over facilities to grind cocoa. Despite resistance, it was the
historical ties with the metropole that ultimately reshaped Ivoirian institutions. There were no
laws against Ivoirian institutions borrowing from the same sources, yet historical ties and
continuities gave financial institutions in Europe a set of advantages that ultimately led to their
influence over the process in Côte D’Ivoire. While Côte D’Ivoire prospered under a particular
model of economic growth tightly tied to international capital, it was ultimately these external
actors who largely forced control of cocoa markets and the most valuable aspects of the cocoa
value chain from Ivoirian hands. The failure of Côte D’Ivoire’s “cocoa war” in the late 1980s
would ultimately lead to a complete institutional reorganization driven largely by external actors.
Policies related to the processing of cocoa tend to favor access to external capital, and on
the whole facilitate the transfer of cocoa beans to large multinational corporations. Grinding
facilities abound in Cote D’Ivoire, making the country one of the largest international processing
centers for cocoa in the international economy (Fold 2002, 234). Nevertheless, while grinding
facilities add value to Ivoirian exports, they do not necessarily result in increased bargaining
power over pricing in the market. The state greatly expanded grinding capacity in the 1980s and
1990s, but Ivoirian policy making in the cocoa sub-sector, negotiated through the IMF, allows
foreign owned mills greater access to Ivoirian cocoa beans (Losch 2002, 2015). Thus, facilities
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owned by the state were quickly bought by large multinationals, who utilize them to grind lower
quality beans that form the backbone of many essential cocoa products, such as cocoa paste and
cocoa butter. The arrangement has changed the functioning of Ivoirian mills, which were
envisioned as facilities to grind the most high quality beans, for the most profitable value added
processing. These activities, however, still take place largely in Europe (Fold 2002, 234). The
true cost for access to low priced beans for multinationals was relocating the less lucrative
portions of the international value chain processing to areas such as Cote D’Ivoire.
The main policies deregulating the cocoa industry took place in the early 1990s, after
intense negotiations with the IMF. Before the reforms, a state monopsony, the caisse de
stabilization was responsible for purchasing cocoa from farmers at a guaranteed price.
Afterward, licensed export agents would then sell the product on the open market, mostly to
large multinationals. After negotiations with IMF, new institutions opened the Ivoirian market,
first and foremost, by greatly diminishing the activities of the caisse de stabilisation and
allowing independent brokers instead to purchase cocoa directly from farmers. The new
regulations also allowed direct purchasing of cocoa beans by foreign interest who had made
investments in the country. Finally, the new regulations allowed for the privatization of the much
of the state’s infrastructure in the industry, particularly its parastatal corporations that were
involved in storage and processing of cocoa.
While the immediate impact of the regulations was positive, in the long term they have
greatly diminished the capacity of Cote D’Ivoire to add value to the exports of cocoa. The entry
of so many new players into the market, combined with new investment, in the short term helped
relieve a struggling sector, as the state had previously cut off exports in an attempt to impact
market conditions. Before liberalization, the caisse de stabilization was struggling to guarantee
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farmers an adequate price for their crop. Therefore, for many farmers, the change of institutions
was critical for their short term survival (Crook 1990, 559-560). In the long term, however, these
changes have tended to erode both the prices paid to farmers, as well as the overall quality of the
crop (Fold 2002, 229). While the cocoa sector in the country is doing well, smuggling to Ghana
has been increasing as the state in Ghana pays a higher price to producers (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2018, 9). Thus, while the sector is no longer in crisis, and while some value
added processing does in fact take place, the institutions surrounding cocoa are not truly growth
enhancing.
While Côte D’Ivoire is the number one producer of cocoa beans in the world, as well as
a major coffee and tea exporter, it is also a large exporter of finished agricultural commodities
such as canned pineapples and palm oil. Historically the state has provided funding in the form
of loans and facilitated public private partnerships to facilitate growth in this industry (Young
1982; Crook 1990). Furthermore, the state has also negotiated with import/export firms, many of
which are at least partially owned by Ivoirians, to market these products. Thus, and even with its
post conflict challenges, the state appears to be playing a positive role in specific forms of
economic growth.
The origins of Ivoirian institutions, however, are the product of selective policy making
based on class, ethnicity and regional origin. The institutions of the state have historically
reflected the ascendency of large planters in the south involved in the production of valuable
cash crops such as tea, coffee, cocoa beans (Young 1982). Colonial policies under the French put
this group at a collective disadvantage, providing resources and facilitating coerced labor to work
on large French estates, while hindering the growth and development of Ivoirian farmers
(Anyang’ Nyong’ o 1987, 187). In response, large Ivoirian planters helped to form the SDIC,
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which not only advocated for their rights but would help organize much needed labor for their
farms. The Syndicat Agricole Africain or SAA would eventually play a key role in supporting
the independence movement under the Parti démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), and after
independence would be involved in shaping policies to facilitate the accumulation of large
southern planters, who were primarily Christian, and of the various Akan ethnolinguistic
groupings. Furthermore, the state would help to mediate and reproduce the relationship between
different parts of the country, as well as with external capital.
More importantly, these regional trends would ultimately be grasped upon by
opportunistic political leaders in order to destabilize the state. It was not long before the
grievances of small producers took on distinct regional and ethnic tones. In particular, this new
type of populist rhetoric tended to scapegoat immigrants for the countries economic problems, as
the Houphuet-Boigny regime had attracted labor both from the north as well as from the south to
facilitate accumulation by large planters. Many of these immigrants had settled in the country
and had succeeded in claiming land that had been hitherto unoccupied. Furthermore, southern
politicians in the democratic era also used the north’s peripheral economic status, and their
migratory trends within the country in search of employment, to claim that many northerners
were not in fact Ivoirian citizens (Cutolo 2010). Thus, the politics of exclusion in Cote D’Ivoire
came to be focused more narrowly on conceptions of citizenship, and competition amongst
regions over the main channels of accumulation. Several bouts of instability, culminating in civil
war was the result. At present, Ivoirian institutions are still in the process of rebounding, though
it should be noted that important fields such as cocoa production and agro-processing continue to
perform well.
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The Ivoirian case resembles that of Kenya, particularly in the manner in which ethnoregional alliances distributed benefits in the form of growth enhancing institutions selectively.
The state, in this manner, actively mediated the relationships between social classes and regions
of the country. Just as in Kenya, key groups were able to shape policy making in a manner that
furthered their accumulation, and that overall, facilitated economic growth. Nevertheless, Côte
D’Ivoire differs from Kenya in that the tight relationships with external capital that made
Ivoirian institutions so successful have spawned distributive struggles that foreclosed the
possibility of a more united bourgeoisie. This process of exclusion reached the point that it was
small scale producers, articulating regional and ethnic grievances that eventually came to the
forefront. Yet, it was very often the state, who would provide the economic means for local elites
to satisfy these concerns. Liberalization, and the ejection of the state from production in the
cocoa economy has greatly constrained its ability to obviate these demands.
Agro-processing institutions in other subsectors tend to produce more growth, though the
state has struggled to support the sector on the whole. Some of the principal problems afflicting
agro-processing featured in Côte d’Ivoire’s “New Industrial Policy I: Diagnosis of the Industrial
Sector and the Institutional Framework” include the high price of imported machinery, as well as
limited state support in transportation, storage and marketing (Repebulique de la Cote D'Ivoire
2012). Training and retaining skilled labor has also been difficult, given the turmoil associated
with the political crisis. Lastly, enterprises generally struggle with financing as many of the main
sources of financing in Cote D’Ivoire have experienced disruptions in their ability to lend
following the political crisis. The linkages between French banks and those in Cote D’Ivoire
have in general, provided opportunities for French companies to either purchase former
parastatals in Cote D’Ivoire, or to join in partnership with them (Losch 2002, 2016). Thus, while
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indigenous ago-processing is a vigorous subsector of Ivoirian manufacturing, it remains more
vulnerable to outside influence than the sectors in most other states explored in this study.
Agriculture in Côte D’Ivoire shows the same type of variegated performance found in
most other countries on the continent. Cash crops, particularly those that make up a substantial
part of the extant sector of the economy, receive the bulk of government resources and expertise.
The cocoa sector thus benefits from the work of agricultural research institutes, while subsidies
for important inputs in cocoa, coffee and other important exports though much reduced since the
1990s, continue to be applied. Food production, on the other hand, remains labor rather than
capital intensive with support in the form of extension officers and subsidies for essential inputs
like fertilizer few and far between. The program for the revival of agriculture specifically
identifies these problems, and sets the goal of providing more support for farmers (Ministère de
l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural 2012). Nevertheless, the resources of the state are
severely constrained, and though the IMF and other donors have made specific contributions in
order to promote food security in a few key essential fields such as rice production, funding
larger and much needed infrastructure for subsistence level farmers is at the moment impossible
for the state.
Like Kenya, the state in Cote D’Ivoire tends to encourage the formation of famer’s
cooperatives, in order both make up for the shortfalls of state aid as well as to facilitate
communication with the state. The number of cooperative associations in Cote D’Ivoire is
immense, and each organization is required to register with the state, who publish a directory of
all the groups on an annual basis (Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural 2017).
Cooperatives allow small scale subsistence farmers in particular to market excess food crops, and
greatly facilitate transportation and storage. Additionally, the state uses these groups to carry out
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extension services in a more efficient manner. Finally, these organizations also serve as a means
of political organization at the local level especially as the state continues to undergo
decentralization of many of its administrative functions.
Conclusions
Core related factors have driven a variegated pattern of development in Cote D’Ivoire that has
been at the heart of contentious politics and violence. These trends have been reinforced by
external actors, whose policies greatly constrained the state’s ability to resolve the contradictions
and social pressures that accompany unequal patterns of development pursued as a reoccurring
regime survival strategy. Demographic and historically contingent factors have pushed the state
to play the leading role in state-society relations. In order to stay in power, the state during the
long tenure of president Houphouet-Boigny cobbled together a social coalition based primarily in
the south, although it later included a few select regions in the north as well. For most regions,
the state’s method of elevating regional elites to positions in the bureaucracy and providing
limited but generally effective development served to provide the material credibility that these
members of the bureaucracy so desperately sought from their own communities. In this manner a
cohesive social coalition was built comprising elites whose nominal leadership over their
communities was built on their reliance upon the regime and its commitment to effective
economic management in internally and externally oriented sectors of the economy. To say that
these elites were dependent on the regime would be a significant understatement. Liberalization
placed significant strains upon this system, upon which elites were already heavily dependent.
The embargo on cocoa, and subsequent penetration and control of the cocoa industry by multinational capital pushed the state firmly towards institutional breakdown and overpoliticized
violence. The same core related factors present in Kenya are also present in Cote D’Ivoire, as is
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the same pattern of development which locates growth enhancing institutions in both internally
and externally oriented segments of the economy. Yet, in Cote D’Ivoire, the combination of an
elite fundamentally reliant upon access to the state apparatus to maintain their own base of
power, and the forceful interjection of multinational capital into all aspects of the cocoa industry
were simply too much for the state to handle as a coherent unity. The subsequent political and
economic decay of the Ivoirian state can be traced to those two factors, which in a social
environment characterized by the lack of a core group, proved to be fatal to social compromise.
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Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis of Causal Pathways
The case studies provide a thorough exploration of the role that the presence or absence of a core
group plays in the production and placement of growth enhancing institutions. They struggle,
however, to explore the role of ideology in this process. Most African states underwent only
brief experiments with forms of socialism, leaving behind little in the way of institutional
legacies. Indeed, cases such as Tanzania, where the edifice of party institutions still survive, are
comparatively rare. It is ultimately much more common for socialist rhetoric, combined with a
somewhat statist approach to development to persist. From an analytical perspective, however,
this trend is somewhat problematic, as it closely resembles the programmatic orientation of most
ostensibly capitalist states such as Kenya, which under Kenyatta adopted a version of “African
socialism” even as it continued to implement market-oriented reforms. Qualitative case studies,
therefore, are ill suited to examining the impact of a socialist transition on development.
Quantitative analysis, therefore, can more easily attempt to test potential linkages
between a past socialist transition and patterns of development. Such an analysis, however, must
take into consideration the other hypothesized causal variable, the presence or absence of a core
group, given its impact on the dependent variable as evidenced in the case studies. The main
purpose of this chapter is thus to clarify the causal mechanisms and pathways linking relevant
independent variables to the dependent variable, while providing a more generalizable test of the
main independent variables from the case studies. Quantitative analysis will be used to separate
potential causal mechanisms associated with the independent variables, as well as to determine
whether or not the theoretical insights developed in the case study can be applied to a larger
group of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A brief qualitative analysis of one additional case,
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taking into account the refinement of causal mechanisms from the quantitative analysis, will
provide further elaboration of the research findings up to this point.
The case studies identify relevant causal mechanisms, but they bring up questions about
the specification of the variables and the micro foundations linking the variables to the
mechanisms. Each of the case studies illustrates that disjunctures in state-society relations lie at
the heart of institutions that are growth enhancing but heavily externally oriented. The cases
provide some evidence that the origin of these disjunctures might be found both in the
disengagement of state apparatus that may have its roots in past transitions to socialist economic
planning giving birth to higher levels of state autonomy, as well as in the tendency to create
economic institutions not to enhance growth but to deliver patronage and benefits more widely
than might otherwise be possible. I hypothesize that the latter mechanism is a symptom of ethno
political cleavages at the national level that take shape around the presence of a core ethnic
group. The case studies provide preliminary confirmatory evidence of these mechanisms while
the quantitative analysis can hopefully provide greater traction on the specification and causal
impact of these independent variables.
The case studies, however, also bring into greater focus the specification of independent
variables and the need to refine causal mechanisms. For example, while the presence of a core
ethnic group may be in part responsible for patterns of institution making, the manner in which
politics unfolded in the two cases with core ethnic groups was remarkably different. In Ghana,
the core Akan speaking people were always at risk of political fragmentation, despite the fact
that they often cohered with one another. Thus, Akan speaking peoples largely opposed the
Nkrumah regime, apart from some specific subgroups that were offered special incentives.
Furthermore, while most Asante (Akan speakers) steadfastly opposed the Rawlings regime,
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many of the other Akan groups supported his regime. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the
presence of a core ethno-political group at the national level did not necessarily create any forms
of group adherence. Indeed, the case study casts doubt on whether or not Tanzania truly
possesses a core group. Despite the cleavage at the national level between mainlanders and those
located on the island of Zanzibar, ethnicity failed to be a politically salient factor of politics. Like
the regime in Ghana, the lack of connection between any particular ethnic group, as opposed to
institution making in Kenya or Cote d’Ivoire, appeared to create a type uniform distribution of
investment that was not directed at any one group to the exclusion of the others. Thus, while the
causal mechanism appears to be the same, the causal pathway is somewhat different.
Furthermore, the pathways linking past socialist transitions to institutional outcomes are
complex, and bound within causal pathways that may involve multiple and somewhat obscure
factors. Institutions to encourage growth in Kenya, for example, were not only the result of
policies that were target at specific ethno-political formations, but were negotiated at critical
junctures in consultation with indigenous Kenyan capital. Hypothesis testing involving such
complexity of causation is better attempted using qualitative methods, focusing on the patterns of
alignment within a given social coalition. While institutional scholars often assert that path
dependency alone is responsible for patterns of institution making and economic outcomes, what
the case studies make clear is that there is no single causal pathway at work, but a multitude
working in conjunction. Institutional path dependency in formerly socialist and/or Marxist
societies most likely impacts the governing apparatus, yet, this path dependency ultimately rests
on variegated structures of society rooted politics. Thus, the first hypothesis points to the
important of the presence of a core ethnic group as a variable of primary importance, regardless
of path approaches to governance. Thus, the “hard test” will focus on whether or not a past
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socialist transition is sufficient for the confinement of growth enhancing institutions to the extant
sectors of the economy. Figure 14. Coalitions and the State lists some of the possible interactions
and causal pathways uncovered in the qualitative analysis. The variables have been arranged
according to their place within the causal pathway outlined in chapter one. Casual pathways are
listed under the variables.22
Figure 14. Coalitions and the State

The major causal variables in the study include the presence or absence of a core ethnic
group, the presence or absence of a past transition to socialism/Marxism.
While the diagram is informative, it also highlights the complexity of the cases; the goal
of the following qualitative analysis is to attempt to simplify some of this complexity by
focusing on the causal patterns that endure over several cases as well as to test some of the
underlying premises more widely. For example, the case studies all affirm that growth inhibiting
institutions are often the cause of dislocations between the state and society, resulting in neglect,

22

I use the term causal pathways to emphasize the multidimensional nature of causal variables. They do not operate
through clear causal mechanisms so much as they are shaped by complex interrelations with other factors in their
respective societies.
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lack of interest, insufficient allocation of resources, etc. These institutions may in fact be the
result of fiscal pressures, or they may reflect a willingness to use development projects as a
means of distributing benefits but with no intention of stimulating growth. This condition may in
fact be conditioned by path dependent legacies of management, based on previous
experimentation with socialism, or it may be a reflection of a survival strategy that caters to the
needs of a fraction an underdeveloped national bourgeoisie, the sheer difficulties of management
under tight fiscal constraints, etc. Quantitative analysis, by means of simplification, can distill
important relationships in order to indicate whether it is socialism, the presence or absence of a
core ethnic group, or other potential causal variables that might be responsible for variation.

Independent Variables of the Quantitative Analysis
The Tanzanian case study, along with that of Ghana provide insights on the sources of cohesion
that characterize a core group. In Ghana, there is no real sense of a larger Akan identity, though
Akan speaking regions do exhibit similar political behavior. Yet, there are no uniform economic
interests that might allow an artful politician to placate or appeal to one industry and thus capture
the region. Instead, it appears that the Akan are a relatively diverse economic group, though their
presence in cocoa growing regions certainly accounts for potential sources of cohesion. While it
is difficult for economic interests alone to account for the cohesion of a core group, the lack of
unified economic interests suggests that a core group is able to draw upon at least some forms of
traditional or symbolic power. Yet, while symbolic forms of power may serve to aid group
cohesion, there are limits to the ability of symbolic or traditional authority to create coherence
within a large group, particularly when unified economic interests are not present. The relative
dispersion of land, capital and human resources on mainland Tanzania means that in effect, one
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region of the country has very little in the way of economic motivation to form either one
cohesive grouping or one of several smaller groupings. A core group is thus not defined by the
economic commonalities of its constituent peoples, but similar economic activity certainly
appears to play some role in creating group cohesion. The absence of a core group in Tanzania
points to the idea that while common economic interests may not be sufficient to create a core
group, they may very well be a necessary condition.
Core groups on the whole, suffer from lower levels of group cohesion than non-core
groups. In a core group, as in non-core groups, it is safe to say that traditional relations of
lineage, clan and ethnicity connect the political preferences of members, just as much as direct
economic interests. In a core group, these features add to group cohesion, but are not, in and of
themselves, enough to solidify cohesion. In non-core groups, on the other hand, these factors
may very well be enough to create group cohesion. It would be a misnomer to think that all
Kikiyu in Kenya, or all Baule in Cote D’Ivoire occupy similar positions within the domestic
economy. Yet, members of the groups for the most part share political loyalties. Thus, when we
consider core groups in comparative perspective it becomes clear that they are not able to
marshal the same level of traditional, symbolic or other forms of social power needed to assure
cohesion. Non-core groups, on the whole, do not suffer from the same phenomena. While they
are by no means cohesive entities they do, generally speaking, possess forms of authority that
allow for greater group cohesion than generally found in core groups.
A core group is clearly a unique entity, distinct from either an ethnic alliance or a
regional grouping. Its defining feature is its mix of both coherence and fragmentary trends. The
core group is an economic and social unity, but one which masks both fragmentation and deep
social divisions. It is these tendencies, upon which social and political actors capitalize, that
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generate distinctive core related factors that ultimately shape the institutional profile of the state.
The production of growth enhancing institutions in specific sectors of the economic is not so
much a choice as it is a reflection of the state itself. The state, for its part, being a social
relationship, whose institutions encompass a type of unwritten consensus between the dominant
social actors.
The Case Studies and Core Group Coding
The case studies point to the difficulties of determining whether or not a country contains a core
group. The first step involves consulting measurement of relative group size; Scarrit and
Maozzafar (1999), thanks to their focus on different types of groups, have served as the primary
quantitative measure of group size in this dissertation. Next, for each case, historical process
tracing, as well as an analysis of socio-economic relations between groups as well as with other
regions of the world, can create a determination of whether or not a core group is present. The
classification of a core group, therefore, requires qualitative case study, carefully undertaken in a
uniform manner. At this point in the dissertation, for example, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for recognizing a core group still have not been worked out.
A careful recoding of core groups would necessitate a massive expansion of the number
of case studies in the dissertation. Indeed, it would require a new methodology of case study
design. Undertaking such a study of core groups on the continent, in a careful structured manner,
requires a separate project; shortcuts, even of a preliminary nature risks conceptual and empirical
confusion.
In this dissertation, therefore, I pursue more modest goals, utilizing the numerical coding
for core groups, in effect maximizing clarity but sacrificing some, though not all of the insights
gained from the case studies. The findings, therefore, pertain to and test the conception of the
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core group as a numerical expression. As group size, even in more nuanced forms of coding is
still a necessary ingredient in the behavior of core groups, these findings may reveal important
new information about the impact of group size relative to other factors such as traditional
leadership. Thus, for this analysis, in determining whether or not there is a core ethnic group, I
utilize Scarrit and Mozzafar’s (1999) classifications of ethnic groups from the early to mid1990s. This classification is admittedly preliminary, as one of the purposes of this dissertation is
to specific with greater clarity, the conceptual outlines of a core group. Nevertheless, I use this
definition as it provides insights into the role of group size, even as it may only represent the
beginnings of a more accurate definition of a core group.
The case studies point to the role that past socialist transitions may play in creating a
more centralized, disengaged approach to institution making. Past socialist transitions in Ghana
and Tanzania released a tremendous potential of organizational energy through society. In Ghana
during the Rawlings regime, for example, a parallel governmental apparatus took shape
composed of committees for the defense of the revolution, led by ordinary citizens. In Tanzania,
the populace applauded the announcement of Ujaama socialism, especially the idea that
opportunities for education would be made available while the pay of civil servants and others
was slashed. Yet, despite the initial warm reception in society, in each case, the dynamics of
maintaining control over the economy led to centralization, and the demobilization of civil
society. Once unleashed, Ghana’s CDR cohorts proved hard to control, and did immense harm to
the economy. In Tanzania, villagers proved reluctant to move to ostensibly more productive
locations, and thus required the coercion of the state to enforce villagization. In each of the cases,
experimentations with popular socialism led to a backlash whose defining characteristic was a
centralization of power and decision making, and a tendency to disengage from relations with
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social groups revolving around production. In Tanzania this tendency led to a top down
approach, in which villagers were not given input on where to relocate, despite their knowledge
and expertise about where their crops would grow best. In Ghana, this policy led to a
disengagement from peasant production in agriculture apart from cocoa and a cut in support for
small producers and agro processors. Yet in each case, this tendency of the state to become more
detached and autonomous from society allowed for growth producing policies to emerge in
sectors like the cocoa industry in Ghana, where policy was guided by networks of technocrats
within the state, or in Tanzania’s acclaimed investment promotion center and its attendant
effective rules and institutions.
In operationalizing the concept of a past socialist/Marxist transition, a variable that I
simply name “Socialism” in the analysis, these cases point to the idea that conceptualizations of
socialism must emphasize actual policies rather than simply socialist rhetoric. Furthermore, they
also suggest that a detrimental impact to institutions would affect those policies geared toward
meeting the domestic needs of the state, rather than the types of foreign exchange earning
policies and practices that might hinder the ability of a given regime to hold onto the reins of
power. Thus, the cases, at least at first glance, appear to suggest that a narrow definition of
socialism, one based on actual policies, be used.
Nevertheless, the legacies of socialism, I argue, are subverted by the social structures
within society, namely, the presence or absence of a core ethnic group. These structures may
work in combination with a general disengagement of the state from productive forces of society
or they may mold the state apparatus in new directions, making it more likely for the state to
favor specific ethno-political groupings with the formation of growth enhancing institutions. This
claim will be tested by examining the impact of past socialist transitions on such things as value
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added in agro-industry. Yet, while it is a testable claim, it also points to a more expansive
definition of a socialist transition. While there are significant differences in the policies and
perspectives of populist inspired socialism, “scientific socialism,” Marx-Leninism, Maoism and
etc., the unifying characteristic of all these approaches to governance is a commitment to social
and economic equality. This commitment is often molded in rhetoric and ideology, even if it is
not always successfully implemented.
Zimbabwe and Senegal illustrate the importance of paying attention to the social impact
of rhetoric. Socialist inspired rhetoric in these cases, as in Uganda, ultimately amounted to little
in the way of policy that could be distinguished from capitalist states such as Kenya. Yet, in
Zimbabwe, socialist rhetoric served to unite a potentially fragmented opposition against white
minority rule; thus socialism and nationalism were intermingled at the level of rhetoric and
served as a means of conceptualizing unity and economic equality. In Senegal, the welldeveloped scholarly vision of Senghor’s African socialism and “negritude” served to unite
Senegalese society and became part of the common sense lexicon of the state. The impact of
such rhetoric, accompanying independence and thus forming the bedrock of a newly conceived
independent Senegal cannot be underestimated. In these two states, a “socialist” transition had
deep roots within society, even if the policies of these states were difficult to differentiate from
others on the continent that did no undergo such a “revolution.”
The coding for past transitions to socialism/Marxism take into account both policy as
well as rhetoric. For these cases, significance comes from either 5 years or more of a declared
socialist regime, or from socialist rhetoric that begins during an independence struggle and
continues after independence for a period of two years. In this manner, Zimbabwe is coded as
“1” for having a legacy of a socialist transition, while in South Africa the abandonment of
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socialist principals and rhetoric upon independence had led it to be coded as “0” indicating an
absence of a socialist legacy. To these classifications, I also add cases in which a declared
socialist or Marxist regime accepts IMF conditionality. This classification recognizes that
institutional path dependency may continue and help to shape the process of economic
liberalization in these cases. In this manner, although the Sankaara regime (1987) in Burkina
Faso lasted only four years, an IMF program was implemented soon after its downfall in a coup.
Thus, Burkina Faso is labeled as having a socialist legacy. Table 7 displays the listing of
countries with “socialist/communist” legacies.
Table 9. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with Socialist/Marxist Legacies
1.
2.
3.
4.

Country
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde

5. Congo, Rep.
6. Ethiopia
7. Ghana
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mail
Mozambique
Sao Tome and
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda

Regime
MPLA
Kérékou
Sankara
PAIGC/PAICV
MassambeDebat
Nguesso
Derg
Nkrumah
Rawlings
Touré
PAIGC
Ratsiraka
Keita
Frelimo

Years
1975- Present
1972 - 1989
1983-1987*
1974-1991

MLSTP
Senghor
Réné
Barré
SSU
Nyerere
Obote

1975-1990
1960-1976
1971-1991
1969-1991
1971-1985
1964-1985
1962-1971
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1963-1968
1979-1990
1974-1991
1957-1966
1981-1983*
1958-1984
1973-1980
1975-1978*
1960-1968
1975-1990

20. Zambia
21. Zimbabwe

Kaunda
Zanu-PF

1964-1991
1980-Present

*Indicates that the regime stayed in power less than 5 years, but within 2 years of
the acceptance of IMF conditionality.

Control Variables in the Quantitative Analysis
The presence or absence of a core ethnic group does little to indicate the amount of ethnic
diversity in a given country, a potentially important control variable. The ethno-political
cleavages in Rwanda, for example, indicate that there are two main ethnic groups. While
Rwanda has a core group, its socio-political environment is quite distinct from a country like
Tanzania, which is host to a multitude for very small ethnic groups. Controlling for ethnic
fractionalization, therefore, helps to capture pertinent variation and can help to explain the
seemingly contradictory between states where a core ethnic group is present like Ghana and
Tanzania. The measure for ethnic fractionalization comes from Alesina, Deveelschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003), a well-known and frequently used dataset that places a
particular emphasis on the smaller subgroups that have been excluded from my coding of a core
ethnic group. The variable, like most fractionalization indices, measures how likely it is for two
randomly selected people to be of the same racial/ethnic group.
Additionally, I have included common control variables to ensure the accuracy of the
independent variables. In particular, I control for level of economic development per capita,
regime type, natural resource rents, and colonial heritage. Most of this data uses averages for the
years 2000-2010. I also control for colonial heritage with dummy variables for British and
French colonialism from Hadenius and Teorell (2005); this measure is particularly important
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when taking into account patterns of state formation and key institutions such as the courts.
Finally, I use the log of average GDP per capita between 2000 and 2010, as measured by the
World Bank, as well as a World Bank measure for the proportion of government revenues which
comes from natural resources such as oil, timber, diamonds and etc.

Externally Oriented Dependent Variables and Analysis
Practicality and the limitations of measurement necessitate that the dependent variable focuses
on the development of growth enhancing institutions that are pertinent to the domestic market.
Most all healthy African economies build growth enhancing institutions that mediate interactions
with the international economy. The tea sector in Kenya, the cocoa sector in Ghana, or the coffee
sector or cocoa sector in Cote d’Ivoire are each host to a set of institutions and practices that
facilitate accumulation. Finding variation in these types of institutions is likely to be difficult and
will not necessarily uncover differing developmental patterns. The track record in institutional
creation for internally oriented development, however, is rarely uniform. Tanzania’s Investment
Promotion Center, an externally oriented institution, is largely viewed as one of the finest on the
continent and in the developing world more generally. Yet, Tanzania was also rocked by
scandals involving collusion between multinationals and governmental officials in its domestic
economy that resulted in essential services failing to be delivered. Variation between healthy
economies, therefore, is less likely to be found within externally oriented institutions and so the
inquiry focuses more generally on aspects of the domestic economy that might have a bearing on
the capacity to produce healthy internally oriented growth, but that which in and of themselves
are not reflective of strong externally oriented institutions.
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Furthermore, at an empirical level, measuring externally oriented institution making
through quantitative indicators presents several difficult practical hurdles that can never be
completed surmounted.23 Activities undertaken by states that focus on export of valuable cash
crops include streamlining a legal framework to attract external investment, upgrading port
facilities, and directing resources towards these sectors in the form of inputs, marketing, and
transportation. These types of spending, however, are not necessarily unique to economies whose
level of value added production are low, or whose institutions facilitate external investment.
Efficient port facilities, for example, are a critical part of industrial development because they
allow much needed intermediate inputs and machinery to enter the country, even if the end result
of production is ultimately domestic. Finding unique measure of externally oriented institutions,
at an empirical level, is therefore a difficult task to accomplish.
At both the conceptual and theoretical level, the concept of measuring externally oriented
institutions is made more difficult because the origins of these institutions are diverse.
Institutions providing adequate property rights, clear ownership and titling of land, a robust legal
framework, and etc., while often directed towards appealing to investment from the international
economy, can also be created through the power and influence of domestic capital. Numerous
datasets geared towards assessing risks in economies in the developing world focus on these
concepts, as a healthy independent bureaucracy that protects property rights is much more likely
to be a safe place to make an investment. Yet, even though this and other measures are widely
available, findings from the case studies cast some doubt on their validity. Kenya, for example,
has consistently moved up in the World Bank’s measures for ease of doing business, and it

23

The bulk of the larger project is geared toward qualitative analysis and theory building for this reason.
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currently occupies the #2 rating out of 51 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the institution
building process that has seen Kenya’s meteoric rise in these rakings, and the influx of foreign
businesses now headquartered in Nairobi, was not the result of a state seeking to facilitate
accumulation from cash crops or the repatriation of profits, but was instead the result of a state
bureaucracy beginning during the Kibaki regime, that sought to further the interests of the
national bourgeoisie. Historically, at least in the West, the groups that pushed for the
enforcement of a valid and effective framework for property rights was domestic capital, rather
than external influences. Measures of externally oriented institution making are therefore
imperfect, though I argue that the one used below is ultimately very useful for examining causal
pathways.
The indicator employed in the analysis is designed to explore the relative autonomy of
the state from society, and the impact that a socialist transition or the presence of a core group
may have. Thus, while the dependent variable may not be a perfect measure of externally
oriented institutions, the analysis may still help us to understand relevant causal pathways. Given
its importance to external investment, I focus on the legal environment and the autonomy of
these institutions. Commonly used indicators attempt to measure the legal environment related
foreign investment, with a focus on the rule of law and property rights; among the most well
known amongst scholars studying Africa are the Heritage Foundation’s Property Rights Index
and Rotberg and Gisselquist’s (2009) Index of African Governance. These indices address the
concept of risk for potential investors, taking into account such things as property rights and
corruption.
Rotberg and Gisselquist’s (2009) Index of African Governance, specifically the measure
about the rule of law and transparency, provides a more accurate pictures of the type of state
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autonomy that I am seeking to analyze. The Heritage Foundation’s measures unfortunately, have
the potential to discriminate against economies who have in the past confiscated property or who
continue to show ambivalence toward global capital. In Ghana, for example, the Rawlings
regime’s continued socialist rhetoric continued to be seen as a potential threat, even as policy
generally expanded the scope of capitalism in the country. Thus, instead of using Heritage
Foundation scores, I make use of the Index on African Governance measure for rule of law,
transparency and corruption. This definition is more expansive, going far beyond property rights
to create a more holistic view of state autonomy. In this manner it also targets a supposed causal
mechanism among formerly socialist states, the tendency to remove processes of institution
making from the influence of social actors. The data for this measure were collected from
NGOSs, government agencies, academics and others in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2007; I use
the mean score of this indicator for the cases. The scores range from “0” indicating low levels of
transparency and ineffective legal institutions to “100” indicating a high degree of effectiveness
and performance of courts, the enforcement of important laws, and low levels of corruption.
I use Ordinary Least Squares regression to test for the association of the independent
variables with Rotberg and Gisselquist’s (2009) index. The regression models examine the
independent impact of past socialist/Marxist transitions and the presence of a core ethnic group.
In addition, I also test for interactions between these variables, as both past experience with
socialism and the distributive structures of associated with a the presence of a core ethnic group
seemed to be at work in the case studies. The regression models are listed in equation form
below with standard errors in parentheses, while Table 8. Past Socialist Transitions, Core
Groups, Transparency and the Rule of Law reports the OLS regression results.
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(1) Rule of Law/Transparency = 2.72 + 5.5 Socialism – 4.83 Ethnic Frac – .45 Resource Rents + 8.05 Log GDP/c
(13.69) (3.02)
(7.13)
(.09)
(1.56)
+e
(2) Rule of Law/Transparency = 9.60 + 6.87 Socialism – 9.06 Ethnic Frac - .32 Resource Rents + 6.41 Log
(13.47) (2.96)
(7.33)
(.10)
(1.67)
GDP/c + 10.08 British + 4.31 French + e
(4.55)
(4.05)
(3) Rule of Law/Transparency = 5.22 + 6.45 Socialism + 5.20 Core Group – 15.16 Ethnic Frac - .26 Resource
(11.15) (2.51)
(2.67)
(6.60)
(.08)
Rents + 6.51 Log GDP/c + 15.46 British + 8.24 French + e
(1.39)
(3.81)
(3.31)
(4) Rule of Law/Transparency = 4.90 + 6.77 Core Group – 9.68 Ethnic Frac - .26 Resource Rents + 6.30 Log
(12.04) (2.51)
(6.75)
(.09)
(1.5)
GDP/c + 14.06 British + 7.8 French + e
(4.07)
(3.57)
(5) Rule of Law/Transparency = 5.11 + 9.07 Socialism + 6.424 Core Group – 4.20 Socialism * Core Group –
(11.19) (3.92)
(3.02)
(4.87)
14.13 Ethnic Frac - .27 Resource Rents + 6.41 Log GDP/c + 15.19 British + 7.52 French + e
(6.73)
(.08)
(1.40)
(3.84)
(3.42)

Table 10. Past Socialist Transitions, Core Groups, Transparency, and the Rule of
Law
(1)
VARIABLES
Socialism

Rule of Law,
Transparency

5.50
(3.02)

(2)

(3)

Rule of Law,
Transparency

6.87*
(2.96)

Rule of Law,
Transparency

(4)
Rule of Law,
Transparency

6.47*
(2.51)
5.20
(2.67)

6.77*
(2.80)

2.73
(13.69)

-9.06
(7.33)
-0.32*
(0.10)
6.41*
(1.66)
10.08*
(4.55)
4.31
(4.05)
9.60
(13.47)

-15.16*
(6.60)
-0.26*
(0.08)
6.51*
(1.39)
15.46*
(3.81)
8.24*
(3.31)
5.22
(11.15)

-9.68
(6.75)
-0.26*
(0.09)
6.30*
(1.49)
14.06*
(4.07)
7.80*
(3.57)
4.90
(12.04)

9.07*
(3.92)
6.42*
(3.03)
-4.20
(4.87)
-14.13*
(6.73)
-0.27*
(0.08)
6.41*
(1.40)
15.19*
(3.84)
7.52*
(3.42)
5.11
(11.19)

44
0.598

44
0.649

41
0.783

41
0.739

41
0.788

Core Group
Soc. * Core
Ethnic Frac.
Resource Rent
Log GDP/c

-4.83
(7.13)
-0.45*
(0.09)
8.05*
(1.56)

British
French
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(5)
Rule of Law,
Transparency

Source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators, QOG Dataset University of Gothenburg
Standard errors in parentheses
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* p<0.05

Scores on the index follow predictable patterns for the most part, though there is a wide
range of variation. Botswana earned the highest score, with 83.34 on the index, followed by
Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa. As with the institutional effectiveness index
in the first chapter, the highest scoring states tend to have had a unique historical experiences
(Cape Verde, Mauritius, South Africa and Namibia) or demographic characteristics such as a
single ethnic group (Botswana) that make them outliers in comparison to the larger group of
states within the continent. At the bottom of the list Somalia earned the lowest score with 14.77,
followed by Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – all states that have struggled
with conflict and political stability. The mean score of the index is 52.29, which falls somewhere
in between the performance of Swaziland (52.94) and Niger (51.12). Finally, the standard
deviation is 15.15. Ghana scores near the top of this measure (71.00), while Kenya, despite its
focus on institutions to facilitate commerce, scores much lower (54.95). While Ghana’s score
places it within the top quintile of the measure, Kenya’s score is within the second quintile
encompassing the 25% to 50% of lower scoring cases.
The analysis appears to support the idea that the same casual pathway that leads the state
to resist popular pressures that might choke off important export sectors may also be present in
measures of the rule of law and transparency. The relationship between a past transition to
socialism and scores on the index are consistently positive, as well as being statistically
significant once the dummy variables for colonial origin are added. In the fifth model, whose rsquared value indicates that it explains 78.8% of variation in the data, the magnitude of the
impact of a past socialist/Marxist transition is 9.07. This impact has the substantive impact of
increasing the predictive institutional performance of a given state from the middle quantiles to
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one of the top performing states on the continent. This measure is especially important as the top
positions tend to be occupied by countries whose exceptional characteristics in population size
and ethnic diversity make them outliers when compared to broader demographic and historical
trends on the continent.
The case studies suggest that the presence of a core ethnic served as a break on patterns
of institution making that deliver group specific benefits, and instead encourage the formation of
institutions designed to distribute patronage more widely. An unfortunate result of this tendency
is growth inhibiting practices especially as it relates to domestic production. Yet, the presence of
a core ethnic group also serves to open access to important programs and institutions across a
broad range of society. In Ghana, Nkrumah wanted to take advantage of the potential splits
within Akan speaking regions, and so he implemented a loan program for small farmers there,
despite the fact that it was technically a stronghold of the opposition. Today, on the other hand,
the NPP succeeded in swinging voters to its side through a plan to build factories in every single
region of the country, not simply its southern stronghold. The presence of a core ethnic group
appears to serve as a mechanism which insures greater access to the institutions of governance,
and acts as a breakwater against the use of institutional power against any group in particular.
The findings of the quantitative analysis support provide confirmation of this causal
pathway. The presence of a core group is significant in all but one of the models; it is not
significant when a past socialist transition is entered into the model, but it becomes significant
when an interaction term involving socialism and a core group is added. The magnitude of the
impact is non negligible – states with core ethno-political groupings are estimated to score 6.42
percentage points higher on the scale for transparency and the rule of law. When the interaction
between a core ethnic group and the presence of the socialism variable is controlled for, the
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coefficient for the presence of a core ethnic group remains statistically significant, although the
interaction term is not. This finding indicates that while a core ethnic group and a past socialist
transition each have an impact on predicted values of transparency, their impact most likely
travels along different causal pathways. While there is a clear distributive dynamic in the use of
state institutions that accompanies the uncertainty surrounding the cohesiveness of core ethnic
groups, for formerly socialist states on the continent there appears to be a type of institutional
continuity that is reproduced in the survival strategies of any given regime and that manifest
itself in terms of autonomous institutions.

Internally Oriented Dependent Variables and Analysis
The goal of theory generation also necessitates a separate quantitative analysis, this one aimed at
the causal mechanisms behind internally oriented growth producing institutions, such as those
found in Kenya and to a slightly lesser extent, Cote d’Ivoire. The nature of variation amongst
healthy African economies greatly facilitates the search for a clear dependent variable. Countries
such as Ghana and Kenya both build externally oriented institutions that produce economic
growth, though Ghana does so more consistently. But while Kenya has also created growth
enhancing institutions oriented towards the domestic market, Ghana struggles to do the same, as
does Tanzania.
The lack of a core ethnic group in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire suggests that alliance making
between ethnic groups, though sometimes unstable, facilitates the delivery of group specific
benefits. The nature of these benefits, at least in successful African states, often appears to be
associated not simply with members of a particular ethnic group but with economic sectors that
are relevant to the location where the group is found. Yet, as occurs in all economies, favoritism

344

for some sectors over others can create growth inhibiting practices. Thus, at least in the Kenyan
case, we see instances where a fragmented bourgeoisie comes together to support policies that
place limits on the ability of the state to produce policies that negatively inhibit growth. In these
cases, group specific benefits combine with processes of class formation to produce growth
enhancing policies in the domestic realm.
The search for a relevant measure of internally oriented institutional performance is
determined in part, by the complicated and unequal relationship that exists between domestic and
international capital. Much ink has been spilt over whether the structure of international
economy would permit the organic development of capitalism in places like Kenya, or whether
the nature of Africa’s larger role within the international division of labor would only lead to
underdevelopment. While examples such as Ghana’s disastrous attempts to generate power and
fuel an aluminum industry Volta River, undermined by usurious conditions placed upon the
project by an American company, point to the dangers of underdevelopment, consensus tends to
hover cautiously around the idea that the effects are mixed. The national bourgeoisie of most
African countries exists within an uneasy relationship with international capital, who often seek
market access for more efficiently produced goods, thereby pushing a dependent bourgeoisie to
sectors of the economy where proximity to important raw material inputs from the agricultural
sector allows for a comparative advantage. Yet the relationships with international capital are not
always contentious, and indeed, these social forces sometimes find themselves on the same side
of important questions as when the state in Cote d’Ivoire colluded with French capital and
African entrepreneurs to force out wholesale traders of agricultural commodities who were
primarily of Indian origin. Nevertheless, the intertwined but asymmetrical relationship between
domestic and international capital, on the whole, manifests itself in a limited sphere of
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opportunities for accumulation due to competition in the form of cheap imported commodities.
The path to accumulation for the national bourgeoisie in Africa, therefore, almost always begins
with agricultural production and marketing, and leads through agro processing and food
manufacturing.
The measure that I employ for domestically oriented institution making thus takes into
account the dominant trajectories of capital accumulation on the continent, and focuses on value
added in agriculture and agro-processing. Data on manufacturing in general would also be
useful, though it must be said that much of the continent suffers from weak performance in this
area. Furthermore, a commonly available measure of productivity in industry, the World Bank’s
industry value added per worker statistic, is unfortunately, much too broad to be very useful, at
least from the perspective of this project. The data included in that measure covers work in the
mining industries and construction, fields which do not quite align with the qualitative case
study’s preoccupation with the role of agriculture and agro processing in the developing
economies of the continent. Thus, as a measure of the ability of the state to produce in the
domestic market, I utilize a measure the UN Food and Agriculture Organization that measures
total value added in agriculture and divides this figure by the number of agricultural workers.
The measure encompasses the years 2000-2012, and most importantly, it focuses not simply on
cash crops or horticulture, but the valued added by processing agricultural products into more
finished material. Included in this measure are factories that produce such widely used
commodities as palm oil, flour, feed for animals, and such products as cocoa butter.
While value added per agricultural worker captures much of the variation that was
described in the case studies, it is not a perfect measure at a conceptual level because it still
includes some aspects of externally oriented institutions, especially if they are effective in
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fostering growth. For example, the effectiveness of Zimbabwe’s agricultural programs and
quality control during the 1980s meant that Zimbabwean commodities such as corn generally
received a premium on international markets in comparison to the same product grown next door
in Botswana. Along the same lines, the elaborate quality control mechanisms and the activities of
the Cocobod in Ghana to insure quality results in a higher price paid for Ghanaian cocoa beans.
This premium, though not necessarily representing a physical change of beans into a more highly
processed product, is included in the calculation of value added. This change in the calculation is
likely to impact only those states that have built especially strong institutions in certain
agricultural sectors linked to the international economy. Few states, despite institutions
facilitating growth, can command price premiums for their goods. Nevertheless, it is possible
that the indicator will inflate some scores of countries whose institution making processes can be
characterized as externally oriented, adding noise to the data and making it harder to obtain
statistical significance. Like the previous indicator, it contains a bias toward a particular
developmental pathway, even as it does not necessarily indicate a foolproof measure of the
pathway.
The analysis uses many of the same measures of association as the last set of regression
models, with some tailoring to fit this specific measure. Dropped from the analysis are the
dummy variables for colonial origin, which are much more important to include when examining
legal frameworks that have not necessarily changed significantly from the colonial period.
Furthermore, I added a control variable for regime type and political openness, to take into
account states such as Cote d’Ivoire whose performance is most likely impacted by political
turmoil, as was Kenya after bouts of repression and election violence in urban center and the
rural west in 1992 and 2007-2008. The specific measure used is the result of averaging Freedom
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House and Polity scores and imputing missing data from Hadenius & Teorell (2005). The
indicator uses a scale where 10 indicates a high level of democracy and political freedom while 0
indicates a low score on these measures. This data was calculated compiled by researchers at the
University of Gothenburg, and downloaded from their Quality of Government dataset. For the
regression equations below, I use the mean scores from 2000-2010. As in the previous analysis
of externally focused institutions, I utilize OLS regression to test the relationship between the
two main independent variables, as well as the interaction between these variables. The
regression models are written in equation form below with standard errors in parentheses, while
Table 9: Past Socialist Transitions, Core Groups and Value Added Per Agricultural Worker
reports the OLS regression results.
(1) Value added per ag worker = -5,039 – 737.40 Socialism + 895.8 Ethnic Frac + 772.5 Log GDP/c + e
(1,281) (283.7)
(637.4)
(148.3)
(2) Value added per ag worker = -5,401 – 958.6 Socialismi + 1,024 Ethnic Frac + 3.38 Resource Rents + 161.9
(1,240)
(286.7)
(659.9)
(9.92)
(67.85)
Freedom House/Polity + 691.9 Log GDP/c + e
(148.2)
(3) Value added per ag worker = -6,349 – 904.9 Socialism + 465.6 Core Group + 1,181 Ethnic Frac + 5.52
(1,333) (317.9)
(324.4)
(792.2)
(10.63)
Resource Rent + 167.2 Freedom House/Polity + 756.2 Log GDP/c + e
(79.70)
(169.2)
(4) Value added per ag worker = -6,346 + 295.5 Core Group + 530.3 Ethnic Frac – 2.12 Resource Rents + 102.6
(1,470)
(351.5)
(836.1)
(11.33)
(84.22)
Freedom House/Polity + 855.0 Log GDP/c + e
(182.5)
(5) Value added per ag worker = -6,356 – 999.5 Socialism + 419.9 Core Group + 160.4 Socialism * Core Group +
(1,353) (474.3)
(369.6)
(589.3)
1,142 Ethnic Frac + 5.96 Resource Rents + 164.9 Freedom House/Polity + 765.4 Log GDP/c + e
(816.7)
(10.90)
(81.32)
(175.0)
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Table 11. Past Socialist Transitions, Core Groups and Value Added Per
Agricultural Worker

VARIABLES
Socialism

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

agworker_val

agworker_val

agworker_val

agworker_val

agworker_val

-737.4*
(283.7)

-958.6*
(286.7)

-904.9*
(317.9)
465.6
(324.4)

295.5
(351.5)

772.5*
(148.3)
-5,039*
(1,281)

1,024
(659.9)
3.38
(9.92)
161.9*
(67.85)
691.9*
(148.2)
-5,401*
(1,240)

1,181
(792.2)
5.52
(10.63)
167.2*
(79.70)
756.2*
(169.2)
-6,349*
(1,333)

530.3
(836.1)
-2.12
(11.33)
102.6
(84.22)
855.0*
(182.5)
-6,346*
(1,470)

-999.5*
(474.3)
419.9
(369.6)
160.4
(589.3)
1,142
(816.7)
5.96
(10.90)
164.9
(81.32)
765.4*
(175.0)
-6,356*
(1,353)

43
0.461

42
0.546

39
0.596

39
0.494

39
0.597

Core
Soc.*Core
Ethnic Frac

895.8
(637.4)

Resource Rent
FH /I. Polity
Log GDP/c
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Sources: Data from World Bank Development Indicators, UNFAO, QOG Dataset University of Gothenburg
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.0

The data, on the whole, show a great deal of dispersion and seem to indicate very real
differences in the ability of states to foster value added production in agriculture. Mauritius is
found at the top of the list, with each agricultural worker representing $6,185.11 of value added.
At the bottom of the list is Djibouti, where each agricultural worker represents only $85 of value
added to the sector. The mean score is $918.39, while the median is a few hundred dollars lower,
at $607.59 per worker. The standard deviation is $1,154.56.
The dependent variable also reveals a few interesting surprises. Following Mauritius at
the top of the list is South Africa, and then Nigeria, one of the most ethnically diverse states on
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the continent that is normally never found near the top of indices of African economic
performance; needless to say, this measure of productivity presents patterns that differ
significantly from most indices on the performance of African states. While the case studies did
not examine politics in Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire appears to display a similar trend, receiving the
third highest ranking. Cote d’Ivoire’s score, however, is surprising only when we take into
account its generally mediocre performance in producing externally oriented institutions. When
we consider the close historic ties linking domestic and international capital to the state, then the
mystery surrounding the creation of growth enhancing institutions in value added agro industries
starts to become clearer. Ghana is also near the top of the list, which is not necessarily surprising
given the price premium attached to Ghanaian cocoa, even though the vast majority of it is
shipped in raw form, as opposed to Cote d’Ivoire where the state invested heavily in processing
facilities in the 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, the measure while containing some minor flaws,
appears to match the conceptual and empirical findings at the heart of the case studies.
The analysis reinforces the idea that a transition to a socialist state is not simply a change
of regime, but fundamental alteration of the state itself. The case studies indicate that a past
transition to socialism/Marxism may create added state autonomy, while at the same time failing
to produce productive links to domestic production. Furthermore, institutional reproduction
appears to occur because elites, particularly technocrats working in conjunction with any given
regime, succeed in dominating other social formations through the utilization of both aid and
revenues from important cash crops. Hence, the frustration of industry groups in manufacturing
in Ghana, for example. This tendency for institutional continuity has led Shivji to claim that top
managers within the state and parastatals constitute a distinct social class. While I have not
adopted this conceptualization, the case studies indicate that at the very least, durable alliances
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between technocrats and elected officials surrounding the extant sectors of the economy do
indeed exist. Furthermore, once in place, this alliance becomes a viable survival strategy causing
the state to reproduce itself through continued emphasis on the extant sectors of the economy,
while neglecting aspects of domestic production that might produce a higher degree of added
valued to the agricultural economy. The data appear to support this contention, and indeed
having a past socialist/Marxist transition corresponds to predicted drop of $999.50 of value
added per agricultural worker, a figure that is very close to the standard deviation of the data.
The impact of a former socialist transition upon value added production is both statistically and
substantively significant.
The data, however, seem to indicate that the more variegated institutional structure of the
Tanzanian case may in fact be exceptional. The state in Tanzania not only experienced a longer
and more consistent period of socialism than a state like Ghana, but it also succeeded in
penetrating rural society with a durable party apparatus. The peculiarities of the Tanzanian case,
it appears, are particular to its own society and may not be widespread.
Lastly, the analysis also provides theoretically useful and somewhat unexpected findings
about the relationship between the presence of a core ethnic group and internally oriented
production. This finding is somewhat surprising, especially given the manner in which the wide
distribution of benefits seems to have played a role in Ghanaian institution making since
independence. In fact, the case studies strongly suggest that a wide distribution of goods and
services tends to accompany the presence of a core ethnic group at the national level.
Furthermore, these concerns do not appear to be tied to any socialist/Marxist legacies; the
Nkrumah regime did not offer state sponsored opportunities to farmers in opposition areas out of
the kindness of their hearts or a commitment to any ideological goals. Instead, they consciously
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undertook a program to ensure that they could fragment the opposition in an area dominated by
Ghana’s core ethnic group. Furthermore, the evidence from Kenya and the Ivory Coast suggest
that group specific benefits that are based on ethnic ties can often lead to productive institutions
if a given ethnic group is closely aligned with a given sector or the economy. Close ties between
regime technocrats and the Kikuyu ethnic group in Kenya appeared to facilitate class based
cohesion amongst the national bourgeoisie in Kenya, facilitating policy implementation
processes that were more conducive to economic growth. In the face of numerous examinations
of the linkage between the presence of a core group institutional development, the posited
relationship between the presence of a core ethnic group and broad service distribution appears
to be valid.
The relationship between the presence of a core ethnic group and the ability to produce
internally oriented growth enhancing institutions may not be reflected in the data because while
the lack of a core ethnic group appears to facilitate a type of “ethno-political pathway” towards
growth enhancing institutions, and the mere presence of a core ethnic group may preclude it, the
mere presence of a core group may not preclude other potentially important pathways.
Another plausible scenario, possibly working in conjunction with the one posited above,
is that growth enhancing institutions may be relying on the political salience of smaller
subnational groups. Thus, while a country may have a core group, governance at the subnational
level may retain characteristics that make them more similar to states without a core ethnic
group. Ideally, this tendency could be partially controlled for in the analysis by examining
measures of fiscal centralization. The problem, however, is that most measures such as those
from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics are missing data for the vast majority of cases on
the continent. Lacking this information, I reran the analysis by recoding the indicator for a “core”
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group using Fearon’s (1993) data on ethnic groups - a dataset that focus more specifically on
subgroups rather than large national group. The result, however, was almost indistinguishable
from the one above.24 Lacking conclusive quantitative evidence of an alternative pathway to
explain why the distributive propensities associated with a core ethnic group do not preclude
domestically oriented growth enhancing institutions, I turn toward a brief qualitative exploration
of the subject. The analysis below specifically explores the causal mechanisms at work in states
where the presence of a core ethnic group does not preclude the development of robust value
added production in agriculture; the goal of the analysis is to find credible potential alternative
pathways or to rule out pathways that do not appear credible.

Preliminary Search for Alternative Pathways
The data on value added production in agriculture revealed some surprising results, particularly
in terms of states who do not necessarily score high on traditional measure of economic
performance or governance but who nevertheless, succeed in creating added value in agriculture.
These states of are particular theoretical interest if they also contain a core ethnic group. An
examination of one of more such case can reveal if potentially plausible causal pathways
involving a wide distribution of state resources in development coincide with the production of
growth enhancing institutions.
It is important to note that at this stage of theory building, the goal is not to test this
hypothesis, which would require a new project and research design and thus are beyond the
scope of this theory building exercise. Instead, my goal is to search for plausible pathways, while
leaving more rigorous empirical testing to future projects. The following figure contains a list of

24

The results of these regression models can be found in the appendix.
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states that contain a core ethnic group but have never experienced a socialist/Marxist transition.
In order to verify that a plausible causal pathway exists, an examination of one of these cases
must address two theoretically significant questions: 1) Do patterns of goods and service
provisions appear to be directed primarily toward an ethno-political alliance? 2) Do the
institutions that facilitate growth appear to be the product of successful state engagement? A
negative response to the first question would clearly rule out a plausible causal pathway and
indeed cast doubt on the relationship between core ethnic groups and patterns of service delivery,
at least for that case. A negative response to the second question, on the other hand, may be
informative for overall theory building. In order to facilitate the process of case selection, I have
divided the dependent variable into quartiles, which correspond to high, medium high, medium
low, and low levels of value added per agricultural worker. I have reported the results below, in
Table 10. Core Groups and Value Added Per Agricultural Worker.
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Table 12. Core Groups and Value Added Per Agricultural Worker
Country

Socialism Core

Value Added Per Worker

Namibia
Mauritius
Mauritania
Nigeria
Chad
Equatorial Guinea
South Africa
Botswana
Central African
Republic
Comoros
Togo
Gambia
Rwanda
Burundi
Niger
Eritria
Malawi

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

High
High
High
High
High
High
High
Medium High

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Medium High
Medium High
Medium High
Medium Low
Medium Low
Low
Low
Low
Low

Source: Data from UN FAO

In order to explore why the presence of a core ethnic group has an impact on the creation of
externally oriented institutions but not upon those dealing with internal production, it is
necessary to choose a case whose institution making fits this pattern. The first task of the
analysis will be to determine the “distribution” of economic institution making. If there is clear
evidence that growth enhancing institutions are being directed at particular ethnic groups, then
this data would contest the empirical findings of previous case studies. If the case maintains a
wide distribution, than it would prove to be confirmatory evidence for distributional impact of a
core ethnic group.
The next task is to determine the manner in which patterns of distribution are tied to
institutional production, specifically in the agricultural and agro industrial sectors. As we clearly
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saw in the case studies, patterns of distribution gave rise to growth inhibiting institutions in
Ghana, while they gave rise to growth enhancing institutions, in some cases, for domestically
oriented industries in Kenya. If a different causal pattern is in fact at work, then if would shed
light on the manner in which growth enhancing institutions are created in a broader range of
African states.
While studies of successful economic performance on the continent seldom include
Nigeria, its performance according to FAO indicators in value added production in agriculture
deserves greater attention. Nigerian institutions score in the “medium-low” quartile among states
in sub-Saharan Africa on the Institute of African Governance on both the scores for rule of law
and transparency by the African Governance Institute, as well as on the composite index
measuring institutional effectiveness in chapter 1. Press about Nigerian political economy
frequently draws attention to scandals involving the pilfering of state funds, or controversies
surrounding oil, politicians, and multinational corporations. Nevertheless, while these accounts
may indicate important tendencies in Nigerian governance, they also detract from examining in
greater detail the state society relations surrounding everyday life and the economic welfare of
ordinary citizens in the country. The study, being targeted at the distributional tendencies of the
state, as well as state society relations surrounding value added production in agriculture cannot
completely remedy this unfortunate situation. Nevertheless, it will attempt to highlight the
complexities of production in an important state in the global south.
The Agrarian Economy and the Distributional Tendencies of the Nigerian State
Nigeria is one of the best-known countries in sub-Saharan Africa and is home to the second
largest economy of the region. An estimated 140 million people live in Nigeria, making it the
most populous state on the continent. Nigeria is also rich in natural resources and is currently the
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world’s eighth largest exporter of crude oil. Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum first struck
oil in 1956, discovering large deposits in the eastern region of the country. Since that time
exports of oil have played an increasingly large part of the Nigerian economy. By 1974, for
example, 82% of all revenues of the state came from oil production, a trend which would see
industry and agriculture suffer from the ravages of Dutch disease as the value of the naira soared.
Nigeria is also known for its large amount of ethnic diversity; according to some
estimates there are over 600 different ethnic groups in Nigeria25, though most are very small and
are generally considered subgroups at least in this analysis. The three largest groups are the
Hausa/Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the south west and the Igbo in the south-east; these groups
have historically dominated politics at the national, creating period bouts of instability in the
process. In fact, Nigeria is also known the instability of its political regimes, numerous military
coups and one civil war. The first coup occurred just six years after independence and
conservative estimates put the number of coups and coup attempts at eight26. In addition, the
Nigerian Civil War, or Biafran war, was one of the most destructive conflicts in the 20th century
claiming upwards of 2 million lives. Nigeria in recent years has also been plagued by armed
insurgency emanating from the Niger Delta, and although Nigeria is currently in a period of
democratic rule political instability is by no means a thing of the past. Many experts believe that
another coup by members of the military is not out of the question in Nigeria's contemporary
democracy.

25

CIA World Factbook

26

This figure comes from Powell and Thyne (2011), a dataset compiled by researchers at the University of
Kentucky studying military coups.
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Historically contingent patterns of development, as well threat of political and social
unrest, have forced upon Nigeria a distributive pattern of institution building that does not
ostensibly favor one particular ethnic group or alliance over another set. While entry into
international markets may cause various forms of uneven development, in Nigeria in contrast to
Cote d’Ivoire, uneven development took on the form of distinctive regional economies rather
than a political and economic center that dominated the other regions. While southern Nigeria
was more prosperous, and exerted economic influence widely, this economic advantage was
never paired with a political and administrative capacity to centralize the Nigerian state as seen
in other colonies. In fact, political necessity during colonialism forced the British to rely heavily
on the administrative capacities of the dominant precolonial state in the north (as opposed to the
south), the Sokoto caliphate and its attendant indigenous landowning class (Watts, Michael 1987,
57-96). While in Cote d’Ivoire, a special relationship developed between French capital and the
exporting regions of the southern portions of the country, reliance upon traditional rulers meant
that there were distinct limits placed both on the penetration of international capital and the
degree to which traditional relations of productions would become altered by the dynamics of
export agriculture.
The proletarianization of peasant labor, at least in the north, would have entailed the
diminished social status of traditional rulers – so it was that the northern reaches of the country
were not destined to become a labor reservoir of the south, as the did in other countries. Nor was
there to be a large scale penetration of multinational firms; despite the implacable and persistent
pleas of the Lever Corporation, the company was not granted large tracks of land in the north for
palm oil production despite pressure stretching over decades(Watts 1987, 73). Connections
between the hinterland and the international economy would thus come to be shaped by
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merchant capital, which enabled traditional elites and landowners further influence over peasant
and their labor.
The state thus developed distinct socio-political and economic tendencies that were only
ever partially unified through the apparatus of the state. While commentators looking for the
causes of early political fragmentation and eventually civil war stress the different political
cultures of regions of Nigeria, it is important to note that they had a firm basis not only in social
norms surrounding politics but in ingrained patterns of accumulation. The accumulative
strategies of the national bourgeoisie in the north, to the extent that we can speak of one, focused
on small scale finance and merchant capital, with elites often able to borrow money from the
state which they would then lend out at peasants as a means of extracting surplus. In this manner,
the state did not simply open up opportunities for accumulation, access to state power became a
primarily means of accumulation.
The southern reaches of the country, on the other hand, developed closer ties to
international capital and southern society was shaped more directly by the proletarianization of
the peasant class and the formation of an urban proletariat. The south was less remote and more
accessible to both trade as well as the missionary education system which preceded and
accompanied colonialism. Foreign capital tended to center around Lagos, and often came into
direct competition with indigenous industries. Yet, while the theory of the rentier state would
predict a shrinking manufacturing sector in the early 60s and late 70s the opposite actually
occurred. The Nigerian government diverted revenues to industries such as shipbuilding, arms
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manufacture, and steel production27. Nevertheless, in time the effects of petrodollars flowing into
the economy and pushing up the value of the naira would make Nigerian products less
competitive both at home and abroad, leading to a contraction of the manufacturing sector. The
accumulative strategies of southern elites, in part because of foreign competition, contained a
large degree of overlap with those of the north, particularly in the acquisition of agricultural
products to sell to multinationals, including ground nuts, palm oil, cassava, cocoa, and other
valuable cash crops. In this manner, Nigeria became one of the largest agricultural producers in
the world for important commodities like palm oil. Yet, differentiation in the south took on a
different character, more similar to that in Cote d’Ivoire in which a bourgeoisie used land
ownership and close political ties to the state and federal government to branch into other forms
of accumulation in conjunction with parastatals or multinational capital (Watts, Michael J. and
Bassett 1985, 7). Yet, this social process had definite limits, producing a clash amongst distinct
class fractions of Nigeria’s national bourgeoisie, which would only be exacerbated once oil
extraction started to occupy a larger role within the Nigerian economy.
The distributive tendencies of the Nigerian state were born out of bloodshed and conflict.
The regional sectarian and ethnic tensions that resulted in the Biafran War, a disastrous civil war
pitting northern and western sections of the state against the east, would ultimately create an
institution building process in which funds and political power were allocated to regional
governments. Furthermore, state building for the federal republic took on a quite literal meaning,
as the number of states in Nigeria jumped from three at the time of independence to 36 by the
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In addition, the Nigerian government also attempted to increase the total proportion of Nigerians (as opposed to
expatriates) working in the oil industry. This policy is met with success, although Nigerians are still
underrepresented in the more technical areas of the industry (Oliveira, 2007, p.184).
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mid-1990s. In the process, political instability and conflict at the national level was replaced with
destabilizing trends at the subnational region, which though serious, tended not to threaten the
political center.

Nigerian Agro Industrial Production
Nigeria’s relative success in value added production of agricultural commodities is due not so
much to the quality of Nigerian institutions, as it is to the presence of both a rich assortment of
agricultural commodities which by nature, necessitate value added processing and a government
structure which allocate petrol dollars to regional governments, albeit in a sometimes corrupt and
inefficient manner. The fragmentation of Nigerian institutions, and numerous state and local
levels governments, encourages an assortment of local initiatives funded through oil revenues.
While funding for these programs may not always be sufficient to meet stated expectations and
goals, in Nigeria there is a consistent effort put forth particularly in extension work that serves as
a means of ensuring regionally competitive agriculture, even if the state on the whole struggles to
meet its food production needs. Furthermore, the state, recognizing the negative impacts of oil
revenues and a rising naira have upon food production, has sought to maintain tariff barriers to
protect farmers in important sectors such as rice farming. Nigerian institutions, while falling far
short of being noteworthy, have leveraged the state’s natural strengths to ensure higher levels of
value added production in agriculture than many of their neighbors.
Nigeria is a major producer of many staple crops that require value added processing to
make them viable; in this manner the sheer wealth of Nigeria’s biodiversity and fecundity in
flora greatly help its agricultural sector. Historically the state has supplied much of the world’s
supply of commodities such as palm oil, and cocoa beans. Today, it is still a major producer of
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crops such as cotton, ground nuts, cassava, and palm oil. Table 15 below illustrates Nigeria’s
palm oil production, which today is one of the highest on the continent, despite the fact that even
these quantities do not meet domestic needs.
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Figure 15. Comparative Palm Oil Production in West Africa in Metric Tons
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Source: UNFAO Data

The inability of Nigeria to meet domestic needs in palm oil production point to issues in
productivity that continue to plague its agricultural sector. For example, Nigeria is the world’s
largest producer of cassava, producing an average of over 38 million metric tons per year
between 1990 and 201428. The next largest producer in Africa, Ghana, produced close to 11

28

UN FAO statistics
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million tons during the same period. Cassava production, on the other hand, has consistently
grown over the last twenty-five years, yet increases in overall production have not necessarily
been due to the intensity of cultivation but rather an expansion of the area under cultivation.
Crop yields for cassava, on the whole, have been in keeping with other countries in the region.
The abundance of raw material however, has also led to a growth in processed forms of cassava,
such as starch, chips and cake29. Nigeria currently exports many of these products throughout the
region, as well as to southern Africa and India. A president’s commission has set aside funding
to continue to expand Nigerian processing capacity. Yet, while the sheer volume of production
contributes to opportunities to add value through processing at economies of scale, productivity
falls somewhere in the middle of regional trends as shown in Figure 16 below.

29

UN FAO Statistics
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The secret of Nigeria’s value added per agricultural worker lies not in the fact that it is
particularly productive, but rather that it reflects consistent effort and engagement at the
subnational level. State and regional governments have a great degree of autonomy from the
political center, and while much of the agricultural sector still involves parastatals, these public
entities are generally attached to the state governments, rather than the federal government.
Furthermore, the fragmentary distributional trends at the heart of the state serves to ensure that
no one region dominates the agricultural sector, under developing other regions in the process as
occurred in Cote d’Ivoire.
Numerous studies in the southern and western portions of the country illustrate both the
difficulties relating to production that occur both with farmers growing oil palms as well as with
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processing facilities. Oil palm farmers struggle with the costs of attainting more productive
equipment, and a severe lack of credit which on the whole keep them from following the
prescribed routines for fertilization. The work of extension agents of the state bureaucracies,
however, is not in vain as famers appear to readily adopt forms of productivity enhancing
measures such as the use of more effective, but less labor intensive, method of ring weeding
(Ugwumba 2013, 146). Additionally, farmers appear to have access to the appropriate varieties
of seeds through state agents (Agwu 2006). Farmers, however, often rely on small hand presses
to extract palm oil, seeds and fibers (Olagunju 2008; Taiwo et al. 2000) a decidedly labor
intensive method that reflects the lack of subsidies for important inputs provided to communities.
Furthermore, where more modern equipment is used either privately, or on behalf of local
parastatals, reports indicate that there are often numerous problems (Taiwo et al. 2000).
Equipment is often aging, the workforce though dedicated lack expertise, and the proper
facilities for the disposal of agricultural waste are often inadequate. Nevertheless, these studies
point to the idea that the state, in part because of a wide distribution of benefits at the state and
local level, is more readily able to engage in domestic production in a positive manner, even if it
is hindered by numerous obstacles.
While the case study’s findings are in their preliminary stages, they point to the idea that
institutional change at the national level in Nigeria has been profound enough that core related
factors tied to the absence of a core group do not appear to play a determinative role in
developmental outcomes related to palm oil and cassava production at the local level. Instead,
monies tied to the politics of oil production are used at the local level in a more or less uniform
manner. While information pertinent to demography at the local level is currently unavailable, it
is logical to assume either that “core” groups exist within this context (as opposed to the national
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level), or that at least in some cases, salient cleavages simply do not exist. It is also possible that
core related factors may take effect in some localities, though currently available data would
suggest otherwise. What is clear, however, is that at the local level, the benefits of social
coalition membership appear to be spread somewhat evenly.

Conclusions
The quantitative analysis largely confirmed the first set of propositions, about the role of past
socialist/Marxist transitions and the presence of a core ethnic group in the formulation of
externally oriented economic institutions. The case studies point to the need for the state to
demobilize society to retain power, a trend that often occurs with past socialist/Marxist
transitions, as well as the tendency to guarantee a viable survival strategy outside of domestic
society, as contributing to institutions that resist popular pressure. The quantitative analysis
confirmed this trend, though it suggested that the presence of a core ethnic group most likely had
independent causal pathways revolving around ensuring access to institutions for all ethnic
groups. Such a finding is consistent with the case studies, particularly with the distributive trends
which tend not to favor any one ethnic group or collection of groups over another.
However, the quantitative analysis only partially confirmed theories about the production
of internally oriented institutions that successfully produce economic growth. The analysis
identified a consistent, statistically significant trend for states that have undergone some form of
socialist/Marxist transition to struggle to produce effective economic institutions geared toward
internal markets at least in agriculture. However, the analysis points to the idea that the presence
of a core ethnic group is not determinative in producing these same institutions. Using the added
leverage of an additional case study, a brief pathway analysis focusing on Nigeria confirms the
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distributive tendencies associated with core groups appear to be at work in Nigeria. Nevertheless,
the need to provide access to economic institutions does not appear to provide more transparent
institutions, but instead at the regional level, creates what appear to be incentives to stimulate
growth at the local level, a trend that could potentially be aimed more specifically at the various
ethnic groups occupying a particular region but which further analysis would have to confirm.
This analysis, though preliminary, confirms the existence of additional causal pathways related
to the presence of a core ethnic group. I leave a more fine grained analysis of the Nigerian case
and the particular developmental pathways its represents for future work.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
The dissertation project posits a question designed to elaborate upon and build theory about
patterns of development among successful African states. While state failure on the continent has
been studied ad nauseum, it is far rarer for the dynamics of successful institution building to be
place under the microscope. The question of why Ghana and Kenya each produce growth
enhancing economic institutions, but according to distinctly different patterns can tell us much
about how African states produce growth. Furthermore, these differing patterns are important they determine the relative density and vibrancy of economic activity of a given state.
The dichotomy of internally oriented vs externally oriented economic sectors is
theoretically invaluable, for it allows the dissertation to speculate on the quality of economic
growth not simply its absence or presence. Growth in externally oriented sectors can certainly be
invaluable but more often than not, it is characterized by a lack of value-added production and a
lack of backward and forward linkages within the larger economy. Internally oriented sectors, on
the other hand, as they are aimed squarely at domestic and regional consumption, often
incorporate value added production, as well as networks of backwards and forward linkages
involving activities such as transportation, marketing or the production of agricultural or
industrial inputs. While there is certainly overlap between these sectors, on the whole, internally
oriented activities generally provide a greater number of positive externalities. Producing growth
enhancing institutions in internally oriented sectors, however, is somewhat rarer. Not all states
find it necessary to actively produce growth in internally oriented sectors of the economy, which
rarely generate foreign exchange. Furthermore, there is a great deal of variation in the degree to
which states manage the production of externally oriented institutions. Thus, the research
question focuses on why Ghanaian institutions, in externally oriented economic sectors,
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outperform those of Kenya, while Kenyan institutions in internally oriented sectors outperform
those of Ghana.
Configurational historical analysis, a variant of process tracing, reveals that a series of
pressures and incentives tied to the presence of a core group - what I refer to as core-related
factors - push Ghanaian regimes to distribute developmental funds widely to a large social
coalition. The pressures of maintaining this social coalition through demonstrated service
delivery are such that Ghanaian regimes must carefully limit the number of people who have a
direct impact on the policy making process, including important producers. In fact, only in rare
instances are social groups given direct policy making input, as occurred during the NLC’s brief
tenure in power as part of a bid to win support from northern chiefs. Most groups such as
clothing manufacturers, for example, have only a very limited impact on the policy making
process. Even within the extant sector, a type of technocratic management prevails, which while
conducive to growth does not incorporate producers in the policy making process. By limiting
potentially costly social input, the regime is able instead to use funds to distribute monies for
developmental projects. While projects that generate foreign exchange are enacted through
growth enhancing institutions, it is important to note that the state feels no such necessity in the
institutions located in the internally oriented portions of the economy. Thus, lack pressure from a
policy coalition, the state shapes institutions in a manner that is meant to deliver short term
benefits aimed at winning support but which fail to create a lasting impact, often due to a lack of
funds. Process tracing thus reveals that core related factors ties to the presence of a core group
drive, at least to a degree, the creation of growth inhibiting institutions in internally oriented
segments of the economy, and growth enhancing institutions externally oriented sectors.
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A configurational analysis of the Kenyan case revealed that core related factors created a
less autonomous state that produced growth enhancing institutions in both internally and
externally oriented segments of the economy. Core related factors tied to the absence of a core
group provided incentives to maintain a smaller, more cohesive social coalition. Furthermore,
inclusion in the policy coalition served as a means to ensure group cohesion. Thus, economic
institutions tended to becomes growth enhancing, while spending on developmental projects was
both concentrated and more extensive, at least within the industries of which it was a part. The
fact that growth enhancing institutions are located in both internally and externally oriented
segments of the economy reflects, to a large extent, the political and economic power of
important members of the social and policy coalitions.
The two principal cases suggest a relatively clear cut causal chain linking the presence or
absence of a core group to differing patterns of development. The presence of a core group
provides incentives to enlarge the size of the policy coalition because core groups are, at least in
the political sense, large, unwieldy, and prone to fragmentation. Increasing the size of the social
coalition necessitates decreasing the size of the policy coalition to control costs. In this manner,
core related factors lead to growth inhibiting institutions internally oriented portions of the
economy. However, paying for the costs associated with maintaining a large social coalition
necessitates a large amount of foreign exchange; thus, it is no surprise that the institutions of the
state governing the extant sector are often growth enhancing. Core related factors associated
with. The absence of a core group, on the other hand, provides incentives for creating more
narrow and cohesive social coalitions that are further cemented through the expansion of the
policy coalition to allow elites to have access to policy makers as well as input into the policy
making process. The institutions associated with. The social and policy coalitions are often
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growth enhancing and located in both internally and externally oriented sectors of the economy.
The absence of a core group, in this manner, creates more uniform institutional performance.
The Tanzanian case, however, test the limits of the causal mechanisms developed in the
primary cases. Configurational historical analysis for the Tanzanian case revealed no core related
factors, and indeed cast doubt on the very idea that regional groupings, rather than ethnolinguistic groupings can provide the basis for a core group. To further complicate matters,
despite appear to lack the features we normally associate with a core group, the method of
building a social and policy coalition in Tanzania resembles the process in countries like Ghana,
which contain a core group. I speculate that this unique scenario is due to low population
densities, and exceptionally low levels of economic inequality between both individuals and
regions. The Tanzanian case adds one final layer of analytical complexity when we take into
account the impact of long-standing party organizations in the form of the ruling, and formerly
socialist CCM. The party structure in this case provides organizational incentive for both
internally and externally oriented forms of production.
Despite Tanzania’s divergences from the inductively developed theory at the heart of the
dissertation, the case does not contradict the theories surrounding core related factors so much as
it offers a further elaboration of potential causal pathways characterized by equifinality. Stated
differently, the Tanzanian case reminds us that there exists many relevant variables outside the
presence or absence of a core group, that nonetheless have a bearing upon patterns of economic
development. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian case also confirms key elements of the causal process
surrounding the construction of social and policy coalitions.
The Ivoirian case, unlike that of Tanzania, provides a much more straightforward
elaboration of theoretically significant findings. The configurational analysis of the Ivoirian case
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sheds light on the ability of the state in the primary cases to generate the necessary elite level
compromise to produce growth enhancing institutions in any part of the economy. In Cote
D’Ivoire the state apparatus was used to elevate the status of elites within their community,
thereby providing a necessary degree of social control. Access to state power was the means by
which elites could exercise leadership within their own communities - it was what made them
elites. The loss of an important election thus predicated forms of contentious politics and
violence as a survival strategy for elites. While social actors in Ghana and Kenya, who on the
whole did not rely on the state for their elite status, managed to come to some form of negotiated
compromise in Cote D’Ivoire there was simply too much at state. Needless to say, conflict and a
break down of all major developmental institutions was the result.
Finally, the quantitative and mixed method analysis both shed valuable light on the
research question and highlighted existing areas of theoretical ambiguity. Given the historical
tendency of African states to subscribe to forms of “African socialism” while remaining
capitalist, as well as the generally interventionist stance of the state on the continent, the
qualitative case studies struggled to identify any possible impact of a socialist path to
development. The quantitative analysis, however, revealed durable, statistically significant
correlations between experience with socialism and measure of state autonomy. These findings,
moreover, are consistent with observations about the enduring role of a formerly socialist party
organization in Tanzania.
A comparison of the primary cases augmented by a broader analysis thus leads to a
compelling answer to the research question. Core related factors are clearly responsible for
divergent patterns of institution making in Ghana and Kenya. Furthermore, Ghana’s repeated
exposure to forms of African socialism most likely contributed to the state’s high level of
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autonomy from society, particularly in the construction of growth enhancing institutions in
important export sectors like cocoa. Core related factors tied to the absence of a core group in
Kenya, on the other hand, are likely responsible to the much more robust performance of
institutions in the internally oriented segments of the Kenyan economy.
Finally, the dissertation highlights several contradictions and theoretical puzzles whose
resolution is beyond the scope of this project. The case studies point to the idea that the concept
of a “core” group overlays more consistently with ethno-linguistic groupings than it does with
ones based on region. Furthermore, the very analysis of the Nigerian case points to the idea that
prominent institutional structures may disrupt the impact of core-related factors. Each of these
findings merits future research and careful consideration.
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